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Abstract 
This thesis studies the interactions between wholesale electricity prices and various energy 
and fuel prices, including those of natural gas, coal, oil and EUA carbon permits, in both spot 
and forward EU markets, during the late years of the noughties boom and the start of the 
twenty-tens. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, Chapter 2 provides the necessary background on 
EU electricity prices and markets, whereas Chapter 3 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. Chapter 4 uses a nonlinear AR-GARCH approach to analyse the impacts of euro 
and pound sterling exchange rates (against the USD) and crude oil prices on the levels and 
volatility of six electricity spot prices. The study finds that electricity price return volatility 
was asymmetrically affected by both exchange rate and oil price returns in all markets only 
after the 2008 subprime crisis, which provided a considerably more symmetric response of 
electricity prices to positive and negative system innovations. Chapter 5 investigates the year-
forward interactions between electricity prices and carbon, coal and natural gas prices in four 
markets via a combination of VAR, Granger-causality and asymmetric AR-GARCH 
analyses. The study shows that average electricity generators in the Nord Pool and EEX 
markets pass their carbon costs through to consumers with a ca. 35% higher rate than justified 
by effective carbon intensity, implying non-competitive practices. Additionally, coal prices 
are found to be the most influential determinant of European electricity price levels and 
volatilities. Chapter 6 analyses the integration of a sample of thirteen electricity spot markets. 
The application of complex network theory enables the creation of an evolving Granger-
causal network of electricity price interactions, informing us on the presence of any changes 
in the normal functioning of electricity markets at both the national and European-wide 
levels. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the conclusions of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Electricity is a very special product and its market assumes a primary role in modern 
Europe and in the economic growth of countries (Payne, 2010). The particular nature of 
electricity, especially the fact that it cannot be stored, is reflected by its particularly complex 
markets and price behaviours. Until not long ago, the vast majority of electricity companies 
in Europe were state-owned and heavily regulated. Since the worldwide liberalisation of the 
1990s, electricity markets became more competitive. However, regulation can be 
considerable across markets, mostly as a consequence of the product’s characteristics, which 
require particular attention to the issue of security of supply. Moreover, the integration of 
European electricity markets is critically slowed down by political issues, ever more in the 
progress towards a low-carbon and renewable system. This large-scale restructuring of 
electricity markets in Europe importantly resulted in more volatile and market-based 
electricity prices. 
Econometric research on electricity prices and their volatility is currently still at its 
earliest stages, having notably progressed only in recent years. Various aspects of both spot  
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and forward electricity and energy markets thus remain largely unexplored. This thesis aims 
at providing new insights on the determinants of electricity prices and the interactions 
between electricity and energy prices in Europe. How are electricity markets in Europe 
organized and how do prices behave? What determines electricity prices? How do electricity 
and energy prices interact? What is the extent of market power and market integration across 
European electricity markets? This thesis aims at answering these questions. 
Firstly, an extensive overview of the markets for electricity in Europe is provided, along with 
a presentation of electricity price behaviour and the main determinants of electricity prices. 
We then focus on three main studies. Specifically, a study of the behaviour of electricity 
prices and their volatility firstly considers the combined effect of exchange rates and oil 
prices on electricity spot prices. The interactions among European electricity prices and 
different energy prices are then investigated by using equilibrium, causality and volatility 
models. Finally, the issue of European electricity market integration is investigated 
throughout the development of a dynamic complex network system of European electricity 
prices. 
 A major occurrence in electricity market history was the signing of the Single 
European Act in 1986, which was mainly intended to complete the internal European market 
for energy, initially created with the Rome Treaty of 1956. To this extent, the fundamental 
aspirations of the EU Commission were those of harmonizing energy prices across European 
member states and improving the security of supply, on the path toward a unified Internal 
Energy Market (IEM) by 2014. However, the year 2014 has just begun and the development 
of a harmonized European market still seems very far away. The main obstacles on the way 
to achieving energy and electricity market integration in Europe are represented by the low 
level of effective liberalisation of most European countries. Although market opening and 
cross-border trade represent the main keys to fostering the liberalisation of markets, these are 
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not easily realisable because of the lack of legislative integration in Europe stemming from 
the failure of countries in prioritising international goals, as opposed to local goals. Three 
main Energy Directives have been launched by the Commission (1996, 2003 and 2009). 
However, the most noteworthy in terms of driving policy to date, remains Directive 
03/54/EC, which principally contributed by laying out the path of reform in member states to 
December 2007 (Pollitt, 2009). With the provision of these energy packages, the EU stated 
that one of its central aims is that of strengthening the operation of a competitive wholesale 
electricity market by requiring an opening to competition of the whole European electricity 
market. Nevertheless, various efficiency problems remain unsolved and mainly relate to 
technical, economic and political barriers. 
Furthermore, the plans for the future as well the structure of today’s electricity markets are, 
from a European perspective, still very far from being clearly delineated. Therefore, at least 
until the time when effective legislative reform optimally connects, couples and coordinates 
European electricity markets, the acceleration of the integration process will not be rapid as 
desirable. The study of the determinants of modern European electricity prices represents a 
major focus of these last years. A better comprehension of the factors affecting electricity 
prices and their interactions with other energy prices represent issues of primary international 
concern since the progression of the worldwide and European liberalisation movement. 
After providing an extensive overview of spot and forward electricity prices and 
markets, and their history (Chapter 2), as well as a detailed overview of the main 
determinants affecting electricity prices and the techniques used to model them (Chapter 3), 
we focus on three main topics: the impact of exchange rates and oil price on electricity prices 
(Chapter 4), electricity and fuel price interactions (Chapter 5), and electricity prices and 
European market integration (Chapter 6). All studies focus on electricity markets in Europe 
during the period 2007-12, unveiling different conclusions. 
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The first study (Chapter 4) answers the questions: What is the effect of exchange rates 
and oil prices on electricity prices and their volatilities? How do these effects change after the 
2008 financial crisis? By applying Nonlinear GARCH models, this study analyses the 
combined effect of exchange rates (against the USD) and (USD-quoted) oil prices on the 
prices and volatilities of six major European electricity markets. A main contribution of this 
study is to show that there is a transmission of volatility between both the exchange rate and 
oil prices, and electricity prices.  Furthermore, we show how the electricity price level is, in 
some cases, affected by changes in the exchange rate and the price of oil. In addition, the 
volatility effects on the electricity prices are shown to drastically change after the contagion 
of the US subprime mortgage crisis on European markets. This volatility can have vital 
implications for the way in which low-carbon generators should be supported. 
The dependency of EU countries on energy imports from non-member countries is substantial 
and rising over time. However, even when a country is self-sufficient in the production of a 
certain fuel, its price may still be set on world markets, as for oil, or sold at prices indexed to 
the oil price, as was the case for gas for many years. Thus, the volatility of oil prices 
represents an central factor influencing European electricity prices and their volatility. This 
effect is additional if we consider the impact that oil prices produce on electricity prices in 
combination with USD exchange rates (EUR/USD and GBP/USD), given that oil is traded on 
international markets in USD. A volatile wholesale price that will be passed through to 
electricity consumers entails substantial risks to their bills.  Moreover, it is unattractive to 
most low-carbon generators whose costs are not linked to fossil fuel prices.  Therefore, 
ensuring that payments to these types of generators are principally de-linked from the overall 
level of power prices would substantially reduce risks for electricity producers. Knowing how 
oil prices and exchange rates impact on European electricity prices represents a topic of 
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primary importance to electricity generators and suppliers, as well as to the consumers 
themselves. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of these issues. 
The second study (Chapter 5) presented in this thesis answers the following questions: 
How do electricity and fuel forward contract prices interact during Phase II of the EU ETS? 
Most importantly, how do electricity prices and carbon prices causally interrelate during 
Phase II? What can be said from such analysis in terms of the presence of market power or 
competition? This paper studies the interactions between electricity, coal, natural gas, EU 
carbon emission allowance (EUA) and stock prices in the first year-forward energy markets 
of: Germany, United Kingdom, France and Norway. Vector autoregressive models and 
Granger-causality tests are used to analyse the relevant equilibrium and causal relationships. 
On the other hand, the conditional volatility of electricity prices is modelled via AR-GARCH 
models. Electricity market competition is investigated following an analysis of the rates at 
which carbon costs are internalised in European electricity prices, suggesting that generators 
‘pass-through’ their carbon cost to consumers at considerably higher rates than justified by 
effective carbon intensity, during the studied trading phase (2008-12).  
The relationship between electricity prices and energy prices is also an essential subfield of 
energy economics, one that is gaining increasing attention in recent years. Do carbon prices 
drive electricity prices, or does the contrary hold? In some cases, evidence is found in favour 
of an effect of carbon prices on electricity prices (such as in the United Kingdom, see Bunn 
and Fezzi, 2009) whereas in other, fewer, cases electricity prices are found to influence the 
European carbon price (such as in Norway, see Nazifi and Milunovich, 2010). This subject 
ultimately concerns the issue of electricity market power: do generators competitively set 
competitive prices that fully reflect additional costs? 
Among the main results of this work, coal prices are revealed to be the key determinant of 
electricity prices and their volatility. This study thus also emphasizes and discusses the role 
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of coal in modern Europe, as well as the reasons for and implications of an increasing 
consumption of coal across European markets. 
The third study (Chapter 6), on the other hand, answers the questions: how well are 
European electricity markets integrating over time? Can we identify the instants in time 
characterizing an improved/worsened degree of integration of EU electricity markets? Also, 
can we draw conclusions on the integration over time relative to the entire system, as 
opposed to only pairs of electricity markets? This study employs complex graph theory for 
the first time in an energy economics study to analyse the interactions of a representative 
sample of thirteen European electricity spot prices during the period 2007–2012. By 
constructing a system of dynamic multivariate networks – where the electricity prices 
correspond to the graph’s nodes and the edges in between them denote the significant degrees 
of pair-wise linear Granger-causality among pairs of prices – we characterize global 
connectivity as the system’s density, or the total quantity of causal interactivity sustained by 
the network system. Previous work on the integration of electricity markets has only dealt 
with the integration of pairs of countries. This study, on the other hand, uses such information 
to advise about the occurrence of abnormal changes in the integration of an entire sample of 
countries. A positive abnormal change suggests an improved degree of connectivity of 
electricity markets in the relevant time window and, in our case, coincided with the 
implementation of the European Commission’s Third Energy Package, a major “change” to 
the integration of EU markets. Furthermore, our local indicators validate the consistency of 
our method by confirming the occurrence of historical events, such as the establishment of 
European interconnectors, as well as different market coupling initiatives, which enables us 
to understand the changes in market integration at the national levels. This technique and its 
application to electricity prices is presented in Chapter 6 and represents a potentially suitable 
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and promising approach for the task of monitoring the process of electricity market 
integration and the normal functioning of market networks. 
The question of market integration among electricity markets in Europe is an increasingly 
prominent topic of international concern. As electricity markets in Europe are continually 
affected by existing political and economic barriers, integration seems to be particularly slow 
because of the differences in the nature of the various European markets, as well as because 
of the differences in legislation among countries and their diverse energy systems. 
It is possible that, without a fully integrated legislative system, electricity market integration 
in Europe will lag behind for years to come. The current transition to a renewable system is 
further fragmenting electricity markets. The low level of liberalisation in various European 
countries is also an important deterrent to full integration. This is also a result of the presently 
insufficient interconnection among national grids (see, for example, Trillas, 2010). In fact, as 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) note, the European energy market liberalisation process is 
increasingly focused on market coupling and cross-border mechanisms. Therefore, a faster 
integration of markets requires an increased number of physical interconnections as well as 
significantly improved technical and trading arrangements. It is crucial for European system 
operators to deploy their efforts in providing a full integration of electricity markets at 
different levels – among which are those relating to security of supply and aspects of market 
design and regulation – which are critical for the dynamic performance of a single European 
market. 
Without legislative harmonization, full integration will never be achieved. Hence, an 
adequate understanding of electricity prices in the modern European environment, their 
interactions with other energy prices as well as other EU electricity prices, should represent a 
primary objective. This thesis thoroughly investigates electricity prices in modern Europe, 
and their determinants, with the aim of providing novel insights into this topic. 
Electricity and Energy Price Interactions in Modern EU Markets                           G. Castagneto-Gissey 
 8 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings from previous chapters, provides the main 
cross-cutting implications and highlights the relevant research gaps identified throughout this 
research, thereby concluding the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Background 
 
Electricity is a very special asset. Unlike most common assets, electricity cannot be 
stored, at least economically. This is the main reason behind the practice of allocating 
electricity in modern spot markets, which are really one-day forward markets. In such 
markets, bids and time-corresponding prices for delivery occurring the next day are submitted 
by generation companies to the market operator. Generally, single-round auctions are 
performed for each hour of the day to determine the resulting market clearing price of that 
hour, as well as the accepted production and consumption bids. Finally, either repair 
heuristics or adjustment markets are used to eliminate physical infeasibilities due to inter-
temporal constraints or network congestions, resulting into the settlement process. Moreover, 
various short-run capacity and security constraints, in addition to the inherent demand 
inelasticity of the product, as well as the variability of demand, render the electricity price 
subject to a large degree of unpredictability. Thereby, there will be times when there is plenty  
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of capacity and the only incremental costs of producing electricity will be fuel and some 
operating and maintenance costs and other times when the capacity constraint will instead be 
binding, causing the incremental cost to increase greatly, and wholesale market prices to rise. 
Furthermore, supply constraints are even more likely if sellers are able to exercise market 
power, intensifying the volatility of wholesale prices (Borenstein, 2009). All this causes 
electricity prices to constantly vary. 
Since the early 1990s, Europe has been involved in a debate surrounding the creation of a 
competitive and unified market for energy. The European Union (EU) has publicized its 
intention of developing a strategic policy to change the entire market structure at the time, 
hence contributing to the creation of a single, competitive European-wide market for gas and 
electricity. This chapter
1
 aims at analyzing the developments of European and regional 
energy markets in accordance with the market efficiency criteria and financial aspects of 
energy (see Karan and Kazdagli, 2011). 
Even though the economic, political and physical barriers in and between European countries 
are still considerable, the number of financial players which participate in these markets is 
continually increasing. Many years after the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(December 2009), European energy markets are still considerably far from the EU’s primary 
goal of establishing an Internal Energy Market (IEM), originally set as 2014. However, 
today, Europe’s energy market presents different important malfunctions which are causing 
regional fragmentation and the future structure of the single European energy market is yet to 
be defined. 
This chapter introduces the main general background information pertinent to the themes 
under study. Firstly, a history of European electricity spot and forward markets is given, 
highlighting the importance of the evolution of markets in the formation of current electricity  
                                                          
1
 The facts reported in this chapter, which present the key developments in European energy markets, are closely 
based on those reported in Karan and Kazdagli (2011). 
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and energy markets. The resulting structure of current European markets for energy and 
electricity are then described. Finally, the main historical facts concerning the development of 
electricity systems in Europe and the current waves of reform are discussed, focusing on the 
main energy directives implemented by the European Commission up to date. 
 
2.1 History of European electricity spot and forward markets 
The worldwide discussion on energy market reform began in the early 1980s as a result of the 
lack of cost efficiency in energy markets. Since then, different countries have stepped up their 
pursuit of improving their markets for energy by introducing privatization, liberalisation and 
restructuring of the energy supply and distribution industries. Accordingly, Chile began this 
movement in 1982 and was followed by Argentina (1992), among others. The United 
Kingdom (1989), instead, served as the main driver for European-wide restructuring (see 
Joskow, 2008). A main reason behind the ongoing liberalisation was the idea of improving 
cost efficiency in the energy sector by increasing competition (see Sioshansi, 2006, and 
Green, 1996). As Woo et al. (2003) note, there are various further drivers of this reform, such 
as politics, union power and the willingness to combine environmental concerns with foreign 
investment. Moreover, the European Union employs an approach not only based on economic 
issues but also on strategic and political goals. 
Since long ago, most European countries have been heavily dependent on oil and gas from 
external sources, and have thereby been concerned about the lack of competition in their 
energy markets. The main idea of the EU was that of creating a European-wide energy 
market where both electricity and gas could be freely traded, as opposed to being dominated 
by major national agents. The introduction of competition was intended to boost efficiency 
and energy security, thereby reducing electricity prices for European consumers through an 
increasing level of competition and a capacity expansion. In fact, the main goals set by the 
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EU are known to be those of increasing the security of supply from both domestic and foreign 
sources, harmonizing energy prices across European member states by creating a competitive 
system and supporting the use of renewable energy to the extent of supporting the 
environment. 
Since the 1980s, different countries in the world began privatizing their infrastructures 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991), making an important step toward market liberalisation. Then, 
the efforts of the European Commission since the 1990s to this extent have been those of 
liberalizing national infrastructures, whereas the liberalisation of the energy industry 
represented perhaps the most important goal on the Commission’s agenda. This also aimed at 
speeding up the process of reform ownership which would have been considerably slower 
without the work of the Commission, which avoided the potential of countries to follow 
internal or political goals. 
The Single European Act (1987) officially set the date for the completion of the single market 
as the end of the year 1992. On the other hand, the Green Paper of 1995 on energy policy 
represented a major spur to the creation of a new European energy market. Finally, a series of 
crucial Directives from the European Commission clearly set the prescription for the 
liberalisation of energy markets, implemented in the second half of the 1990s. The European 
Parliament’s and Council’s Directive 96/92/EC concerned the introduction of common rules 
for the creation of an internal electricity market. Similarly, the gas sector underwent the same 
experience in 1998. European reform was pursued under two main frameworks; firstly, the 
issuance of such Directives required all member states to liberalize their energy markets by 
certain key dates. Secondly, the EU committed itself to aiding this liberalisation process by 
improving the interactions between national markets through the issuance of compatible 
cross-border trading rules and by supporting the expansion of national transmission toward 
continental integration. The first and second EU Electricity Market Directives of 1996 and 
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2003 mainly regarded the unbundling of the industry as well as the gradual opening of 
national markets
2
. Furthermore, the second Directive promoted the toughening of regulation 
regarding network access and the requirement of independent system operators, thereby 
supporting competition. The aim of the regulation of cross-border trade was mainly that of 
facilitating the process of market integration. This Directive also aimed at achieving, by July 
2007, the following targets: (i) the unbundling of the transmission system operators (TSOs) 
and the distribution system operators (DSOs) from the rest of the industry, (ii) free entry to 
generation, (iii) the monitoring of supply competition, (iv) a full market opening, (v) the 
promotion of renewable sources, (vi) the strengthening of the regulator’s role, and (vii) a 
single European market (Jamasb, 2005). 
Because the Commission’s efforts to raise the standards of regulation came after most 
markets already established a certain structure, in most countries, the integration in the EU 
market represents a fundamentally intricate problem. In Italy and Spain, for example, 
regulators represent a weak entity in the face of established incumbent company interests. 
Moreover, in 2005, despite a full liberalisation of the German market, no central regulator 
was yet established in Germany. In addition, it was impossible to drive countries such as 
France to electricity market liberalisation given their state-owned monopolistic practices. As 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) note, these deviations from European practice reflect the need to 
avoid sovereign issues and provide a more gentle approach in order to take into consideration 
the individual states’ circumstances. 
In this process, the position set by the European Commission through the Lisbon Strategy of 
2000 is pragmatic. Not only did it encourage the fostering of liberalized energy markets in 
Europe, it also created an ambitious agenda which jointly treated electricity and gas. 
                                                          
2
 The original Directives can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/legislation/index_en.htm. 
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Further legislation surrounding European energy markets emerged during later years 
gradually shifting the focus from liberalisation to integration. The second Gas Market 
Directive (2003/55/EC) aimed at regulating third party access as fundamental for all 
infrastructures. The third package was instead adopted in June 2009 and provided an 
overview and guidance for future energy policy. The latter mainly entailed the integration of 
energy and environmental objectives, as previously set out through the Kyoto agreements 
(1997) and its binding obligations on industrialized countries to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. It also contained important regulations and measures aimed at reinforcing 
the security of supply. As Pollitt (2009) denotes, in order to achieve an ultimately significant 
level of integration, via an increase in competitiveness and efficiency in market structures, 
various further processes should be undertaken; these mainly involve: the privatization of 
state-owned electricity assets, an extension of vertical unbundling of transmission and 
distribution from the generation and retailing sectors and the introduction of an independent 
system regulator. These stages, however, are far from progressing at an acceptable rate in the 
different European member states, this perhaps being the reason for such slow pace of market 
integration. 
On the other hand, the US experience in this sense has never promoted or provided a 
mandatory federal restructuring and competition law. In this way, the most important reforms 
were left for federal states to consider under the politics of deregulation. Nevertheless, 
Europe remains the world’s most extensive jurisdiction of reform of the electricity sector 
involving integration of distinct national electricity markets (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
 
2.2 European Energy markets 
The new energy market in Europe is sought to be one based on diversification of generation 
assets which is able to provide an environment able to cope with differing market conditions 
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across countries. Therefore, in case a certain country were not able to produce relatively 
cheap electricity to their citizens because of adversities occurring in their market, including 
the risk of experiencing supply restrictions, there should be another country, with different 
generation units to compensate by providing lower prices. In fact, interconnection represents 
a central aim of the Commission which encourages the links between countries’ transmission 
lines to the extent of cutting average prices and promoting competition. However, various 
problems at the national levels, such as political and economic barriers, or different trading 
arrangements, prevent the full integration of the diverse energy systems in Europe. 
The second energy package, which was effectively implemented in 2003, was able to give an 
important push to the process of market integration by providing the application of sanctions. 
In addition, the EU provided some comprehension for the differences between markets and 
accepted the proposal of development policies for the established regional markets. At the 
moment, there are seven electricity markets and three gas markets in Europe. The seven 
electricity markets are listed along with the member countries, in the table below (Table 2.1): 
 
 
Regional market Countries included 
Central-West 
Belgium, France, Germany 
Luxembourg, Netherlands 
North 
Denmark, Finland, Germany 
Norway, Poland, Sweden 
France, UK, Ireland France, United Kingdom, Ireland 
Central-South 
Austria, France, Germany 
Greece, Italy, Slovak Republic 
South-West France, Portugal, Spain 
Central-East 
Austria, Czech Republic, Germany 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
Baltic Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
 
Table 2.1 Regional EU electricity markets in 2014 (Source: European Parliament, 2014). 
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On the other hand, the three gas markets in Europe are: the UK’s National Balancing Point, 
“NBP”, Germany’s “Bunde” and Belgium’s “Zeebrugge”. 
The position taken by the Commission on the small amount of markets is motivated by their 
ability to control and coordinate them in a more effective way than if they were more. The 
main advantage related to the approach of using regional markets is that stakeholders have a 
greater involvement compared to the same possibility in a European context. Furthermore, 
the diversities between regional markets can more effectively be dealt with on a regional 
basis. However, the markets differ in terms of history and characteristics. Thus, future policy 
should be aimed at integrating these characteristics and efficiently creating compatible and 
harmonized trading regulations. 
 
2.2.1 European electricity spot and forward markets 
Electricity markets face various problems, mainly relating to the degree of competition 
among the member states’ generators. Although there are seven distinct electricity regional 
markets in Europe, these can be further grouped into three main regions: Continental Europe, 
the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries. 
Whereas the UK moved from an electricity market structure of pure monopoly to a 
competitive setting in the early 1990s, on the other hand, the Nordic energy market (Nord 
Pool, which comprises the markets of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Baltic 
states) represents the most harmonized cross-border electricity market in the world. The Nord 
Pool market was established by Norway and Sweden, with Finland and Denmark joining the 
circle towards the end of the 1990s. There is a small concentration of power producers even 
though none of these holds more than 20% in market share. In addition, it must be said that 
public ownership still dominates the Nordic region. As in the UK, the level of market 
participation remains high because it is possible and straightforward to change suppliers if 
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desired. The Nordic market’s success depends on the fact that it has been serving for a much 
longer term compared to others. In fact, most of the properties of this market rely on specific 
geographical factors such as the supply of hydroelectricity and interconnector capacity. As 
Amundsen and Bergman (2006) claim, the Nordic experience suggests that deregulation in 
electricity markets has a large potential of working well in case there is a complete absence of 
regulations on prices as well as on financial market development. Also, political support must 
be maintained in the market-based system even though prices happen to be high, thus 
providing a credible, consistent and coherent market environment. 
In contrast, in Continental Europe, much of the energy market reform process was led by 
Germany in the late 1990s, less than a decade after the structural market changes occurred in 
the UK and Norway. Germany still represents the largest electricity market in Continental 
Europe in terms of the number of agents as well as available generation capacity in the 
market. France also represents an important market in the EU, among the first in terms of 
volumes of traded electricity. During the period 1990-2004, the French government refused 
to open its electricity market. However, after 2004, the monopolistic status of public 
company EDF changed and the market was opened to liberalisation and competition. 
Furthermore, Spain’s efforts in developing its Iberian electricity market with Portugal are 
succeeding, with much emphasis placed on renewable energy. In addition, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Belgium have all taken important steps toward full liberalisation and were 
followed by all south-eastern European countries, who agreed to adopt EU legislation. 
Countries in Central Europe are physically well integrated with western countries on the 
European grid, having also initiated their gradual adoption of the EU Western European 
model which provides regulated third party access for large consumers. In Eastern Europe, 
Hungary and Poland were the pioneers of energy market reform (Kaderjak, 2005). However, 
their efforts are also much related to the occurrences in Central Europe, and their future 
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integration with Central European countries is key to the development of their energy 
markets. Past experience indicates that electricity generation capacity in Central Europe is not 
well dispensed and market power has avoided a healthy and substantial increase in 
competition. It should also be considered that whereas Germany and The Netherlands have 
encouraged mergers, on the other hand, the Netherlands, Austria and Czech Republic and 
Estonia are still subject to an oligopolistic market structure. Finally, Portugal and France have 
ended up supporting the concept of national champions (Haas et al., 2006). Therefore, it is no 
surprise that integration is a slow process and that initial predictions and arrangements will 
not be met. 
 
2.2.2 Gas market 
Markets for gas in Europe have been considerably restructured since 1998. However, the 
decline of gas resources in Europe and the resulting heavy dependence on external supply 
represent the main obstacles to integration and full liberalisation of European gas markets. In 
fact, only 25% of primary energy use comprises natural gas, whereas about 60% of it is 
imported (Rademaekers et al., 2008). Since the issuance of various gas directives, after 1998, 
EU countries tried to harmonize and integrate gas markets. In the process, however, they 
required country-specific solutions which have significantly slowed the integration process. 
The European gas market is a liberalized one and the gas hubs and markets are considerably 
developed. In particular, the most developed hubs which deal with the highest volumes of gas 
are Bunde-Oude, Baumgarten and Zeebrugge. At the moment, Germany has the most 
developed and structured natural gas market in Europe. Germany consumes important 
quantities of gas and also holds similarly important amounts of gas in storage. Furthermore, it 
serves as a transit between various countries, Germany being at the heart of Central Europe. 
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In addition, in 2005 European markets for gas still lacked cross-border integration and 
harmonization as well as a reasonable level of competition. Even though it is now possible 
for consumers to switch between suppliers in a relatively easy way and EU legislation has 
taken important steps toward harmonization, many different obstacles of a political nature are 
still there. However, much emphasis has been placed on the extent of lack of competition in 
European gas markets by the European Commission and important results have been 
achieved. For example, even though former monopolistic gas companies still retain a 
considerable amount of market power in the different countries, their market shares have 
remarkably fallen since the legislation on promoting competition was passed. Moreover, 
various countries have undertaken a defensive and conservative approach in terms of their 
natural gas market models. In order to compensate for this, different companies have devoted 
their investments in Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, as Harris and 
Jackson (2005) note, many gas companies have diversified their businesses by entering other 
utility markets, such as electricity. Importantly, today, in different countries such as Spain, 
Italy and the UK, power companies have an important effect in the European market for gas. 
The 2007 inquiries by the Commission (2007a, 2007b) revealed severe malfunctions and 
failures in the European gas market, in terms of competition. As Karan and Kazgadli (2011) 
note, there are various distortions. Mainly, the considerable level of market concentration in 
the market due to insufficient unbundling, as well as the deconstruction of vertically 
integrated large incumbents represented an important drawback to the integration process 
under this point of view. Also, the illiquidity present in the gas market and the clear lack of 
infrastructures limit the access of new entrants and competitors. In addition, the present levels 
of cross-border competition and the lack of reliable information represent major 
shortcomings of a competitive European market. Finally, and very importantly, there is a lack 
of transparency in gas markets which should be tackled. In fact, as the IEA (2008) suggests, 
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since after the supply crisis of 2005-2006, energy policy has focused on the provision of 
secure supplies rather than on issues relating to market competition (see Aalto and Korkmaz, 
2014). 
 
2.2.3 Coal market 
Even though the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), or the European 
market for carbon dioxide emissions, was established to provide fundamental incentives for 
countries to develop into renewable economies, heavily polluting coal plants still today 
represent an important component of electricity generation in many European countries. The 
establishment of the carbon market has caused natural gas to leapfrog coal-fired generation 
and coal is gradually set to decrease. However, given the low carbon price that has affected 
the EU ETS mainly during Phase I and II, the use of coal is not decreasing steadily and 
generators still hold reasonable incentives to produce with coal-fired plants. Thus, around 
30% of the power generated in the EU-28 in 2014 is coal-based. In addition, new 
technologies such as carbon capture and storage aim at reducing carbon emission from coal 
plants and therefore maintain the important role of coal in the European electricity generation 
process. Thus, coal-fired generation is currently modernized as opposed to completely 
abolished. As the Commission often advocates, coal nevertheless helps in maintaining a 
diversified range of energy sources and thereby reduces the dependence on imports. 
Furthermore, the role of coal in the EU has even increased after the EU’s enlargement during 
2004 to 2007 by including member states that were primarily reliant on coal production. Coal 
is mainly transported to ports and geographical proximity determines coal flows (Baruya, 
2014). In addition, there was a large impact of US shale gas on displacing coal to exports 
toward the EU, which we discuss later in Chapter 5. 
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2.2.4 Other markets for energy 
Electricity generation by burning oil clearly represents a tiny amount of total generation in 
European countries. Oil currently represents only about 3% of total electricity generation in 
Europe. This is understandable considering that oil prices are excessively high and that their 
volatility is not bearable by electricity generators, which rank oil at the top of their merit 
curves and are ready to activate oil-fired plants only in cases of extremely high demand for 
electricity. 
 
2.3 The EU ETS and Renewable energy 
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) represents the European Union's 
policy to tackle climate change. It is the key instrument for European countries to reduce 
industrial greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective manner. The EU ETS is the main 
international system in Europe for trading greenhouse gas emission allowances and covers 
more than 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in 31 countries (European Commission, 
2014).The Commission implemented the European Union Emission Trading System (EU 
ETS) with the aim of pricing carbon emissions within a cap-and-trade system. The European 
market for carbon, launched in 2005, works by raising the cost of generating electricity from 
burning fossil fuels in order for the more polluting technologies to be unprofitable to run, 
increasing variable costs in the form of permits. This is aimed at inducing the transition of 
electricity generation to a generation process based on renewable technologies or those with 
low carbon intensity. 
The EU’s much publicised aim is that of providing 20% of its energy generation from 
renewable resources by 2020. Renewable energy includes: solar, wind and tidal power, 
hydro-electric, biomass and geothermal energy. More renewable energy would enable the EU 
to cut carbon and greenhouse gas emissions and decrease dependency on imported energy. 
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Furthermore, boosting the industry of renewable energy encourages technological innovation 
and employment in Europe (European Commission, 2014). A decisive impulse to other 
European countries was given in recent years by Germany, who is currently leading the 
forces in the shift to a renewable energy system thanks to its much publicised Energiewende 
(literally, “energy transition”) movement. In 2014, however, Germany still uses much coal in 
its electricity generation process but, among other factors, this can be attributed to the 
decommissioning of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima disaster of 2011. 
 
2.4 Electricity Prices in Europe 
Electricity cannot be economically stored and production is subject to very rigid short-term 
capacity constraints. In addition, highly variable demand implies there will be times when 
there is plenty of capacity and the only incremental costs of producing electricity will be the 
employed fuel and some operating and maintenance costs. At other times, the capacity 
constraint will instead be binding, causing the incremental cost and thus wholesale market 
prices to greatly rise. Supply constraints are even more likely if sellers are able to exercise 
market power, intensifying the volatility of wholesale prices (Borenstein, 2009). This causes 
electricity prices to constantly vary. 
 
2.4.1 Spot markets 
This section introduces wholesale electricity spot prices and their special nature. We always 
refer to the wholesale market, where generators are the producers while electricity suppliers 
are the buyers of the market. The suppliers then resell the electricity to final consumers and 
households. We also refer to baseload electricity prices, which are generally measured in 
EUR/MWh (or EUR per thousand kW per hour) or using the local currency in countries 
which have not undergone monetary union (e.g., GBP/MWh in the United Kingdom). In most 
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cases, we refer to the spot market, as opposed to the market for bilateral contracts, which will 
be discussed later. Examples of electricity derivatives are electricity options and futures, 
which may be used to tackle price uncertainty and hedge spot market risk. 
The worldwide electricity market deregulatory reforms of the 1990s brought about an 
increased level of competition. This provided a very unstable and extremely volatile price 
scenario to the face of the new market participants, arisen due to the liberalisation process 
(Huisman and Mahieu, 2001). 
All spot (and bilateral contract) market agents face huge market risks due to price volatility. 
Daily annualised volatilities of 300% are common for electricity prices; in contrast, the most 
risky financial prices such as stock indices (e.g., the Dow Jones Industrial Average) have an 
annual volatility of around 23%. Daily (annualized) volatility is usually reported to be in the 
range of 300-900% for daily prices and 1,500-3,000% for intraday prices. Also, electricity 
price volatility exhibits persistence. This means that today’s return has a large effect on the 
forecasted variance many periods in the future. 
An example of a daily electricity price in a deregulated spot market is the APX ENDEX 
exchange electricity spot price of the United Kingdom, shown below (Fig. 2.1). 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 - British electricity spot market price index during 24 hours (Jan-03-2005). 
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The main characteristics of electricity spot prices can be described as exhibiting seasonality 
at various temporal levels (on the daily, weekly and annual), mean-reversion, jumps (spikes) 
and extreme volatility (Huisman and Mahieu, 2001). In addition, the distribution of electricity 
prices is typically non-normal given its high kurtosis (excessive height of the distribution) 
and skewness (fat tail) values. This can also occur as a consequence of seasonality and the 
prevalence of random events in international markets. Weron (2005) describes electricity 
price kurtosis and fat tails in more detail. Each of the main concepts related to electricity spot 
markets and prices is described in the next sections. 
Given the special nature of electricity, the spot market is actually a day-ahead, or a 
one-day forward, market. This derives from the nature of the product which is recognized as 
basically non-storable (or not economically storable). The electricity spot market is a day-
ahead market because, differently from other commodity or financial prices, it requires 
advanced notice (usually 12-36 hours in advance) by the system operator in order to validate 
the feasibility of the supply schedule, ensuring that it lies within the system transmission 
constraints at all times. 
Following the recent restructuring processes many countries now run a deregulated power 
market. The spot market for electricity occurs once a day at a given power exchange, with the 
system operator equating demand and supply to establish a price at every hour of the day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 25 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 - The long term courses of 6 EU spot market electricity prices, (Jan-05 to Sep-2007): 
Powernext (France), EEX (Germany), GME (Italy), APX ENDEX (The Netherlands), OMEL 
(Spain), APX UK (United Kingdom). The y-axis denotes the time (in days), whereas the y-
axis denotes the electricity price of the 6 markets (in EUR/MWh). 
 
 
The above graph (Fig. 2.2) depicts the dynamics of wholesale electricity prices in the spot 
markets of major European countries, during the longer term. The demand for electric energy 
is notably subject to recurring seasonal variations, thus reflecting on spot prices. The next 
section discusses the recurrent seasonality aspects present in typical electricity spot price time 
series in Europe. 
 
2.4.1.1 Seasonality effects 
Electricity spot prices, similarly to the relative demand time series, characteristically exhibit 
various seasonal patterns, at different temporal levels (see Weron et al 2004, Kaminski 1999, 
Eydeland and Geman, 2000, for a detailed introduction to the seasonality of electricity 
demand and prices). These cyclical fluctuations in electricity prices mainly arise due to  
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climatic conditions or the number of daylight hours. Depending on the main input to 
electricity generation – as well as the prevalence of weather related sources, as with some 
renewable technologies such as wind power in the UK (see Green and Vasilakos, 2012) or 
fuel mix – also the supply side can show seasonal fluctuations in output. 
It is well-known that loads, or the principal component in the process governing spot prices, 
are generally predictable given they follow a sinusoidal  wave-like movement over time. 
Following Pilipovic (1998), Weron et al (2004) show that fitting a pure sinusoidal function 
(or the sum of two cosine functions in two distinct periods) is a good representation of 
electricity prices (see Fig. 2.3). 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 – Upper Panel: The Nord Pool daily average system price (Jan-97 to Apr-00) with 
the superimposition of annual sinusoidal cycle obtained through wavelet decomposition; 
Lower Panel: The deseasonalized log price. Source: Weron et al (Energy Policy, 2004). 
 
 
This can be attributed to the seasonality recurrent in electricity price time series. However, 
different electricity markets show different kinds of seasonality incorporated in their price 
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processes. For instance, the German market would not allow an analysis such as the above 
where annual cyclical fluctuations are dealt with; German prices, in fact, present similar 
movements throughout the annual period with peaks occurring mostly in the winter, and 
sometimes during the summer. 
Figure 2.3 is reported in order to depict one kind of seasonality present in electricity prices, 
that at the annual level. Other natures of this phenomenon can be traced to the daily, weekly 
and, sometimes, monthly levels - depending on the generating process - which in turn might 
depend on market characteristics as well as on regulatory aspects. 
In order to tackle issues related to seasonality when modelling electricity prices, Boolean 
indicators, or binary variables, are commonly employed within regression analyses of various 
kinds. 
 
2.4.1.2 Spikes 
Electricity prices are known for their extreme volatility and recurrent price jumps. These are 
due to the instantaneous nature of the electricity market that deals with a non-storable 
commodity, the constraints on transmission as well as the balancing of supply and demand 
(Huisman and Mahieu 2003). Because prices can change as much as by 1,000% in less than 
an hour, financial derivative markets for electricity exist, so that market agents can hedge 
their spot risk, or uncertainty about spot prices, through long-term future contracts. Price 
jumps, or spikes, derive from large load fluctuations (multiplied by the large coefficient of 
responsiveness or elasticity to changes in demand), which can be caused by adverse climatic 
and weather conditions, as well as by both generation outages and transmission failures. The 
fuel mix used in a country’s generation process and whether there are specific kinds of 
renewable technologies also determines the presence of spikes (see Goto and Karolyi, 2004, 
or Geman and Roncoroni, 2006, for a detailed analysis on electricity price jumps). 
Electricity and Energy Price Interactions in Modern EU Markets                           G. Castagneto-Gissey 
 28 
 
2.4.1.3 Mean reversion 
Mean reversion is an important feature of electricity prices. Following the frequent spikes in 
prices, the price level tends to return back and fluctuate around a mean level (see Schwatrz, 
1997 or Weron et al., 2004b). Related studies calculate the Hurst exponent after rescaled 
range analysis testing for the anti-persistence of electricity price spot market data, finding 
only intradaily persistence (see Simonsen, 2003, and Weron et al., 2004). Cartea and 
Figueroa (2005) similarly use a model for mean reversion with seasonality. Deng (1999) 
instead proposes several mean-reverting models to describe the spot prices of energy 
commodities which are difficult or costly to store. The latter is in fact the main reason 
justifying the instantaneous nature of these prices and lies behind the success of mean 
reversion-based models. An introduction to mean reverting models used on electricity prices 
time series is given in Section 3.1.1.3.2 and 3.1.1.3.3. 
 
2.4.1.4 Price Formation 
This thesis makes use of various wholesale baseload electricity spot and year-forward prices 
from different energy exchanges across the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators (ENTSOE) area. The fuel mix present in each of the markets determines the 
electricity spot price mean level and its volatility. 
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Fig. 2.4- Fuel mixes present in the EU area in 2013 (Source: EUROSTAT) 
 
 
The figure above (Fig. 2.4) shows the fuel mix in the EU area in 2013. Overall, the member 
states comprising the EU-27 relied in 2010 on: coal, lignite and other solid fuels (20%), oil 
(13%), natural and derived gas (19%), nuclear (28%), renewable (18%) and other fuels (2%) 
to produce electricity (Eurostat, 2011). Fossil fuels therefore still represent a large (53%) 
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share of total electricity generation in Europe. This can be detrimental in terms of electricity 
price levels and volatility as they can be driven by rising fuel prices. 
Furthermore, a country’s generation fuel mix determines the hours of operation of its power 
plants, as shown by the figure below: 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 – Load duration curve representing the amount of actual capacity devoted to 
production with either unit. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 shows the cost curves for two generating units (say, nuclear and gas). Nuclear power 
generation entails higher fixed costs but lower marginal costs compared to those incurred 
when running a natural gas-fired station. This determines the hours of operation, t(x), in the 
load duration curve. The number of hours of operation derived from the intersection of the 
generating units’ cost curves determines the optimal amount of actual capacity devoted to 
each unit: capacity A indicates gas production actual capacity, whereas B is nuclear actual 
capacity. In fact, the higher the marginal cost, the lower the utilisation of that production unit. 
One of the main consequences of the restructured market design present today is essentially  
that prices are now determined according to the fundamental rules of demand and supply; 
there is in fact a market ‘pool’ (the spot market) in which the retailers’ purchase orders are 
compared to the bids placed by generators to sell the next day’s electricity load. As 
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generators and retailers make their production and consumption, the central market operator 
then uses the tool of single-round auctions and considers the hours of the market horizon one 
at a time. A single-round auction is performed each hour in order to determine the market 
clearing price in that hour as well as the accepted production and consumption bids. Ex post, 
adjustment markets are used to eliminate physical infeasibilities due to intertemporal 
constraints or network congestions (Nogales et al 2002), resulting in the settlement process. 
In a deregulated industry, the sole objective of generating companies is to maximize their 
profits, or minimize costs. In order to achieve this, each generating company formulates its 
own strategic bidding (Mazengia, 2008). 
The practice of marginal price setting can give a false impression that the price formation 
process in electricity markets is different from that in other commodity markets. The only 
diversity between commodity markets and electricity markets can actually be recognized in 
that there are additional security components in the case of electricity markets given that 
electricity is delivered at the exact instant of time in which the consumer requires it. 
Effectively, it is the demand inelastic nature of electricity prices, which is caused by the 
instantaneous nature of the product that causes the only difference between these markets and 
therefore electricity price formation can be a more accurate term than marginal price setting, 
argues Hjalmarson (Nord Pool, 2013). He also considers that a great difference between these 
markets (including other energy markets) lies in that the variable costs of production vary 
hugely between the different kinds of technologies used. In fact, whereas wind and nuclear 
power production implies virtually no cost
3
, and are used for baseload power, on the other 
hand, technologies such as those based on oil  are instead very expensive, are to be turned on 
only in case of high demand. 
                                                          
3
A larger fixed cost for nuclear, though a very low marginal cost which applies to hydro and wind technologies 
whose fixed cost is also relatively quite low, but not to micro-hydro, reason for which subsidies apply. However, 
note that hydroelectricity production has an opportunity cost: that of producing with fuels, which should be 
reflected in the electricity prices. 
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It is of extreme relevance for an electricity spot market to continuously reach its objective of 
maximizing cost efficiency by supplying the demand for electricity from the cheapest source 
available at each point in time. 
The large differences in production costs for the generators can cause a large exposure to risk 
for losses in efficiency which may in turn derive from a poorly functioning price formation 
process. Also, a system not operating a sound spot market needs a larger reserve capacity. 
Finally, even though the electricity product is particular, the price levels in spot markets are 
determined by the balance of the forces of supply and demand – therefore, prices in this 
market are only affected by changes in their relationship (Hjalmarson, 2013). 
 
2.4.2 Forward markets 
The global restructuring of electricity markets through competition-based policies which 
provided a shift from cost-based regulated pricing to market-based pricing implied the 
creation of market platforms for short-term (spot) and long-term trading, as prices became 
more volatile and agents needed a way to hedge this volatility. This effectively transformed 
electricity into a tradable commodity. 
The forward market is used as a substitute for the spot market because of price volatility and 
uncertainty concerns. As Longstaff and Wang (2004) note, the forward market is one in 
which market agents can hedge against price risk by entering into forward purchases or sales 
of electricity. The forward market functions with the spot market and forward market prices 
should essentially be given by the discounted values of expected spot prices in consideration 
of market uncertainty and contract maturity
4
. In fact, given spot power prices are volatile and 
electricity cannot be economically stored, familiar arbitrage-based methods are not applicable 
                                                          
4
 For example, Botterud et al. (2010) find that electricity futures prices are consistently higher than spot prices. 
The authors point out that these differences can be explained by differences between the supply and demand 
sides in terms of risk preferences and the ability to take advantage of short-term price variations. 
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for pricing power derivative contracts (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002). Furthermore, a 
firm which decides to buy electricity forwards may discover the next day that they need less 
than they have declared in their contracts
5
. In such case, they are expected to try and sell the 
excess in the spot market. In a similar fashion, a firm that has a contract to sell forward may 
on the next day experience an unexpected outage or generating plant maintenance problem. 
In this case, instead, they would need to enter the spot market in order to purchase enough 
power to meet their commitments as by contract (Longstaff and Wang, 2004). Electricity 
forwards are typically sold on European power exchanges. The most common forward 
contracts are the one-month and one-year forward contracts. 
Kaldor (1939) stipulated the common method for pricing forward contracts in the area of 
commodity markets, given by: 
𝐹𝑡,𝑇 = 𝑆𝑡𝑒
(𝑟+𝑆)(𝑇−𝑡)       [Eq. 2.1] 
where 𝐹𝑡,𝑇 is the forward price at time t for delivery at time T, 𝑆𝑡 is the spot price at time t, r 
is a constant interest rate and s are storage costs (Redl et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, an equilibrium-based model of electricity futures prices
6
 considers 
equilibrium relationships for forward pricing, in the fashion of Keynes. The price of futures 
contracts is then based on the spot price and the risk premium, a compensation for bearing 
spot risk. 
Given that futures or forward prices of electricity depend on future conditions, they are bound 
to depend on the expectations of future economic activity. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 However, there exist volumetric option contracts such as swings, nominations and recalls. 
6
 Note that there is no difference between electricity futures and forward prices as the interest rate is not 
stochastic but constant, given the diffused use of inflation targeting.  More formally, the forward price is a 
martingale under the forward measure and the futures price represents a martingale as well, though under the 
measure of risk-neutrality. The forward and risk neutral measures are identical when interest rates are 
deterministic. 
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2.4.2.1 Energy trading in Europe 
The liberalisation which took place in the different European countries provided increased 
volumes of wholesale electricity trading and led to the creation of different power exchanges 
and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. OTCs and exchanges are both available for physical 
delivery and the main difference among them is that forward contracts are traded in OTC 
markets whereas futures are traded in exchanges, where a whole range of other financial 
products are available, such as options. Energy trading offers products which are able to 
safeguard companies from the volatility and adverse conditions in the market and are 
increasingly used. Moreover, the EU Commission’s main aims are also those of promoting 
liquidity and information in both spot and forward markets in order to support competition, 
and the opening of intra-day and balancing markets. 
 
2.4.2.1.1 Electricity 
Power exchanges in Europe trade spot and energy derivatives. The total exchange in spot 
markets was 820,000 GWh in 2007, but futures trading in the same year was about 1.1 GWh 
million. The largest power exchanges are Nord Pool (Lysaker, Norway), EEX (Leipzig, 
Germany) and IPEX (Rome, Italy) Rademaekers et al., 2008). Powernext (France) and APX 
(Netherlands) are the second most important exchanges, whereas APX UK, EXAA, 
Towarowa, Belpex and OMEL present considerably lower trading volumes. 
The Nord Pool power exchange is the major trading platform in the Nordic electricity market. 
Nord Pool operates both a spot and a derivatives market and is one of the most volatile, 
mature and liquid financial power markets in the world (Karan and Kazdagli, 2011). In the 
UK, power exchanges account for only a small part of electricity trading because bilateral 
trading takes place in OTC markets via power brokers. Year-ahead contracts are typically the 
most traded product in the derivatives market and are studied in Chapter 5. 
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2.4.2.1.2 Gas and Coal 
There are seven important trading platforms for gas in Europe, i.e. APX NL, APX UK, APX 
ZEE, Powernext, EEX and Endex (future), whereas EEW is a relatively new platform (2007). 
APX is linked to the Zeebrugge gas hub (Belgium) and to the National Balancing Point 
(NBP) in the UK with an interconnector. APX UK is the most mature gas exchange in 
Europe. 
Coal markets, on the other hand are mostly physical. The ARA coal market is the most active 
in Europe (Netherlands) and delivers coal from various parts of the world. 
 
2.6 Barriers to European Energy Market Integration 
Efficiency problems for competitive markets are caused by different types of barriers. Aside 
purely technical barriers related to the nature of electricity, political and economic barriers 
are also very important in shaping the geopolitical environment in Europe today. 
Governments are typically very involved and this prevents a fully independent working of the 
market. This is mainly because of security of supply issues and simply the special nature of 
the commodity. In fact, energy security is an important barrier to European market 
integration which forces, concerns and encourages government intervention and is also very 
related to further political and economic problems.  
The energy sector is extremely important for the development of all industries. Limited 
generation capacity in Europe prevents an increasing level of inducing more competition. As 
Serrallés (2006) notes, generation is many times based on security considerations rather than 
only marginal cost ones. However, given that competition law differs across most countries, 
there is primary a need to provide an integration of judicial systems in this respect. 
Market concentration is much higher in the gas market relative to the power market. Whereas 
in countries such as France, Germany and Spain the shares of the largest three companies in 
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total production are very high, they are less than half in the UK, which used to display a 
monopolistic structure before its liberalisation. Concentration is up to more than 70% on 
average across EU countries excluding Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta, Finland and 
Portugal (Karan and Kazdagli, 2011). This implies that lower electricity prices and improved 
levels of competition in Europe are perhaps still far away. 
The various national electricity markets in Europe are very different in terms of legislative 
details, which are often tied to the differing characteristics of their energy markets. To this 
extent, policies in favour of renewable energy cause regional fragmentation. Current 
legislations represent a main barrier to the integration process of EU markets. Thus, policies 
aimed at coordinating the regional characteristics of energy sources with legal issues would 
be particularly beneficial for the European internal market. The fact that privatization in most 
countries is not progressing as desired by the EU, is blocking the reformation process. In 
addition, the unbundling regime has been applied in most countries but full integration has 
been partially achieved, as the EU imposes a minimum obligation policy on network 
operators in the unbundling, legal and functional terms, between the transmission and 
distribution sectors on one hand and upstream and downstream (supply) functions on the 
other. 
Moreover, although national regulators were established in the EU in 1989, the governance of 
European regulation is still a multi-authority national, level-based structure. In fact, for a 
faster rate of integration of EU markets, different gaps should be filled. Examples of these 
gaps include: balancing regulations and objectives, transparency, responsibility for security of 
supply, coordination and perhaps even price controls (Karan and Kazdagli, 2011). 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
The first part of this chapter presents the main techniques used to model electricity 
spot and forward prices and their volatility. The second part, on the other hand, introduces the 
main determinants of electricity prices in term of what ought to drive the models that will be 
employed throughout the studies presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The literature relating to 
each of these studies is discussed in the substantive chapters. 
 
3.1 On the analysis of electricity spot and forward prices and volatility 
This section presents the main econometric issues relating to electricity price modelling and 
introduces the leading techniques used to model electricity prices. A brief insight into the 
econometric aspects of electricity prices and their typical stylised facts are firstly given. 
As described in Chapter 2, electricity prices derive from the instantaneous nature of 
electricity markets as well as from the non-storability of the product, implying that such 
prices are extremely volatile. In fact, as Hadsell et al. (2004) note, the assumption of constant 
variance in time for electricity price returns is not an appropriate one. Specifically, Engle and 
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Patton (2001) describe three facts about asset price volatility which are common to electricity 
markets. Firstly, they note that electricity price volatility exhibits persistence. This means that 
today’s price return has a large effect on the forecasted variance many periods in the future, 
or that periods of high or low volatility tend to be clustered together. Secondly, volatility is 
mean reverting, i.e. there is a certain level of volatility at which volatility eventually returns. 
Finally, innovations may have an asymmetric effect on volatility, i.e. positive or negative 
innovations have a different magnitude of impact on the volatility of electricity prices. Poon 
and Granger (2003) note the popularity of GARCH-type models for accounting for these 
stylized facts. The Bollerslev (1986) model was the first of its type and accounted for non-
stationary variance processes, a characteristic widely attributed to electricity prices.  Chapters 
4 and 5 show the use of other types of GARCH models, emphasizing other characteristics of 
electricity prices, such as those relating to the asymmetric response of innovations. 
The time series tools used until nowadays in modelling electricity prices are based on an 
autoregressive component and are principally: Second order polynomials, Auto-Regressive 
(AR) and Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) models, such as also the ARX and 
ARMAX for exogenous components. Multivariate ARMA or ARIMA models are also used. 
GARCH, or AR-GARCH, models are also very popular and widely used in this field, as well 
as in the following chapters. These will be presented shortly. 
The main pre-processing techniques for electricity prices involve log transformation, 
normalization, removal of outliers, removal of the periodic and non-periodic trend 
components, but also other methods such as wavelet transformations (Aggarwal et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the most common way of identifying and validating time series models is 
through inspection of the Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation functions (ACF and 
PACF), while parameter estimation is frequently carried out by maximum likelihood 
functions and regression analyses, or by using the simpler least squares estimation methods. 
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This section we only cover time series techniques, with game theory models (see Chuang et 
al., 2001) and simulation models (see, for example, Otero-Novas et al., 2000, Bunn and 
Oliveira, 2001) lying outside of the scope of the review. 
 
3.1.1 Time Series Modelling Techniques for Electricity Prices 
The time series models used with electricity prices are: parsimonious stochastic models, 
regression or causal models and artificial intelligence based models. 
 
3.1.1.1 Parsimonious Stochastic Models 
One of the popular model classes in the literature that predict or model electricity prices is the 
one relating to parsimonious stochastic models.  This class includes: autoregressive moving 
average (ARMA) models - which represent stationary processes - and autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) and generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedastic (GARCH) models - which represent non-stationary processes. 
The assumption of stationarity is satisfied if the error term has a zero mean and a constant 
variance. However, since many variables, including electricity price time series, exhibit 
trends, different variances, and correlation between past and future values, first-differencing 
is used to provide a new stationary time series. 
 
3.1.1.1.1 The AR-GARCH type of models 
A GARCH model is simply an ARCH model (a simple model with an equation for the mean 
and one for the variance, which is thereby assumed to be non-constant) with an ARMA 
model specified as the error variance. Bollerslev (1986) originally formulated the GARCH 
(p,q) model as: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝜎𝑡−𝑝
2          [Eq. 3.1] 
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which can be summarized as: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2𝑞
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑡−𝑖
2𝑝
𝑖=1                   [Eq. 3.2] 
Where 𝜎𝑡
2 is the variance and 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2  is the squared ARCH error. 
The lag length p in a GARCH (p,q) process specification shall be found. In order to do so, we 
first estimate the best fitting AR(q) model for the mean: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑞𝑦𝑡−𝑞 + 𝜀𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡  [Eq. 3.3] 
to then compute the autocorrelations of the squared error 𝜀2 through: 
𝜌 =
∑ (?̂?𝑡
2−?̂?𝑡
2)(?̂?𝑡−1
2 −?̂?𝑡−1
2 )𝑇𝑡=𝑖+1
∑ (?̂?𝑡
2−?̂?𝑡
2)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
       [Eq. 3.4] 
If we consider a large sample, which is usually the case with electricity price intraday data, 
the asymptotic or standard deviation of 𝜌(𝑖)is 1/√𝑇. Values which are larger than 1/√𝑇 
explicitly indicate GARCH errors. In order to estimate the total number of lags, we make use 
of the Ljung-Box test until the significance of these GARCH errors is less than the usual 5% 
value. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic follows a Chi-Squared distribution with n degrees of 
freedom if the residuals are uncorrelated. The null hypothesis assumes no ARCH or GARCH 
errors. The alternative therefore implies there are GARCH errors within the conditional 
variance. 
 
3.1.1.1.2 The Jump Diffusion model 
Jump-diffusion  (see Merton, 1976)  is essentially a stochastic process which combines jumps 
to a subsequent process of diffusion. It also represents an important model which has 
significant applications in the field of condensed matter physics and option pricing. However, 
the jump diffusion model is also quite popular within energy economics literature with 
application to electricity pricing. An example is Cartea and Figueroa (2005), who develop a 
mean-reverting jump diffusion model with seasonality, including mean reversion. An 
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example of an application to (Nord Pool) electricity prices is given by Jablonska et al (2011). 
The two main components of all jump-diﬀusion models are Brownian motion, or the 
diﬀusion part, and the Poisson process, or the jump component.  
The most basic example of a mean-reverting jump-diffusion model is the one described in 
Clewlow and Strickland (2000) and Clewlow et al. (2001b), represented by: 
𝑑𝑆 = 𝛼 · (µ − 𝛷 · 𝐾𝑚 – 𝑙𝑛 𝑆) · 𝑆 · 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎 · 𝑆 · 𝑑𝑧 + 𝐾 · 𝑆 · 𝑑𝑞      [Eq. 3.5] 
where S is the spot price of electricity, 𝛼 is the mean-reverting intensity, µ is the long-run 
average value of ln(S) in the absence of jumps, 𝛷 is the average number of jumps per annum, 
𝐾𝑚 is the mean jump size,  𝜎 is the spot price volatility, 𝑑𝑧 is a Wiener process and  𝑑𝑞 is the 
Poisson process. 
The jump diffusion model takes account of the disturbances implied by the diffusion, with the 
𝜎 · 𝑆 · 𝑑𝑧 component, and jumps with (with 𝐾 · 𝑆 · 𝑑𝑞). 
 
3.1.1.1.3 The Regime-Switching models 
A further well-known model used for electricity prices is undoubtedly the regime-switching 
model, which sometimes is also used to represent the merit order regime switching of power 
plants which enable the activation of costly plants to maintain the system efficiently 
operating at times of high demand. 
We will briefly mention in Chapter 6 the use of the regime-switching model, which was 
employed to detect the change in regime of our proxy for European electricity market 
integration. 
This model is based on the transition from one state to a second distinct state governing the 
underlying process. Autoregressive models with stochastic disturbances are usually used for 
the representation of mean electricity prices, whereas the simplest specification is that the 
change in state is the realization of a two-state Markov chain. A Markov chain is essentially a 
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memoryless process such that the future state depends on the current state only, and not on its 
sequence earlier in the series. More formally, this is expressed as: 
Pr(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑥| 𝑋1 = 𝑥1, 𝑋2 = 𝑥2, … , 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛) = Pr(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑥| 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛)       [Eq. 3.6] 
where the possible values of Xi, or the random variable (the electricity price), are a countable 
set. See, for example, Mount et al. (2006), who use regime switching models to predicting 
electricity price spikes. The next section discusses the determinants of electricity prices. 
 
3.1.1.2 Regression or Causal Models  
Regression type models are based on the theorized relationship between a dependent variable, 
the electricity price, and a number of exogenous variables which can be estimated. Causal 
models are similar but include more Granger-based models of causality and cointegration. 
The exogenous variables to be used in regression models are usually identified using basic 
fundamental reasoning
7
 or according to the correlation they have with the electricity price 
and both regression and causal models present classic econometric techniques related to 
regressions. Regressions are usually used in linear forms, though with a stochastic nature 
employed to describe electricity price volatility. 
 
3.2 Electricity price and volatility determinants 
Whereas forward and future prices depend on the time to maturity and are affected by 
economic activity, spot prices mostly depend on temperatures and weather conditions. This is 
why spot prices are more volatile compared to future prices, which are much more stable. 
                                                          
7
 This means focusing on the fundamentals that drive electricity prices, i.e. the forces of supply and demand and, 
therefore, the factors affecting them. These factors are discussed in section 3.2. 
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Nevertheless, spot and forward prices share most essential determinants. These determinants
8
 
are classified according to: 1. Market characteristics, 2. Nonstrategic uncertainties, 3. 
Stochastic uncertainties, 4. Behaviour indices, and 5. Temporal effects (Aggarwal et al., 
2009). However, to better understand the set of electricity price determinants
9
, we will  
subdivide them more simply according to whether they are supply- or demand-side variables. 
The following is a simple demand and supply figure representing the electricity market, 
where in fact the electricity price is determined by fundamentals: 
 
 
Fig. 3.1- A graphical representation of the market for wholesale electricity. 
 
The above diagram (Fig. 3.1) depicts the electricity demand (both on- and off-peak) and 
supply (the marginal cost, i.e. the supply schedule pre-established by the market operator 
based on the generators’ bids) schedules. As in traditional markets, a rise in demand or a 
tighter supply can cause electricity prices to increase, sometimes through large spikes. 
                                                          
8
 Section 3.2 is based on the variables reported in Aggarwal et al. (2009), but not its classification of electricity 
price determinants. There is currently no other work in the literature reporting the determinants of electricity 
prices resulting from past studies. 
9
 Aggarwal et al. (2010) briefly explores all variable types in literature studies of electricity prices. However, the 
authors do not distinguish between supply and demand. Also, they place under different classifications variables 
which are very similar; e.g., historical loads under market characteristics and forecast load under strategic 
uncertainties. 
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3.2.1 Demand-side factors 
The main factor affecting electricity spot prices is certainly the historical load of electricity 
demanded and supplied.  An example of a daily electricity price in a deregulated spot market 
is the British (APX ENDEX exchange) electricity spot price, shown below (Fig. 3.2) together 
with the relative demand curve: 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 - A daily course of the British electricity price (upper panel) compared to the corresponding 
demand (lower panel) for electricity (Jan-03-2005). 
 
 
When supply constraints are not binding and there are no particular shocks to the system, 
demand and prices display a clearly positive relationship. The extreme responsiveness of 
prices to the demand series, on the other hand, is demonstrated by the extreme demand 
inelasticity of electricity and can be attributed to the nature of the electricity product itself, 
which requires markets to clear at each trading hour (or half-hour in the British market). In 
any case, the electricity load represents a major explanatory variable when explaining 
changes in the electricity price (see for example, Joskow and Kahn, 2001, or Weron, 2007).  
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Moreover, temperature is one of the main determinants of prices in electricity spot markets 
given the clear dependence of electricity demand on climatic conditions. Temperature, 
weather and electricity sales are investigated and described in Engle et al. (1983), who find a 
nonlinear relationship between electricity prices and these variables by using a 
semiparametric regression procedure. Weather can also be a very important factor in 
theoretical terms (see Green and Vasilakos, 2011, for a study on seasons’ worth of water 
inflow and Denmark’s power market) or simply because it is crucial with respect to the fuel 
mix and the country’s available technologies. In fact, the Norwegian electricity price is a 
classic example of this; in Norway, electricity is produced from hydropower sources (which 
are affected by precipitations) and account for 95% of total production. This represents a 
considerable dependence of electricity prices on weather variable conditions, although 
Norway does indeed possess a long-lasting water supply (including reservoirs). Also, it is 
well known that renewable energy such as wind power, which Germany increasingly 
supports, is itself reliant on its natural component. 
In addition, imports and exports are also crucial determinants of electricity prices in the spot 
market. In fact, the difference between the quantity imported and exported determines the 
flow of electricity and thus the change in price. An inflow of electricity increases the 
domestic electricity supply thereby providing a fall in the price level at which electricity is 
sold to retailers
10
 (see, for example, Zareipour et al., 2006). 
Demand elasticity can explain the jumps in electricity prices and can be considered as a good 
explanatory variable of electricity prices. The jumps in prices are due to extreme demand 
inelasticity since supply is effectively fixed on the previous day relative to dispatch. The 
instantaneous nature of the market and the non-storability of the electricity product determine 
the high responsiveness of prices to changes in demand. Kirschen et al. (2000), for example, 
                                                          
10
 This would really depend on the price of the imported electricity as well as the capacity of interconnectors. 
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describe the effect that the market structure can have on the demand elasticity of electricity. 
Similarly, the spike existence indexes reveal the periods in which there are price spikes and 
can be important variables in modelling electricity prices. The presence of spikes has 
important implications in the context of risk management, where large jumps in prices are the 
main motive behind the use of insurance protection and forward contracts. There are various 
Markov chain models, as well as data mining methods, which decompose electricity prices in 
order to obtain signals during peak price periods. Zhao et al. (2007) explains that a price 
spike is an abnormal market clearing price at a certain hour of the day and is signiﬁcantly 
different from the price of the previous hour. Price spikes may last for several periods and are 
highly stochastic in nature. Abnormal prices can be classiﬁed into three main categories 
according to Catalão (2012).  A price that is signiﬁcantly higher than its expected value is 
deﬁned as an abnormally high price; if the difference between two neighbouring prices is 
larger than a threshold, this type of prices is deﬁned as the abnormal jump price; finally, there 
are negative prices which can result as a result of excess supply
11
. 
The settlement period represents an additional important factor causing changes in electricity 
prices. In fact, electricity is priced at each settlement period. Therefore, the settlement period 
effectively refers to a certain hour (or trading period) of the day. Day types and month 
indications can be useful when modelling electricity prices according to seasonal patterns, 
reflecting the seasonality of the underlying demand series. Dummy variables are usually used 
to model the seasonality present in electricity price time series. Also, it is well known that 
electricity prices can display a different pattern on weekends. In fact, as Ramsay and Wang 
(1998) note, electricity price values during weekends or public holidays are usually less 
fluctuating and lower in levels. The month of the year can also be of significant relevance 
when modelling electricity prices. There are in fact certain months which are generally 
                                                          
11
 An example is Germany, during 2012-13. 
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warmer than others and months which are colder. Electricity prices in the same months of 
different years may exhibit similar properties given the similar temporal effects of demand. 
Furthermore, holiday codes, such as the Christmas code (Szkuta et al., 2009), are sometimes 
used when modelling the seasonality present in electricity prices at certain times of the year, 
for example during holidays or festivities. An example is Wang and Ramsay (1998), who 
employ an artificial neural network-based estimator for electricity spot prices during weekend 
and public holidays. The higher demand for electricity during particularly cold or warm 
periods raises the demand and price of electricity during such periods, or seasons
12
. In fact, 
electricity is especially more expensive during summer and winter days compared to other 
periods of the year, in Europe. These effects can be captured using the summer or winter 
indices, which may be used as dummy variables in wholesale electricity price models. 
Finally, clock changes can also cause variations in electricity prices. In fact, a reduction 
(increase) in demand and prices when the clock changes forward (backward) can occur. 
 
3.2.2 Supply-side factors 
Having briefly introduced the main factors affecting the demand for electricity, we now focus 
on those factors influencing wholesale electricity supply. 
Capacity excess or shortfall probably represents the leading supply-side factor of electricity. 
Capacity surplus, for example, is measured as total available capacity less the required peak 
time capacity. In the case surplus decreased under this dynamic threshold – which could 
perhaps represent an incentive to larger agents to make use of their market power – electricity 
prices can be abruptly and significantly affected. In fact, lower levels of capacity imply a 
tighter market with less transmission lines able to provide electricity in a given country, 
which naturally increases the price of available electricity. 
                                                          
12
 The periods of higher- or lower-than-normal electricity demand can be proxied by heating (HDD) or cooling 
degree days (CDD). 
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Furthermore, in electricity economics, an operating reserve is the generating capacity 
available to system operators within a short time interval to meet the level of demand in the 
case a generator fails or there is any supply disruption. The majority of existing power 
systems is designed in such a way that under normal conditions of operation the operating 
reserve is constantly equal to at least the capacity of the largest available generator plus a 
fraction of the peak load level. Historical reserves are known to well explain (and predict) the 
movements of wholesale electricity prices. In fact, they can be a good indicator of the 
underlying electricity price because it would suggest when the price is high, or when there are 
peaks, as given the nature of the merit order of electricity wholesale supply, by which the 
most expensive plants operate during periods of high demand. 
More generally, generation capacity is a crucial factor affecting electricity prices. The 
net capacity factor of a power plant is the ratio of its actual output over a period of time, to its 
potential output if it were possible for it to operate at full name plate capacity indefinitely. 
When generation or transmission is limited, transmission congestion occurs and high prices 
therefore prevail on the electricity market. An expansion of capacity can result in an 
increased competition level, thus lowering prices. 
The extent of electricity generation from renewable (such as hydropower and thermal solar) 
or non-renewable (e.g., nuclear or fossil fuels) sources in a given country affects the domestic 
electricity price and, possibly, the foreign electricity price (so long as there is available 
interconnection capacity). This clearly depends on a country’s generation fuel mix as on the 
market where electricity is purchased. 
Bidding strategies can also be a powerful factor influencing the course of electricity prices. In 
fact, as the generators’ bids to sell the next day’s electricity load are compared to the 
consumption bids by the market operator, strategic bidding by large generators can have a 
notable effect on prices. Kian and Keyhani (2001) use, among other variables, different 
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proxies for bidding strategies, as the predicted strategic behaviour of market participants, in 
their dynamic model of electricity prices, providing results that confirm the importance of 
strategic bidding. Furthermore, bidding strategies are mainly used in game theory models. 
Increasing fossil fuel prices such as those of oil and gas also represent additional costs to 
generating power plants when demand is relatively high. Contreras et al. (2003) use ARIMA 
models to predict the next-day electricity price using oil prices and other fuel prices. A 
country which uses very little fuel in electricity generation can result in an electricity price 
heavily dependent on fuel prices, as we will see in Chapter 5. Even though Norway produces 
electricity almost exclusively through hydropower, their price can be largely linked to fuel 
prices when water becomes scarce. The link between electricity and fuel prices can also be 
substantial in countries with little or no fuels used in electricity generation because the fuel 
price, or foreign electricity, can always represent the opportunity cost of producing domestic 
electricity. As we have seen, the majority of EU electricity production still depends on fossil 
fuels (about 53%). Therefore, European prices are greatly linked to fossil fuel prices. The 
figure below (Fig. 3.3) depicts the similar behaviour of British electricity spot prices and the 
coal, gas and carbon prices (using year-ahead data): 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 -Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices for baseload delivery, in the 
United Kingdom (GB). 
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Fuel and electricity prices are very closely related and follow similar movements. Because 
the demand for electricity is highly variable, when periods of spare capacity prevail, the fuel 
prices will be the only incremental costs of producing electricity (along with some operating 
and maintenance costs). 
Finally, political issues can certainly be an important determinant of electricity prices. This is 
the case especially for forward prices, which heavily depend on the future economic outlook.  
An example of the importance of politics can be seen by considering the Russia-Ukraine 
disputes, began in 2005 and still ongoing today, in 2014. In fact, Russia provides 
approximately 25% of the natural gas consumed within the EU. However, in 2005, 80% of 
these exports travelled across Ukranian territory before serving EU countries (Stern, 2006). 
Following a dispute between Ukraine and Russia over outstanding debts, Russia eventually 
cut its gas supplies travelling through Ukraine. Furthermore, in January 2009, the 
disagreement resulted in the disruption of supply to eighteen European countries. This caused  
much concern across these countries, which were substantially reliant on gas for electricity 
production. Electricity prices were greatly influenced by these supply cuts, with various 
major spikes recorded in those months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Exchange Rates, Oil Prices & Electricity Spot Prices:                            
Empirical Insights from EU markets 
 
with Richard Green* 
 
 
Having discussed the main determinants of electricity prices, we now focus on further 
factors which may contribute to their variation. Electricity is produced using fuels which are 
traded in US dollars and priced on domestic markets in national currencies. An example of 
these fuels is oil, which is mainly used to serve peaking demand for electricity and represents 
a “last resort” in the merit order given its elevated prices. 
In this chapter, we look at the effect of oil prices on the electricity prices of European 
countries. This entails analysing the combined effect of oil prices along with the EUR/USD 
exchange rate. To this extent, how did the contagion of the subprime mortgage crisis (2008) 
on EU markets affect the impact of oil prices and exchange rates on European electricity 
prices? Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between daily electricity spot price returns 
and both the crude oil spot price return (in US dollars) and the exchange rate return in six 
European countries – namely: France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom - during the time periods 2005-2007 and 2008–2011, i.e. before and after the 
contagion of the subprime crisis on European markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
*Professor of Sustainable Energy Business and Energy Economics at Imperial College 
London. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Electricity is produced using fuels that are often traded on world markets and priced in US 
dollars (USD) but sold on domestic markets in national currencies. Oil represents one of 
these fuels. Due to the high oil prices oil is normally used to serve peaking demand. 
Moreover, its shares in total generation are very low and oil is used as infrequently as 
possible. Nevertheless, oil is an important generation unit, especially given that it sets the 
electricity price when employed to produce electricity. 
How do European electricity prices react to changes in US dollar-denominated oil prices? 
The response of electricity prices to oil prices and exchange rates will depend on the fuel mix 
in each country, and on the way in which gas prices respond to changes in the oil price. 
Because the price of electricity is linked to the marginal cost of production, some 
technologies with high average shares may rarely set the price – the obvious example of this 
is nuclear power, which has very low marginal costs. In contrast, oil-fired stations are 
frequently reserved for peaking use, running relatively infrequently but almost always setting 
the price when they do, so that their share of price-setting is above their share of generation.  
Natural gas and coal plants can also set electricity prices – in most of the countries in our 
sample, the fuel which is more expensive (per MWh of electricity it can produce) is the one 
which will set the price more often. Finally, we should note that while the fuel for 
hydroelectric generation (important in several of our countries) is free of cost, stations would 
offer power to the market based on the opportunity cost of using their water now, rather than 
saving it for later use, and that opportunity cost is based on expected power prices (and hence 
fossil fuels). We should also note that all of these countries trade power amongst themselves 
(European Commission Eurostat, Energy Production and Imports, 2012), and while prices in 
adjacent markets can differ when the transmission lines between them are congested, at other 
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times, the price in, say, the Netherlands may actually be set by the marginal power station in 
France. 
The dependency of EU countries on energy imports from non-member countries is very large 
and increasing over time. However, even when a country is self-sufficient in a fuel, its price 
may still be set on world markets (as for oil) or sold at prices indexed to the oil price (as was 
the case for gas for many years and still is, especially in Central and Eastern Europe). In the 
1990s, British generators had to pay more than the price of imported coal for large volumes 
of domestic output, but power prices were based on the cost of the imported coal that would 
compete for marginal supplies. In contrast, gas prices in North West Europe (including the 
UK) have increasingly been set in national markets, based on national supply and demand, 
although obviously influenced by the cost of imports or potential value of exports – where 
capacity exists. 
Moreover, crude oil prices and the exchange rate will feed through to the cost of oil-fired 
power generation in national currencies. The exchange rate will also affect the cost of coal in 
national currencies, when this is traded in dollars. Gas prices can depend on the oil price and 
the exchange rate in countries where they are still oil-indexed, such as Italy, which still 
imports much of its gas through pipelines with long-term oil-indexed contracts. In countries 
with so-called “gas-on-gas” competition, these factors may have less impact – for example, 
the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported into Spain is linked to the price that LNG 
cargoes could obtain in other markets
13
. 
This paper tests the hypothesis that European electricity prices depend on the exchange rate, 
of the national currency against the US dollar, and the oil price, for a sample of EU countries. 
Among the electricity market agents, the topic of this study can also be particularly useful for 
electricity generators whose costs are not linked to oil prices or exchange rates, such as 
                                                          
13
 Yet, this LNG mostly comes from the Middle East or West Africa, who also sell on oil-indexed prices. 
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domestic producers of electricity with renewable generation technologies. Knowledge of the 
effect of oil prices on electricity prices may give them an advantage in strategic terms. In 
addition, it can be important for market agents to consider the impact of these variables on 
electricity prices in terms of asymmetric effects of positive and negative shocks, as these can 
produce substantial risks. Furthermore, this study provides insights on the effect of an 
economic crisis on electricity prices. In fact, we specifically study the periods between 2005-
2007 and 2008-2011, i.e. before and after the contagion of the US subprime mortgage crisis 
on European markets. 
In the present study we chose three European countries - which use greater amounts of 
nuclear, hydro and alternative sources for electricity production (France, Spain and Germany) 
- as being less sensitive to changes in crude oil prices and to the EUR/USD exchange rate, 
and compared them with three EU-27 countries which are more dependent on fossil fuels (the 
Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom). Five of our sample (France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Spain) use the Euro (EUR), while the United Kingdom uses the sterling 
pound (GBP). We hypothesise that the volatility and levels of electricity prices in our sample 
of European countries can be significantly affected by oil prices and exchange rates towards 
the USD.  Furthermore, we investigate whether volatility responds symmetrically to positive 
and negative oil price and exchange rate shocks.  
We also study the volatility of electricity prices during the different time frames, the first 
corresponding to that studied by Muñoz and Dickey (2005), i.e. January 2005 - September 
2007, and the second following that period, i.e. from January 2008 - December 2011.  Our 
first period covers the end of the noughties boom; the second coincides with the subprime 
crisis and its aftermath. 
Our study examines the volatility of daily electricity price returns using two alternative 
classes of volatility models: the Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
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(GARCH) and the Non-linear Asymmetric GARCH (NGARCH) models. GARCH models 
assume that a data series is normally distributed and that the volatility response to innovations 
in the market is symmetric. However, empirical evidence also applies to the present case, 
suggesting that positive and negative returns of equal magnitude may not generate the same 
response in volatility (Black, 1976; Nelson, 1991). The leverage effect, i.e. negative 
correlations between returns and volatility, is often observed in financial time series. Some of 
these effects can be captured only by non-linear models. 
The main contribution of our study is to show that there is a transmission of volatility 
between both the exchange rate and oil prices, and electricity prices. Furthermore, we have 
shown that the electricity price level is affected by changes in the exchange rate and the price 
of oil. 
We henceforth ask the following questions: (i) what is the impact of the 2008 financial crisis 
on European electricity prices in terms of the combined effect of exchange rates and oil 
prices? and (ii) how do electricity prices react to positive and negative oil price and exchange 
rate shocks and does this asymmetric effect change as a result of the crisis? 
The rest of Chapter 4 is organised as follows: data and preliminary statistical analyses are 
reported in section 4.2. Models and econometric methodology are provided in section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 summarises the main findings. Section 4.5 discusses the findings in relation to 
previous studies reported in the literature and provides suggestions for further related 
research. Finally, section 4.6 concludes the paper. 
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4.2 Background & Previous Work 
This section introduces the background and main literature studies relating to this work. 
While section 4.2.1 presents some recent history on oil market occurrences, whereas section 
4.2.2 describes the fuel mix used in electricity generation in each of the markets considered in 
this study. Finally, section 4.2.3 discusses the previous work on electricity and oil price 
interactions. 
 
4.2.1 Oil prices 
The worst US recessions since the Great Depression corresponded to periods of remarkably 
high oil prices. Examples include the events that occurred in 1973, 1981 and, more recently, 
in 2005. Therefore, there is reason to believe that high oil prices and economic downturns are 
two particularly related events. In fact, for example, El-Sharif et al. (2005) and Sadorsky 
(1999) find that the relationship between oil and stock prices is always positive. Factors 
contributing to higher oil prices include a weak dollar and the rapid growth in Asian 
economies, and their increased consumption of oil. Moreover, political pressures in the 
OPEC-member countries are among the major influencing oil prices. 
In 2005, different hurricanes as well as refinery problems contributed to higher prices. After 
the collapse of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, in 2008, and thus after the start of the 
financial crisis, the oil price continued to soar. Spare capacity fell considerably and 
speculation in the oil forward and futures markets was exceptionally strong. Trading on 
NYMEX closed at a record USD $145 on July 3, 2008. However, this was because of the 
particularly weak USD, as reported in the figure below.  
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Fig. 4.1 – Brent crude oil price in GBP/barrel, EUR/barrel and USD/barrel during 2005-11 
(Source: Bloomberg). 
 
Moreover, as can be seen from above (Fig. 4.1), the oil price sharply fell a few months later, 
as a result of the recession and the falling demand for oil. Following an OPEC cut in January 
2009 prices rose steadily supported by rising demand in Asia. In late February 2011, prices 
jumped again as a result of the Libyan civil war. Concerns about additional interruptions 
grew from unrest in other Middle East and North African producers. Such fears arose once 
more due to the Arab Spring and the social unrest in oil producing countries. 
 
4.2.2 European electricity markets and prices 
The six European electricity markets are organized as day-ahead markets and as such their 
prices are dependent on marginal costs of production which in turn depend on the marginal 
fuels used. The fuel mix present in each country will determine the effect of the oil price on 
the electricity price. Each of the studied markets uses different technologies to produce 
electricity. The six countries considered (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and 
United Kingdom) are represented by the following generation fuel mixes (see Fig. 4.2, 
below). 
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Fig.  4.2 – Fuels used for electricity generation in six European markets, in 2010 (percentage 
shares). 
 
As can be seen from above, coal and gas remain crucial inputs for electricity generation in 
Europe. Overall, the member states comprising the EU-27 relied in 2010 on: oil (13%), 
nuclear (28%), coal, lignite and other solid fuels (20%), natural and derived gas (19%), 
renewable sources (18%) and other fuels (2%) to produce electricity (Eurostat, 2011). 
 
4.2.3 Previous work 
The impact of exchange rates and oil prices on electricity prices represents a topic which has 
not been extensively investigated. From a general point of view, Blomberg and Harris (1995) 
pointed out that commodity price movements can be a reaction to swings in dollar exchange 
rates as opposed to a signal of general inﬂation pressures. Amano and van Norden (1998) 
concluded that the macroeconomic role of oil prices may become more important as other 
energy prices, such as coal, gas, and to a lesser extent electricity, are sometimes priced to 
compete with oil on international markets. Therefore, oil price ﬂuctuations are reﬂected in 
general energy price ﬂuctuations. Moreover, Sadorsky (1999) constructs empirical models to 
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find that oil prices and volatility affect the economy asymmetrically, or in other words, 
variations in oil prices heavily influence the economy but changes in the economy have a low 
effect on oil prices. 
Muñoz and Dickey (2009) have studied the relationship between Spanish electricity spot 
prices, oil prices and the USD/EUR exchange rate during the period 2005-2007. They 
showed that these variables were co-integrated, implying the existence of a long-run 
equilibrium among them. A transmission of volatility from the USD/EUR exchange rate and 
oil prices to Spanish electricity prices was also observed, although the electricity price level 
remained unaffected. 
This field of research was initiated by Sadorsky (2000), who used co-integration procedures 
to study the interaction between prices for crude oil, heating oil and gasoline and a trade-
weighted index of exchange rates. Granger-causality analysis found a long-run relationship 
between the energy prices and exchange rates, thus providing evidence in favour of a 
transmission of exogenous exchange rate shocks to energy prices. We now explore this 
literature, also emphasized in Muñoz and Dickey (2009), with whom we additionally 
compare our results. 
Indjehagopian et al. (2000), for example, study the market for heating oil in Germany and 
France, concluding that weekly variations of the FF/USD and DM/USD exchange rates affect 
heating oil prices instantaneously. 
Further literature exists with regards to the interface between exchange rates and oil prices. 
Among other studies, Camero and Tamarit (2002) analysed the causes of changes in real 
exchange rates, specifically studying the Spanish peseta. They concluded that rising oil prices 
caused the depreciation of the peseta. 
Lemming (2003) studied exchange rate ﬂuctuations in the Nordic power market and 
concluded that within the Nord Pool market, they are possible causes of an additional risk in 
Electricity and Energy Price Interactions in Modern EU Markets                           G. Castagneto-Gissey 
 60 
 
terms of generation costs. In fact, the Ontario Energy Board emphasizes in its report of May 
2008 that the exchange rate is an important factor which can affect Canadian electricity prices 
as generators purchase fuels in U.S. dollars. 
Youseﬁ and Wirjanto (2004) study several OPEC member countries and conclude that there 
is a link between the USD exchange rate  and oil prices. They comment that these countries 
can beneﬁt from a strong USD. 
Narayan et al. (2008) instead provide the conclusion that an increase in the oil price is likely 
to induce an appreciation in Fiji/USD exchange rates. Chen and Chen (2007) focus on the 
long-run relationship between oil prices and real exchanges rates in the G7 nations. They 
suggest that real oil prices can be considered a decent forecaster of the real exchange rate.  
Simpson (2007) shows that daily oil price changes are produced by changes in the global 
stock index and the coal price. In addition, he suggests that movements in oil prices are 
associated with changes in natural gas prices. 
Furthermore, Boyer and Filion (2007) explain the stock returns of oil firms by including 
natural gas factors. In fact, as we will explain, natural gas and oil prices have been closely 
linked, or coupled, for many years. In relation to the EU, Hahn (2007) has analysed the 
impact of shocks in exchange rates sectoral prices in the Euro area. 
In an interesting study, Oberndorfer (2008a) encompasses energy stock returns and volatility 
determinants in Europe and concludes that EU stocks offer a weak performance in times of a 
high volatility in oil prices. 
Studies which aim at examining the impact of local currencies against the exchange rates and 
the oil price on electricity prices are lacking in the current literature. Moreover, this is the 
first study that presents such analysis on a sample of European countries. 
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4.3 Data 
Daily data relative to the price of the OPEC basket of crude oil (see Fig.4.1), for weekdays 
covering the two time frames, January 3, 2005 - September 28, 2007 and January 2, 2008 - 
December 30, 2011, were obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
(source key: OILOPEC).  For the same periods, time series relative to spot prices 
(EUR/MWh or GBP/MWh) of wholesale electricity - for the following countries: France 
(Powernext), Germany (EEX), Italy (GME), The Netherlands (APX), Spain (OMEL), and the 
United Kingdom (APX UK) - and for the EUR/USD or GBP/USD exchange rates were 
obtained from Thomson Reuters. The electricity prices used in this study are the mean of 
hourly wholesale prices, or half-hourly in the case of the British market, APX UK. Five of 
our electricity price series are based on day-ahead auctions, whereas the data from APX UK 
are from continuous bilateral trading until shortly before real time. These prices are therefore 
formed at slightly different times from the oil prices we report; using several lagged variables 
in the regression will capture the potentially varying rate at which information feeds through 
to these prices. 
The choice of the two time frames depends on the intention to study two specific periods: the 
first being one previous to the subprime mortgage crisis, whilst the second time frame depicts 
the period during the crisis, which hit European countries after its origination in the United 
States. The figure below shows our six EU electricity spot prices during 2005-2007. 
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Fig. 4.3 – Behaviour of the European electricity spot prices within the first period, i.e. 
January 2005 - September 2007, including the prices of: Germany, France, United Kingdom, 
Italy, Spain and The Netherlands. 
 
 
As clear from above, electricity spot prices in Europe are very closely linked and are subject 
to particularly large peaks by which prices can jump by tens or even hundreds of percentage 
points.  The second period, on the other hand, can be seen below (2008-2011). 
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Fig. 4.4  – Behaviour of a sample of six European electricity spot prices within the second 
period, i.e. January 2008 - December 2011. These include the spot prices of: Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands. The y-axis denotes the electricity 
price in EUR/MWh, while the x-axis denotes time (2008-11). 
 
 
 
It is possible to note a substantial change in behaviour with EU electricity prices seeming to 
have increased in volatility and levels. The period just after the contagion of the subprime 
crisis on European markets, or the start of the series reported above, shows a noticeable rise 
and fall in prices, with volatility considerably more pronounced than in the first period, 
previously reported. 
In fact, Kazi et al. (2011) estimated the break date of the contagion effect between US stock 
markets and those of sixteen OECD countries  due to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, 
by means of a single break (dynamic conditional correlation GARCH) model. However, this 
date is likely to only be an approximate date for such a sharp break. They found it to be 
exactly the day of October 1
st
, 2007, which conveniently coincides with the end of Munoz 
and Dickey’s (2009) sample period. 
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We intend understanding what forces are driving both electricity spot prices and their 
volatility throughout these two periods. Moreover, we are interested in determining where 
this large volatility transmission into European electricity prices comes from. 
The descriptive statistics relative to the daily return series are shown in Table 4.1. The mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera, Ljung–Box Q tests and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics are also reported. 
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An examination of sample autocorrelations, partial autocorrelations, as well as formal unit 
root tests revealed that the data were non-stationary in levels. Given the stationarity 
requirements of the analysis, the log-returns of each single variable were computed 
(applicable to electricity prices, oil prices and exchange rates).   
Mean returns are quite small, but the corresponding standard deviations are larger, by an 
order of several magnitudes. The distributions of the electricity price returns demonstrate 
high positive skewness and high positive kurtosis, as shown by the highly significant Jarque-
Bera test. Positive skewness suggests significant asymmetric response to positive shocks, 
while the negative skewness values for the oil price returns suggest a greater probability of 
large decreases during the sample period. The returns of the six electricity prices in the two 
periods are reported hereafter. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 – Daily data of electricity price returns covering January 2, 2005 - September 20, 
2007. 
 
 
The high value of kurtosis statistics suggest that extreme price changes occur very frequently. 
The stationarity of the time series data was explored by using informal and formal approaches 
available in the econometrics literature including the autocorrelation functions and unit root 
tests, respectively. Finally, autocorrelation is not anymore present in the log-returns. 
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The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests the null hypothesis that a time series yt is I(1) 
against the alternative that it is trend stationary I(0), assuming that the dynamics in the data 
have an ARMA structure. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 – Daily data of electricity price returns covering January 2, 2008 - December 30, 
2011. 
 
 
 
The ADF test clearly rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in the first differenced series 
without exception at the 1‰ significance level, suggesting that the electricity price returns 
are stationary. The Box-Pierce Q-statistics do not reject autocorrelations up to 20 orders in 
returns. The returns are thus serially autocorrelated and subject to time-varying volatility. 
The evolution of returns of the electricity prices are graphed in Figure 4.5 and 4.6 for the time 
frames 2005-2007 and 2008-2011 respectively, with their shape suggesting that the time 
series are subject to volatility and volatility clustering. 
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4.4 Empirical Models 
The distribution of electricity price returns is asymmetric, as shown by the highly positive 
skewness and leptokurtic values for all the examined countries.  Spanish and Italian 2008-
2011 electricity price data were corrected by removing outliers - identified as values 
exceeding by five standard deviations the autoregressive mean - and were replaced by 
polynomial interpolation. This follows Trück et al. (2007), who observed that the robustness 
of the findings can be improved by removing outliers from the data before applying a test. In 
particular, three points were removed and substituted within the Spanish time series and five 
points within the Italian one. 
Modelling electricity price returns and their volatility consists of two essential steps: the first 
involves the specification of the ARMA(p,q) model for mean returns, comprising specific 
diagnostic tests on the residuals, whilst the second relates to the specification of the GARCH 
(p,q) models for conditional volatility (followed by relative diagnostic tests). 
Seasonality is usually present in electricity spot price data. Therefore, we tried to capture it 
using two deterministic seasonal functions, a weekly and a monthly seasonality, by means of 
daily and monthly dummy variables in both the conditional mean and conditional variance. 
Indeed, the use of monthly variables did not improve and, in some cases, still worsened the 
performance of the model. Therefore, only the daily dummy variables were used. These four 
binary variables which attributed a value of 1 to the day of the week the dummy was 
representing and a value of zero for all other weekdays. Weekends were not considered 
because they are notably display a different behaviour compared to weekdays, thus they were 
not part of the data analysed. We use the log-returns of prices for this analysis. 
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4.4.1 Conditional mean 
We assume that returns follow an AR(1) process with stochastic variance. In fact, the AR(1) 
model provides a better fit than the MA(1) model, given that it exhibits the lower standard 
deviation of the residual series. Furthermore, the residuals correlogram indicates that an 
MA(1) model does not provide a satisfactory fit, as the residual series is clearly not a realistic 
realisation of white noise. 
The model for the mean is reported below: 
𝑧𝑡 = η𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
;   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘                                    [Eq. 4.1] 
where z is the time series, the coefficient δ is the autoregressive parameter,η𝑡 = 𝜃 + λ𝜎
2and 
σ2 is defined in Eq. 4.2. 
After testing the residual series of the model, a significant high order ARCH effect with 
respect to the time series studied was observed and, therefore, a generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedastic model (GARCH) was applied. 
 
4.4.2 Conditional variance 
In the Bollerslev(1986) GARCH(1,1) model, the equation describing the conditional variance 
is specified as follows: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                 [Eq. 4.2] 
where the real valued parameters ω, α and β satisfy the conditions ω> 0, α ≥ 0 and  β ≥ 0 and 
(α + β) < 1. However, in many cases it was shown that the sum of the α and β parameter 
estimates is relatively close to unity and, therefore, the stationarity condition is violated. The 
estimate of β allows for an evaluation of the persistence of the shocks, with an absolute value 
of β<1 ensuring stationarity and ergodicity for the model.   Often, the β parameter estimate is 
too large and mistakenly shows an exaggerate volatility persistence.  
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The GARCH model assumes the conditional variance is a linear function of the lagged 
squared returns. Therefore, one potential short-coming of the GARCH model is the 
assumption that 𝜎𝑡
2 symmetrically responds to news about volatility from the previous period. 
A special case and alternative of a non-linear GARCH (Higgins and Bera, 1992) is given by: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾1𝐺1(𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                                  [Eq. 4.3] 
where ω, α and β are as in Eq. 4.2,  |γ|≥0 and  G1:(0,∞)→[0,1] is an increasing function, 
similar to the cumulative distribution function of a positive continuous random variable. The 
function G1 can be used to allow for a smooth shift in the parameter ω, which determines the 
level of the conditional variance, 𝜎𝑡
2.When 𝜎𝑡−1
2  takes a small value the NGARCH model 
approaches the GARCH(1,1) model and the relation is symmetric. Since the G1 function is 
taken as continuous, the change in the level parameter is smooth, in contrast with the abrupt 
change which is observed in the threshold models. The introduction of this G1 function can 
remove the non-stationary behaviour of the conventional GARCH(1,1) model. 
In order to ensure a well-defined process, all the parameters of the infinite-order ARCH 
representation must be positive. When the γ-parameter, which reflects the leverage effect, is 
estimated to be positive, it implies that negative shocks have a greater impact on the 
conditional volatility compared to positive shocks. 
Both models were estimated by maximum likelihood. Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) 
information criteria were also used to compare the two models. Since information criteria 
penalise models with additional parameters, the AIC and BIC criteria for model order 
selection are based on parsimony as well as goodness of fit. 
To capture the spillover of exchange rate and oil price return volatility into domestic 
electricity price return volatility, in addition to ARCH and GARCH terms, we embed 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity components into the standard GARCH model. Following 
Judge et al. (1985), the functional form of the multiplicative heteroscedasticity employed in 
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this chapter is exponential. The estimator of the variance of the error is the expected value of 
the square of the errors 
𝜖2 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑥2𝑡                                                     [Eq. 4.4] 
Eq. 4.4 can be easily estimated using OLS, and where 𝜖 has a mean of zero and is 
independent of x by assumption. 
In Eq. 4.4, the coefficients 𝜑𝑖 denote the effect of external factors, namely exchange rate and 
oil price returns, on the electricity price volatility. One of the advantages of using the 
exponential function for conditional volatility is that it rules out the possibility of negative 
variance.  
The estimates of 𝜑1and 𝜑2 capture the spillover of the external factor volatility into the 
conditional variance. and therefore, in our case, the effect of the exchange rate and oil price 
returns on the volatility of the domestic electricity price returns
14
. 
The introduction of weekly dummy variables in the conditional variance resulted in the lack 
of identifiability of the GARCH models due to a flat likelihood surface that gave rise to 
numerical instabilities in the estimation of the parameters. Therefore, we did not study the 
effect of the weekly seasonality on the conditional variance. 
 
4.4.3 Sign and Value Expectations of Model Parameters 
For the oil price, for example, a 10% increase would lead to a 2% direct increase in power 
prices, if oil-fired power stations set the market price in 20% of the hours – assuming power 
prices are directly proportional to the cost of the marginal fuel.  If gas-fired stations set the 
price in another 40% of hours, and the price of gas is directly indexed to that of oil, we would 
                                                          
14
 Both effects may be due to the fact that most coal is imported, except for German lignite, and so is quite a lot 
of gas, excluding UK and gas domestic production. Both prices are denominated in USD, thus any estimated 
relationship may be equally attributable to coal as well as oil/gas. Coal prices did increase substantially between 
2005-7 and fell also substantially from 2008 onwards due to supply and demand factors. 
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get an overall effect of a 6% increase, and a coefficient of 0.6.  The coefficient would be 
lower if gas prices were only partially linked to those of oil. 
We measure the exchange rate in terms of EUR (or GBP) per USD.  This implies that an 
increase in our variable (which implies a depreciation of the EUR) will lead to an increase in 
the price of electricity (as imported fuel becomes more expensive) and so the sign should also 
be positive.  A 10% depreciation of the exchange rate would lead to a 10% rise in the 
domestic oil price, all else being equal, which would feed through to a 2% increase in power 
prices, as above; however, the exchange rate would also affect the domestic cost of coal 
priced in dollars and so the coefficient might be greater than that for the oil price. 
The combined effect of fuel price and exchange rate should be additional in terms of ARCH-
in-mean. For example, if the oil price increases by 20% from $60/barrel to $72/barrel and 
meanwhile there is a 10% depreciation of the EUR against the USD (from EUR 1 per USD to 
EUR 1.1 per USD), then the local cost of the oil per barrel would be €79.20 instead of €60, 
which corresponds to an overall price increase of 32%.  
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4.5 Results 
The time courses of the European electricity spot prices for the time frames 2005-2007 and 
2008-2011 are reported in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. The natural-logs of the daily 
electricity spot price returns for the time period 2005-2007 are depicted in Figure 4.5, while 
those referring to the interval 2008-2011 are shown in Figure 4.6. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.4 present the estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values for the 
conditional mean equations of AR-GARCH and AR-NGARCH models, along with the log 
likelihood, AIC and BIC and Q-test, for the two periods of time under inspection (2005-2007 
and 2008-2011, respectively). Similarly, the results relative to each of the two GARCH 
specifications are reported in Tables 4.3 (time frame 2005-2007) and 4.5 (2008-2011). In all 
models, the lags of the dependent variables are included as exogenous variables for the 
underlying equations. 
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As shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.5, the volatility of the exchange rates and oil price returns 
significantly affects domestic electricity price return volatility and, in some cases, also its 
mean (see Tables 4.2 and 4.4).  In the first period, the positive sign and significant t-statistic 
for the coefficient on the exchange rate, within the mean equation for the Italian case, 
indicates that the appreciation of the EUR against the USD leads to a lower electricity price 
in that country, as expected.  In contrast, there is a statistically significant, and anomalous, 
negative correlation between the level of the oil price and electricity prices in The 
Netherlands.  The contribution of natural gas in electricity production is quickly growing in 
The Netherlands and in 2009 represented about 60% of its total production. In order to fulfill 
the Kyoto Protocol commitments, the use of natural gas is growing within the country while 
the share of coal-fired electricity production is progressively decreasing; in fact, coal 
contribution accounted for 40% of total electricity generation in 1990 and decreased to 25% 
in 2009
15
. 
The Netherlands is the largest gas producer in Europe (National report on the Dutch Energy 
Regime, 2008) and over 60% of electricity stems from natural gas‐fired generation. 
Seasonality in prices is due to the dependence of electricity demand on weather conditions as 
well as on social and economic activities, with consequently different holiday and seasonal 
effects. The relevance of periodicity is acknowledged for instance by Wilkinson and Winsen 
(2002) and Hernáez et al. (2004) who show that the pattern of prices varies across day-types. 
For instance, the Monday effect refers to the well-known tendency for stock prices to fall on 
Mondays; a similar behaviour is also present in electricity spot prices. Wang and Ramsay 
(1998) note also that electricity price values at weekends and public holidays are generally 
lower and less fluctuating. The daily periodicity positively affects the electricity price returns 
                                                          
15
 This is possibly because Netherlands are the second largest producer in the EEA after Norway and are larger 
than the UK. Their gas is denominated in EUR and they export it to both the UK and Germany. In the former 
case, this would make the GBP/EUR exchange relevant in the analysis. 
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in most examined markets, even though there also are some negative influences. This implies 
that different days are associated with different electricity price behaviour. 
The ARCH-M test shows that the volatility of electricity prices affected their level only in 
Italy in the first period. The conditional variance is significantly influenced by the EUR/USD 
exchange rate returns for Spain - in agreement with the findings of Muñoz and Dickey (2005) 
in spite of the different methodological approach used - by the oil price returns for both 
Germany and UK and by both exchange rate and oil price returns for Italy and The 
Netherlands, although the magnitude of the effect, i.e. the spillover, is different among the 
countries.  
If we consider the second time frame, i.e. the period 2008-2011 (Table 4.2), the level of 
electricity prices is only affected by the level of the exchange rate in the UK. 
The level of the oil price has a statistically significant effect for Italy.  For France and Spain, 
the t-statistics resulting from the one-period lagged ARCH-M test are significant for both 
GARCH models, indicating that there is statistical evidence implying the conditional variance 
affects the conditional mean in those countries (alone). 
Instead, as far as the conditional variance is concerned, the ARCH (α) and GARCH (β) 
parameters are positive and significant in both models, indicating the presence of ARCH and 
GARCH effects in the conditional variance equations. The highest own-innovation or ARCH 
spillovers (𝛼) are observed for Germany and Spain, indicating the presence of strong ARCH 
effects. The lagged volatility or GARCH spillovers (𝛽) are also significant for all countries, 
but larger in magnitude for Italy and UK. In addition, the GARCH parameters for the Spanish 
electricity market exceed unity implying that the model is not stationary for the presence of a 
unit root in the conditional variance; past shocks do not dissipate but persist for very long 
periods of time. 
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The GARCH model assumes that the conditional variance is governed by a linear 
autoregressive process of past squared returns and variances. Although this model is able to 
capture heteroscedasticity and volatility clustering, excess kurtosis with fat tails and the 
leverage effect of conditional distribution cannot be described by the classical GARCH 
model. Accordingly, in the present study the log likelihood, AIC and BIC criteria provide 
evidence that augmenting the GARCH model with leverage terms enhances the model’s 
performance. In fact, the sum of the NGARCH parameters α, β and γ is always lower than 
one, indicating model goodness. 
The parameter for the asymmetric volatility response (γ) is negative and significant for all the 
examined countries, representative of an asymmetric response to positive innovations in the 
conditional variance equation. This result is generally consistent with the skewness values 
reported in Table 4.1 and reflects the conditions that electricity price volatility tends to rise in 
response to positive spikes. 
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4.6 Discussion 
This section emphasizes the main findings of this study. The next section discusses the 
effects of the financial crisis on electricity prices in Europe, whereas section 4.6.2 provides 
the main policy implications. 
In the time period 2005-2007, the effect of exchange rate returns volatility on electricity price 
return volatility was significant only for Italy, The Netherlands and Spain, but became 
significant for all the examined countries within the time frame 2008-2011. This increased 
volatility transmission may reflect the greater correlation between a wide variety of markets 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis contagion.  There was also more volatility to 
transmit: the coefficient of variation of the daily EUR/USD exchange rate rose by a third 
between the two periods, while that for the GBP/USD rate doubled. 
Exchange rate log-returns only had a statistically significant effect on the Italian electricity 
price level in the first period.  In the second period, we find significant coefficients for France 
and for The Netherlands. This divergence is surprising, given the strong process of price 
convergence which has been observed among the electricity markets of The Netherlands, 
Germany and France (see Dijkgraaf and Jansen, 2007).  
For Italy, Netherlands and Spain, at least within the period 2005-2007, oil price return 
volatility significantly affected the volatility of electricity prices. This is not surprising given 
the importance of fossil fuels in European electricity production, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
The better performance of the NGARCH- over the GARCH-model indicates that the effect of 
exchange rates and oil prices on electricity price volatility is asymmetric. The negative 
asymmetry parameter can be interpreted as an inverse leverage effect (Knittel and Roberts 
2005 and Janczura and Weron 2010), implying that exchange rate and oil price increases 
have a clear negative impact on electricity price volatility while exchange rate and oil price 
decreases do not significantly affect the electricity price. 
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A volatile environment weakens the effect on price level changes since it reduces the 
surprise.  While there is no literature regarding the asymmetric effects of the EUR exchange 
rate against the USD, the presence of asymmetric effects of oil prices on electricity price 
volatility was previously described by Hadsell et al. (2004) and Higgs and Worthington 
(2005). 
It is interesting to note that, in spite of the different methods used to measure the electricity 
price volatility, our study exhibits a similar outcome for the Spanish electricity price volatility 
to that previously shown by Muñoz and Dickey (2005), i.e. the volatility of Spanish 
electricity spot prices was affected by the EUR/USD exchange rate. In relation to the 
different approaches, while we used GARCH models to assess the conditional variance and 
the conditional mean of electricity price returns, Muñoz and Dickey (2005) defined the 
current time volatility as the squared difference of present and one-period lagged electricity 
prices, to then apply a vector error correction model. 
The few other studies reported in the literature regarding the effect of oil prices and/or 
exchange rates on electricity price volatility reach differing results. Mohammadi (2009) did 
not find a long-term relationship between oil and US electricity prices. In contrast, Narayan et 
al. (2008) observed that previous values of oil price and USD/EUR exchange rates affect the 
evolution of future values of the exchange rate, both in terms of levels and volatility. 
Future studies including a larger number of countries where there is a working electricity spot 
market to set the price, such as those in Latin America, Australia and New Zealand, might 
help to clarify the role of these or other countries’ currencies exchange rate against the USD 
and that of the oil price in the conditional variance and the conditional mean of the electricity 
price.  
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4.6.1 The 2008 financial crisis: determinants of exchange rates and oil prices 
This study showed that after the financial crisis of 2008, volatility transmission between 
European electricity prices and both oil prices and the USD/EUR (or USD/GBP) exchange 
rate increased visibly. Furthermore, there was a considerable decrease in the asymmetry of 
these responses, down by 54% in absolute terms, after the financial crisis of 2008. This 
represents the first study considering the asymmetric effects of the EUR exchange rate 
against the USD. It also represents the only work up to date which studies the combined 
effect on electricity prices of exchange rates and oil prices. Only a very few studies have 
previously focused on the role of either exchange rates, or oil prices, on electricity prices.  
We now devote our focus to the determinants of our oil prices and exchange rates during the 
crisis of 2008. 
 
4.6.1.1 Exchange rates 
Kohler (2010) finds noteworthy insights into the behaviour of exchange rates during different 
financial crises. According to the study, exchange rate movements during the global 
downturn of 2007-09 were unusual and different compared to those occurred during other 
crises such as the Asian 1997-8 crisis, or the Russian debt default crisis of 1998. In fact, 
during the crisis of 2007-09, many countries which were not at the centre of the crisis saw 
their currencies brusquely depreciate (see Fig.4.1). The author notes that these financial 
crisis-linked movements were strongly reversed shortly after a large depreciation, in a large 
number of countries. Two factors are likely to have instigated these reversions. Firstly, during 
the 2007-09 financial crisis, ‘safe haven’ effects went in opposition to the characteristic 
pattern of flows associated with the crisis. Secondly, interest rate differentials are observed to 
explain considerably more of the crisis-related movements of exchange rate in 2008–9 
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compared to the past. The latter most likely reflects structural changes in the determinants of 
exchange rate dynamics as, for example, the increased role of carry trade activity. 
Past work on exchange rate movements during financial crises mainly focused on the 
unexpected and extraordinary appreciation of the USD (e.g., McCauley and McGuire, 2009; 
McGuire and von Peter, 2009). 
Financial crises are usually related with exchange rate movements which reflect both an 
increased level of risk aversion as well as substantial changes in the investors’ perception of 
risk when investing in certain currencies. 
Kohler (2010) also notes how the 2007 global financial crises was different from other crises, 
including with regard to exchange rate movements. Many different currencies, although not 
at the centre of the crisis, substantially depreciated and reversed within a year (e.g., the 
Japanese Yen, against the US dollar). As previously mentioned, safe haven flows and interest 
differentials can explain some of these exchange rate movements. It should be noted that 
uncertainty and risk aversion can lead to safe haven flows. In addition, option prices suggest 
that the Yen, the Swiss franc and to a lesser extent, the USD were perhaps considered as safe 
havens. Non-safe haven currencies depreciate during crises and are also likely to appreciate 
when risk aversion abates, unless country-specific risk remains. Furthermore, in 2008, high-
interest currencies depreciated more. This link between exchange rate depreciations and 
higher interest rates during the crisis intensified over time. 
 
4.6.1.2 Oil prices 
Having explained what might have been the causes of exchange rate movements during the 
crisis of 2007-9, we now focus on the determinants of oil price changes. 
Crude oil is an internationally traded commodity, quoted in USD, and controlled by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As such, changes in the oil price can 
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derive from internationally agreed oil supply cuts by OPEC. Tamvakis and Lin (2010), for 
example, study the effect of OPEC announcements on crude oil prices. They observe post-
announcement effects on return expectations by investigating accumulated deviations from 
average returns in rolling time-windows surrounding announcements. 
Fig. 4.1 shows the large spike in oil prices occurred at the start of 2008. Was this a bubble? In 
order to understand whether it was a bubble or not, we shall consider the two main 
explanations of the 2008 increase in oil prices – these are the peak oil theory and the 
fundamentals theory. 
The peak oil theory derived from the explanations and predictions offered by geologist M. 
King Hubbert in 1956. According to his theory, global oil production was expected to reach a 
peak sometime during the first decade of the 21
st
 century. After that peak, however, the 
production of crude oil will progressively fall, never to rise again. He stated that the world 
will not run out of energy as countries will devote their resources in the production of energy 
with alternative energy sources. More specifically, Hubbert predicted that the peak would 
occur in the early 1970s. Until 1970, almost no one accepted Hubbert’s predictions. As that 
decade began, his predictions turned out to be correct (Deffeyes, 2008). The calculations by 
Hubbert were based on decreasing oil reserves
16
. Thus, this explanation can be interpreted as 
a consequence of the world running out of oil. The latter gradually decreases the supply of 
oil, thereby providing progressively higher price levels.  
The fundamentals theory, on the other hand, states that the oil price rise was triggered by the 
normal interaction of demand and supply (e.g., Verleger, 2005; Lipsky, 2009). As Khan 
(2009) notes, the fundamentalists argued that the increased financialisation of commodity 
markets in the period 2006-8 and, in particular the oil industry, provided speculation trading 
                                                          
16
 See Maugeri (2006) for a insightful presentation of Hubbert’s theory. 
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which in turn increased oil prices greatly beyond their long-run equilibrium level (Hamilton, 
2009). 
It should be noted that notwithstanding Hubbert’s success in predicting the occurrence of the 
oil price peak of the early 1970s, the peak oil theory only relates to the long-run and thus 
cannot explain oil price movements in the short-term. In addition, as Khan (2009) notes, the 
theory implies that the sudden fall in oil prices after its 2008 peak was due to a sudden 
discovery of novel oil reserves, which was clearly not the case. Hamilton (2009) also notes 
how this sharp fall in prices cannot reflect the scarcity rent hypothesis. 
The major argument of the fundamentals view is represented by the unresponsiveness of 
demand and supply to changes in oil prices, implying that markets are able to clear only when 
large changes in prices are followed by small changes in demand. Given that global GDP 
growth was very fast during 2007 and 2008 relative to previous years, as well as that supply 
was relatively constant due to capacity constraints, oil prices were then expected to be rising. 
Khan (2009) finally concludes that “while market fundamentals obviously played a role in 
the general run-up in the oil prices from 2003 on, it is fair to conclude by looking at a variety 
of indicators that speculation drove an oil price bubble in the first half of 2008. Absent 
speculative activities, the oil price would probably have been [much lower]”. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
The present study investigates the effect of daily exchange rate returns and crude oil spot 
price returns on the electricity spot price return for a sample of European countries. The EU 
countries investigated were selected on the basis of their national currency (EUR/USD or 
GBP/USD) and their dependency on fossil fuels for electricity production, with France, Spain 
and Germany using more nuclear, hydro and alternative sources than UK, the Netherlands 
and Italy. Furthermore, Spain was also chosen in order to provide terms of comparison with 
the results reported in Muñoz and Dickey (2005).  
We show that there is in many cases a transmission of volatility between both the exchange 
rate and the oil price returns towards the price return of wholesale electricity and that, for 
some countries, the level of the electricity price return is also affected by changes in the 
exchange rate and oil price returns. The effects become greater for all the countries studied in 
the time frame 2008-2011, likely as a consequence of the economic crisis that struck the 
Eurozone after contagion derived from the US subprime mortgage crisis. 
A volatile wholesale price that will be passed through to electricity consumers implies 
significant risks to their bills.  It is also unattractive to most low-carbon generators whose 
costs are not linked to fossil fuel prices.  Ensuring that payments to these generators are 
largely de-linked from the overall level of power prices (as with Feed-in-Tariffs or the UK 
government’s proposed Electricity Market Reform) would reduce risks for generators and 
consumers alike. 
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Chapter 5 
Electricity and Energy Forward Market 
Interactions: An Assessment of ETS Phase II 
 
 
Another important factor which may affect the electricity price is the price of carbon 
emissions. This chapter studies the interactions between electricity prices and carbon EUA 
prices in the major four European year-ahead energy markets, during Phase II of the EU 
Emission Trading System. The study of this relationship is able to provide interesting 
conclusions on the level of competition prevailing across EU electricity markets. 
Chapter 5 specifically looks at how EU generators of electricity integrated the cost of 
carbon emissions into their electricity prices. VAR and Granger-causality analysis are used 
to analyse the causal interactions of a sample of electricity prices, whereas the volatility of 
these prices is studied with basic and asymmetric AR-GARCH models. Among the main 
results, the marginal rate at which carbon prices feed into electricity prices is shown to be 
ca. 135% in the EEX and Nord Pool markets, where electricity and carbon prices display 
bidirectional causality. Therefore, electricity generators internalized the actual cost of freely 
allotted emission allowances into their electricity prices considerably more than the 
proportionate increase in costs deriving from effective carbon intensity. Moreover, electricity 
prices in France and United Kingdom are found to Granger-cause the carbon price. This 
study also shows how European prices for electricity remain deeply linked to coal prices 
among other factors, both in terms of levels and volatility, regardless of the underlying fuel 
mix. Policies concerning the impacts of carbon and coal prices on electricity prices are likely 
to be crucial in limiting the externalities involved in the transition to a low-carbon system. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The commitments of the EU in relation to the Kyoto Protocol (1997) resulted in the 
introduction of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The European 
carbon market, launched in 2005, is a relatively young market and the most important carbon 
emissions trading scheme in the world. Emissions trading schemes, as well as carbon taxes, 
work by raising the cost of generating electricity from burning fossil fuels so that the more 
polluting the technology is, the greater its variable cost. This should induce a transition of 
electricity generation towards technologies with low carbon intensity and eventually, to a 
renewable system. 
However, the over-allocation of free emission permits starting from 2005 until 2012 was 
ultimately the cause of severe market distortions. In fact, a major characteristic of the first 
phase of the EU ETS was that almost all emission allowances were allocated for free to the 
installations covered by the scheme. During the pilot phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007), more 
than 2.2 billion allowances of 1 tonne each were allocated each year (EC, 2005). At average 
current market prices for 2005, this represented a social value of approximately € 40 billion 
p.a., ca. 60% of which is allocated to the power sector (Sijm et al., 2006). 
The generous rounds of free allocation, which continued during Phase II (2008-12), not only 
provided windfall profits to EU power generators, but also proved detrimental to the 
incentives for producers to abandon carbon intensive generation. In fact, the carbon market 
crashed at the end of Phase I and resulted in an extremely low carbon price due to emission 
measurement problems that led to an overestimation of industrial emissions, on which 
allowance allocation was based. 
Since 2008, an increasing number of studies have focused on the analysis of the EU ETS. 
Studies such as Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) and Chevallier (2009) focused on 
the drivers of electricity and carbon prices, respectively. Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 
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(2010), were the first to analyse the interplay between energy prices during Phase I. They 
also considered the first of five years of Phase II, in the context of the French Powernext, 
albeit that market alone. However, as Phase I (2005-2007) is widely considered a ‘learning’ 
Phase, given the excessive over-allocation of free emission permits, and Phase III was only 
recently launched (i.e. January 2013), Phase II (2008-2012) currently remains the only 
complete and potentially useful period available to us in the examination of electricity and 
carbon price interactions in Europe. Nevertheless, it is still important to note that the effects 
of the stages of overallocation, which resulted in the carbon market crashing, still remain in 
the market. This implies that market participants were subject to great uncertainty and that 
electricity prices were consequentially even harder to predict. 
The relationship between carbon and electricity prices unveils important information on the 
structure of an electricity market. As a marginal cost of electricity, competitive power 
generators should integrate the carbon price into their electricity prices. The marginal rate at 
which carbon prices are passed onto consumers is commonly referred to as the “pass-
through” rate of carbon prices into electricity prices and relates to the traditional concept of 
competitive cost abatement. Bonacina and Gulli (2007) theoretically demonstrate that the 
marginal opportunity costs of carbon prices should be fully internalized in power prices when 
the electricity market is perfectly competitive. From an empirical point of view, Sijm et al. 
(2006) conclude that pass-through rates generally varied from 40 to 100 percent during Phase 
I. Moreover, Jouvet and Solier (2009) found that pass-through rates are visible during Phase I 
but cannot were not observable during Phase II, possibly as a result of the economic crisis 
that struck Europe in 2008. Economic theory suggests that, in many sectors, businesses will 
pass on their extra costs through to consumers and thus earn net profits as a result of the 
impact on product prices combined with the extensive free allocations of emission allowances 
(Smale et al., 2006). 
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Since the launch of the EU ETS, the relationship between electricity and carbon prices has 
been subject of thorough debates. Researchers reach differing conclusions on the direction of 
causation between electricity prices and carbon prices. It is therefore not clear whether 
electricity prices cause changes in the carbon price, or vice-versa. Moreover, there is a lack of 
studies analyzing this relationship for the entire duration of Phase II and comparing the major 
electricity markets in Europe. 
This study investigates the causal interactions between carbon prices and the electricity prices 
of Nord Pool (i.e. Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark), United Kingdom, France and 
Germany, during Phase II of the EU Emission Trading System. By doing so, it determines the 
relationships between carbon and electricity prices and, where possible, the marginal rates at 
which carbon prices feed into electricity prices are derived. In addition, it provides an 
analysis of how fuel prices and forecasts of economic activity, as reflected in stock market 
indices, affect European electricity prices in terms of levels and volatility. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main 
concepts related to this study. Section 5.3 describes the market data used, section 5.4 outlines 
the main methodologies, whereas section 5.5 reports the main results. Section 5.6 discusses 
the results, compares the four European markets and provides policy implications. Finally, 
Section 5.7 summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper. 
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5.2 Background 
This section describes the main concepts related to the present analysis. Firstly, an overview 
of European electricity markets during Phase II (2008-12) is given, focusing on the employed 
electricity generation processes. The next section describes the theories of long-run cost 
abatement and the causal relationship directing from electricity to carbon prices, which this 
paper empirically investigates. 
 
5.2.1 European Electricity Markets 
During Phase II, the member states comprising the EU-27 mainly relied on nuclear energy 
(28%) coal, lignite and other solid fuels (20%), natural and derived gas (19%), renewable 
sources (18%),  oil (13%), and other fuels (2%), to generate electricity (Eurostat, 2011). The 
figure below (Fig. 5.1) depicts electricity generation by fuel for each of the studied markets. 
 
        
Fig. 5.1 – The selected countries’ electricity generation fuel mix (2011). Source: World Bank 
(Germany, France and UK shares) and ENTSO-E Memo (Nord Pool). 
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More specifically, Germany mainly used coal (46%), and natural gas (14%). France, instead, 
generates electricity mostly using nuclear power (79%), but also employs some coal (4%) and 
natural gas (4%). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was largely based on natural gas 
(40%) and coal-fired generation (30%) (World Bank, 2011). Finally, the Nord Pool market 
mainly used hydro (53%) and nuclear power (21%) for electricity generation, as well as some 
fossil fuels (15%) (Entso-E Memo, 2011). 
The carbon scheme is subdivided in different trading periods. The second trading period (i.e. 
in 2007), which ran from January 2008 to December 2012, coincided with the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The third phase began in January 2013 and will 
terminate by December 2020, and represents a turn to auctioning of the majority of permits as 
opposed to their previous free allocation. It also provides a harmonization of the rules in 
relation to the remaining permit allocations, as well as the inclusion of other important 
greenhouse gases (among which are nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons). 
This paper relates to Phase II of the EU ETS carbon market (2008-12). The following graph 
shows the behaviour of the carbon one-year forward price during the entire duration of       
Phase II. 
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Fig. 5.2 – The behaviour of the EU ETS Phase II carbon forward price (2008-12). 
 
Phase II presented a step towards the abolition of free allocation in favor of auctioning with a 
sharp decrease in the number of free permits
17
. In fact, the Phase II forward price rose over 
EUR 25 per metric ton of carbon dioxide during the first half of 2008, almost reaching 30 
EUR/MT. The price then crashed from July 2008. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gave two main reasons for this fall in the value 
of carbon permits: reduced output in energy intensive sectors due to the economic recession
18
 
and the fact that the European markets’ perception of future fuel prices was revised 
downwards (UNFCCC, 2009), as we will see later by inspecting the gas and coal forward 
prices, which followed a similar behaviour. 
 
5.2.2 Theoretical Background & Previous Work 
This section analyses the previous work on the interactions between electricity and carbon 
allowance prices since the establishment of the EU ETS. These mainly regard: the influence 
                                                          
17
 Nevertheless, the proportion of free permits still accounted for over 90% of toal permits. 
18
 This implies that a lower extent to abatement is required to meet the cap, thereby providing a decrease in the 
carbon price.  
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of the carbon price on the electricity price and the inverse situation, in which causality runs 
from the electricity price to the carbon price. These underlying theories are discussed 
hereafter. 
 
5.2.2.1 Carbon price effect on electricity prices 
The long-run cost abatement, or “pass-through”, effect relates to the percentage of the carbon 
price which is, in fact, passed-through to the electricity price, representing a causal effect 
running from the carbon price to the electricity price. In such a scenario, the price of carbon 
emission enters the generators’ balance as an effective cost and is thereby attached to each 
carbon intensive unit utilized to produce electricity. As Sijm et al. (2005) note, the use of 
carbon allowances carries an opportunity cost, given that increased profits are foregone by 
selling these permits, regardless of whether they were allocated free of expense or purchased 
at auctions. A fully competitive electricity market is expected to deliver a pass-through rate 
of 100%, which is the case with internalization of any costs incurred in the generation 
process. Since the start of Phase I, there have been large debates in relation to the 
applicability and empirical findings of this theory. This was primarily due to the fact that 
power producers were experiencing large abnormal profits due to the free allocation of 
emission allowances. In the case of the German electricity market, econometric simulations 
by Sijm et al. (2005, 2006) found a pass-through rate on the EEX electricity price of about 
80%. Other markets exhibited a slightly lighter effect, though still at a minimum of 60%. 
Empirical support for this measure was provided in various studies, however most of these 
considering Phase I of the EU ETS. Bunn and Fezzi (2009) were the first to address this issue 
by using equilibrium models. They estimated a VECM including electricity, carbon and gas 
prices, finding that the carbon price affects the electricity price in the United Kingdom, both 
in the short-run and long-run equilibria. Fell (2010) similarly finds a positive carbon price 
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pass-through effect across all Nordic countries. On the other hand, by using gas as an 
explanatory variable in a VECM for Germany, Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) 
provided evidence of an asymmetric pass-through effect, implying that rising carbon prices 
had a larger magnitude of effect on the electricity price compared to falling prices. Keppler 
and Mansanet-Bataller (2010), on the other hand, used several bivariate VARs and Granger 
causality tests to find a significant pass-through effect in France during Phase I, whilst not in 
Phase II. As shown by Jouvet and Solier (2011), pass-through rates were generally hard to 
detect during Phase II. Furthermore, at a price of EUR 15/tCO2 and average emissions of 
800g CO2/kWh, German power companies would collectively need to spend about EUR 1bn 
p.a. on allowance purchases, or slightly less if they are able to cut emission levels, but would 
still receive more than EUR 5bn p.a. resulting from the power market incorporating the 
opportunity costs of carbon emissions (Carbon Trust, 2007). 
 
5.2.2.2 Electricity price effect on carbon prices 
Whereas the pass-through theory relates to the effect of the carbon price on the electricity 
price, the inverse situation happens in the short-run, when carbon abatements cannot be 
performed, aside from running gas instead of coal-fired stations, and entails the power 
producers increasing their output by using more carbon allowances. Some authors have 
reported the causal link directing from the electricity price toward the carbon price. For 
example, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) show how the electricity price directly and 
significantly impacts on the carbon price in Phase II (although, only one year of data was 
employed). Moreover, Nazifi and Milunovich (2010) isolate the influence of the Nord Pool 
electricity price on the carbon price using a VAR model for Phase I. However, Phase II is not 
analysed in this study. Some of these authors refer to the causal link running from the 
electricity price to the carbon price as proof of the so-called ‘short-term rent capture theory’. 
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This theory refers to the scenario in which selling allowances on the carbon market results in 
an opportunity cost for electricity generators with a degree of market power. As the author 
notes, in avoiding producing in order to sell allowances, these producers give up their 
electricity market rent. Thus selling allowances also entails an opportunity cost which may be 
passed through to the carbon price (Convery et al., 2008). 
The extensive allocation of free permits affected costs in different ways. In fact, free permit 
issuance does not affect average costs at the level of output compatible with free allocation. 
Given the absence of an increase in average costs and the increased marginal costs of 
production, this scenario implies an increase in the levels of profits by electricity producers, 
at each level of output, thereby increasing total profits (Keppler and Cruciani, 2010)
19
. 
 
Fig. 5.3 -An increase in marginal costs implies higher monopolistic profits deriving from free 
permit allocations. Q’ is the output level corresponding to free allocation. 
 
The above figure (Fig.5.3) shows how monopolistic profits increase due to free permit 
allocation. The fact that permits are free of expense implies that average costs increase to a 
much lesser extent compared to the proportional increase in marginal costs. The fact that the 
average cost curve fails to increase by the right amount, in proportion to the marginal cost 
                                                          
19
 However, this may only occur if power prices rise with marginal costs. 
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rise, implies a larger amount of profit to be gained by the electricity producer.  The increase 
in profits is given by the difference between the two areas (P’,D,AC’,c’)-(P,D,AC,c)>0. In 
this situation, the electricity output has decreased from Q to Q’ whereas the price level has 
increased from P to P’. As can be seen from the graph, there is reason to believe that the 
change in profits can be small
20
. Therefore, as opposed to authors such as Keppler and 
Mansanet-Bataller (2010) who attribute this effect to the short-term rent capture theory
21
, we 
will refer to the causal link directed from the electricity price to the carbon price as a purely 
statistical relation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 The increase in profits is small if we consider a simple model with the demand, average costs, marginal costs 
and marginal revenue curves assumed to behave according to standard shapes, as those shown in Fig.2. 
21
 Ellerman (2010) introduced the short-term rent capture theory. This theory refers to the scenario in which 
selling allowances on the carbon market results in an opportunity cost for electricity generators with a degree of 
market power (Keppler, 2010). As Bertrand (2011) notes, in avoiding to produce in order to sell allowances, 
these producers have to give up their rent in the electricity market. Thus selling allowances also entails an 
opportunity cost that may be passed through to the carbon price. 
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5.3 Data Analysis 
This section introduces the time series data used in this study and analyses their stationarity 
properties. It then describes the main econometric techniques employed in this study, i.e. 
Vector autoregression and Granger-causality. Finally, the GARCH models used to analyse 
the volatility interactions between our variables and the electricity prices are introduced. 
 
5.3.1 Data Choice and Description 
We consider the forward power market, specifically the year-ahead market where, for 
example, electricity delivered in 2014 is traded during every weekday of the year 2013. The 
data runs from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012 (ie, 1,304 data points), covering the 
full length of EU ETS Phase II. All data were obtained from Bloomberg and transformed in 
EUR/MWh
22
. The choice of considering year-ahead markets relates to the fact that spot, or 
day-ahead, prices are contaminated by demand changes, on a daily basis, that long-period 
forward prices are hardly affected by. The movement of privatization, which occurred in the 
UK at the start of the 1990s, was followed by most European markets. As Green (1999) 
points out, since then, generators have covered most of their sales in the contract market. 
Conventional generators can raise spot prices well above their marginal costs, yielding large 
levels of profits, in the absence of a contract market. However, if fully hedged, generators 
effectively lose their incentives to raise prices above marginal costs; however, competition in 
the contract market can lead power producers to sell contracts for much of their output. 
Daily data relative to gas, coal and carbon one-year forward prices were selected to explain 
the electricity prices of the four major European markets, namely those of: Germany 
                                                          
22
 Except for the carbon price, which is kept in EUR/metric ton of CO2, in order to take into account the carbon 
intensity of the different generation units (such as coal and gas possess different carbon contents). 
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(European Energy Exchange, EEX), France (Powernext), United Kingdom (APX UK)
23
 and 
the Nord Pool system price (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark). 
Fig.5.4, reports the time courses relative to the one-year forward prices of electricity for the 
four considered markets: 
 
Fig.5.4 – The behavior of the 4 electricity forward prices during EU ETS Phase II (2008-12), 
i.e. Germany, France, UK and Nord Pool 
 
The highest electricity prices (in EUR) in the period 2008-12 are those in the United 
Kingdom (on average, ca. 62 EUR/MWh), with the exception of the years 2009-2010 in 
which they overlapped with French forward prices (57 EUR/MWh). Electricity prices in 
Germany (55 EUR/MWh) are slightly lower than those in France, whereas the lowest prices 
during Phase II are those prevailing in the Nord Pool market, at around 44 EUR/MWh. A 
likely reason for the low prices of Nord Pool is explained by their relatively lower marginal 
                                                          
23
 The electricity spot markets from which forward contracts are priced are based on day-ahead auctions, 
whereas APX UK uses continuous bilateral trading until shortly before real time. This consideration is made 
given the clear dependence of forward electricity prices on the relative day-ahead price. In addition, British 
prices are formed every half hour, as opposed to Norway, Germany and France which instead provide hourly 
markets. 
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costs, as a consequence of their exclusive use of hydropower and nuclear for baseload 
electricity generation. 
The natural gas forward price data are from three of the major European natural gas trading 
hubs, i.e. Bunde (situated in Bunde/Oude at the Dutch-German border, EEX), the Title 
Transfer Facility (TTF, or the Dutch hub) and the National Balancing Point (NBP, the British 
hub). The Dutch forward price is used in the model for France, whereas the NBP price is used 
for United Kingdom
24
. In the models for Germany and Nord Pool the Bunde gas price is 
employed, given that Norway, a major gas supplier, exports its gas mainly to Germany, but 
also to the UK and slightly less to France. 
 
 
Fig. 5.5 – The behaviour of the NBP, EEX and TTF natural gas forward prices. 
 
The above figure (Fig.5.5) depicts the three natural gas prices employed in our models. 
Clearly, the NBP price (United Kingdom) assumes a slightly different behaviour compared to 
the other gas prices, TTF and Bunde, which are visibly more related given that they are 
formed in areas which are more closely linked. 
                                                          
24
 Please see Appendix Figs.5A.1-5A.4 for the diagrams illustrating electricity and fuel forward prices, for each 
of the studied markets. 
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By coal, we refer to the internationally traded commodity classified as coal CIF API2, or the 
first-year Generic CIF ARA steam coal price
25
, delivered to the ARA region, which 
represents a European coal price benchmark. The figure below shows the behaviour of the 
coal price over the period 2008-12. 
 
 
Fig. 5.6 – The behaviour of the ARA CIF coal forward price (2008-12). 
 
As previously mentioned, a reason for the deep fall in carbon prices during the period 2008-
2009 was represented by the adverse economic outlook, deriving from the subprime crisis. In 
fact, this study also employs data relative to the four countries’ respective national stock 
market indexes given that, in contrast with day-ahead prices, which strictly depend on 
temperatures, year-ahead prices rather depend on future economic activity
26
. These are the: 
DAX Index (Germany), CAC Index (France), FTSE-100 Index (United Kingdom) and OBX 
Index (Norway). Each index represents daily closing prices and serves as an indicator of the 
state of the national economy. These are depicted below, where it is possible to notice the 
similar patterns followed by all market indexes: 
                                                          
25
This coal is delivered to the ARA (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp) region in Northwest Europe and is a 
representative price relative to the transactions that currently take place in the studied markets. Prices are cost, 
insurance and freight inclusive. 
26
In an efficient market, stock prices are equal to the expected discounted flow of future dividends. Future 
dividends, though, depend on future profits which in turn deeply depend on general economic activity. 
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Fig. 5.7 -The behaviour during 2008-12 of the stock market index levels relative to: Germany (DAX), 
France (CAC), United Kingdom (FTSE, indicated above as GB) and the Nordic countries (represented 
by the Norwegian OBX). The SX5E Index (Eurostoxx 500) is included for comparison to the 
European generic stock market. The Norwegian OBX Index ranges from 17.94 to 58.72 but is here 
reported in the above figure as multiplied by a factor of 30, for visual clarity. 
 
 
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section reports the main descriptive statistics relative to the raw data of all considered 
variables. The next section, on the other hand, examines the data’s stationarity properties, 
ensuring the applicability of the data for the subsequent econometric analyses, introduced in 
section 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 (left) Summary statistics of carbon, electricity, gas, coal prices and stock indexes. 
 
 
Price Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Carbon 14.08 5.30 5.72 29.33 
UK electricity 62.21 13.83 40.15 108.45 
DE electricity 54.91 9.25 42.60 90.70 
FR electricity 56.90 10.06 43.85 93.45 
NO electricity 44.17 7.81 27.60 69.75 
UK gas 20.59 6.20 7.17 36.79 
DE gas 24.51 5.71 12.00 42.48 
FR gas 24.19 5.74 11.75 42.20 
NO gas 24.51 5.71 12.00 42.48 
Coal 11.39 2.24 7.60 19.72 
FTSE Index 6,378.08 900.24 3,872.26 8,523.71 
DAX Index 6,169.17 899.13 3,666.41 7,849.99 
CAC Index 3,671.07 546.90 2,519.29 5,495.67 
OBX Index 427.08 100.35 178.73 587.51 
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Price Skewness Kurtosis Prob(JB) 
Carbon 0.261 0.585 <0.0001 
UK electricity 1.240 1.235 <0.0001 
DE electricity 1.663 2.346 <0.0001 
FR electricity 1.936 3.048 <0.0001 
NO electricity 0.83 0.26 <0.0001 
UK gas 0.369 0.744 <0.0001 
DE gas 0.537 0.628 <0.0001 
FR gas 0.503 0.505 <0.0001 
NO gas 0.537 0.628 <0.0001 
Coal 0.822 1.269 0.0004 
FTSE Index -0.64 -0.11 <0.0001 
DAX Index -0.56 -0.39 <0.0001 
CAC Index 0.79 0.43 <0.0001 
OBX Index -0.78 -0.28 <0.0001 
 
Table 5.2 (right) Skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque–Bera test results. 
 
 
Table 5.1 reports the mean values, standard deviations and ranges of the variables of interest. 
The highest forward prices (Nord Pool and UK) also present the highest variances. Table 5.2, 
shown above, depicts the values of skewness and kurtosis relative to the distribution of the 
studied time series. The JB tests are also reported. As shown in Table 5.2, none of the 
variables has a normal distribution. In particular, the French electricity price presents positive 
leptokurtosis, implying a distribution which is sharper than a normal distribution and values 
which are concentrated around the mean. This implies thicker tails and a high probability for 
extreme values. Platykurtic distributions are instead observed for all other asset prices, 
implying flatter than normal distributions and wider peaks, with a lower chance for extreme 
values, and observations being wider spread around the series’ means. In addition, all the 
stock indexes besides the French CAC, which is skewed rightwards, are skewed to the left, 
whereas all energy prices are skewed to the right. All JB tests show statistical significance 
(alpha<1.96) at the 5% level, implying the normality of our series’ distributions. 
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5.3.3 Stationarity tests 
Given the non-normal nature of the time series considered we employ stationarity tests, as 
reported in this section. Table 5.3, below, shows the mean values, standard deviations and 
ranges relative to the first differences of electricity, carbon, coal and gas year-ahead prices 
and stock prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Summary statistics of the first differences of electricity, carbon, coal and gas forward 
prices, and stock prices. 
 
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Peron tests (PP) were used to check the 
stationarity properties of the data. To check for the presence of a unit root we test the null 
hypothesis that the difference is assumed to be stationary (i.e. ϕ=1), against the alternative 
that the trend is non-stationary process (ϕ<1). Under the null hypothesis, the autoregressive 
polynomial of zt, ϕ(z) = (1-ϕz) = 0, has a root equals to 1. The results of the stationary tests 
are reported in Table 5.4. Estimation by Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC, BIC) 
suggested the selection of one lag. If the ADF statistics is less than -2.87, the null hypothesis 
is rejected (boldface-marked in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5). 
 
 
First Difference Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Carbon price -0.013 0.343 -1.72 1.62 
UK Electricity price -0.010 1.152 -13.33 9.44 
DE Electricity price -0.014 0.71 -3.65 4.45 
FR Electricity price -0.012 0.79 -7.40 7.00 
NO Electricity price -0.012 0.85 -10.47 4.20 
UK Gas 0.002 0.63 -2.45 8.03 
DE gas 0.0006 0.381 -1.72 3.40 
FR gas 0.0003 0.382 -2.55 2.30 
NO gas 0.0006 0.381 -1.72 3.40 
Coal 0.0007 0.205 -1.43 1.38 
FTSE Index -0.94 92.88 -492.98 594.69 
DAX Index -0.15 95.63 -523.98 518.14 
CAC Index -1.39 63.53 -368.77 367.01 
OBX Index 0.003 0.830 -3.50 3.57 
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Levels ADF PP 
Carbon price -2.63 -2.72 
UK Electricity price -1.74 -1.72 
DE Electricity price -1.28 -1.38 
FR Electricity price -1.32 -1.36 
NO Electricity price -2.05 -1.96 
UK gas -1.75 -1.65 
DE gas -1.18 -1.38 
FR gas -1.18 -1.35 
NO gas -1.18 -1.38 
Coal -1.65 -1.79 
FTSE Index -2.47 -2.34 
DAX Index -2.02 -1.98 
CAC Index -3.37 -3.30 
OBX Index -1.36 -1.33 
 
Table 5.4 (left) Unit root tests on the level series showing ADF and PP t-statistics.1% critical value -3.430, 5% 
critical value -2.860 (boldface-marked), 10% critical value -2.570; 
 
 
 
 
First Differences ADF PP 
Carbon price -34.33 -34.33 
GB Electricity price -37.29 -37.28 
DE Electricity price -32.58 -32.50 
FR Electricity price -35.84 -35.84 
NO Electricity price -36.32 -36.38 
GB gas -35.44 -35.51 
DE gas -31.77 -31.93 
FR gas -32.69 -32.85 
NO gas -31.77 -31.93 
Coal -33.24 -33.23 
UKX Index -35.23 -37.55 
DAX Index -35.23 -35.24 
CAC Index -38.05 -38.30 
OBX Index -36.08 -36.09 
 
Table 5.5 (right) Unit root tests on the differenced series, showing ADF and PP test statistics. 1% critical value -
3.430, 5% critical value -2.860 (boldface-marked), 10% critical value -2.570. 
 
The raw data appear to exhibit non-stationary behaviour, as the ADF test on each market is 
greater than -2.87, whereas stationarity was achieved after first differencing. 
Therefore, the results summarized above (Table 5.5) indicate that the first difference
27
 of the 
variables tested is stationary and integrated of first-order, i.e. we are using I(1) variables.  
Johansen’s maximum likelihood procedure can be used to examine the possible existence of  
                                                          
27
 See Appendix Figs. 4B.1-4 for an illustration of the time series’ behaviours in terms of first differences. 
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cointegration between the variables examined. The null hypothesis of no cointegration was 
not rejected and the first difference or innovations of the variables can be used to test for 
Granger-causality. 
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5.4 Econometric Models 
The following section introduces the main econometric methods employed in this study. The 
study investigates the causal relationships between the considered variables by means of a 
Granger-causality VAR-based analysis. The AR-GARCH model, used to study the volatility 
interactions between our variables and the different electricity prices, is finally introduced 
and concludes this section. 
 
5.4.1 VAR model 
The dynamic behaviour of the considered time series was assessed by means of a stationary 
vector autoregression (VAR) model. The VAR model, introduced by Sims (1980), is a 
method used to characterize the joint dynamic behaviour of a series of variables. It is an 
econometric model used to capture the linear interdependencies among multiple time series, 
where all considered variables are treated symmetrically in a structural sense. 
The fundamental mathematical representation of the VAR(p) equation is given by: 
𝑦𝑡=𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵0𝑥𝑡+𝜀𝑡                                                     [Eq. 5.1] 
where, for each market considered, yt is K x1 vector of endogenous variables (in this case the 
electricity price) and xt is M x 1 vector of exogenous variables (in this case containing coal, 
natural gas and carbon prices and the stock index), A is a K x Kp matrix of coefficients and B0 
is a K x M matrix  of  coefficients, Yt is the Kp x 1 vector given by 𝑌𝑡 = (
𝑦𝑡
⋮
𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1
) and εt is a 
vector of innovations which can be simultaneously correlated but which are uncorrelated with 
their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all variables on the right hand side of Eq.5.1. 
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) were used to determine the most appropriate VAR lag lengths. 
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The multivariate least squares method, or the conditional maximum likelihood estimator, is 
used as estimator for the coefficient matrix and is consistent and asymptotically efficient. The 
latter involves employing the Kronecker product as well as the vectorization of the matrix 
containing the endogenous variable. 
Moreover, while the VAR modelling approach often provides an accurate representation of 
the dynamic behaviour of a system of variables, the main drawback entails the economic 
interpretability of its parameters. In fact, whereas Granger-causality analysis can be used to 
determine the causality relationships between our variables, on the contrary, the VAR 
coefficients only represent reduced form model parameters because the instantaneous 
interactions of the endogenous variables are not explicitly modelled but are included in the 
covariance matrix of the residuals (see Cooley and Le Roy, 1985 and Bunn and Fezzi, 2008). 
Therefore, we will use the VAR model as the benchmark for the Granger-causality analysis, 
which will determine the direction of causation between our variables. Finally, the pass-
through rates of carbon prices into electricity prices, if any, will be established by the 
respective GARCH conditional mean model parameters and the effective carbon intensity of 
the units on margin, as described in  section 5.4.3.1. 
 
5.4.2 Granger causality analysis 
Granger causality describes the dependency relationships between two time series. This 
section introduces the Granger (1969) test, explaining the econometric details relevant to the 
type of data under analysis. 
Following Karagianni et al. (2009), according to this test, if two distinct series  {𝑋𝑡, 𝑌𝑡 ≥  1}  
are strictly stationary, {𝑌𝑡} Granger-causes {𝑋𝑡} if past and current values of Y embody 
further information regarding the future values of X. In fact, supposing that FX,t and FY,t 
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denote the relevant information set of past values of both Xt and Yt, at time t, {Yt} is said to 
Granger-cause {Xt} if the following condition is satisified: 
(𝑌𝑡+1, … , 𝑌𝑡+𝑘) |(𝐹𝑋,𝑡, 𝐹𝑌,𝑡)~ (𝑌𝑡+1, … , 𝑌𝑡+𝑘) | 𝐹𝑋,𝑡                                [Eq. 5.2] 
where ‘~’ denotes distribution equivalence. Supposing that 𝑋𝑡
𝑙𝑋= (𝑋𝑡−ℓX+1,…, Xt) and that 
𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑌= (𝑌𝑡−ℓY+1,…, Yt) represent the lag-vectors, where ℓX, ℓY ≥ 1, the null-hypothesis states 
that realized values of 𝑋𝑡
𝑙𝑋  embed further evidence on Yt + 1, beyond that present in𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑌. The 
null is then expressed as follows: 
𝐻0 = 𝑌𝑡+1 |(𝑋𝑡
𝑙𝑥; 𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑦) ~ 𝑌𝑡+1| 𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑦  ,                                            [Eq. 5.3] 
thereby stating that the prediction of the one period future value of Y given the combined 
information set of X and Y is the same as the same prediction made with only the information 
set, or time series, of Y alone. The relative test statistic is formulated as: 
𝑇𝑛(𝜀𝑛) =
𝑛 − 1
𝑛(𝑛 − 2)
 . ∑{𝑓𝑋,𝑍,𝑌(𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖)
𝑖
𝑓𝑌(𝑌𝑖) − 𝑓𝑋,𝑌(𝑋𝑖𝑌𝑖)𝑓𝑌,𝑍(𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖)}.               [Eq. 5.4] 
For ℓX = ℓY = 1 and in the case that 𝜀𝑛 = 𝐶𝑛
−𝛽(𝐶 > 0, 1/4 < 𝛽 < 1/3), Diks and 
Panchenko (2006) provide evidence that the test-statistic in Eq. 5.4 satisfies the following 
equation (Karagianni et al., 2009): 
√𝑛
𝑇𝑛(𝜀𝑛 − 𝑞)
𝑆𝑛
𝐷
→ N(0,1)                                                  [Eq. 5.5] 
where 
𝐷
→ denotes the statistic convergence to a normal distribution and where Sn represents 
the estimator of the asymptotic variance relative to Tn(·). Thus, in accordance with the latter, 
a single-tailed test form was used. 
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5.4.3 Conditionally heteroscedastic volatility models 
The previous analysis of skewness and kurtosis (see Table 5.2) suggests that the distributions 
of the first differences of the electricity prices are asymmetric. All outliers – identified as 
values exceeding by five standard deviations the autoregressive mean – were removed and 
replaced by polynomial interpolation, following Trück et al. (2007), who has shown that 
robustness of results can be considerably improved by removing outliers from the data prior 
to the application of statistical inference. Polynomial interpolation was also used to replace 
missing values. Modelling electricity prices and their volatility implies executing two 
essential procedures, the first entailing the specification of an ARMA(p,q) model for the 
conditional mean, involving the use of diagnostic tests on the residuals, and the second 
requiring the specification of a GARCH (p,q) model for the conditional volatility, similarly 
followed by diagnostic tests (Castagneto-Gissey and Green, 2013). The electricity price series 
are adequate for an investigation using heteroscedastic volatility models given that their first 
differences are serially autocorrelated and display time-varying volatility. In addition, 
inspection of these differenced prices (see Appendix Figs. 5B.1) also shows how the series 
exhibit the property of volatility clustering. 
The possibility of transforming the series into natural logs was abandoned given that it would 
have implied a reduction of the volatility magnitude observed in the electricity prices, thereby 
potentially disguising the explored statistical links (see Karakatsani and Bunn, 2008). 
Seasonality is typically an important issue to be considered when analyzing electricity price 
data. We did not expect seasonality in the electricity price time series given the use of year-
ahead contract prices
28
. Nevertheless, we checked it through the use of Boolean indicators but 
did not detect the presence of seasonal variations. 
                                                          
28
 Year-ahead prices are intended for a full-year contract. This means that they are not for buying only one day, 
a long-time in advance but rather for the whole year. Thus, the product goes over all available seasons. 
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The previous analysis of skewness and kurtosis (see Table 5.2) suggests that the distributions 
of the first differences of the electricity prices are asymmetric. All outliers – identified as 
values exceeding by five standard deviations the autoregressive mean – were removed and 
replaced by polynomial interpolation, following Trück et al. (2007). The electricity price 
series are adequate for an investigation using heteroscedastic volatility models given that 
their first differences are serially autocorrelated and display time-varying volatility. In 
addition, inspection of the differenced prices (see Appendix A2, Figs. 5B1-B4) also shows 
how the series exhibit the property of volatility clustering. The possibility of transforming the 
series into natural logs was abandoned given that it would have implied a reduction of the 
volatility magnitude observed in the electricity prices, thereby potentially disguising the 
explored statistical links (see Karakatsani and Bunn, 2008). Seasonality is typically an 
important issue to be considered when analyzing electricity price data. However, we didn’t 
expect year-ahead seasonality for annual data but checked it through the use of Boolean 
indicators; however, no seasonality was detected. 
We empirically formulate the following specification for the conditional mean model, applied 
to explain the first differences of electricity prices, 𝑦𝑡, as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                              [Eq. 5.6] 
where Xt is (𝑖)ℎ?̂?. The GARCH process (Bollerslev, 1986) is represented by: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
ℎ𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑦𝑡                                    [Eq. 5.7] 
where yt is a vector with one-period lagged exogenous variables (i.e. carbon, gas and coal 
future prices and stock market index) that explains the time varying variance process ht  
The model assumes that 𝜃 >0, α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0, as well as (α + β) < 1. The sum of the 
estimates for α and β is, in many cases, considerably close to one, thereby violating the 
condition for stationarity. The estimated value of β enables for an assessment of the 
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persistence of shocks; in fact, an absolute value of β<1 ensures the convenient properties of 
stationarity and ergodicity for our model. Finally, the GARCH model assumes that h 
responds in a symmetric fashion to the innovations to one-period lagged volatility; different 
specifications of the GARCH model are fitted to the data and the most parsimonious model is 
selected. In fact, we will use the simple asymmetric ARCH (SAARCH) model by Engle 
(1990) for one of the four countries examined (United Kingdom). The SAARCH model 
basically adds the γ term that makes the GARCH model respond asymmetrically to positive 
and negative shocks. 
  
5.4.4 Calculation of Pass-through rate 
The cost pass-through rate (PTR) of the carbon price into electricity prices is calculated as the 
GARCH conditional mean coefficient, or the derivative of the electricity price with respect to 
the carbon price (𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛), divided by the ‘theoretical’ value of the carbon cost (TCC): 
PTR =
𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛
TCC
                                                                [Eq. 5.8] 
The theoretical carbon cost (TCC), or the effective carbon intensity of coal and gas-fired 
generation, is given by the sum of the carbon intensities of gas- (0.35) and coal-fired 
generation (0.9) times their average shares in electricity generation at the margin, as: 
TCC = 0.9𝜁𝐶 + 0.35𝜁𝐺 ,                                                   [Eq. 5.9] 
where C (G) stands for coal (gas) and 𝜁𝐶  and 𝜁𝐺  are the coal and gas average shares at the 
margin in the market’s electricity generation, respectively. In turn, 𝜁𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 and 𝜁𝑔𝑎𝑠 are given 
by the efficiency of coal times the GARCH coefficient on the coal price (the marginal change 
in the electricity price given a unit change in the coal price; i.e. 𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙) and the efficiency of 
gas times the GARCH coefficient on the gas price (the marginal change in the electricity 
price given a unit change in the gas price; i.e. 𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠), as: 
𝜁𝐶 = 𝜑𝐶𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙                                                       [Eq. 5.10]  
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and 
𝜁𝐺 = 𝜑𝐺𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠.                                                       [Eq. 5.11] 
The efficiency of gas, 𝜑𝐺, is set as equal for all markets (0.53), whereas that of coal, 𝜑𝐶, is 
known to vary across countries
29
. We use an efficiency factor of 0.36 for United Kingdom 
and Nord Pool, while a factor of 0.4 is used to represent the efficiency of coal-fired 
generation in Germany and France. 
As 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 approaches the ‘theoretical’ carbon price value (PTR), the marginal rate at which 
the carbon price feeds into the electricity price approaches 100%, indicating a competitive 
internalization of carbon costs. Consequently, values <100% suggest some degree of market 
power, whereas values >100% indicate that costs are integrated within electricity prices more 
than proportionately. 
 
5.4.5 Model parameter expectations 
Germany and United Kingdom are particularly intensive in coal- and gas-fired electricity 
production, as indicated by their generation fuel mix (see Fig. 5.1). Therefore, their models 
are expected to yield the largest coefficients for the relationship between electricity prices 
and both the coal and natural gas prices. France, on the other hand, uses tiny fractions of coal 
and gas (both about 4%) in producing electricity, instead largely based on nuclear power. The 
same applies to the Nord Pool market, which only uses about 15% of fossil fuel generation
30
.  
Thus, we would expect gas and coal prices to have a relatively small impact on the electricity 
prices of Nord Pool and Powernext. However, it should be noted that countries such as those 
comprising the Nord Pool market can be reliant on coal prices as coal-fired generation 
                                                          
29
 Thermal efficiencies are assigned according to Efficiency of conventional thermal electricity production of the 
European Environment Agency (2013). 
30
 This argument could also be extended to include the fact that Nordpool is not one homogeneous market. 
Sweden and Denmark do use quite a lot of coal in their generation and their domestic prices feed into Nordpool 
prices. 
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represents the opportunity cost of present hydro-generation. Local prices may also be set by 
the electricity imports from neighbouring countries as well as by the opportunity cost of not  
exporting. Similarly, electricity prices should reflect the use of the utilized carbon intensive 
units, i.e. coal and gas, and should thereby imply lower magnitudes of effect
31
 for France and 
Nord Pool compared to the United Kingdom and Germany, which are more reliant on carbon 
(and imports). The impact of national stock market indexes, on the other hand, is expected to 
reach statistical significance given that year-ahead prices can be largely dependent on 
expectations of future economic activity. These hypotheses are also expected to be 
qualitatively valid in the conditional variance models, although it is possible for results to be 
larger in magnitude in terms of volatility interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 The magnitude of the effect is measured as the estimated coefficient times one standard deviation. 
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5.5 Results 
This section reports the main estimation results relative to the employed time series models. 
Section 5.5.1 presents the VAR model and Granger causality test results, whereas the 
GARCH volatility results are reported in section 5.5.2. Finally, section 5.5.3 presents the 
observable cost pass-through rates. 
 
5.5.1 VAR analysis results 
The VAR model estimation by the eigenvalues of the companion matrix of the system 
showed that the variables were jointly ergodic, implying that the effects of shocks die out, 
thereby demonstrating the applicability of the models. The Lagrange multiplier test was not 
able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlations even with a single lag, thus the 
optimal lag length is set at 1. This was further confirmed by the values of AIC and BIC, as 
well as the Wald test statistics. Table 5.6, reported below, shows the vector autoregression 
results: 
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Endogen. 
Variable 
 
Exogen. 
Variable 
 
UK DE FR NO 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 p
ri
ce
 
Electricity 
-0.107 
(0.033) 
0.001 
0.033 
(0.043) 
0.438 
-0.198 
(0.036) 
<0.0001 
-0.075 
(0.034) 
0.030 
Carbon 
0.387 
(0.103) 
<0.0001 
0.162 
(0.071) 
0.024 
0.466 
(0.072) 
<0.0001 
0.173 
(0.080) 
0.031 
Gas 
0.004 
(0.055) 
0.938 
0.0044 
 (0.066) 
0.947 
0.335 
(0.070) 
<0.0001 
0.093 
(0.078) 
0.232 
Coal 
0.475 
(0.179) 
0.008 
0.204 
(0.122) 
0.094 
0.373 
(0.125) 
0.003 
0.077 
(0.140) 
0.581 
SMI 
-0.00029 
(0.00036) 
0.419 
-0.00020 
(0.00021) 
0.349 
-0.00069 
(0.00035) 
0.051 
0.022 
(0.031) 
0.478 
Constant 
-0.005 
(0.032) 
0.876 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
0.487 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
0.567 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
0.585 
E
U
A
  
p
ri
ce
 
Electricity 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
0.323 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
0.265 
0.007 
(0.016) 
0.679 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
0.682 
Carbon 
0.132 
(0.031) 
<0.0001 
0.143 
(0.035) 
<0.0001 
0.127 
(0.032) 
<0.0001 
0.137 
(0.032) 
<0.0001 
Gas 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.465 
-0.002 
(0.032) 
0.949 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
0.871 
-0.009 
(0.031) 
0.782 
Coal 
-0.175 
(0.053) 
0.001 
-0.141 
(0.059) 
0.018 
-0.185 
(0.055) 
0.001 
-0.165 
(0.056) 
0.003 
SMI 
-0.00014 
(0.00011) 
0.198 
-0.00012 
(0.0001) 
0.268 
-0.00031 
(0.00016) 
0.049 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
0.122 
Constant 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
0.187 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
0.185 
0.0013 
(0.0094) 
0.180 
-0.0122 
(0.009) 
0.192 
N
a
tu
ra
l 
g
a
s 
p
ri
ce
 
Electricity 
0.024 
(0.018) 
0.184 
0.072 
(0.023) 
0.002 
0.056 
(0.017) 
0.002 
-0.016 
 (0.015) 
0.287 
Carbon 
0.0088 
(0.026) 
0.736 
0.021 
(0.038) 
0.584 
0.065 
(0.035) 
0.068 
0.089 
(0.036) 
0.012 
Gas 
-0.042 
(0.056) 
0.457 
0.044 
(0.035) 
0.215 
-0.0062 
(0.034) 
0.857 
0.088 
(0.035) 
0.011 
Coal 
0.209 
(0.098) 
0.033 
-0.021 
(0.066) 
0.754 
0.159 
(0.061) 
0.010 
0.064 
(0.062) 
0.302 
SMI 
0.00005 
(0.00019) 
0.787 
0.00002 
(0.00011) 
0.841 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.124 
0.008 
(0.014) 
0.584 
Constant 
0.0013 
(0.017) 
0.938 
0.0012 
(0.010) 
0.909 
0.00096 
(0.0104) 
0.926 
0.00068 
(0.0105) 
0.948 
C
o
a
l 
p
ri
ce
 
Electricity 
0.022 
(0.006) 
<0.0001 
0.069 
(0.012) 
<0.0001 
0.024 
(0.009) 
0.012 
0.0033 
(0.0082) 
0.691 
Carbon 
0.011 
(0.018) 
0.537 
-0.037 
(0.020) 
0.068 
-0.004 
(0.0019) 
0.849 
0.0123 
(0.0190) 
0.520 
Gas 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.830 
0.012 
(0.019) 
0.534 
0.063 
(0.018) 
0.001 
0.044 
(0.019) 
0.018 
Coal 
0.0081 
(0.031) 
0.797 
-0.063 
(0.035) 
0.074 
-0.029 
(0.032) 
0.378 
0.011 
(0.033) 
0.746 
SMI 
0.0005 
(0.00006) 
0.067 
0.0001 
(0.00006) 
0.099 
0.00011 
(0.00009) 
0.223 
0.012 
(0.007) 
0.098 
Constant -0.0008 (0.005) 0.929 
0.0004 
(0.0055) 
0.948 
0.0001 
 (0.056) 
0.973 
-0.00005 
(0.005) 
0.993 
S
to
ck
 M
a
rk
et
 I
n
d
ex
 
Electricity 
0.748 
(2.66) 
0.778 
0.891 
(5.829) 
0.878 
0.924 
(2.95) 
0.754 
0.024 
(0.034) 
0.472 
Carbon 
-12.06 
(8.36) 
0.149 
-6.38 
(9.72) 
0.512 
-6.98 
(5.96) 
0.242 
-0.048 
(0.078) 
0.543 
Gas 
-4.556 
(4.466) 
0.308 
-8.699 
(8.932) 
0.330 
-1.89 
(5.96) 
0.743 
-0.039 
(0.077) 
0.610 
Coal 
-3.95 
(4.44) 
0.374 
-39.25 
(16.58) 
0.018 
-22.20 
(10.34) 
0.032 
-0.237 
(0.138) 
0.085 
SMI 
-0.012 
(0.029) 
0.675 
0.044 
(0.029) 
0.127 
-0.037 
(0.029) 
0.201 
0.017 
(0.031) 
0.571 
Constant 
-1.192 
(2.564) 
0.642 
-0.347 
(2.627) 
0.895 
-1.60 
(1.75) 
0.361 
0.0020 
(0.023) 
0.931 
LL -10751.190 -8944.367 -8806.76 -3276.776 
AIC 16.612 13.834 13.623 5.122 
BIC 16.831 14.053 13.842 5.340 
 
 
Table 5.6 VAR parameter estimates. SMI is short for stock market index (i.e. DAX for 
Germany, CAC for France, FTSE for the United Kingdom and OBX for the Nord Pool 
countries). 
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As previously explained, because simple vector autoregression coefficient estimates do not 
represent reliable descriptions of the true relationships between pairs of variables, we use the 
VAR model as the benchmark model against which the Granger-causality tests are 
performed. These are discussed next. The coefficient estimates describing the relations 
between electricity and carbon prices are subsequently derived using the conditional mean 
equations of the different GARCH models employed (see section 5.5.3), as explained in 
section 5.4.3.3. 
 
5.5.2 Granger causality test results 
The significant correlations found by using the VAR model do not imply causality, rather 
they simply indicate that one variable can cause changes in the other variable or that both 
variables can be caused by a different, omitted factor. However, given the choice of variables 
included in the model, this should not be the case. In fact, an indicator of economic activity 
and all major fuel costs were incorporated to comply with this analysis. The test results are 
reported in the tables below (Tables 5.7-5.10), for each market. The probabilities in bold 
indicate the rejected hypotheses and thus that the inverse statement is considered valid. 
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Null hypothesis for GERMANY F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 1.450 0.068 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.0002 0.010 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 2.196 0.146 
The DAX  future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.275 0.643 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.368 0.215 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.131 0.897 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 7.631 0.043 
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.714 0.485 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 12.481 0.006 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.269 0.501 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.038 0.950 
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.057 0.892 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 24.244 <0.0001 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 1.726 0.019 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.192 0.656 
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.099 0.055 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 0.0039 0.076 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 0.196 0.679 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 1.231 0.104 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 7.273 0.059 
 
Table 5.7 Granger-causality test results for the German model (1 lag considered). The numbers in 
bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying statement cannot be 
accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
 
 
In Germany, the relationship between carbon and electricity future prices is bidirectional, 
although with a stronger effect of electricity prices on carbon prices than vice-versa, as 
shown by the relatively higher probability value for this direction of causation. 
In addition, the coal price Granger-causes the electricity future price, displaying a relatively 
low VAR coefficient (0.069), even though Germany uses large amounts of coal in electricity 
generation. In addition, the relationship between the DAX Index and the ARA coal price 
expressed by the VAR model is bidirectional and very strong. Finally, the significant 
relationship between coal and carbon future prices observed in the VAR model is likely 
driven by a third, unknown factor. 
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Null hypothesis for NORD POOL F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 1.064 0.079 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.661 0.267 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.409 0.338 
The OBX  future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.120 0.041 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.101 0.288 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.199 0.916 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 8.335 0.006 
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.579 0.282 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.424 0.566 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.484 0.019 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.906 0.581 
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.824 0.308 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.226 0.345 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.122 0.270 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.758 0.050 
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.289 0.104 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.234 0.741 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.628 0.581 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.404 0.769 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 3.465 0.226 
 
Table 5.8 Granger-causality test results for the Nord Pool model (1 lag considered). The numbers in 
bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying statement cannot be 
accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
 
 
In the case of the Nord Pool market, all relationships established throughout the VAR model 
were successfully reflected by the Granger-causality tests, which revealed the true directions 
of causation between the studied variables. In particular, there is a bidirectional causal 
relationship between Phase II carbon prices and Nord Pool electricity prices, displaying a 
significant coefficient of 0.17. In this case, the relationship is stronger with the direction of 
causation pointing toward the Phase II price as opposed to the inverse relationship. 
Whilst the effect of carbon prices on electricity prices is known and confirmed, given that  
carbon prices are simply a cost to be passed onto the final electricity price, the inverse effect 
is still unconfirmed. The rent capture effect (e.g., see Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller, 2010)  
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is the only theory up to date that describes such effect. However, there is reason to believe 
that this might be a purely statistical relationship since it may be hard to believe that 
electricity prices may exert a considerable influence on the EU-wide price of carbon. 
In addition, the natural gas price affects the carbon price, indicating a VAR coefficient close 
to 0.09. Furthermore, there is evidence of a bidirectional causal relation between coal and gas 
prices in the Nord Pool market, whereby coal prices affect gas prices comparatively more 
than vice-versa. Finally, the carbon price negatively affects the coal price, as recorded in all 
other markets. 
 
Null hypothesis for FRANCE F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 41.793 <0.0001 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 23.408 <0.0001 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 9.072 0.011 
The CAC  future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 4.890 0.087 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.344 0.842 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.499 0.779 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 12.64 0.002 
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 3.943 0.139 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 12.130 <0.0001 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.844 0.358 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 7.307 0.007 
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.060 0.303 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 6.618 0.037 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.699 0.095 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 16.082 <0.0001 
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 2.229 0.328 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 2.241 0.326 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 1.375 0.503 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 0.127 0.939 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 4.639 0.098 
 
Table 5.9 Granger-causality test results for French model (1 lag considered). The numbers in bold 
denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying statement cannot be accepted 
and that the inverse therefore holds. 
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In France, a unidirectional relationship between electricity and carbon future prices is 
recorded. In addition, the CAC Index, a proxy for French future economic activity, exhibits a  
bidirectional Granger-causality relationship with the Phase II carbon future price. The 
relationship is, however, supported by a low coefficient magnitude. The model for France 
also indicates that the carbon future price affects the coal price and that there is a 
bidirectional causality relation between carbon and CAC future prices. Coal and gas prices do 
not display Granger-causality, meaning that a third factor should be responsible for the 
significant relationship observed in the VAR. Finally, a strong bidirectional link is recorded 
between coal and stock prices in France. 
 
Null hypothesis for UNITED KINGDOM F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 0.357 <0.0001 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.066 0.977 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 11.057 0.029 
The UKX future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.998 0.309 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 3.837 0.441 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 2.607 0.747 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 11.031 0.001 
The UKX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.699 0.429 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 5.989 0.024 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas   future prices 0.270 0.256 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 6.393 0.048 
The UKX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.606 0.532 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 16.657 <0.0001 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.534 0.436 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.692 0.694 
The UKX prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.353 0.129 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause UKX future prices 1.363 0.609 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause UKX future prices 1.231 0.314 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause UKX future prices 1.210 0.618 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause UKX future prices 3.078 0.364 
 
Table 5.10 Granger-causality test results for the United Kingdom model (1 lag considered). The 
numbers in bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying statement 
cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
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The electricity future price Granger-causes the carbon future price in the UK. In contrast, the 
coal forward price does not Granger-cause the electricity forward price in the United  
Kingdom, neither vice-versa, suggesting that a third variable is possibly responsible for the 
strong cointegration observed between coal and electricity prices, reported earlier (Table 5.6). 
This could perhaps be related to some form of expectations about the markets. Furthermore, 
the carbon future price negatively affects the ARA coal future price, with the respective VAR 
coefficient around 0.18. In addition, the UK gas future price Granger-causes  
the coal price. Finally, a third factor should be responsible for affecting both electricity and 
coal future prices since the detection of Granger-causality between these two variables was 
not possibly verified. 
 
 
5.5.3 GARCH analysis results 
Since the time series showed a significant volatility clustering property, ARCH models were 
introduced to depict these properties. Given the observed series autocorrelation, the random 
walk model was used. After testing the residual series of the model, a significant high-order 
ARCH effect with respect to the carbon allowance price series was observed and, therefore, a 
GARCH model was applied. The use of more complex volatility models, such as TGARCH 
or EGARCH or APARCH did not improve the significance of the models and therefore the 
most parsimonious model, the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model, was applied in all cases except for 
the UK, for which the SAARCH model yielded improved results. The table below (Table 
5.11) reports the GARCH model results. Note that the carbon, gas, coal and stock indices 
represent the exogenous variables whereas the electricity price of each market is the model’s 
endogenous variable: 
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 UK DE FR NO 
Conditional mean model 
Carbon 
0.621 
(0.054) 
<0.0001 
0.668 
(0.032) 
<0.0001 
0.378 
(0.039) 
<0.0001 
0.521 
(0.048) 
<0.0001 
Gas 
0.697 
(0.034) 
<0.0001 
0.472 
(0.035) 
<0.0001 
0.628 
(0.042) 
<0.0001 
0.505 
(0.051) 
<0.0001 
Coal 
1.366 
(0.119) 
<0.0001 
1.132 
(0.079) 
<0.0001 
0.870 
(0.089) 
<0.0001 
0.883 
(0.104) 
<0.0001 
SMI 
0.0006 
(0.0002) 
0.007 
0.0004 
(0.00009) 
<0.0001 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.289 
0.087 
(0.018) 
<0.0001 
Constant 
0.021 
(0.016) 
0.178 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
0.131 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
0.194 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.437 
ARCH-in-Mean 
L1 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.374 
0.062 
(0.163) 
0.705 
0.327 
(0.260) 
0.070 
-0.045 
(0.083) 
0.587 
L2 
-0.0025 
(0.008) 
0.740 
-0.016 
(0.208) 
0.939 
-0.372 
(0.389) 
0.340 
-0.044 
(0.108) 
0.682 
L3 
0.0032 
(0.006) 
0.564 
-0.041 
(0.129) 
0.748 
0.064 
(0.237) 
0.788 
-0.015 
(0.075) 
0.838 
AR 
-0.149 
(0.036) 
<0.0001 
-0.106 
(0.031) 
0.001 
-0.139 
(0.031) 
<0.0001 
-0.083 
(0.031) 
0.007 
Conditional variance model 
Carbon 
0.540 
(0.367) 
0.141 
1.604 
(0.360) 
<0.0001 
1.665 
( 0.421) 
<0.0001 
2.965 
(0.479) 
<0.0001 
Gas 
1.253 
(0.078) 
<0.0001 
0.378 
(0.208) 
0.070 
0.569 
(0.134) 
<0.0001 
0.500 
(0.157) 
<0.0001 
Coal 
-0.063 
(0.389) 
0.871 
4.094 
(0.281) 
<0.0001 
2.897 
(0.332) 
<0.0001 
2.195 
(0.526) 
<0.0001 
SMI 
0.012 
(0.0008) 
<0.0001 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.786 
0.008 
(0.001) 
<0.0001 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.137 
Constant 
-2.329 
(0.093) 
<0.0001 
-4.764 
(0.242) 
<0.0001 
-5.995 
(0.268) 
<0.0001 
-5.036 
(0.361) 
<0.0001 
ARCH 
ARCH (α1) 
0.492 
(0.055) 
<0.0001 
0.145 
(0.027) 
<0.0001 
0.075 
(0.012) 
<0.0001 
0.178 
(0.029) 
<0.0001 
GARCH 
(β1) 
0.396 
(0.025) 
<0.0001 
0.750 
(0.039) 
<0.0001 
0.894 
(0.014) 
<0.0001 
0.803 
(0.029) 
<0.0001 
SAARCH 
(γ1) 
-0.181 
(0.032) 
<0.0001 -  -  -  
α1+ β1 -  0.895  0.969  0.981  
α1+ β1+γ1 0.707  -  -  -  
LL -1483.878  -509.475  -793.419  -1079.276  
AIC 3001.757  1050.950  1618.839  2190.553  
BIC 3089.688  1133.709  1701.598  2273.312  
Prob>chi
2
 <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  
Q(20) 107.959  58.782  59.932  123.931  
 
 
Table 5.11 Parameter estimates from the AR-GARCH (Germany, France and Nord Pool) and 
SAARCH (United Kingdom) models. Standard errors are given in brackets. Note that the parameter 
“Carbon” in the conditional mean model corresponds to 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 in Eq.5; the same applies to “Gas” 
and “Coal” in the same model, which correspond to 𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠 and 𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙, respectively, in Eqs. 7 and 8. 
SMI stands for stock market index. 
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As shown in Table 5.11, carbon, gas and coal future prices are all relevant factors in the 
determination of the levels and volatilities of electricity future prices in the Nord Pool, 
Powernext, EEX and APX UK markets. 
The conditional mean model results imply that the first differences of carbon, gas and coal 
determine the electricity price first difference in each of the considered markets. The 
SAARCH model was used for the British model because of its superiority in terms of model 
performance and parsimony in comparison with the simple AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model, used 
for other countries. 
The coefficients for the carbon price impact on the different electricity prices range from 0.38 
to 0.69. The reliability of these parameters is validated by considering the theoretical value 
that the carbon price coefficient should have been based on the shares of gas and coal at the 
margin as well as their respective carbon intensities and plant efficiencies. To this extent, the 
estimated coefficient for the United Kingdom and its theoretical counterpart are fairly close 
and can both be rounded to 0.6. A similar situation was encountered in the case of France, as 
both empirical and theoretical values are close to 0.4. In the Nord Pool market and Germany, 
there is instead a slightly larger deviation of the coefficient estimates (0.52 and 0.67, 
respectively) from the theoretical parameter values (0.38 and 0.5, respectively). This enables 
for an evaluation of the pass-through rate of carbon prices into electricity prices which we 
will focus on in the next section (section 5.5.4). All standard errors are small compared to the 
respective coefficients, thus these relationships assume statistical importance. 
On the other hand, the coefficients explaining the impact of the first differences of natural gas 
prices range from a minimum of 0.47 (Germany) to a maximum of 0.70 (United Kingdom). 
The parameters on the coal price effect on the electricity price are considerably larger and 
range from the lowest value of 0.87 (France) up to 1.37 (UK). Finally, the effects of the first 
differences of the national stock market indexes on the respective electricity price are 0.0002 
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for France and 0.087 for Nord Pool. In all cases, the standard deviations relative to the 
coefficients are small compared to the estimated coefficient values, implying a valuable 
impact of the exogenous variables on the respective electricity prices. 
The volatility of electricity future prices is also determined by the carbon, gas and coal future 
price volatilities, in all markets. The most important determinant of electricity price volatility 
is the volatility of coal prices, with relative coefficients ranging from 2.1 (Nord Pool) to 4.1 
(France)
32
. However, the relationship did not reach statistical significance in the UK. 
Carbon price volatility is shown to have a large impact on electricity price volatility in France 
and Germany, whereas slightly less in the other countries. Finally, gas price volatility was the 
most pronounced in terms of its impact on electricity price volatility in the UK and 
substantially less in the other markets. Moreover, the volatility of carbon and ARA coal 
prices are significant predictors of electricity price volatility in all markets except for the UK; 
in addition, natural gas price volatility predicts electricity volatility in all markets except in 
Germany. National stock market index volatility contributes to the determination of 
electricity price volatility in the EEX and Nord Pool markets. However, the implied 
magnitudes of effect are very small in these cases, both in terms of the levels and volatility of 
electricity prices
33
. Overall, as expected, the volatility transmission of fuel prices onto 
electricity prices was notable and confirms previous findings (e.g., Mansanet-Bataller and 
Soriano, 2009). 
The presence of an asymmetric parameter for the British model reflects the so-called leverage 
effect (the parameter γ1), which occurs when past price changes are negatively correlated 
with future changes in volatility. The negative gamma coefficient observed indicates that 
positive price-level shocks induce a greater effect on volatility compared to negative shocks. 
                                                          
32
 Note that the estimated coefficient is a result of the employed measurement units. 
33
 This is measured by the GARCH conditional variance model coefficient estimate times one standard deviation 
of the independent variable. 
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Furthermore, relative to the ARCH-M estimation, the conditional mean of electricity prices 
was not significantly affected by the volatility of the respective electricity prices in any of the 
countries, at any of the three lags employed. The high GARCH coefficient for all countries, 
except for the UK, suggests the existence of a large degree of volatility persistence, 
considered to be a common feature in financial series, especially for electricity prices. The 
ARCH and GARCH parameters are positive and significant, indicating the presence of 
ARCH and GARCH effects in the electricity differenced future prices. Since α1+ β1 < 1, it 
can be argued that there is stability in volatility, although the volatility persists over time, as 
shown by the high values of the GARCH parameter, for each of the examined markets. 
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5.5.4 Pass-through rates 
The carbon price pass-through rate into the electricity prices is calculated based on the 
conditional mean results, as explained in section 5.4.3. The implied gas and coal shares at the 
margin are computed assuming that the pass-through rate of gas and coal prices into 
electricity prices is equal to one
34
. The table below (Table 5.12) shows the implied gas and 
coal shares at the margin and the derived carbon price pass-through rates: 
 
Market 
Implied coal 
share at margin 
Implied gas 
share at margin 
Carbon price 
Pass-through rate (%) 
DE 0.45 0.25 135 
FR 0.35 0.33 88 
UK 0.49 0.37 109 
NO 0.32 0.27 138 
  
Table 5.12 Implied gas and coal shares at the margin and carbon price pass-through rates. The standard errors of 
the carbon price GARCH conditional mean model coefficients, representing the change in the electricity price 
per unit change in the carbon price are 0.032, 0.039, 0.054 and 0.048 for Germany, France, UK and Norway, 
respectively. The pass-through rates in bold indicate the direction of causation running from carbon prices 
toward electricity prices. 
 
The causal relationship running from the electricity price toward the carbon price is 
observable only in the Nord Pool and EEX markets, where the recorded pass-through rates 
exceed 135%. The inverse direction of causation is recorded for UK and France, thus the 
pass-through rate cannot be confirmed. In any case, the obtained value for this relationship is 
substantially lower in both France and UK. For France the lowest value in the sample was 
obtained (88%) and represents the only falling behind the full pass-through rate of 100%. In 
fact, as France is more heavily regulated compared to other markets, it might be possible that 
carbon prices are relatively less integrated into their electricity prices as opposed to other 
markets. 
                                                          
34
 For example, the pass-through rate of gas prices into electricity prices is given by the change in electricity 
price per unit change in gas price (or the gas price GARCH coefficient in the conditional mean) times the 
thermal efficiency of gas power plants (53%), divided by the percentage of time gas plants are at the margin. 
This enables us to solve for the implied share of gas at the margin. The same applies to the derivation of the 
implied coal share at the margin calculated using a thermal efficiency of 0.53 for gas-fired generation. The 
efficiency of coal is set as 0.4 for for Germany and France and as 0.36 for Nord Pool and UK. 
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Table 5.12 shows the gas and coal shares at the margin implied by our models, which should 
be equal to the average ratio recorded over the studied period between the marginal change in 
CCGT and coal output with respect to the marginal change in total generation, respectively. 
We validate the gas and coal price coefficients by considering the British case, for which 
hourly generation by fuel data was available
35
. The average ratios of marginal changes of 
CCGT and coal to total output were calculated as 0.41 and 0.44, respectively. These values 
are reasonably close to the implied gas and coal shares at the margin, shown in Table 5.12, 
i.e. 0.37 and 0.49, respectively. Moreover, if the actual marginal shares are substituted into 
the ‘theoretical’ gas and coal shares in Eq. 5.11, we derive an even higher pass-through rate 
of 115%, which emphasizes non-competitive practices in the United Kingdom. Using these 
values, the pass-through rates of gas and coal prices into electricity prices were derived as 
90% and 112%, respectively. Therefore, these results suggest that British generators 
integrated the cost of coal substantially more than the cost of gas. 
Similarly, the implied shares of gas and coal for France, Germany and Norway should reflect 
the effective marginal shares in electricity generation in these countries. In fact, Germany is 
mostly reliant on coal, thereby explaining the relatively higher implied share of coal 
compared to gas. On the other hand, France and the Nord Pool countries are mostly based on 
nuclear and hydropower and use only very small amounts of both fossil fuels, which might 
explain the similar implied shares of coal and gas, which are noticeably lower than the same 
implied shares derived for Germany and UK. 
Nevertheless, the implied shares of coal are larger compared to those of gas in all the studied 
markets, suggesting the importance of coal in electricity generation during Phase II. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 We used hourly generation by fuel type data, extracted from the Elexon Portal. 
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5.6 Discussion 
This section discusses the main results presented in section 5.5. Firstly, section 5.6.1 reveals 
the relevant insights relating to the causal interface between electricity and carbon prices 
during Phase II. Section 5.6.2 then discusses the factors affecting European electricity prices 
and their volatility. Finally, section 5.6.3 presents the main cross-cutting policy implications 
relating to this study, including considerations on the level of competition and the role of coal 
in European electricity markets. 
 
5.6.1 Interactions among Electricity and Carbon forward prices 
Data relative to the four major European power markets – i.e. EEX, APX UK, Powernext and 
Nord Pool – were used to determine the causality interactions among electricity prices and 
carbon prices during Phase II. 
 
5.6.1.1 Nord Pool market 
In the Nord Pool market, the relationship between electricity and carbon prices is 
bidirectional and that the stronger relationship runs from the electricity price toward the 
carbon price.  
Nazifi and Milunovich (2010) investigated the relationships among carbon, fuel, and 
electricity prices in a VAR model for Phase I and detected a significant influence of the 
electricity price on the carbon price. Notably, they found that the electricity price Granger-
causes the carbon price, which is consistent with the results found in this study, implying that 
the situation has not changed in the Nord Pool market. 
Moreover, the results presented in section 5.5.4 show that a 1 unit increase in the carbon price 
leads to a 1.38 units increase in the Nord Pool electricity price. In fact, although the countries 
within the Nord Pool market are not heavily reliant on carbon, their prices can still depend on 
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fuel costs, including carbon, as carbon intensive generation clearly represents a main 
opportunity cost of producing electricity. In fact, the Nord Pool electricity price heavily 
depends on rainfall, thus a lack of water inflow is able to drive up the price of electricity as 
expectations of future drought make the electricity price more dependent on fuel prices. 
However, the Granger-causality analysis also provided evidence of the existence of a pass-
through effect, as the relationship was bidirectional. To this extent, Mirza and Bergland 
(2012) found that, during Phase I, on average, prices have remained close to the marginal cost 
of production. In addition, Fell (2010) finds evidence of dynamic pass-through in the Nordic 
electricity market during Phase I, observing that the electricity price promptly reacts to a 
shock in the carbon price. 
 
5.6.1.2 Germany 
In Germany, the relationship between carbon and electricity future prices is also bidirectional. 
Also in this case, the larger effect is that of the electricity price on the carbon price. 
Moreover, the estimated pass-through rate implies that a 1 unit increase in the carbon price 
leads to a 1.35 units increase in the electricity price, which demonstrates a large and non-
proportionate marginal internalization of carbon costs by German generators. 
Most and Genoese (2009) do not find any evidence of market power, instead found by 
Schwarz and Lang (2006), for example. During Phase I, Bunn and Fezzi (2008) demonstrated 
that a 1% shock in the carbon price translated into a 0.52% shock in the electricity price in 
Germany. Sijm et al. (2006) similarly finds that the pass-through rate for Germany was the 
highest among other European countries, in the range of 60-117%, during the period January 
to December 2005 (Phase I). This was confirmed by Neuhoff et al. (2006), who found similar 
estimates. This suggests that the rate at which generators integrate the additional increase in 
carbon costs is larger than the actual increase in costs and that this rate has increased from 
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Phase I to Phase II. Considering that during Phase I, permits were freely allocated, this has 
translated into considerable windfall profits for German electricity generators during Phase II 
(see Sijm et al., 2006). Furthermore, Müsgens (2006) finds significant market power in the 
German electricity market. In addition, in 2011, nuclear power stations in Germany were 
decommissioned as a consequence of the Fukushima disaster. This provided an increase in 
electricity imports and an increased use of coal and lignite. 
 
5.6.1.3 United Kingdom 
In the UK, electricity prices drove carbon prices during Phase II through a unidirectional 
causal relationship. According to our estimation results, a 1 unit increase in British electricity 
prices induced a 1.09 units rise in carbon prices; however, this could not be confirmed by the 
appropriate direction of causality, i.e. running from the carbon to the electricity price. Bunn 
and Fezzi (2008) showed that, during Phase I, the pass-through effect prevailed and that a 1% 
shock in the carbon price translated into a 0.33% shock in the electricity price in the UK. This 
diversion might perhaps be due to the effects of the financial crisis, as noted by Jouvet and 
Solier (2009). The economic downturn had depressed the activity of energy intensive 
industries and their electricity demand, perhaps leading to increased levels of capacity and a 
disruption of carbon cost pass-through rates in three major ways: the decline in the rate of 
capacity utilisation, the fact that generators did not possess adequate incentives to incorporate 
the freely allocated allowances in their prices when demand was falling and, finally, an 
allowance effect induced by the decrease in emissions by EU countries due to the financial 
crisis. Moreover, more authors have found evidence of the effect of the carbon price on the 
electricity price during Phase I (see, for example, Bunn and Fezzi, 2009; Fell, 2010; 
Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller, 2010). 
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The observed effect of electricity prices on the carbon price represents the first piece of 
evidence in favor of such a causal relationship in the United Kingdom during the EU ETS. 
This can be explained by evidence of market power; in fact, the market share of the largest 
electricity generator in the British electricity market was 21% between 2005-2007 (Phase I), 
while it rose to 32% in the period 2008-12, or Phase II (Eurostat, 2014). Moreover, 
congestion at peak times was notable and supply during this period was negatively influenced 
by the financial crisis. 
 
5.6.1.4 France 
In France, the relationship between electricity and carbon prices is unidirectional and 
provides evidence that the French (Powernext) electricity price drives the European carbon 
price during Phase II. The results suggest that a unit increase in the Powernext electricity 
price triggers a 0.88 rise in the Phase II carbon price. A similar result was observed by 
Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) who unveiled this relation for the first time, although 
only using the first of five years of data for Phase II (i.e. 2008), or only 20% of available 
Phase II data. This study instead uses the entire duration of the phase, or the full period 2008-
12 thereby confirming their findings. In Phase I, on the other hand, the inverse situation 
prevailed, as demonstrated by the same authors. However, Phase I was largely considered a 
learning phase and permits were freely allocated. This change from Phase I to Phase II is 
similarly attributed to: the declining capacity utilisation and European emissions as well as 
the absent incentives to incorporate the freely allocated allowances in their prices when 
demand was decreasing. 
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5.6.2 Other factors affecting electricity prices and volatility 
Having explored the relationships between electricity and carbon future prices in the 4 
markets under study, we now focus on additional factors affecting electricity prices and their 
volatility. These are the gas and coal prices and economic activity. 
 
5.6.2.1 Factors affecting electricity prices 
While natural gas prices do not directly affect electricity prices, the coal price directly 
impacts on the electricity price only in Germany. This can be attributed to the fact that 
Germany is the largest coal user in Europe and almost half of its generation stems from coal 
and lignite. 
The GARCH conditional mean analysis of the four electricity prices series showed that 
carbon, coal and natural gas prices are all crucial determinants of electricity prices in Europe. 
Coal prices have the largest effect on electricity prices. Notably, coal prices exhibit a higher 
impact on electricity prices compared to gas prices, which highlights the importance of coal 
in Europe during Phase II. The increase in electricity prices associated with a 1% increase in 
coal prices is a very large 1.062%, on average across the four markets considered. Similarly, 
a 1% increase in electricity prices is also associated with an average 0.58% increase in gas 
prices across all studied markets. 
Moreover, as expected, the most notable interactions between electricity prices and coal 
prices are those occurring in Germany and the UK, which are predominantly coal-based, as 
opposed to the Nord Pool countries, which use little coal (perhaps only at peaking times), and 
France, which is mainly nuclear-based and uses only about 4% of coal. 
On the other hand, the link between electricity and gas prices is the most considerable in the 
UK, mostly, and France. However, whereas the UK relies on gas-fired generation by about 
40%, in France gas is used in only 4% of total generation, on average. This effect is also large 
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in Germany, even though it remains below that recorded for the Nord Pool countries, even 
though the latter employ considerably less gas than Germany. Therefore, gas prices are 
important determinants of electricity prices in Europe even though gas is not a preferred 
means of production. However, even though switching from coal to gas is a particularly 
appealing practice nowadays which allows cost abatement
36
, gas prices are considerably less 
important than coal in the determination of electricity prices. On the other hand, carbon prices 
are the most influential in determining electricity prices in Germany and the  UK which are, 
in fact, considerably more reliant on carbon permits than Nord Pool and France. Finally, 
economic activity in the Nord Pool countries was the most influential in the determination of 
electricity prices compared to all other markets. This might perhaps be explained by the fact 
that, the Nordic countries being the most renewable-based and efficient across the four 
markets, future economic activity might exert more influence compared to other countries, 
which are instead more reliant on fuel prices. However, this might also be explained by a 
steeper supply curve, thereby increasing the responsiveness of Nordic power prices to 
changes in supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Cost abatement is possible by electricity generators only if the cost of producing electricity with natural gas is 
lower than the cost of producing with coal. Note that these costs take into account the price of emitted carbon. 
Thus, if the carbon price is sufficiently high, everything else equal, this should shift the relative profitability of 
generation in favour of using gas.  
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5.6.2.2 Factors affecting electricity price volatility 
The analysis of the conditional volatility of the electricity prices, on the other hand, 
demonstrated that a considerable transmission of volatility occurred during Phase II between 
electricity prices and coal, gas, carbon and stock markets. Among all, coal price volatility 
impacted the most on electricity price volatility, by a large magnitude, displaying a 
coefficient of 2.28, on average across all markets, with an average standard deviation of 0.38. 
Carbon price volatility also had a large impact on the volatility of electricity prices (1.69), 
varying with an average standard error of 0.41. The gas price, on the other hand, showed a 
mean coefficient of 0.68 and standard error of 0.14, across all markets. The largest correlation 
between electricity and coal price volatility was recorded in Germany, where the coefficient 
of volatility transmission was the largest (4.094). It was smaller in France (2.897) and about 
half the size in the Nord Pool countries (2.195). The relationship was not significant but, 
interestingly, negative in the UK. These results confirm the conditional mean results and 
further emphasize the role of coal prices with respect to electricity prices in Europe. 
Furthermore, Nord Pool data shows a very large link between electricity price volatility and 
carbon price volatility, with a coefficient in the GARCH model suggesting that a 1% increase 
in the volatility of carbon prices implied an increase in the Nord Pool electricity price 
volatility by about 3%. The relation is instead one in the range of 1.6% for France and 
Germany, still representing a large transmission of volatility, although comparatively smaller 
than the same in the Nord Pool market which uses little carbon in its generation process. 
However, it shall be noted that the Nord Pool countries own some gas potential and will rely 
on it in the case in which water becomes scarce. Moreover, the gas and electricity prices 
experienced a large transmission of volatility in the UK, which is comprehensible considering 
the 40% of gas in British electricity generation. In addition, in the UK, results suggest 
asymmetric effects of shocks on volatility, a matter of concern for risk management. 
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5.6.3 Policy Implications 
This section discusses the main policy implications that can be derived from this study. The 
main results relate to the relationships between carbon and electricity prices in the main 
European energy markets. Firstly, there is an influence of the electricity future prices of UK 
and France on the EU ETS Phase II price. This emphasizes the fact that carbon prices are 
possibly not passed onto final electricity prices and that the inverse situation occurs. 
Secondly, there are bidirectional causal relationships between electricity and carbon future 
prices in the Nord Pool market and Germany. In this way, the integration of carbon prices 
into electricity prices was able to be quantified. We thereby conclude that a 1 unit increase in 
the carbon price causes a rise by over 1.35 units both in the German and Nord Pool electricity 
prices. This is not consistent with the evidence found by Sijm et al. (2006) who found 
average pass-through effects to be in the range of 40 to 100. In fact, the observable pass-
through rates seem to be excessively large, implying that German and Norwegian electricity 
generators incorporate considerably more than the increase in carbon prices into their 
electricity prices. 
Furthermore, this study shows how coal prices are, by far, the most important determinant of 
electricity prices in Europe, both in terms of levels and volatility. 
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5.6.3.1 Electricity and Carbon Prices: Competition in European Electricity Markets 
The extremely large carbon pass-through rates observed in Germany and Norway suggest that 
prices in those countries might be driven by prices in trading partners with more emissions, or 
that additional, unknown transmission mechanisms are occurring contemporaneously to the 
changes in carbon prices. However, it is very possible that generators are somehow pushing 
through larger increases in their electricity prices, suggesting anti-competitive behaviour. 
Competitive malpractice is currently a hot topic. Very recently, Mokinski and Wölfing (2014) 
found an asymmetric pass-through of EUA prices into wholesale electricity prices in 
Germany. Moreover, they find that this asymmetry has disappeared in response to a report on 
investigations by the competition authority. Even though asymmetry was not specifically 
looked at in this study, except in a general sense in the model for the United Kingdom
37
, this 
study suggests that German and Norwegian generators took advantage of the positive changes 
in carbon prices to increase their electricity prices more than proportionately, thereby 
inducing higher profits
38
. 
In fact, soon after the institution of the EU ETS, some energy intensive firms in Germany 
called on the local competition authority to scrutinize the practice of price setting by German 
generators. Their main complaint was that internalising the actual cost of freely allocated 
allowances constitutes an abuse of market power and should be disallowed. On the other 
hand, the producers argued that, the generation of additional units of electricity required the 
use of additional allowances, which could have otherwise been sold, regardless of whether 
they were bought on the market or allocated as an initial, free endowment. In addition, they 
claimed to be in line with competitive practices having simply increased prices given the 
increased opportunity costs. The German competition authority thus undertook investigations 
                                                          
37
 The asymmetric effect recorded for the UK implies that positive innovations have a larger effect compared to 
negative innovations. However, the innovations derive not only from carbon prices but also coal and gas prices. 
38
 It should be noted that price decreases are assumed to have the same effect as price rises, thus generators are 
also assumed to decrease their prices more than proportionately. 
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in the matter and issued hearing summons to RWE and E.ON, which accounted for over 60% 
of German installed capacity. The progress report was published in 2006 (BKartA, 2006). 
Thus, concerns seem to remain for both Germany and the Nord Pool countries, as the low and 
continually falling prices during Phase II cannot justify the excess internalization of 
additional costs. This suggests that structural and behavioural remedies would be sensible. As 
Borenstein et al. (1997) note, relatively small investments in transmission capacity may yield 
surprisingly large payoffs in the form of increased competition. It is thus crucial for the EU 
Commission to introduce novel competition policies. Policies aimed at improving and 
increasing internal and external transmission, widening the market, and enhancing market 
operations between countries can be seen as appropriate remedies. Furthermore, it can be 
crucial to deploy additional resources towards investments in renewable energy, which could 
contribute by reducing power prices. 
Furthermore, the allocation of emission allowances in the EU ETS was carried out in Phase II 
via both auctions and free allocations. Grandfathering of carbon permits is widely criticized 
for providing little incentive for innovative and new competition to offer clean and renewable 
energy. In addition, as discussed in this paper, during Phase II substantial windfall profits 
were made by power companies. This can be attributed to the fact that the relevant Directive 
limits credited auctioning during Phase II to a maximum of 10% of issued allowances (Sijm 
et al., 2006). Since the start of 2013, i.e. Phase III, free allocation was phased out in favour of 
auctioning. 
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5.6.3.2 The importance of Coal 
This study has also demonstrated that, during Phase II, the future price of coal represents the 
most important determinant of electricity future prices both in terms of their levels and their 
volatility. Their effect is the largest on the most coal-intensive electricity markets of Germany 
and the UK, which use the largest amounts of coal in electricity generation in our sample 
compared to France and Nord Pool, where the coefficient on the GARCH models indicated a 
minimum of about 0.9 between them. The only significant Granger-causal link between coal 
and electricity prices was that directing from the coal price to German electricity prices. 
However, even though in most cases causality was not detected via the VAR-Granger 
method, our GARCH results suggest that there is a strong link between coal prices and 
electricity prices in all countries. Fuel prices can therefore set the price of electricity in 
countries where little amounts of coal are used, such as the Nord Pool countries. In Phase II, 
the combination of low coal prices, high gas prices and an ultra-low carbon price has resulted 
in coal-fired generation revealing itself as increasingly profitable in a number of European 
countries, where different gas-fired power plants operated at a loss. 
For example, in 2010, Germany’s largest utility spent EUR 400 million building a gas-fired 
power station (EON SE’s Irsching-5 in Bavaria), declared just three years later as largely 
unprofitable although it represented one of the most efficient gas plants in the world. In fact, 
it operated less than 25 percent of the time as falling power prices made burning natural gas 
unprofitable by record margins. More generally, European utilities, including the GDF Suez 
SA and Centrica Plc gas plants in France were stuck in a similar crisis. In addition, 
production from gas plants in France decreased by 24% in 2012. As European weakness held 
back electricity demand, cheaper coal and the collapsing cost of carbon permits are alienating 
the use of gas-fired plants. Switching to coal-fired generation not only increases emissions 
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but also provide substantially lower profits for electricity producers burning natural gas since 
gas-fired plants generate about a quarter of European power (Andersen and Patel, 2013). 
  
 
Fig. 5.8 – The marginal profitability of coal over gas-fired generation is calculated as the clean dark spread 
minus the clean spark spread. It is possible to note how for the majority of the period considered, coal was more 
profitable than gas. One of the reasons for this were the low coal and carbon prices in Europe. 
 
 
As can be appreciated from Fig.5.8, the marginal profitability of coal over gas-fired 
generation was generally positive throughout the length of Phase II
39
, for all countries, except 
the UK, during most of the phase. However, there seems to be a tendency for the profitability 
of coal over gas to increase, also in the UK, starting slightly after the beginning of 2010 and 
lasting until the end of Phase II. 
One of the reasons why coal has become so profitable is because it became cheap on world 
markets as a result of the new shale gas trend that hit the US, where gas prices have 
                                                          
39
 The marginal profitability of coal over gas-fired generation was calculated as the clean dark spread minus the 
clean spark spread. The clean spreads are calculated as: Clean Spark Spread = Spark Spread – (Carbon 
Price*0.411); Clean Dark Spread = Dark Spread – (Carbon Price*0.971). The spark spread, instead, is given by: 
Wholesale electricity price – Price of gas/0.4913, whereas the dark spread by Wholesale electricity price – Price 
of coal/0.35. Please see Appendix Figs. 5C.1-5C.4 for the clean spreads and marginal profitability of coal over 
gas during Phase II, relative to the markets of: Norway, UK, France and Germany.  
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unexpectedly dropped, where an increase in gas-fired electricity production was experienced. 
Probably, an additional factor behind the increase in coal-fired generation was the set of 
regulations in Europe at the time, such as the Large Combustion Plant Directive, which seems  
to have pushed generators to maximize their coal use before shutting down. Germany’s  
emissions also rose. Coal use soared in 2011, and carbon emissions increased after years of 
consistently falling. Moreover, this increased use of coal is likely to reflect on internationally 
pre-fixed climate change and efficiency objectives
40
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 The renowned 20-20-20 goals by the EU regard a 20% increased use of renewable energy, 20% increased 
energy efficiency and 20% reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases, by 2020. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This study considered the interactions between electricity and carbon year-ahead prices 
during Phase II of the European Union Emission Trading System (2008-12) and investigated 
the drivers of electricity future prices in terms of levels and volatility. 
Among the main results, the causal relationship between carbon and electricity forward prices 
is bidirectional in the Nord Pool and EEX markets. In addition, there is evidence that the 
French and British electricity prices Granger-cause the carbon price. Based on the results 
obtained in this study we conclude that the average electricity generator in Germany and the 
Nordic countries internalized the cost of carbon into their electricity prices considerably more 
than proportionately in relation to the increase in costs deriving from effective carbon 
intensity, even though permits were freely allocated. In addition, given the progressively 
falling carbon prices, the marginal opportunity costs of carrying these allowances were likely 
not sufficient to justify the excessive increases in electricity prices. To this extent, 
safeguarding a healthy level of international competition among European generators must be 
ensured in order not to deviate from the path toward full integration. 
In addition, coal prices are shown to be the most influential determinants of electricity prices 
in Europe during Phase II, both in terms of levels and volatility, although coal represents an 
inframarginal production unit. This fundamental reliance on coal, which mainly derives from 
low coal and carbon prices, may represent an obstacle in the accomplishment of EU emission 
reduction goals. Moreover, policies aimed at limiting the supply of emission permits should 
be considered an appropriate measure to discourage coal use and support natural gas-fired 
generation. 
 
 
 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 153 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Dynamic Granger-Causal Networks of 
Electricity Spot Prices: A Novel Approach to 
Market Integration 
with Fabrizio de Vico Fallani* and Mario Chavez† 
 
 
The previous chapters analysed the effects of important factors which may influence 
electricity prices. Electricity prices, however, may also be determined by the prices 
prevailing in the electricity markets of other countries. 
The analysis of the interactions between electricity prices is able to deliver an 
accurate description of the integration between electricity markets. Previous studies 
analysing the extent of integration between electricity markets only considered pairs of 
prices. This study, on the other hand, analyses the integration of the entire system of 
electricity markets. 
Chapter 6 uses graph theory to analyse the interactions of a representative sample of 
13 European electricity spot prices during the period 2007–2012. We construct 7,651 
dynamic multivariate networks, with electricity prices corresponding to the graph’s nodes 
and the edges in between them denoting the significant degrees of pair-wise linear Granger-
causality between them. Global connectivity is then characterized by the system’s density, or 
the total quantity of causal interactivity sustained by the network system, which informs about 
the occurrence of abnormal changes in connectivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
*Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle Épinière, Hôpital de La Pitié-Salpȇtrière; Paris, France. 
† Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Hôpital de La Pitié-Salpȇtrière; Paris, France. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The issue of whether European markets are integrated was explored by various authors, with 
diverse methodological approaches and contrasting results, with some authors accepting the 
European electricity market integration hypothesis, and others rejecting it. Most studies in 
this field investigate whether couples of electricity prices exhibit equilibrium relationships, 
the latter implying that at least one of the prices is causing changes in the other. This is the 
most common measure of whether two economic processes, or electricity spot prices in this 
case – given these are effectively determined by the equation of demand and supply in the 
competitive European markets – have a common dynamic pattern and whether one is 
statistically able to provide useful information to predict the other variable’s activity. This 
concept is referred to as Granger-causality and is a well-established concept in economics 
and finance. 
This study applies Granger-causality analysis and complex network theory to study the 
interactivity between European electricity prices during 2007-2012. This enables us to detect 
any substantial network changes occurred during this period, indicating the occurrence of 
events which have disrupted the normal functioning of markets. The novelty of our study 
resides in the use of graph theoretical networks to model the dynamic interactions among 
European wholesale electricity prices. Our aim is that of providing inferences regarding the 
European network’s state and evolution over time. We model the causal interactions between 
the electricity spot prices as a connectivity network, where nodes represent the different 
countries in our sample and the relative links in between them denoting the significant 
influences between relative pair-wise price variations. 
We intend to address the question of whether electricity markets in the European area exhibit 
any abnormal behaviour which can be explained by historical events. In addition, we validate 
the technique’s reliability by verifying the commissioning date of European interconnectors, 
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as well as the implementation of different market coupling initiatives, established during the 
studied period, in relation to the generated local connectivity data. 
The proposed approach takes advantage of modern network theory, a mathematical 
framework capable to characterize connected systems with a great efficacy (Boccaletti et al, 
2006; see also Latora and Marchiori, 2001, Sporns, 2002, and Watts, D. and J., Strogatz, 
2008, on complex networks). The complex pattern of propagation between the different 
countries’ electricity prices gives rise to an interconnected system, a network, which changes 
over time and informs us about how the prices of different markets influence each other and 
how these relationships vary in time. Our purpose is that of extracting novel information from 
this network, throughout the period 2007-12, in order to draw conclusions regarding the 
development of the European electricity market integration process. Our innovation in this 
sense relates to the use of a system approach which describes the multivariate interactions 
between the electricity spot prices relative to the countries constituting the European market, 
rather than only investigating their simple univariate profiles.  
Whereas past studies have provided evidence that only some electricity markets are 
converging (see for example Zachmann, 2008, or Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010), in the sense 
that their electricity prices have a long-run cointegration or equilibrium relationship, we are 
instead using such information, concerning the short-run causality interactions among these 
prices, to determine the dynamic behaviour of the entire system. 
Our study shows that, until 2011, the connectivity of European electricity markets remained 
at a substantially low level, around 2% on our measure, with a large jump to ca. 7% occurring 
during the final quarter of the same year. Aside such relatively large jump, abnormal changes 
in connectivity were essentially similar in numbers and magnitude. We can therefore 
conclude that the way toward the attainment of electricity price integration in Europe seems 
to still be very long. 
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The modern theory of networks, originated through the discovery of small-world networks 
and scale free networks at the end of the last millennium, represents the most recent approach 
to complex systems. The study of complex networks has attracted a large amount of interest 
in the last years and was applied to metabolic systems, social networks and the brain (Stam 
and Reijneveld, 2007). We apply this promising technique to the electricity system with an 
economic perspective devoted to the issue of European market integration. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 is dedicated to the main 
background information related to this work, whereas section 6.3 outlines the relevant 
methodologies we employed. Section 6.4 reports the main results, discussed in section 6.5. 
Finally, section 6.6 concludes the study. 
 
6.2 Previous Work 
The following section introduces the previous studies that deal with electricity market 
integration in Europe from an empirical perspective. 
Within the past few years, different authors have addressed their efforts in trying to ascertain 
whether electricity markets in the European area are establishing concrete steps toward the 
completion of an internal market and thus whether price coupling and harmonization are 
being effectively achieved. 
Since 2004 until today, a series of contrasting studies have emerged with some showing a 
certain degree of price convergence between couples of electricity prices, and some others 
rejecting it. However, none of these has ever studied the dynamic integration of a substantial 
collection of electricity prices in order to understand whether there have been global changes 
in market integration. For example, based on a principal component analysis, Zachmann 
(2008) rejects the overall market integration hypothesis except for some pairs of countries. 
Studies such as that by Robinson (2007), who uses B-convergence and co-integration tests, 
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on the other hand, suggest that convergence did in fact occur for most countries. The truth 
would probably depend on the proximity of the markets under study, which increases the 
probabilities of market coupling or interconnector commissioning, as well as the period of 
time under scrutiny. However, this is not fully proven, as shown by the contrasting 
conclusions which have so far been reached in this context. 
Indeed, more recently, Bunn and Gianfreda (2010) demonstrated increased market integration 
for Germany, France, Spain, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Integration was 
found not to increase with geographical proximity but rather with interconnector capacity. 
Moreover, Kalantzis and Milonas (2010) found that interconnection but also geographical 
distance play a central role in price dispersion. 
Furthermore, using a correlation and co-integration analysis, Boisseleau (2004) did not find 
convergence among wholesale electricity day-ahead prices. In contrast, Armstrong and Galli 
(2005) observed convergence among wholesale price differentials in the markets of France, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Spain, from 2002 to 2004. 
Very recently, by using a fractional co-integration analysis, Houllier and de Menezes (2013) 
showed that long memory for price shocks and co-integration exist only for a few markets, 
such as Germany, The Netherlands and France. 
The creation of a competitive single electricity market in Europe should, principally in the 
absence of transmission constraints, determine the convergence of electricity prices in the 
direction of a single price for all national markets. In such scenario, we expect the global 
integration of European electricity markets to be generally improving throughout the years. 
Thus, previous studies on this topic only considered the integration between pairs of prices as 
opposed to considering an entire system of prices. This study, on the other hand, characterises 
the behaviour of a sample of prices, thus an entire system of electricity markets, over time.  
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6.3 Methodologies 
This section explains the methodology of our work, which aims at understanding how 
European electricity markets are integrating over time. We compute a measure of 
connectivity between the dynamics of our sample of electricity prices by referring to the 
system’s global connection density, in turn based on the principle of Granger-causality. 
The idea is that the stronger the connectivity value (the significant Granger-causality 
estimate) is, the larger will be the degree of integration between electricity prices. In fact, 
when two electricity markets are connected by a transmission line, if capacity is large 
enough, their prices will tend to converge to a similar level over time, due to the law of one 
price, by which arbitrage theory applies. This implies that at least one price is exerting 
Granger-causation on the other. Either way, the level of Granger-causality increases 
throughout the process. In a similar fashion, this can also apply when market structures are 
altered due to changes in legislative matters in relation to market integration issues. Our main 
aim is to determine in which periods of time there is any abnormal behaviour of such 
measure, both in terms of global and local connectivity, and whether we can associate it to 
any major market occurrence.  
Previous studies have used Granger-causality to analyse the causal relationship between stock 
prices and exchange rates (e.g., Granger et al., 1998). Causal relationships between electricity 
prices, on the other hand, have not been addressed. Woo et al. (2006) represents one of the 
very few studies to use electricity prices and causality testing, using the Granger 
instantaneous-causality test to explore the potential causal relationships between wholesale 
electricity prices and natural gas prices in California. Similarly, Ferkingstad et al. (2011) 
apply causal inference to determine the relationship between oil, gas, coal and electricity 
prices. 
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6.3.1 Stage I: Data Analysis 
We use hourly time series data relative to a sample of 13 European wholesale electricity day-
ahead prices, covering the period 02/07/2007 to 29/06/2012. The markets considered are: 
Belpex (Belgium), APX UK (United Kingdom), APX Endex (The Netherlands), Nord Pool 
Spot (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Powernext (France), European Energy Exchange 
(EEX) (Germany, Switzerland), Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME) (Italy),  OMI-Polo 
Portugués (OMIP) (Portugal) and Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad 
(OMEL) (Spain). The electricity prices (Thomson Reuters) were obtained with a time 
sampling of one hour. This applies to all markets aside from the British one (APX UK), for 
which trading observations are recorded at every half-hour of each day. The total amount of 
available data points for each market is therefore 31,320 (62,640 in the case of British prices, 
for which we take hourly averages to make them compatible with the other series). We only 
use data relative to weekdays given it reflects electricity markets during normal functioning 
hours in which all agents (e.g., firms) are actively operating, as well as because the usage and 
diversity of weekend data might induce an adverse effect on the overall treatment and 
assessment of the data. Furthermore, the maximum time difference between the studied 
countries is two hours; thus, all prices have been aligned to take this into account. The 13 
hourly electricity day-ahead prices (in EUR/MWh) can be described as depicted by the table 
below (Table 6.1): 
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 Mean StdDev 
Prob. 
(Skewness) 
Prob. 
(Kurtosis) 
JB test 
Belgium 56.090 26.450 1.865 14.016 <0.0001 
Denmark 50.064 20.360 4.686 84.000 <0.0001 
Finland    31.855 16.244 16.325 563.686 <0.0001 
France 57.485 46.211 36.837 2204.547 <0.0001 
Germany 54.115 25.095 1.678 9.835 <0.0001 
Italy 75.639 29.088 0.832 1.490 <0.0001 
The Netherlands 55.452 24.451 1.548 5.364 <0.0001 
Norway 28.581 10.031 0.670 3.977 <0.0001 
Portugal 50.619 17.146 0.160 0.441 <0.0001 
Spain 47.799 16.142 0.082 0.757 0.003 
Sweden 31.663 15.854 17.287 620.242 <0.0001 
Switzerland 60.233 25.243 1.470 7.362 <0.0001 
United Kingdom 48.230 25.242 3.563 24.205 <0.0001 
 
Table 6.1 Mean and standard deviation of wholesale day-ahead electricity prices in the time frame 
2007-2012. The normality distribution test (JB), including skewness and kurtosis values, are also 
reported. 
 
 
As can be seen from the above table, the highest electricity price is the Italian one, possibly 
due to the large amounts of imports as well as the carbon intensity pertinent to the electricity 
generation process in Italy (even though prices in EU ETS Phases I and II were very low), 
whereas the lowest price is registered in Norway, perhaps due to their efficiency stemming 
from an almost exclusive usage of hydropower to produce electricity. France, Sweden and 
Finland display price values which are highly skewed to the right and accompanied by a large  
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excess kurtosis, i.e. a leptokurtic price distribution. Finally, the UK is the country which 
exhibits an electricity price which is closest to the mean price of wholesale electricity in our 
European sample (i.e. EUR 49/MWh). 
Based on the characteristics of the technique we employ, all electricity prices are used in raw 
form, i.e. they are not normalized, in order to capture more information from the movements 
in each series at every point in time. 
 
6.3.2 Stage II: Granger-causality from Multivariate Autoregressive (MVAR) models 
Granger-causality was initially proposed in the context of econometrics to enable the 
investigation of causal influence between two series41. Letting two time series x(t) and y(t) be 
jointly stationary, we can infer the existence of Granger-causality running from y(t) to x(t) if 
the combined information from both variables is able to significantly improve the forecast of 
x(t) as opposed to solely using the information from x(t) (Lin et al., 2009). The individual AR 
representation of each series is given by: 
𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎1𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜖1(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑘=1
,        𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖1(𝑡)) = 𝛴1                                 [Eq. 6.1] 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑑1𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜂1(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑘=1
,        𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜂1(𝑡)) = 𝛤1                                 [Eq. 6.2] 
 
where 𝑎1𝑘 and 𝑑1𝑘 are the autoregressive coefficients, 𝜖1(𝑡) and 𝜂1(𝑡) are noise terms and 
𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑝. The joint description of the bivariate series [𝑥(𝑡), 𝑦(𝑡)]𝑇 can be given by the pth-
order AR: 
                                                          
41
 Because we are employing a multivariate system (MVAR), we are effectively using Granger-Geweke 
causality rather than the more common Granger causality method. In fact, Granger-Geweke causality is simply 
Granger-causality adjusted for multivariate systems (Geweke, 1982).  We henceforth use the term ‘Granger-
causality’ to refer to Granger-Geweke causality. 
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𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎2𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + ∑ 𝑏2𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜖2(𝑡)                                    [Eq. 6.3]
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑐2𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + ∑ 𝑑2𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜂2(𝑡)                            [Eq. 6.4]
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
where the noise terms are uncorrelated over time and their covariance matrix is expressed as: 
Σ = [
𝛴2 𝛶2
𝛶2 𝛤2
]                                                                [Eq. 6.5] 
where 𝛴2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖2(𝑡)), 𝛤2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜂2(𝑡)) and 𝛶2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜖2(𝑡), 𝜂2(𝑡)). If x(t) and y(t) are 
independent, then 𝑏2𝑘 and 𝑐2𝑘 are zero. 
We can notice that the value of 𝛴1 measures the accuracy of the autoregressive prediction of 
x(t), based on its own past values, whereas the value of 𝛴2 represents the accuracy of 
prediction of the present values of x(t) based on the past values of both x(t) and y(t). A 
measure of Granger-causality is then defined as (Lin et al., 2009): 
𝐺𝐶𝑦⟶𝑥 = 𝑤𝑦𝑥 = log (
𝛴1
𝛴2
).                                               [Eq. 6.6] 
Similarly, one can define causal influence from x(t) to y(t) as: 
𝐺𝐶𝑥⟶𝑦 = 𝑤𝑥𝑦 = log (
𝛤1
𝛤2
).                                              [Eq. 6.7] 
The model order q can be selected according to the Akaike criterion: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = 2 log[det(Σ)] + 2𝑝𝑀2/𝑛                                          [Eq. 6.8] 
where Σ is the estimated noise covariance matrix of the bivariate AR model, 𝑀 is the number 
of time series and n is the length of the data window, or number of samples, used to estimate 
the model. The first term decreases with increasing p, whereas the second term punishes 
models with a high order. This criterion tries to find the optimal q that minimizes the cost 
function, where the latter is defined in such way to balance the variance accounted for by the 
AR model against the number of coefficients to be estimated. 
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In our case, we use the electricity spot price time series of 13 European markets. We will 
therefore use an extension to the multivariate case of Granger-causality. Given the set Y(t) of 
13 simultaneously observed stationary time series, the MVAR model of order p is defined as  
𝑌(𝑡) = ∑ 𝐴𝑚𝑌(𝑡 − 𝑚) + 𝐸(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑚=1
                                             [Eq. 6.9] 
where each matrix 𝐴𝑚 (of dimension 13x13) is formed by elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 describing the linear 
interaction of 𝑥𝑗(𝑡 − 𝑚) on 𝑥𝑖(𝑡), 𝑝 represents the number of lags of each explanatory 
variable, and E(t) is the vector of error terms. The MVAR model of country y’s electricity 
price treats each of the remaining 12 electricity prices as well as their lags, as explanatory 
variables. 
We estimated each MVAR model using the Burg algorithm (Burg, 1967, and Burg, 1975), 
which makes use of the Levinson-Durbin (Levinson, 1947, and Durbin, 1960) procedure with 
a different constraint to find a solution with similar computational requirements, though 
without instability. The Levinson-Durbin method is a procedure that recursively calculates 
the solution to an equation concerning a Toeplitz matrix. The algorithm runs in θ(𝑛2) time, a 
considerable improvement in relation to the Gauss-Jordan elimination, which runs in θ(𝑛3) 
recursion. 
The original Burg algorithm was extended for multivariate AR models with the Nuttall-
Strand method (Schlögl, 2006). A detailed comparison of various MVAR estimators revealed 
that the MVAR Burg algorithm provides the most accurate estimates (Schlögl, 2006 and 
Aydin, 2010). The Burg method is viewed as superior to the non-parametric methods due to 
different properties, these being: (i) it does not apply windows to the data and does not 
depend on the assumption that the autocorrelation series is not zero outside the window; (ii) 
both backward and forward prediction errors are effectively minimized in the least squares 
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sense; (iii) it always yields an AR model which is stable; (iv) it is computationally eﬃcient 
(Proakis et al., 2005 and Aydin, 2010). 
For each pair of electricity prices, which we denote as x and y, we calculate the Granger-
causality in both directions of causation, i.e. 𝑤𝑥⟶𝑦 and 𝑤𝑦⟶𝑥. If we let: 
𝐹𝑥⟶𝑦 =
𝑛 − 2𝑝
𝑝
(exp(𝑤𝑥⟶𝑦)) − 1                                      [Eq. 6.10] 
under the null hypothesis of no causal relationship, 𝐹𝑥⟶𝑦 asymptotically follows a F-
distribution with 𝑝 and 𝑛 − 2𝑝 degrees of freedom, where 𝑛 denotes the length of the time 
and p is the AR model order (Gourevitch et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009). 
The creation of a connectivity network for the system of electricity spot prices is based on the 
previously described MVAR analysis and enables us to derive the connectivity between pairs 
of prices and, therefore, the system’s global connectivity. We apply graph theory to our 
system of electricity prices in order to analyse the degree of European electricity market 
connectivity. In our model, the hourly spot prices represent the network’s nodes whereas the 
causal interactions among them denote the edges linking the different nodes on the graph. 
This allows us to derive the local connectivity indicators, which will in turn reveal the 
system’s global connectivity. 
 
6.3.3 Stage III: Creating a European Electricity Spot Price Connectivity Network 
Stage III of our analysis represents our innovation: the creation of a Granger-causal 
connectivity42 network system. In our case, which relates to MVAR estimation, the necessary 
data for fitting a multivariate AR model of order p must be larger than 𝑀2𝑝, where M is the 
number of time series (Schlögel and Supp, 2006). For this reason, the Granger-causality was 
                                                          
42
 For information about the standard Granger-causal connectivity computational technique, please refer to Seth 
(2010). See also Seth (2008, 2011) for a more theoretical approach to causal networks. 
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computed with an MVAR model of order 𝑝 = 4 (set by the AIC) over temporal windows of 
720 points, which corresponds to a time scale of of 30 days. 
In order to have a time-varying estimation of the network we referred to a sliding window 
with a shift of 4 points, i.e. we estimated a network every 4 hours, resulting in a total of 7,651 
total shifts, or estimated networks. In other words, we are creating a matrix 13x13 for each of 
the 7,651 time shifts from the original 31,320 hourly price data points available for each 
market. Each non-zero entry of the 13x13 matrix represents a link (the value of Granger-
causality) that was significantly stronger (p<0.05, with false discovery rate, FDR, corrected 
for multiple comparisons) than the null hypothesis of no causal relationship. This operation 
resulted in the generation of sparse unweighted networks. 
 
6.3.3.1 Network Theoretical Indices 
In mathematics and computer science, graph theory is the study of mathematical structures 
used to model pair-wise relations between objects from a certain collection. A graph is an 
abstract representation of a network. It consists of a set of N vertices (or nodes), our 
electricity prices, and a set of L edges (or connections), indicating the presence of causal 
interaction between the vertices. The adjacency matrix A contains the information concerning 
to the relative graphs’ connectivity structure (see Fig.6.1). When a weighted and directed 
edge exists from node i to node j, the corresponding entry of the adjacency matrix is Aij≠ 0; 
otherwise Aij= 0. 
 
6.3.3.1.1 Node Strength  
The simplest attribute of a node is its connectivity degree, or strength, which is the total 
number of connections established with other vertices. This quantity is subdivided into the in-
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strength, din, and out-strength, dout, when directed relationships are being considered. The 
formulation of the in-strength index, din, can be introduced as: 
    𝑑𝑖𝑛(𝑖) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑉                                                        [Eq. 6.11]  
Eq.6.11 represents the total amount of links incoming to the vertex i. V is the set of available 
nodes (electricity prices) and wij indicates the presence of an arc from point j to point i, 
defined by the relative node’s pair-wise linear Granger-causality in the time domain (see 
Eq.6.6). Interactions that do not reach statistical signiﬁcance are set to zero. The value of a 
given in-strength will depend on the degree of linear pair-wise Granger-causality between 
two nodes, which can be a number between 0 and 1; therefore, we can expect to see values 
between 0 and 12 in the extreme case in which a given price is fully Granger-caused (i.e. 
GC=1) by the remaining 12 prices in the sample. It shall be noted that connectivity strength 
values can either be zero or a positive number. 
Conversely, for the out-strength: 
dout(i) = ∑ wj,i                                                   [Eq. 6.12]j∈V   
Eq. 6.12 represents the total amount of links outgoing from the vertex i. It shall be noted that 
wj,i ≠ wi,j because of the property of reciprocity, i.e. reciprocal asymmetry in Granger-causal 
relations in the time domain. 
In-strengths and out-strengths have clear functional interpretations. A high in-strength value 
indicates that a unit is influenced by a large number of other units, while a high out-strength 
value specifies the existence of a large number of potential functional targets (Boccaletti et 
al., 2006). The figure below (Fig. 6.1) depicts an illustrative example of in- and out-strength 
computations. 
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Fig. 6.1 - Example of in-strength and out-strength computation in a simple n-node network (in this example, 
n = 5). The network graph is given on the left-hand side whereas the relative adjacency matrix (an n-by-n 
matrix, where n is the number of price series) is pictured on the right. The sum of the significant causality 
strength entries in row 3 determines the out-strength relative to node 3, whereas the sum of the entries in column 
3 represents the node’s in-strengths. Numbers are solely representative of examples of statistically significant 
Granger-causalities. Zeros replace values of Granger-causality that are not significant at the 5% level, 
considering a z-score of Z > 1.96. The main diagonal of the matrix, i.e. representing same-price causality is also 
set to zero (it would be one, or perfect causality, otherwise). Therefore, in this time shift, node 3 has an in-
strength value of 1.63 and an out-strength value of 0.63, meaning that the electricity price representing node 3 is 
more affected by other prices compared to how much it affects other prices in the sample. 
 
 
A simple example of how to calculate in-strengths (and out-strengths) is provided in the 
figure above. For simplicity, we depict a 5-node network.  Note that the network graph (for a 
given time shift) is given on the left whereas the relative adjacency matrix is shown on the 
right. Therefore, the network graph is one composed of 5 nodes whereas the adjacency matrix 
is a 5x5 matrix, with each entry representing the degree of pair-wise linear Granger-causality 
between the nodes. Therefore, the main diagonal of this matrix, showing the causality 
between same variables, is effectively disregarded and set at zero. If we take node 3 as the 
node of interest, it is possible to see that the only nodes which are affecting node 3 (as 
indicated by arrows directing towards node 3) are nodes 1 and 5. Therefore, column 3 shows 
non-zero entries at the corresponding entries for rows 1 and 5. These entries indicate 
statistically significant Granger-causality values, whereas all entries of zero imply that these  
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causal relationships are statistically insignificant at the 5%-level (for Z > 1.96). The sum of 
these column entries is the node’s in-strength. On the contrary, the network graph shows that 
node 3 is significantly affecting (with outgoing links) only nodes 2 and 4. Therefore, row 3 
shows positive values at the corresponding positions for columns 2 and 4. Similarly, the sum 
of entries in this row (i.e. 0.54 and 0.09) represents the out-strength for price 3 at the given 
time shift. 
 
6.3.3.1.2 Network Global Connection Density 
In order to capture the general level of interconnectivity of a system throughout a certain 
period of time, we refer to the network system’s global connection density, D, defined as: 
      𝐷 =
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑ 𝑤𝑖,𝑗𝑖,𝑗∈𝑉                                                        [Eq. 6.13]  
where V is the set of available nodes, or electricity prices. Global density is the actual number 
of edges in the graph as a proportion of the overall number of potential edges, and is the 
simplest indicator of the physical cost — for example, the energy or other resource 
requirements (in metabolic and brain activity networks, respectively) — of a given network 
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). Causal density is a measure of the overall quantity of causal 
interactivity which is sustained by a network over a given period of time. In our case it 
represents the connectivity, or causal activity, supported by the network of electricity prices 
throughout the period of time under study. In fact, a large degree of causal density indicates 
that the system is strongly coordinated in terms of individual market activities or pricing 
processes. Note that the in-strength (or equivalently, in-degree), which we will mainly focus 
on, is the only variable used in the calculation of the global connection density. 
Values of global density (Eq. 6.13) can be expected to be between 0 and 1 and will depend on 
the sum of each node’s in-strength (see Eq. 6.11) which, in turn, depends on the sum of 
individual causalities (see Eq. 6.6 and Fig. 6.1), at each time interval. 
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6.4 Results 
The following section reports the main results. After constructing the network system based 
on the previously explained MVAR model structure of European electricity day-ahead prices, 
we derive our main integration factors (see Eq. 6.11-6.13): the node’s in-strength and out-
strength series for each of the 13 markets, and the system’s global density. The former two 
indicate local measures of connectivity relative to each graph’s individual nodes, whereas the 
global density of the network system delivers a causal-based measure of global interactivity. 
Node-strength results are reported next. We primarily focus on the in-strength results given 
they are used to calculate our global connectivity measure, the system’s density. In addition, 
the computed in-strength series are used to validate our data in relation to occurred market 
coupling initiatives, as shown in the next section. Finally, we depict the graphical 
representation of the estimated network at the most substantial global density peak (as well as 
its adjacency matrix) and compare it to an average density network, in order to give a 
graphical representation of examples of networks at different points in time. 
 
6.4.1 Node Strength Estimations 
Following our estimations, the electricity price which displayed the largest number of in-
strengths, i.e. the one which is mostly Granger-caused by other electricity prices in the 
sample, is the Dutch price. In fact, the Netherlands was a net importer of electricity since the 
1980s and for almost the entire period under analysis (until 2010), thus, its electricity price 
might have been determined by a number of other markets. During the studied period (i.e. 
2007-12), large-scale maintenance projects were ongoing in its neighbouring countries (CBS 
Statistics Netherlands, 2010) and this could have perhaps been the reason for a large mean 
value of incoming Granger-causality (one of about 24%). 
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On the other hand, the market which was less affected (an in-strength of 14%), as shown by 
the lower number of incoming causalities was the Norwegian one. This might be 
comprehensible considering that Norway tends to export extensively given its production by 
means of, almost exclusively, hydropower. 
In addition, if we consider the Granger-causalities between Nordic electricity prices the result 
is not surprising. For example, during the first window (i.e. 02-Jul-2007 01:00 -> 11-Aug-
2007 00:00), Norway significantly affected the electricity prices in Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark. On the contrary, the electricity prices in Finland, Sweden and Denmark did not 
significantly influence the Norwegian price. 
The figure below (Fig.6.2) shows a visual representation of the estimated in-strength (on the 
y-axis from Belgium downward to the United Kingdom) relative to the studied time interval: 
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Fig. 6.2 - Behaviour of the 13 European price in-strength values between 2007 and 2012. The darker colour 
indicates the intensity, or strength, of the connectivity in-strength, as shown on the right-hand side bar. 
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The above illustration depicts the connectivity node in-strengths43 relative to each of the 
thirteen European markets over the frame 2007-2012. It is possible to note a substantial 
increase in node in-strength during the final quarter of 2011. This implies that the causality 
interactions between the electricity prices in our sample have considerably increased during 
this quarter. The following figure (Fig.6.3) similarly shows the behaviour of the node out-
strengths. Note that results are consistent under a qualitative point of view because both node 
in- and out-strengths indicate a relatively large rise in connectivity towards the final quarter 
of 2011: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 See Fig. 6.A1 and 6A.2 in the Appendix for a representation of all in-strength and out-strength values over 
time (Appendix A3). 
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Fig. 6.3 – Electricity price out-strength values for each of the thirteen European markets considered. The darker 
colours indicate the connectivity intensity of the out-strengths. 
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In relation to the node out-strengths, the electricity prices which exhibited the lowest out-
strength values during the period 2007-2012 were those of Denmark and Belgium (both with 
5.13%), meaning that, on average, these countries’ electricity prices were those which least  
influenced other prices in our sample. On the other hand, the UK displayed the highest out-
strength values indicating that its electricity prices were mostly associated with outgoing 
causality (around 42%). These results can be explained by the fact that larger countries are 
able to influence other electricity prices in a certain area relatively more compared to smaller 
countries
44
. 
The next section validates the reliability of our technique by verifying historical events such 
as the occurrence of European interconnectors commissioning, as well as different market 
coupling initiatives, established during the studied period. 
 
6.4.1.1 Applying the Model to Verify Historical Occurrences 
By using Granger-causality-based complex networks for the first time in an energy 
economics study, our investigation showed that European electricity spot markets exhibited a 
considerable interconnectivity peak during the final quarter of 2011. Moreover, the degree of 
connectivity among our sample of European markets remained substantially low (ca. 2%), 
with the largest peak reaching around 7%, meaning that an average 7% of causality increases 
was recorded at the very most. The edge density of the market graph corresponding to this 
latest period was more than twice as large compared to the preceding mean level. The 
                                                          
44
 As can be seen from the two figures above (Figs. 6.2 and 6.3), outgoing causality is globally more frequent in 
time compared to incoming causality, implying that prices tend to influence more other prices in the sample 
compared to how much they are influenced by other prices. This is justified by the network matrix property of 
reciprocal asymmetry. Perhaps, this might be a consequence of not comprising the whole set of electricity prices 
(including extra-European electricity prices linked to the electricity prices in our sample) in our model. 
Nevertheless, both measures provide clear evidence of an increase in connectivity between European electricity 
prices towards the end of 2011Q4. 
In addition, the UK tends to mostly import via its inter-connectors to France (2GW) and Netherlands (1GW). I 
wouldn't expect it to have such out-strength. However, one could also interpret the flow of electricity towards 
the UK as a way for price setting for French and Dutch electricity to be competitively set at the margin in the 
UK. 
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dramatic jump of the edge density suggests a substantial high in the integration of electricity 
spot markets across Europe, implying that an increasingly larger number of spot markets 
significantly affected the others’ behaviour in the period November 4 to December 16, 2011. 
This might have possibly been a lagged implication of the EU Third Energy Package, 
implemented in March that year and the first fully concerning the issue of EU electricity 
market integration. Complex networks informed us on how the system of electricity prices 
evolved over time, indicating when abnormally large or small changes in interconnectivity 
occurred in the European market system. This, in turn, enabled us to understand when events 
have disrupted the normal functioning of markets. 
However, before discussing the behaviour of global connectivity in relation to changes in 
markets structure and possibly explanatory events, it is necessary to inspect the latter in 
relation to the various European electricity markets’ estimated local connectivity data. This 
effectively means investigating whether it is possible to verify the occurrence of market 
coupling, from our node in-strength data. This is investigated in two ways, as shown for each 
event relating to the commissioning of an interconnector or the establishment of market 
coupling, between 2007-12. 
On the individual markets side, physical transmission interconnectors and market coupling 
between various European countries have been introduced, especially from 2010 to 2011. Do 
the computed node in-strengths reflect these events? The commissioning of electricity 
interconnectors between different national electricity grids, or the introduction of market 
coupling, which took place during the period under analysis are listed hereafter and discussed 
relative to the computed connectivity in-strength data. As mentioned earlier, in order to 
understand whether these events are reflected in the data relative to the different countries’ 
electricity price in-strengths, we carry out:   1. simple t-tests to investigate whether the mean 
in-strength relative to the coupled markets’ electricity prices has increased in the period 
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succeeding the commissioning/coupling date, and  2. correlation tests to check whether the 
correlation among the coupled markets’ price in-strengths is effectively larger in the period 
after commissioning/coupling took place compared to the period preceding that date. 
In our model, the in-strength of an electricity price is a measure of the number of links 
incoming to that electricity price node and is calculated as the sum of significant Granger-
causality strengths that are influencing that electricity price during a given time shift. 
Therefore, it follows that if a country’s transmission system has physically connected with 
another transmission system then, by definition, the average of incoming causalities should 
be larger after the occurrence of electricity interconnector commissioning (or, more 
generally, market coupling between two countries), henceforth referred to as period t+1, than 
what it used to be before the interconnector was established (or markets rules instituted) and 
began functioning, i.e. t-1
45. Therefore, in the case two markets were coupled, both markets’ 
price mean in-strength should be significantly larger during t+1, or after the 
commissioning/coupling date (where the relative in-strength is denoted as 𝐷𝑡+1), compared to 
the period preceding that date (𝐷𝑡−1). The same applies to the correlation among coupled 
markets’ prices in-strengths; in fact, we would expect the price in-strengths of such markets 
to be more correlated after the commissioning/coupling date compared to the period before 
that date. 
More formally, given the time shift number (where in our case, 𝑇 = 1,2,3, … ,7651) 
corresponding to the date of a certain interconnector commissioning (or market coupling 
establishment46) (𝑇𝑡) and the known end point of our series (𝑇𝐹, i.e. 7,651), it is easy to 
extract the time length of the price in-strength series to be tested against the same series 
                                                          
45
 Perhaps, a thin transmission line might have no impact on the degree of Granger-causality recorded after the 
interconnector commissioning. However, all interconnectors studied in this work represent major ones in recent 
EU history. 
46
 The date used to indicate a certain period in time corresponds to the second of the two dates indicated in a 
given network time shift. For example, it is possible to refer to the shift “04-Nov-2011 09:00:00 to 16-Dec-2011 
08:00:00” as “16-Dec-2011 08:00:00” in order to denote a specific point in time. 
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preceding a given commissioning/coupling date, i.e. 𝐿 = 𝑇𝑡+1 − 𝑇𝑡. Therefore, the initial date 
relative to the series 𝐷𝑡−1is given by 𝑇𝑡−1 = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐿. Thus, we test whether the mean of the 
in-strength series of a certain electricity price after commissioning/coupling took place (i.e. 
𝑇𝑡 to 𝑇𝑡+1) is significantly larger than the mean of the same series before that event (i.e. 𝑇𝑡−1 
to 𝑇𝑡)  and thus, whether µ𝑡+1(𝑇𝑡+1) > µ𝑡−1(𝑇𝑡−1). In a similar fashion and using the same 
time lengths, we also test whether correlation between such markets has generally improved 
after the commissioning/coupling date, i.e. whether 𝜌(𝐷𝑡+1
𝐴 , 𝐷𝑡+1
𝐵 ) > 𝜌(𝐷𝑡−1
𝐴 , 𝐷𝑡−1
𝐵 ), where A 
and B indicate the price in-strength series of two distinct markets and 𝜌 is the Pearson 
correlation coefficient. The introduction of a physical interconnection with another country’s 
transmission line implies that the electricity price of interest should exhibit an average 
number of incoming Granger-causal links that is larger compared to those observed before 
the event. Consequently, it is expected for µ
𝑡+1
 to be significantly larger than µ
𝑡−1
. 
Estimations are carried out through the use of Student’s t-tests, by which standard inference 
methods apply (i.e. alpha is set at 0.05, with Z>1.96). 
The commissioning of European electricity interconnectors and the implementation of market 
coupling which have occurred between 2007 and 2012 are: the Central Western Europe 
(CWE) Initiative (November 2010; coupling of France, Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Germany), Interim Tight Volume Coupling (November 2010; involving Germany and 
Denmark), the NorNed cable  (February 2011; connecting and coupling The Netherlands and 
Norway), APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool (February 2011; coupling the markets of Belgium, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and the BritNed cable (March 
2011; connecting and coupling the United Kingdom and The Netherlands) (EU Commission, 
Energy Observatory, 2007-12). 
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Table 6.2, reported below, depicts the t-test results and changes in mean values, for each 
coupled market’s price in-strengths, in the periods before and after the 
commissioning/coupling date. 
 
Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative: November 2010 
Coupled 
Markets 
µ
𝟐
≠ µ
𝟏
? 
µ
𝟐
 µ
𝟏
 µ
𝟐
> µ
𝟏
? Δ µ 
H p-value 
FR 1 P<0.0001 0.2590 0.1871 ✓ +38.50% 
BL 1 P<0.0001 0.2455 0.2120 ✓ +15.80% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2675 0.2118 ✓ +26.30% 
DE 1 P<0.0001 0.2538 0.1530 ✓ +65.88% 
Interim Tight Volume Coupling: November 2010 
DE 1 P<0.0001 0.2538 0.1530 ✓ +65.88% 
DM 1 P<0.0001 0.3221 0.1284 ✓ +150.86% 
NorNed cable: February 2011 
NO 1 P<0.0001 0.1940 0.1111 ✓ +74.62% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2675 0.2345 ✓ +14.07% 
APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool: February 2011 
BL 1 P<0.0001 0.2510 0.2154 ✓ +16.53% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2675 0.2345 ✓ +14.07% 
NO 1 P<0.0001 0.1940 0.1111 ✓ +74.62% 
SW 1 P<0.0001 0.3051 0.1265 ✓ +141.19% 
FI 1 P<0.0001 0.2015 0.1292 ✓ +55.96% 
DM 1 P<0.0001 0.3177 0.1784 ✓ +78.08% 
BritNed: March 2011 
UK 1 P<0.0001 0.1809 0.1138 ✓ +58.96% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2695 0.2408 ✓ +11.92% 
 
Table 6.2 Price in-strength mean values before (µ
t−1
) and after (µ
t+1
) the known coupling dates for each 
occurred market coupling event which took place between 2007 and 2012. H=1 implies acceptance of the null 
that µ
t+1
 is significantly different from µ
t−1
. 
 
 
The above table shows that the mean value of coupled markets’ electricity price in-strengths 
generally increases after the interconnector commissioning or market coupling rules 
institution date. The average increase is one of over a half, i.e. 0.56%, across all markets 
considered. All tests exhibit a P<0.0001, thereby indicating the significance of results. 
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The CWE Initiative was put on action in November 2010, coupling France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands (already members of the Trilateral Market Coupling) with Germany and 
Luxembourg. 
As can be appreciated by inspecting the values reported in the above table, the electricity 
price in-strengths of France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark (CWE Initiative) are 
significantly different in the two periods. More importantly, the mean value of their price in-
strength series was significantly and considerably larger in period t+1 compared to the period 
t-1. This suggests that the null hypothesis is accepted. In this case, Germany was the new 
entrant in the linked transmission system and exhibits the largest price in-strength mean value 
increase, one of about 66%, as compared to the 39%, 16% and 26% increases for France, 
Belgium and The Netherlands. This might be a consequence of Germany being a new entrant, 
and one who tended to have high imports during period t+1, which possibly explains this 
result. 
We also tested for improvements in price in-strength correlations among the studied markets. 
Similarly, the results indicate that correlation generally increases. In this case, the correlation 
between the coupled markets’ electricity price in-strengths increases by a large magnitude 
after the coupling date. In fact, as can be appreciated from Table 6.3, below, in the case of the 
CWE Initiative, each market exhibited large increases in price in-strength correlations after 
the coupling date: 
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Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative: November 2010 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
03-Mar-2009 08:00  > 
01-Nov-2010 04:00 
01-Nov-2010 04:00  > 
30-Jun-2012 00:00  
FR, BL 0.739 0.838 +13.40% 
FR, NL 0.420 0.645 +53.60% 
FR, DE 0.341 0.491 +44.23% 
BL, NL 0.749 0.727 -0.03% 
BL, DE 0.533 0.581 +9.01% 
NL, DE 0.755 0.865 +14.57% 
 
Table 6.3 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and  
after the Central Western Europe Initiative coupling of France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany 
(November 2010). 
 
The above table shows that all in-strengths relative the electricity prices of the countries 
involved in the CWE coupling experienced an increase in correlation of at least 13.40% after 
market coupling was effectively implemented. In fact, all markets’ electricity price in-
strength correlations dramatically increased after the coupling date (aside from a negligible 
outlier47, reported in the above case). 
Similarly, during November 2010, the Interim Tight Volume Coupling (ITVC) linked the 
European Market Coupling Company (EMCC) coupling of Germany and Denmark with 
CWE. In fact, mean values for both German and Danish price in-strengths during the period 
t+1 were significantly larger compared to the period comprising t-1, suggesting the 
possibility of a more connected system for both countries’ markets. Denmark’s price mean 
in-strength change from period t-1 to period t+1 (151%) was very large compared to 
Germany’s given that during this period the direction of flow was mainly from Germany to 
Denmark, and not the contrary. This probably led to the observation of higher inward 
causality values for Denmark. 
                                                          
47
 The only case in which a positive change in correlation was not recorded entailed the correlation (i.e., -0.03%) 
between Belgium and The Netherlands (CWE Initiative, November 2010); see Table 3. In all other cases, the 
correlations recorded after the commissioning/coupling dates were all positive and substantially large. Given 
also its minimal magnitude, we freely classify this observation as an outlier. 
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Again, also in this case, Germany and Denmark exhibited substantial increases of electricity 
price in-strength correlations after the volume coupling date (see Table 6.4, below). 
 
Interim Tight Volume Coupling: November 2010 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
03-Mar-2009 08:00  > 
01-Nov-2010 04:00 
01-Nov-2010 04:00  > 
30-Jun-2012 00:00  
DM, DE 0.146 0.373 +155.16% 
 
Table 6.4 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and 
after the Interim Tight Volume Coupling of Denmark and Germany (November 2010). 
 
The above table shows a considerable rise in the in-strength correlation between German and 
Danish electricity prices, one of more than 150%, after the introduction of the Interim Tight 
Volume Coupling. 
Furthermore, in January 2011, the neighbouring Italian and Slovak electricity markets 
coupled. However, given the unavailability of Slovakian data and thus the absence of the 
relative electricity price series in our sample, this market coupling case could not be verified. 
However, aside from the latter, all other interconnector commissioning or market coupling 
events are considered in this study. 
During the same month, i.e. January 2011, the markets of Norway and The Netherlands 
successfully coupled through the NorNed cable. In this case, the computed t-test implies that 
the electricity price in-strength values of Norway and The Netherlands are significantly 
different in the periods before and after the interconnector commissioning date and that both 
mean values are substantially larger after that date. The reason for the Dutch price mean in-
strength change being notably larger compared to that for Norway could be attributed to the 
fact that The Netherlands effectively became a net exporter of electricity after many year 
around the end of 2009, exporting its electricity even to Norway. 
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The coupling of Norway and The Netherlands can also be qualitatively appreciated from 
inspection of Table 6.5, below: 
 
NorNed cable: February 2011 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 02-Sep-2009  > 
01-Feb-2011 
01-Feb-2011  > 
30-Jun-2012  
NO, NL 0.217 0.307 +41.94% 
 
Table 6.5 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and 
after the introduction of the NorNed cable coupling The Netherlands and Norway (February 2011). 
 
 
The above table shows that Norwegian and Dutch electricity price in-strengths experienced a 
large increase in correlation after the commissioning date of the NorNed interconnector. 
In February 2011, APX-Endex, Belpex and Nord Pool Spot launched a cross-border intra-day 
market. During this month the markets of Belgium and The Netherlands were successfully 
coupled to the Nord Pool market comprising Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark.  
The results relating to this case show that the electricity price in-strength series for each 
market’s electricity price are significantly different before and after the coupling date. In 
addition, the price in-strength mean values for period t+1 were much larger than in period t-
1, suggesting that the hypothesis is correct also in this case. In addition, the changes for the 
Nord Pool markets are much larger than those relative to Belgium and The Netherlands. In 
fact, the former markets display a mean value change from 56% up to 141%, whereas the 
latter exhibit smaller increases of 14-17%. The reason for Sweden showing such a large 
increase in the mean price in-strength over the two periods (i.e. 141%) might be linked to the 
fact that during this period Sweden imported abnormally more compared to previous years. 
The coupling of Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and The Netherlands is 
empirically confirmed from the results in Table 6.6, reported below: 
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APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool: February 2011 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
02-Sep-2009  > 
01-Feb-2011 
01-Feb-2011  > 
30-Jun-2012  
BL, NL 0.653 0.754 +15.42% 
BL, NO 0.386 0.497 +28.65% 
BL, SW -0.082 0.579 +808.08% 
BL, FI -0.200 0.5462 +373.10% 
BL, DM 0.313 0.536 +70.93% 
NL, NO 0.217 0.307 +41.94% 
NL, SW -0.033 0.386 +1,269.70% 
NL, FI -0.170 0.407 +339.60% 
NL, DM 0.180 0.315 +75.42% 
NO, SW 0.458 0.824 +79.83% 
NO, FI 0.108 0.793 +636.62% 
NO, DM 0.726 0.829 +14.19% 
SW, FI 0.668 0.849 +27.14% 
SW, DM 0.313 0.782 +149.71% 
FI, DM 0.225 0.788 +249.38% 
 
Table 6.6 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and  
after the APX Endex-Belpex-Nord Pool coupling of Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark (February 2011). 
 
The table reported above suggests that all price in-strength correlations considerably 
increased after the APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool coupling in February 2011. 
We additionally support the above results with some insights from two graphical 
representations. For greater visual clarity, we depict a shorter period of time. In accordance 
with the above, from 01-Feb-2011 to 28-Feb-2011 the countries’ price in-strength correlation 
was one of 99%, whereas it was 84% during 01-Jan-2011 to 01-Feb-2011 (P<0.0001 in both 
cases). The behaviour of the price in-strength values during the month of February 2011 are 
shown for both sets of markets. 
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Fig. 6.4 – Representation of Belgian and Dutch price in-strengths during the month after their coupling date, i.e. 
February 2011. Their behaviours are closely related and much different in comparison to the Nord Pool 
countries’ electricity price in-strengths, shown below (Fig.6.5). 
 
 
As can be seen from Figs. 6.4 and 6.5, the electricity price in-strength behaviour was very 
similar among Nord Pool countries and among Belgium and The Netherlands. This might 
perhaps be attributed to proximity and past integration. 
 
 
Fig. 6.5 – Representation of Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Danish price in-strength values during the month 
after their coupling, i.e. February 2011. Their behaviours are closely related and much different from the 
Belgian and Dutch in-strengths behaviour (see Fig.6.4). This is because Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
were already integrated in the Nord Pool market, whereas Belgium and The Netherlands were integrated 
through a different framework. 
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The similar behaviour of Belgian and Dutch price in-strengths, as well as the clearly different 
behaviour from all Nord Pool country electricity price in-strengths, which follow a similar 
pattern among them, might suggest that proximity, as well as past integration are relevant 
elements in the determination of electricity market integration. The latter would be in 
agreement with Kalantzis and Milonas (2010) who found that geographical proximity plays a 
significant role in price integration. It is, however, in contrast with studies such as Bunn and 
Gianfreda (2010), who found that proximity is not a crucial component. However, the above 
observations are probably not enough to conclude that proximity plays a significant role in 
price integration. 
Finally, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands were connected by the BritNed cable in 
March 2011. Table 6.7, below, shows that the mean values relative to the price in-strengths 
observed in period t+1 and period t-1 are significantly different from each other and that the 
mean period t+1  price in-strength value is significantly and considerably larger compared to 
that of period t-1, for both electricity prices considered. In fact, the UK exhibits a price in-
strength mean increase of 59% compared to the 12% increase for The Netherlands. In fact, 
during the period from March 2011 to June 2012, The Netherlands mainly exported its 
electricity to the UK, and not vice-versa, thereby influencing the UK electricity price. In 
addition, it is also likely that such observation can be explained by the fact that the UK had a 
proportionately larger increase in its interconnection compared to The Netherlands, which 
instead was already well-linked. In addition, the results reported in Table 6.7 show that both 
markets’ price in-strength correlations substantially increased after the interconnector 
commissioning date. 
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BritNed cable: March 2011 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
28-Oct-2009  > 
01-Mar-2011 
01-Mar-2011  > 
30-Jun-2012  
GB, NL 0.235 0.295 +25.82% 
 
Table 6.7 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and 
after the introduction of the BritNed cable coupling The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (March 2011). 
 
 
Finally, the above table confirms the previous results which suggest that the correlation 
between electricity price in-strengths generally increases after interconnector commissioning. 
In fact, the results relating to the BritNed cable commissioning which linked the national 
transmission systems of The Netherlands and the United Kingdom show that electricity spot 
price in-strength correlation increased, after March 2011, by over 25%. 
The hypothesis relating to our hypothesis of an increased correlation between the coupled 
markets’ electricity price in-strengths is shown to be accepted in all cases of European 
electricity interconnector commissioning studied, as well as those more generally relating to 
market coupling. The same applies to the observation of larger price mean in-strengths after 
the commissioning/coupling date, which is also shown to be true in all cases. Such result is 
not biased by the individual price in-strength peaks (see Fig. 6A.3 in Appendix A3) that some 
countries display toward the end of the period under study. In fact, most of the countries 
which actually coupled their transmission lines with other markets did not exhibit a peak 
during the final part of the studied time period, which might have otherwise provided an 
upward bias for µ
𝑡+1
.  
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6.4.2 Global Connection Density 
Global connection density represents the actual number of edges in the graph as a proportion 
of the overall number of potential edges and is our overall connectivity indicator. The value 
of global connection density varies from zero (‘empty’ network) to one (perfectly connected 
network). Global density floated around a relatively low mean level of 2% throughout the 
entire time frame, with a standard deviation of 0.0086. The maximal value of global 
connectivity is shown as the largest peak in the figure below (Fig.6.6), which displays the 
behaviour of the system’s global connection density during the period 2007-2012: 
 
Fig. 6.6 - Behaviour of global connectivity of the 13 European spot prices in the sample throughout the period 
2007-2012. The dotted horizontal lines represent the upper and lower confidence bounds (Z>1.96), whereas the 
middle line shows the mean. Time is on the x-axis and represents 4-hour shifts per point, whereas the value of 
global connection density (expressed in unit) is shown on the y-axis. 
 
 
By exploiting the Granger-causal interactions between electricity prices, our model yields a 
time-varying indicator of overall connectivity, the system’s global density, which exhibits a 
clearly stochastic behaviour. In our work, we calculated the distribution of the global 
connection density series for the entire time length and extracted the relative z-score values in 
order to understand in what instants of time global connectivity was 3 standard deviations 
above the mean (Z>1.96, p<0.05). In complex theory, all values above (below) the upper 
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(lower) confidence bound imply ‘abnormal’ values and thus point to an unusually large (low) 
connectivity. As discussed at later stages, this coincides with the implementation of an 
important energy package, one in fact dealing with European electricity market integration. 
Similarly, values which are below the lower bound (indicated by the lower dotted line) depict 
the periods in which European electricity market connectivity reached abnormally low levels. 
As shown by the above graph, such periods of lower-than-normal connectivity occur as 
frequently as over-connectivity does; this indicates that the process of electricity market 
integration is not particularly pronounced. Moreover, there are no episodes which denote a 
substantially large drop in connectivity below the lower bound. This is not the case for over-
bound connectivity as can be seen from the large peak recorded towards the end of the series, 
denoting a significantly very large spike occurring in December 2011 and reaching a 
connectivity magnitude of ca. 7%. Furthermore, an initial interconnectivity peak, one of 
around 4%, can be observed within by the first 592 shifts of our model (i.e. November-
December 2007). The succeeding two peaks reached values of about 3%. Generally, 
European electricity market connectivity remained at a mean level of ca. 2%. The largest 
peak in global density was recorded during the period between 29-Nov-2011 04:00 and 17-
Apr-2012 08:00, with an over-basal increment of a magnitude of around 2.4 times denoting 
the peak occurred on 16-Dec-2011 08:00. The values of the five observed large peaks in 
global density are given as follows: 
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Time of Occurred Peak    Approx. Peak Level 
𝟐𝟕˗˗ − 𝐃𝐞𝐜 − ˗˗𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕 𝟏𝟐: 𝟎𝟎 4% 
𝟏𝟗 − ˗˗𝐉𝐮𝐥 − ˗˗𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 𝟎𝟒: 𝟎𝟎 3% 
𝟏𝟔˗˗ − 𝐌𝐚𝐫˗˗ − 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟐: 𝟎𝟎 3% 
𝟏𝟔 − 𝐃𝐞𝐜 − 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏 𝟎𝟖: 𝟎𝟎 𝟕% 
𝟐𝟑 − ˗˗𝐌𝐚𝐫 − ˗˗𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟐 𝟎𝟒: 𝟎𝟎 4% 
 
Table 6.8 Time of occurred peak and relative approximate level of Global Connection Density reached by the 
system of electricity prices. The period of largest interactivity in the system comprehends the final 2 peaks and 
refers to 29-Nov-2011 04:00 to 17-Apr-2012 08:00. The largest peak is close to 7%. On the other hand, the 
mean value of global connection density is ca. 2%. 
 
 
Firstly it shall be noted that approximate peak values are given because the concept of a 
global density peak is a relative one. In fact, the main result of complex network analysis, in 
our case, relates to finding in which period the global connection density trespasses the upper 
(or lower) confidence bounds. 
In the subsequent discussions, we only consider the largest peak in global density, i.e. that 
occurring on 16-Dec-2011. This is mainly because: (i) this peak is at least 43% greater than 
the second peak as measured by the density’s amplitude from the upper bound, i.e. a 
minimum of 3% over 4% (when considering an alpha of 0.05 and Z>1.96), and (ii) it is the 
only peak which results significant using an alpha of 0.01 (i.e. Z>2.58). A possible cause of 
the largest positive peak (around 7%), occurred in 2011Q4, might have entailed the impact of 
a potentially major occurrence of extreme temperatures throughout Europe. Such increase 
was in fact observed across different market price in-strengths (see Appendix Figure 6A.3 in 
Appendix A3). However, the correlation between heating degree days (HDD) (and cooling 
degree days, CDD) and the global connection density series, we were unable to attribute the 
spike to a change in temperatures due to very low correlation with the HDD and CDD of 
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various European cities, including: Rome and Athens (controlling for the Southern European 
area), Oslo and Stockholm (Northern Europe), Lisbon and Madrid (Western Europe), Paris 
and Berlin (Central Europe), Warsaw and Prague (Eastern Europe). Thus we excluded the 
possibility of a cold (or heat) wave. 
We additionally use a simple ARIMA (1,0,0) regression to check whether European 
electricity price global system connectivity represents a random walk process. A simple 
model of connectivity can be summarized by an autoregressive model, as: 
 Δ𝐺𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝜑𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜑
2𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝜑
3𝑒𝑡−3 + ⋯ + 𝜑
𝑛𝑒𝑡−𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡           [Eq. 6.14] 
where GCD is short for global connection density, 𝜑 is the autoregressive parameter and 
𝑒𝑡, 𝑒𝑡−1, … , 𝑒𝑡−𝑛 represents the sequence of random shocks. In the above model we test the 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the autoregressive parameters is equal to one. In that case, 
the change in global connectivity at time t is given by the weighted sum of random shocks. 
The table below (Table 6.9) depicts the estimation results relating to the random walk model 
fitted to the natural log of the produced sample global connectivity time series data. 
 
 
 Coeff. z P>|z| 95% LCB 95% UCB 
𝝋 
0.9929 
(0.0014) 
735.49 0.000 0.9903 0.9956 
Constant 
-3.9954 
(0.1133) 
-35.28 0.000 -4.2174 -3.773 
 
 
Table 6.9 ARIMA(1,0,0) regression estimation results. Wald chi2(2)=542983.05, LL=14482.2, Prob<0.0001. 
Fit to estimation data: 90.3% FPE: 6.958e-07, MSE: 6.956e-07, Standard errors are given in brackets. 
 
 
The above estimation results show that a random walk process could have produced the 
generating process underlying the data and that an AR(1) model is therefore a suitable 
representation of EU electricity price global connectivity. In fact, the AR(1) parameter 
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coefficient estimate displays a highly significant value of 0.99. Therefore, the expected value 
of current changes in connectivity is given by white noise, thus the best estimate of 
connectivity at time t representing its value at t-1. This was also confirmed by inspection of 
relative autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions. 
Therefore, global sample connectivity of EU electricity prices represents a quasi-pure 
stochastic process. Given this is the first study applying graph theory to electricity prices, it 
was the case to provide a documentation of the generating process underlying the global 
connection density of electricity price data. 
However, it is crucial to note that the usefulness of this technique simply relies in the 
identification of the periods in which the data exhibit abnormal behaviour, as previously 
described, the latter informing about the presence and impact of essential changes within the 
electricity system from a structural perspective. 
 
6.4.3 Network Representations 
The system of electricity price interactions summarized by the global connection density 
gives rise to a network which varies over time. An example of a network estimated at a given 
point in time is shown in Fig.6.7, below. The following figure, as well as the relative 
adjacency matrix, depicts the network associated with the largest global connection density 
peak (i.e. in 2011Q4). 
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Fig. 6.7 - Left Panel: This map represents the electricity price in-strengths associated with the highest global 
connection density peak, i.e. the shift 04-Nov-2011 09:00:00 to 16-Dec-2011 08:00:00 (no. 6,807 of 7,651). The 
countries denoted by their abbreviation are the 13 countries considered in this study. The arrows shown between 
pairs of countries denote the significant linear Granger-causality running in the direction of the country pointed 
at by the given arrow. The thickness of the associated arrow corresponds to a certain range of the in-strength 
coefficient, as reported in the upper left hand-side corner of the image. Each of these arrows corresponds to a 
certain value of the relative adjacency matrix. Right Panel: The colour bar depicted on the right represents the 
adjacency matrix computed at the same network shift, where each entry of the 13x13 matrix is associated with a 
different in-strength value, according to the colour-scale reported on the right. The brighter colours imply 
increasing causality. 
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The map shown depicts the network computed during the shift 04-Nov-2011 09:00:00 to 16-
Dec-2011 08:00:00, whereas the box on the right shows a chromatic representation of that 
network’s adjacency matrix. The latter represents the electricity price Granger-causal 
interactions that occurred around 16-Dec-2011, i.e. the largest density peak in which the 
value of global connection density increased over 7%. The figure below (Fig.6.8), instead, 
depicts a network obtained at an average value of global density (2.32%). 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.8 - Upper Panel: The electricity price in-strengths associated with an average global connection density 
peak, i.e. the shift 02-Mar-2010 01:00:00 -> 13-Apr-2010 00:00:00 (no. 4,177 of 7,651). Each arrow 
corresponds to a certain value of the relative adjacency matrix. Lower Panel: A chromatic representation of the 
adjacency matrix computed at the same network shift, where each entry of the 13x13 matrix is associated with a 
different in-strength value, according to the colour-scale reported on the right. The brighter colours imply 
increasing causality. 
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The above image shows a network in which the Granger-causal interactions between the 
electricity prices in our sample were less pronounced compared to that previously exposed. 
The lower amount of causal interactivity is clear by inspection of the arrows, or Granger 
causality degree, in the maps, which represent the corresponding weights reported in the 
relative adjacency matrices. 
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6.5 Discussion 
So what precisely has changed during 2011Q4 that might have induced such a relatively large 
rise in electricity spot price causal interactivity? The large peak in global connection density 
coincides with the implementation of the Third Energy Package, issued by the European 
Commission in September 2007. We first consider the latter in relation to our global measure 
of connectivity (Section 6.5.1). Section 6.5.2 instead discusses the relationship between our 
local connectivity measures and the occurrence of historical events throughout the 
verification of the available interconnector commissioning, or market coupling institution. 
Finally, Section 6.5.3 outlines the possible shortfalls of the model and lays out the grounds 
for future work. 
 
6.5.1 Implementation of Third Energy Package 
More specifically, during this period, the introduction of major network codes relating to 
capacity allocation and congestion management effectively occurred. In fact, the treatment of 
congestion is a crucial aspect in electricity pricing and changes in congestion management 
cause alterations to the formation process of electricity prices, in turn possibly providing the 
observation of an increased causation among them. Balancing also represents a key 
mechanism which might also impact on prices and balancing was perhaps one of the mainly 
revised procedures. In fact, two main set of policies were put into action precisely during the 
period in which the largest peak occurred (between November 2011 and April 2012, i.e. 
starting from 2011Q4). These mainly regarded system operation and balancing, and are 
discussed in the next two sections (i.e. sections 6.5.1.1 and 6.5.1.2). 
 
 
 
Electricity and Energy Price Interactions in Modern EU Markets                           G. Castagneto-Gissey 
 196 
 
6.5.1.1 Introduction of Network Code 
The guidelines on System Operation, or the Capacity Allocation and Congestion 
Management Network Code ‘require[s] that the TSOs establish one or more common grid 
models suitable for community-wide application’ (ENTSOE, 2013) and was approved in 
2009, effectively being implemented in the period between 2011Q2-2011Q4 (Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, EU Commission, 2009), i.e. in coincidence with the large 
connectivity peak.  
The Commission notes that, as a minimum, each common grid model is to cover an area 
suitable for the capacity allocation method utilized, at least the synchronous area. 
Furthermore, the common grid model is by then required to include a detailed description of 
the transmission network including the location of generation units and demand. During this 
period, the Commission also required improved transparency between TSOs. Such network 
code requires European TSOs to update the common grid model and the common base case 
more often, as required for a given allocation procedure, with all data relevant for the 
respective calculations, such as the expected network topology, generation and demand 
forecast. In fact, from this period on, TSOs are required to make this data available to all 
European TSOs, ready for immediate use. 
In addition, during this period, significant updates on the capacity allocation methods for the 
day-ahead market were implemented.  To this extent, it must be noted that the newly applied 
network code foresees that TSOs implement capacity allocation in the day-ahead market 
based on implicit auctions via the novel single price coupling algorithm which 
simultaneously determines volumes and prices in all relevant zones. This is done through the 
usual marginal pricing principle. Also, the implementation takes into account the role of the 
power exchanges and requires harmonization of day-ahead bidding deadlines. Moreover, in 
the case there were insufficient transmission capacity for the enabling of all requested trades, 
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calculated zonal prices should differ. ‘The [newly established] single price coupling 
algorithm calculates volumes and prices for all bidding areas and for each unit of time’ 
(Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, EU Commission, 2009). This means that 
such code enforcement implies there can only be one price calculated for each bidding area 
and hour. This new algorithm also allows for block bids. 
Additionally, in terms of pricing, the code defines the price of transmission capacity between 
zones when congestion occurs. Such definition implies that, in the event of congestion, the 
price of transmission capacity is given by the difference between the corresponding day-
ahead zonal electricity prices. Apart from congestion pricing, the network code 
methodologies in relation to the day-ahead market provide the necessary requirements for the 
establishment of price references for the forward market. 
 
6.5.1.2 Introduction of System Balancing Rules  
Furthermore, a second substantial change to regulations that occurred in the period 
corresponding to our largest observed connectivity peak is represented by the Framework 
Guidelines on balancing. An integrated electricity balancing market is the last component of 
the IEM. However, integration of the different national balancing markets is a challenging 
task due to the dramatic differences present in existing national balancing market 
arrangements. However, the balancing framework guidelines are, in fact, intended to balance 
such differences by fostering cross-border competition and improved balancing efficiency, 
whilst protecting the security of supply. In fact, the code establishes common rules for 
electricity balancing across European member states. This effectively involves: the 
establishment of common principals for procurement and an EU-wide methodology for the 
activation of Frequency Containment Reserves, Frequency Restoration Reserves and 
Replacement Reserves as well as the activation of Balancing Energy from Frequency 
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Restoration Reserves and Settlement (ENTSO-E Draft Network Code on Electricity 
Balancing, 2013).  
Such regulations cover the rules for trading related to technical and operational provision of 
system balancing rules including network-related power reserve rules ‘with the purpose of 
contributing to non-discrimination, effective competition, efficient functioning of the market, 
completion and functioning of the internal market in electricity and cross-border trade, 
security of supply, benefits for customers, participation of demand response, EU’s targets for 
penetration of renewable generation as well as to ensure the optimal management and 
coordinated operation of the European electricity transmission network (Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, EU Commission, 2013). Therefore, to this extent, these 
Framework Guidelines have provided a much increased degree of integration, coordination 
and harmonization of the national balancing regimes with the intention of smoothing the 
progress of electricity trading within the EU. These new guidelines are in line with the 
Commission’s Regulation No. 714/2009 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
Therefore, it might well be possible that such specific and wide-scale changes - in relation to 
capacity allocation, congestion management and balancing as well as the introduction of the 
single price coupling algorithm, which directly and notably influence the electricity price in 
each market, as well as the relation between electricity prices across markets - might have 
caused the large interconnectivity peak in our system of European electricity price networks. 
The third Liberalisation Package, published on 13 July 2009, effectively provided and 
implemented these binding Framework Guidelines and Network Codes and set the legal 
framework for cross-border transmission management and market integration. The deadline 
for member states to implement such regulations was March 3
rd
, 2011. As effective 
implementation was achieved close to this date, we would expect to see a change in market 
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integration around this time. Therefore, we believe that the large spike in system 
interconnectivity reflects such dramatic changes. 
 
6.5.1.3 Further Considerations 
During the final quarter of 2011, the eurozone, as well as other European countries, 
experienced worsening economic conditions. The latter was the reason for contracting gross 
value added in the main energy intensive sector (e.g. construction, manufacturing and 
mining) and led to a decreasing industrial electricity demand in Europe (European 
Commission, Quarterly Reports on European electricity Markets, 2011Q4). Thus, it can also 
be possible that the large increase in connectivity might have been induced by the sharp fall 
in demand everywhere in Europe. 
Also, aside from a very short cold spell in mid-November, the temperatures were generally 
even milder in most parts of Europe for the resting duration of the quarter. Moreover, there 
was a reduction in heating from households throughout this quarter. However, we excluded 
the possibility of a heat/cold wave having caused increased levels of interactivity within the 
network towards the end of 2011, based on a correlation analysis with heating and cooling 
degree days for various cities in different parts of Europe. Furthermore, a blend of the latter 
combined with the much decreased level of industrial demand at a European-wide level 
brought about one of the lowest consumptions of electricity in Europe in the last decade. 
Furthermore, the deteriorating economic outlook, as by inspection of European forward 
energy prices as well as energy demand forecasts, also much affected carbon emission 
allowance prices in this period. In fact, carbon prices fell during the final quarter of 2011, to 
levels lower than those prevailing during the economic downturn of 2009. This might 
contribute to explaining the lower electricity prices in this period and thus a larger amount of 
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European exports (to the Balkan countries, for example; this is not directly included in the 
model, though it can indeed be reflected in the electricity prices). 
European electricity market connectivity remained at a substantially low mean level of 
2.32%; the magnitudes relative to positive abnormal behaviour suggests the lack of a strong 
integration among European markets. This might possibly be recognized as a result of the 
presently insufficient interconnection among national grids (Trillas, 2010 and Bollino et al., 
2013). As Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) note, the European energy market liberalisation process 
is increasingly focused on electricity market integration and cross-border mechanisms. They 
suggest how this signals that the liberalisation of national markets for electricity is now closer 
to the single European energy market long-term objective. However, the latter requires an 
increased number of physical interconnections and improved technical arrangements. It is 
crucial for European system operators to deploy their efforts in providing a full integration of 
electricity markets at different levels – among which are those relating to market 
concentration, investments, security of supply and aspects of market design and regulation – 
which are critical for the dynamic performance of a single European market. 
We believe that full integration under various regimes is a necessary condition for increasing 
European market connectivity at an acceptable rate/level and that improved legislative 
integration under different aspects, among which those relating to market design, can be a 
key factor for an improvement in connectivity between markets. However, increasing 
interconnection among national grids should be seen as a primary need. In fact, achievement 
of a sufficient level of physical electricity interconnection among countries is what 
principally implies the convergence of electricity prices in the direction of a single European 
price. Very importantly, this also reduces the impact of congestion and market power on 
electricity prices. 
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Given its past integration, efficiency and experience, the Nordic power system represents a 
crucial player in the process toward European market integration and should represent an 
important catalyst toward full price integration in the EU. Our study suggested that Norway 
revealed itself as the most efficiently connected electricity system (i.e. that less affected by 
others). Norway itself produces electricity almost exclusively based on the low marginal cost 
hydropower, which can explain the prevalence of relatively low Norwegian electricity prices. 
 
6.5.2 Local Connectivity Measures 
The goodness of the model employed in this study was verified by means of a t-test and a 
correlation test. The t-test served to understand whether electricity price mean in-strengths 
generally increased after the market coupling (or interconnector commissioning) date. We 
showed that this holds in all cases and that the mean in-strength increased, on average, by 
more than a half during the period after the dates relating to interconnector commissioning, or 
market coupling institution. Similarly, the correlation between electricity price in-strengths 
increased in all cases, on average by a factor of 1.89. 
In addition, the electricity prices which exhibited the highest in-strength values, indicating 
they are subject to a great deal of influence from other countries, were those of The 
Netherlands; on the other hand, those with the lowest in-strength values were the Norwegian 
electricity prices, implying that prices in Norway are the least affected by changes in other 
prices. Whereas the high in-strength values for The Netherlands can be explained by the fact 
that during the studied period (i.e. 2007-12), large-scale maintenance projects were ongoing 
in The Netherland’s neighbouring countries (CBS Statistics Netherlands, 2010), perhaps 
probably being the reason for a large mean value of incoming Granger-causality, the low 
potential for Norwegian prices to be affected by others is comprehensible considering that 
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Norway tends to export extensively given its almost exclusive use of hydropower for 
generating electricity. 
In relation to the out-strength results, the electricity prices with highest out-strength values 
were recorded in the UK, indicating that UK prices showed a high potential of influencing 
other prices; conversely, those with the lowest out-strength values were displayed by 
Denmark and Belgium, implying that Danish and Belgian spot prices correspond to the 
electricity prices with the lowest ability of influencing other prices. These results can instead 
be explained by the fact that larger countries are able to influence other electricity prices in a 
certain area relatively more compared to smaller countries.  
 
6.5.3 Model shortfalls and Future Work 
Perhaps, a network which could make an even better representation of the true network 
system could be one where larger countries, for example, were to be constrained to provide a 
higher strength of influence in global connectivity, compared to smaller countries. As Stam 
and Reijneveld (2007) note, in some cases, weighted graphs may represent more accurate 
models of networks. This may be an interesting extension to this paper as well as a fruitful 
subject for future studies on electricity and energy networks. The model could also be 
augmented by the use of fuel prices in the expressions for individual electricity prices, 
thereby providing a more comprehensive representation of the system. In addition, from an 
empirical side, a larger number of electricity markets (a total of 13 were considered in this 
study) could be taken account of, possibly together with an even more prolonged sample time 
frame (about 6 years in this work). From a theoretical viewpoint, researchers in economics 
and energy could benefit from extending this technique in various ways, from the 
aforementioned application of exogenous (or perhaps endogenous) weights to the formulation 
of a system comprising more complicated econometric models as well as distinct ones for 
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each of the electricity prices considered, including various further applications. In fact, 
whereas we used a simple MVAR model for each electricity price, the latter can be replaced 
with models which focus on other econometric properties of electricity prices, where the 
regime-switching jump diffusion models might represent a more accurate representation of 
electricity price behaviours. 
We firmly hope that this paper can foster and advance the research presently focusing on 
electricity market integration as well as that relating to further energy systems. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
This study applies graph theory to model European electricity spot price interactions during 
the period 2007-12. Total connectivity is measured by the system’s global connection 
density, or the total quantity of causal interactivity sustained by the network system. The 
novelty of this work resides in the use of dynamic complex networks, which enable for a 
representation of Granger-causal relationships among electricity prices over time. 
The goodness of the technique is verified on the basis of the estimated local connectivity 
measures (electricity price in-strengths) in relation to historical market occurrences. In all 
cases, the electricity price mean in-strength relating to coupled markets is shown to increase, 
on average, by more than a half, a factor of 0.56, during the period succeeding the known 
interconnector commissioning (or market rules implementation) dates compared to the period 
prior to those dates. Similarly, in all cases, the correlation coefficient between the coupled 
markets’ price in-strengths is shown to increase by a factor of 1.89 after the coupling date. 
On the other hand, the analysis of global connectivity resulted in the detection of a 
substantially large abnormal spike in global connection density, one of ca. 7%, occurring 
within 2011Q4 and possibly reflecting the implementation of crucial market integration and 
balancing rules which affected the pricing and coordination processes of European electricity 
markets. In fact, the Third Energy Package (2007) came into force during the period between 
2011Q2-2011Q4, thereby coinciding with the largest peak in global connection density. 
Aside from the relatively large jump in global connectivity, abnormal positive and negative 
changes were essentially similar in numbers and magnitude. We can therefore conclude that 
the way toward the attainment of a reasonable rate of electricity market integration in Europe 
seems to still be very long. 
On the path to full market integration, market networks should be periodically monitored.  
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Our model, which is able to create a time-varying network describing the evolving influences 
between the behaviours of the different European electricity prices, is able to detect important 
changes in market integration and can be considered a suitable and promising approach for 
this task. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
Following a presentation of the history, structure and recent developments 
surrounding EU electricity markets (Chapter 2), this thesis investigated the determinants of 
electricity prices (Chapter 3). Novel insights on these determinants were then presented 
through three main studies, using data from European markets relative to the period 2007-
2012. The interactions of electricity spot prices, in terms of levels and volatility, with 
exchange rates and oil prices, were addressed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5, on the other hand, 
studied electricity forward prices, their volatility and the interactions with the forward prices 
of coal, natural gas and carbon emission allowances. Finally, Chapter 6 studied the causal 
interactivity between EU electricity spot prices. The main conclusions of this thesis regard: 
the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, the determinants of European electricity prices and 
volatility, including the relationships between electricity prices, market power in European 
electricity markets and European electricity market integration.  
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 207 
 
The study reported in Chapter 4 investigated the relationship between daily electricity 
spot price returns and both the crude oil spot price return (in US dollars) and the exchange 
rate return in six European countries, during the time periods 2005-2007 and 2008–2011. Of 
the considered markets, France, Spain and Germany use more nuclear, hydro and alternative 
sources compared to UK, The Netherlands and Italy. We considered the years before and 
after the contagion of the US subprime crisis on European markets in order to detect any 
differences resulting from the financial crisis of 2008. 
We verified the presence, in most cases, of a transmission of volatility between both the 
exchange rate and the oil price returns towards the price return of wholesale electricity and 
that, for some countries, the level of the electricity price return was also affected by changes 
in the exchange rate and oil price returns. These effects became considerably larger in all the 
markets studied during the succeeding time frame (2008-2011), likely as a consequence of 
the economic crisis that hit the eurozone after contagion from the US. 
The use of an asymmetric AR-GARCH model enabled the conclusion that the inverse 
leverage effect was well represented and implied the asymmetry of positive innovations in 
the conditional variance and therefore that the response of electricity prices to positive shocks 
was larger compared to negative shocks. Moreover, there was a general decrease in the 
asymmetry of this response, down by 54% in absolute terms, after the financial crisis of 2008. 
This is the first time that a study considers the asymmetric effects of the EUR exchange rate 
against the USD on electricity prices. 
Therefore, this study suggests that two likely effects of the 2008 financial crisis were: (i) 
decreasing the asymmetric response of European electricity prices to shocks in oil prices and 
exchange rates in the period after the financial crisis, thus implying a more symmetric and 
equivalent effect of positive and negative shocks to electricity markets, and (ii) increasing the 
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effect on electricity prices of both oil prices and exchange rates, by means of both the impact 
on levels as well as in terms of volatility transmission. 
Volatile wholesale prices that will be passed through to electricity consumers imply 
significant risks to their costs, and are also particularly unattractive to most low-carbon 
generators whose costs are not linked to fossil fuel prices.  Therefore, this study suggests that 
it should be of primary relevance for the European Commission to allow market policies in 
the spirit of Feed-in-Tariffs or the UK government’s proposed Electricity Market Reform. 
This practice would be able to reduce risks for generators and consumers by ensuring that 
payments to these generators are largely de-linked from the overall level of power prices. 
The study presented in Chapter 5 considered the interactions between electricity and 
carbon future prices during Phase II of the European Union Emission Trading System (2008-
12), thereby studying the key drivers of electricity future prices in Europe. The main 
conclusions that can be derived from this work are that: (i) the coal price represents the most 
influential determinant of electricity prices both in terms of levels and volatility, and that (ii) 
there is imperfect competition among European electricity markets during Phase II. The 
presence of imperfect competition in European markets was verified with a combination of 
VAR models, Granger-causality tests and GARCH analysis and is represented by a non-
perfect pass-through rates, thus indicating that carbon prices are not proportionately passed 
onto electricity prices, a situation expected to occur in fully competitive markets. To this 
extent, we find that the pass-through rates in Germany and Norway are particularly high 
(135% on average in both cases) and that the relationship between carbon and electricity 
prices is bidirectional and positive. On the other hand, we record a causal effect of both 
French and British electricity prices on the carbon price, further emphasizing the role of 
market power across European countries. The presence of market power in European 
electricity markets can be seen as impeding the goals set by the Commission, whereby a lack 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 209 
 
of competitiveness in European electricity markets can be detrimental in terms of EU market 
integration. Therefore, it is crucial for the EU to introduce new competition policies such as 
full electricity market liberalisation and investment in additional transmission capacity. 
Policies aimed at improving and increasing both internal and external transmission capacities 
and enhancing market operations between countries can represent appropriate remedies. 
The importance of coal was demonstrated through the asymmetric GARCH model results and 
confirmed by examining the profitability of coal- over gas-fired electricity generation across 
the four studied markets. The notable rise in the incentives to burn coal came as a 
consequence of the low coal prices prevailing on international markets. Some of the reasons 
for such low prices are represented by the low US gas prices, encouraged by the considerable 
shale discoveries in the US and China. In addition, the low EU ETS price for carbon 
allowances has even more incentivized the use of coal, which could ultimately prove to be 
detrimental toward the accomplishment of European emission reduction goals, were actual 
incentives to remain intact. In fact, these incentives have pushed up emissions in Germany 
and the UK in 2011, where the relationship between coal and electricity prices was the 
strongest in our models. Therefore, measures in favour of reducing coal consumption such as 
by large acquisitions of emission allowances by the authority can be desirable, when all 
outstanding carbon permits are called back or exercised (to avoid further windfall profits by 
electricity generators), as the price of EUAs is then likely to rise thereby making coal more 
expensive and favouring an increased utilisation of gas at the expense of coal-fired 
generation. 
       Finally, the work presented in Chapter 6 investigated the issue of European electricity 
market integration by applying complex network theory to a sample of thirteen electricity 
spot prices during the period 2007-12. We constructed a system of dynamic multivariate 
networks, with electricity prices corresponding to the graph’s nodes and the edges in between 
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them denoting the significant degrees of pair-wise linear Granger-causality between the 
prices. The network system’s global connectivity is then characterized by the system’s 
density, or the total quantity of causal interactivity sustained by the network system. This 
informed us about the occurrence of abnormal changes in connectivity: we report a very large 
peak (lasting from November 2011 to April 2012), where the graph’s density jump reached 
about 2.4 times its previous mean level. This suggested an improved degree of connectivity 
of electricity markets during this period and coincided with the implementation of the 
European Commission’s Third Energy Package, suggesting the goodness of the technique in 
detecting this important change. These results are supported by our local integration 
indicator, the in-strength, which validates the reliability of our methodology by verifying 
historical events such as the occurrence of major European interconnectors commissioning 
and the implementation of the main market coupling initiatives, established during the 
studied period. 
In order to achieve an acceptable level of integration, electricity market networks should be 
monitored on a periodic basis. The model used in this study creates a time-varying network 
which describes the evolving relationships between the behaviours of European electricity 
prices and can detect important changes in market integration. Thus, we propose this 
technique as a suitable and promising approach for the task of supervising the progress of 
energy market integration and, perhaps also other issues such as cross-border trading. 
       This thesis has demonstrated the importance of coal in setting electricity prices across all 
major European markets. In addition, we have seen how coal price volatility is the most 
important factor in the determination of the volatility of electricity prices. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the Commission’s efforts in tackling carbon emissions and its willingness to 
discourage coal use, European electricity prices seem to generally be very closely linked to 
coal prices. The increased utilisation of coal represents a serious concern for European 
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countries, especially in terms of its impact on the speed of transition to an integrated, low-
carbon energy system. There are different reasons for this great rise in the profitability of coal 
over gas-fired stations across European countries during the end of the 2010s. The 
combination of low coal prices, high gas prices and an ultra-low carbon price effectively 
resulted in coal-fired generation revealing itself as increasingly profitable in a number of 
European countries, where instead gas-fired power plants operated at a loss. The low coal 
price recorded on international markets as a result of international shale bonanza effectively 
drove down coal prices. The considerations reported in this thesis do not suggest that the 
European carbon market is not working well. Rather, they emphasize the implications of the 
practice to diffuse free carbon permits which proved detrimental to the same competition 
policies set by the EU. The low carbon price stands at the heart of the questions concerning 
the correct functioning of the carbon market. As Phase III has commenced and the market for 
carbon has phased out free allocation in favour of auctioning, the conclusions about the 
functioning of the EU ETS will be more reliable with the advent of future research. 
Moreover, the transition to a renewable system is taking place and, to this extent, it is not 
wrong to praise the role of the carbon market. On the other hand, the achievement of 
European carbon reduction goals will depend on the appearance of higher carbon prices, a 
policy advocated in Chapter 5. 
Moreover, we have demonstrated how the volatility of electricity prices was affected by 
exchange rates (against the USD) and oil prices during the 2008 financial crisis. A large 
increase in volatility transmission from both exchange rates and oil prices toward electricity 
prices, across all considered markets, was recorded in the period after the crisis struck on 
European markets, likely as a consequence of the economic downturn itself, which provided 
an increase in volatility interactions. We have also seen that the response of electricity prices 
to positive shocks was larger compared to that deriving from negative shocks in exchange 
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rates and oil prices. Furthermore, there was a general decrease in the asymmetry of this 
response, by more than a half, after the financial crisis of 2008. This means that, after the 
crisis struck on European markets, the response of electricity prices to negative shocks and 
positive shocks became considerably more balanced. This can be relevant to several market 
agents, among which are electricity. 
In addition, this thesis investigated the subjects of integration and competition in European 
electricity markets. In actual fact, these represent two closely tied issues. Perhaps, EU 
electricity market integration can hardly be achieved if competition is unbalanced across 
European markets. One of the central aims of the EU is that of operating a competitive 
wholesale electricity market, requiring the opening to competition of the whole European 
electricity market. However, a lack of competition currently prevails. We have shown that 
market integration was fairly low over time and that only major market occurrences, such as 
the implementation of the EU Third Energy Package, have clearly encouraged a rapid 
increase. The main barriers to integration are caused by issues of technical, economic and 
political natures. Technical barriers are mostly related to the regional features of energy and 
rely on physical networks, which are subject to liquidity and operational complexities, 
entailing the shift toward regional fragmentation of both gas and electricity markets. In fact, 
policies in favour of renewable energy are regional policies which cause further 
fragmentation across markets, given the regional nature of electricity markets.  Therefore, it 
is certainly an arduous job that of coordinating the different regions in a single network. In 
addition, these complexities give rise to intricate problems related to the differing 
competition laws existing in the various European countries. Hence, there is currently an 
essential need to achieve judicial integration. On the other hand, political barriers such as 
those based on security of supply concerns, are preventing an independent functioning of the 
internal European market. Also, the tight capacity constraints faced by EU generators are 
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effectively decreasing the level of competition, calling for the development of additional 
internal and external transmission capacity. Thus, a clear knowledge of the ways to combine 
complementary or adjacent energy markets is a primary concern. A good understanding of 
these issues is likely to provide integration in a quick and effective way. In addition, 
unbundling remains an important issue to be addressed as it prevents the full integration of 
markets. For an improved integration of European markets, different issues should be 
considered, such as in terms of balancing regulations and objectives, transparency, 
responsibility for security of supply, coordination and perhaps also price controls. The 
experience of reform has revealed that implementing competitive electric systems is not an 
easy process and that these reforms occur in a three-dimensional space. The first dimension 
of competitive reform entails legal and regulatory reform, amending the laws and regulations 
relating to companies in the EU electricity industry, as well as establishing their conditions 
and rights to enter markets and integrate into networks. A second dimension, similarly 
crucial, is the operational development of technical and commercial infrastructures for these 
companies and, in general, for electricity and energy markets. The third dimension, which 
can be considered pre-eminently strategic, involves industrial assets and the transformation of 
portfolios and business structures as well as the different forms of corporate ownership 
(Glachant, 1998). The shape assumed by competitive reform is ultimately determined by a 
combination of these three dimensions, in a given country or European area. This explains 
why the potential for variety of electricity market reform can be so intricate and complex. It 
is thus not enough to simply declare the European market “open” to competition for desirable 
competitive mechanisms to appear across all dimensions of the reform (Hunt and 
Shuttleworth, 1996; Holborn and Spiller, 2002). Rather, in the absence of an adequate set of 
infrastructure for electricity transmission and distribution, this industry maintains particularly 
strong imperfections associated with traditional network industries, or natural monopoly due 
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to economies of scale and asset specificity. Similarly, the impossibility of storing electricity 
and the issue of real-time management of generation and final consumption equilibrium are 
combined to produce powerful externalities, such as congestion, among network users, which 
naturally creates the rationale in favour of the maintenance of central regulators (Glachant, 
2002). Moreover, because of the importance of electric energy provision with vertical or 
horizontal, special or exclusive, relationships among the industry’s players, such as 
transmission and distribution, as well as with their energy sources, the electricity sector is 
highly subject to market power and strategic asymmetries among market agents (Glachant 
and Finon, 2003). 
Imperfectly competitive markets are a clear barrier to the integration of European electricity 
markets and a primary concern for European authorities. In order to mitigate market power, 
the best measures can be seen as those entailing capacity divestiture, entry, promoting 
interconnection, and the capacity to regulate competition in generation. Partial divestiture 
should also lead to an increase in competition (Green, 1996). Moreover, a better 
understanding of the special characteristics of electricity markets is needed; there is strong 
urge for the development of viable regulatory tools, as for example, information obligations 
and licence conditions, in order to identify and treat a possible exercise of market power 
(Newbery, 2002a). Once more, the differing regulatory frameworks across European 
countries represent the main dilemma. Nonetheless, much of the EU lacks the necessary 
legislative and regulatory power to mitigate generator market power (Newbery, 2002b). Thus, 
“keeping the lights on” will remain a familiar practice until a clear way of integrating the 
different European markets is approved and effectively implemented among member states. 
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Appendix A1 
GARCH model estimations (Chapter 5 supplementary material). 
Vector autoregression UNITED KINGDOM   
 
Sample:  3 - 1303   No. of obs      = 1301 
Log likelihood = -10751.19   AIC             = 16.61213 
FPE            =  11.27681   HQIC            = 16.69415 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  10.36252   SBIC            = 16.83073 
 
Equation           Parms RMSE R-sq chi2     P>chi2 
    
GB_Elec_FD           11 1.1422 0.0247 33.01026   0.0003 
Gas_GB_FD            11 .627461 0.0148 19.50984   0.0342 
Carbon_FD            11 .339644 0.0300 40.22706   0.0000 
Coal_FD              11 .202416 0.0306 41.06325   0.0000 
GB_Index_FD          11 92.7349 0.0108 14.24118   0.1623 
    
     
Coef.  Std. Err. z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     
GB_Elec_FD    
GB_Elec_FD  
L1.    -.107075 .0327596 -3.27 0.001    -.1712825 -.0428674 
L2.    .0045995 .0327747 0.14 0.888    -.0596378 .0688367 
Gas_GB_FD  
L1.     .004262 .0546832 0.08 0.938    -.1029151 .1114391 
L2.   -.0109662 .0544698 -0.20 0.840     -.117725 .0957927 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .3872406 .1029487 3.76 0.000     .1854647 .5890164 
L2.    .0785855 .1032584 0.76 0.447    -.1237972 .2809682 
Coal_FD  
L1.    .4750266 .178803 2.66 0.008     .1245791 .8254741 
L2.   -.0202508 .1779535 -0.11 0.909    -.3690333 .3285317 
GB_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0002934 .000363 -0.81 0.419    -.0010049 .000418 
L2.    .0004681 .0003619 1.29 0.196    -.0002411 .0011774 
_cons   -.0049151 .0315772 -0.16 0.876    -.0668054 .0569752 
     
Gas_GB_FD     
GB_Elec_FD  
L1.    .0239005 .0179963 1.33 0.184    -.0113716 .0591726 
L2.    .0458977 .0180046 2.55 0.011     .0106093 .0811862 
Gas_GB_FD  
L1.   -.0177892 .0300399 -0.59 0.554    -.0766664 .041088 
L2.   -.0326363 .0299227 -1.09 0.275    -.0912837 .0260111 
Carbon_FD  
L1.   -.0420477 .0565544 -0.74 0.457    -.1528922 .0687969 
L2.   -.0781571 .0567245 -1.38 0.168    -.1893351 .0330208 
Coal_FD  
L1.    .2088519 .0982246 2.13 0.033     .0163353 .4013685 
L2.   -.1223212 .0977579 -1.25 0.211    -.3139231 .0692807 
GB_Index_FD  
L1.    .0000538 .0001994 0.27 0.787    -.0003371 .0004446 
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L2.    .0002173 .0001988 1.09 0.274    -.0001723 .000607 
_cons     .001341 .0173468 0.08 0.938    -.0326581 .0353402 
     
Carbon_FD     
GB_Elec_FD  
L1.   -.0096268 .0097414 -0.99 0.323    -.0287195 .0094659 
L2.    .0065257 .0097459 0.67 0.503    -.0125759 .0256273 
Gas_GB_FD  
L1.    .0118894 .0162606 0.73 0.465    -.0199807 .0437596 
L2.   -.0033947 .0161971 -0.21 0.834    -.0351405 .0283511 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .1317169 .0306128 4.30 0.000     .0717169 .191717 
L2.   -.0468421 .0307049 -1.53 0.127    -.1070226 .0133383 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -.1750641 .0531688 -3.29 0.001    -.2792731 -.0708551 
L2.   -.1049958 .0529162 -1.98 0.047    -.2087097 -.0012819 
GB_Index_FD  
L1.    -.000139 .0001079 -1.29 0.198    -.0003506 .0000725 
L2.   -.0000213 .0001076 -0.20 0.843    -.0002323 .0001896 
_cons   -.0123827 .0093898 -1.32 0.187    -.0307863 .006021 
     
Coal_FD       
GB_Elec_FD  
L1.     .022375 .0058055 3.85 0.000     .0109964 .0337536 
L2.    .0099713 .0058082 1.72 0.086    -.0014126 .0213551 
Gas_GB_FD  
L1.   -.0020796 .0096907 -0.21 0.830    -.0210731 .0169138 
L2.   -.0080204 .0096529 -0.83 0.406    -.0269398 .010899 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .0112724 .0182441 0.62 0.537    -.0244855 .0470302 
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Granger causality Wald tests UNITED KINGDOM 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
GB_Elec_FD          Gas_GB_FD   .04714     2    0.977     
GB_Elec_FD          Carbon_FD    15.61     2    0.000     
GB_Elec_FD            Coal_FD   7.0715     2    0.029     
GB_Elec_FD        GB_Index_FD   2.3479     2    0.309     
GB_Elec_FD                ALL   30.366     8    0.000     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Gas_GB_FD         GB_Elec_FD   7.4715     2    0.024     
Gas_GB_FD          Carbon_FD   2.7279     2    0.256     
Gas_GB_FD            Coal_FD    6.091     2    0.048     
Gas_GB_FD        GB_Index_FD   1.2622     2    0.532     
Gas_GB_FD                ALL   18.932     8    0.015     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Carbon_FD         GB_Elec_FD   1.6383     2    0.441     
Carbon_FD          Gas_GB_FD   .58378     2    0.747     
Carbon_FD            Coal_FD   14.768     2    0.001     
Carbon_FD        GB_Index_FD   1.6936     2    0.429     
Carbon_FD                ALL   25.162     8    0.001     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Coal_FD         GB_Elec_FD   16.288     2    0.000     
Coal_FD          Gas_GB_FD   .73071     2    0.694     
Coal_FD          Carbon_FD   1.6581     2    0.436     
Coal_FD        GB_Index_FD   4.0958     2    0.129     
Coal_FD                ALL   26.324     8    0.001     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
GB_Index_FD         GB_Elec_FD   .99148     2    0.609     
GB_Index_FD          Gas_GB_FD    .9623     2    0.618     
GB_Index_FD          Carbon_FD   2.3159     2    0.314     
GB_Index_FD            Coal_FD   2.0185     2    0.364     
GB_Index_FD                ALL   9.7084     8    0.286     
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Vector autoregression  GERMANY 
 
Sample:  3 - 1303   No. of obs      = 1301 
Log likelihood = -8944.367   AIC             = 13.83454 
FPE            =  .7012822   HQIC            = 13.91655 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .6444247   SBIC            = 14.05314 
 
Equation           Parms RMSE R-sq chi2     P>chi2 
    
DE_Elec_FD           11 .697902 0.0284 37.99385   0.0000 
Gas_DE_FD            11 .377201 0.0306 41.04307   0.0000 
Carbon_FD            11 .339436 0.0312 41.86999   0.0000 
Coal_FD              11 .200318 0.0506 69.3202   0.0000 
DE_Index_FD          11 95.0101 0.0205 27.23955   0.0024 
    
     
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     
DE_Elec_FD    
DE_Elec_FD  
L1.    .0331705 .0428155 0.77 0.438    -.0507463 .1170873 
L2.   -.1018271 .0429898 -2.37 0.018    -.1860857 -.0175686 
Gas_DE_FD  
L1.    .0044023 .0656118 0.07 0.947    -.1241945 .132999 
L2.     .197811 .06524 3.03 0.002     .0699429 .3256791 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .1616821 .0714102 2.26 0.024     .0217208 .3016435 
L2.   -.0531426 .0711863 -0.75 0.455     -.192665 .0863799 
Coal_FD  
L1.    .2038765 .1218236 1.67 0.094    -.0348933 .4426463 
L2.   -.1075827 .1211838 -0.89 0.375    -.3450986 .1299331 
DE_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0002006 .0002141 -0.94 0.349    -.0006201 .0002189 
L2.   -3.62e-06 .0002132 -0.02 0.986    -.0004214 .0004142 
_cons   -.0134067 .0193003 -0.69 0.487    -.0512345 .0244211 
     
Gas_DE_FD     
DE_Elec_FD  
L1.     .072242 .0231408 3.12 0.002     .0268868 .1175971 
L2.   -.0105094 .0232351 -0.45 0.651    -.0560493 .0350305 
Gas_DE_FD  
L1.    .0440041 .0354617 1.24 0.215    -.0254996 .1135078 
L2.    .0469895 .0352608 1.33 0.183    -.0221204 .1160994 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .0211277 .0385956 0.55 0.584    -.0545183 .0967738 
L2.   -.0421161 .0384746 -1.09 0.274    -.1175249 .0332928 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -.0205943 .065843 -0.31 0.754    -.1496442 .1084555 
L2.    .0026696 .0654972 0.04 0.967    -.1257025 .1310418 
DE_Index_FD  
L1.    .0000231 .0001157 0.20 0.841    -.0002036 .0002499 
L2.    .0000488 .0001152 0.42 0.672     -.000177 .0002746 
_cons    .0011863 .0104314 0.11 0.909    -.0192588 .0216314 
     
Carbon_FD     
DE_Elec_FD  
L1.   -.0231996 .020824 -1.11 0.265    -.0640139 .0176146 
L2.   -.0295715 .0209088 -1.41 0.157     -.070552 .0114089 
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Gas_DE_FD  
L1.   -.0020215 .0319113 -0.06 0.949    -.0645666 .0605235 
L2.    .0147168 .0317305 0.46 0.643    -.0474739 .0769075 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .1432747 .0347315 4.13 0.000     .0752023 .2113471 
L2.   -.0173814 .0346226 -0.50 0.616    -.0852404 .0504776 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -.1407526 .0592508 -2.38 0.018    -.2568821 -.0246231 
L2.   -.0589082 .0589397 -1.00 0.318    -.1744278 .0566114 
DE_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0001152 .0001041 -1.11 0.268    -.0003193 .0000888 
L2.   -.0000424 .0001037 -0.41 0.683    -.0002456 .0001608 
_cons    -.012449 .009387 -1.33 0.185    -.0308472 .0059491 
     
Coal_FD       
DE_Elec_FD  
L1.    .0686656 .0122893 5.59 0.000     .0445791 .0927521 
L2.    .0180959 .0123393 1.47 0.143    -.0060887 .0422805 
Gas_DE_FD  
L1.     .011713 .0188324 0.62 0.534    -.0251979 .0486239 
L2.    .0121729 .0187257 0.65 0.516    -.0245289 .0488747 
Carbon_FD  
L1.   -.0374051 .0204967 -1.82 0.068    -.0775779 .0027678 
L2.   -.0396329 .0204325 -1.94 0.052    -.0796798 .000414 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -.0625268 .0349668 -1.79 0.074    -.1310605 .0060069 
L2.   -.1160174 .0347832 -3.34 0.001    -.1841911 -.0478436 
DE_Index_FD  
L1.    .0001013 .0000614 1.65 0.099    -.0000192 .0002217 
L2.    .0001021 .0000612 1.67 0.095    -.0000179 .000222 
_cons    .0003605 .0055397 0.07 0.948    -.0104972 .0112181 
     
DE_Index_FD   
DE_Elec_FD  
L1.    .8917313 5.828757 0.15 0.878    -10.53242 12.31588 
L2.   -13.16738 5.852495 -2.25 0.024    -24.63806 -1.696705 
Gas_DE_FD  
L1.   -8.699199 8.932172 -0.97 0.330    -26.20593 8.807537 
L2.    17.13038 8.881563 1.93 0.054    -.2771615 34.53793 
Carbon_FD  
L1.   -6.379203 9.721545 -0.66 0.512    -25.43308 12.67468 
L2.    6.343747 9.691061 0.65 0.513    -12.65038 25.33788 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -39.25117 16.58466 -2.37 0.018     -71.7565 -6.74584 
L2.    1.149562 16.49756 0.07 0.944    -31.18506 33.48418 
DE_Index_FD  
L1.    .0445225 .0291407 1.53 0.127    -.0125921 .1016372 
L2.   -.0210869 .0290205 -0.73 0.467    -.0779661 .0357923 
_cons   -.3476631 2.627473 -0.13 0.895    -5.497415 4.802089 
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Granger causality Wald tests GERMANY 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
DE_Elec_FD          Gas_DE_FD   9.2303     2    0.010     
DE_Elec_FD          Carbon_FD   5.3768     2    0.068     
DE_Elec_FD            Coal_FD   3.8504     2    0.146     
DE_Elec_FD        DE_Index_FD   .88292     2    0.643     
DE_Elec_FD                ALL   18.456     8    0.018     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Gas_DE_FD         DE_Elec_FD   10.147     2    0.006     
Gas_DE_FD          Carbon_FD   1.3828     2    0.501     
Gas_DE_FD            Coal_FD   .10218     2    0.950     
Gas_DE_FD        DE_Index_FD   .22934     2    0.892     
Gas_DE_FD                ALL   19.388     8    0.013     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Carbon_FD         DE_Elec_FD   3.0699     2    0.215     
Carbon_FD          Gas_DE_FD   .21707     2    0.897     
Carbon_FD            Coal_FD   6.3034     2    0.043     
Carbon_FD        DE_Index_FD   1.4455     2    0.485     
Carbon_FD                ALL   26.787     8    0.001     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Coal_FD         DE_Elec_FD   32.533     2    0.000     
Coal_FD          Gas_DE_FD    .8442     2    0.656     
Coal_FD          Carbon_FD   7.9678     2    0.019     
Coal_FD        DE_Index_FD   5.8143     2    0.055     
Coal_FD                ALL   54.271     8    0.000     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
DE_Index_FD         DE_Elec_FD   5.1422     2    0.076     
DE_Index_FD          Gas_DE_FD   4.5214     2    0.104     
DE_Index_FD          Carbon_FD   .77396     2    0.679     
DE_Index_FD            Coal_FD   5.6686     2    0.059     
DE_Index_FD                ALL   24.667     8    0.002      
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Vector autoregression FRANCE 
 
Sample:  3 - 1303   No. of obs      = 1301 
Log likelihood =  -8806.76   AIC             = 13.623 
FPE            =  .5675729   HQIC            = 13.70501 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  .5215561   SBIC            = 13.8416 
 
Equation           Parms RMSE R-sq chi2     P>chi2 
    
FR_Elec_FD           11 .765946 0.0783 110.5591   0.0000 
Gas_FR_FD            11 .376282 0.0390 52.73339   0.0000 
Carbon_FD            11 .33949 0.0309 41.4444   0.0000 
Coal_FD              11 .201111 0.0430 58.52584   0.0000 
FR_Index_FD          11 63.2519 0.0165 21.76465   0.0163 
    
     
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     
FR_Elec_FD    
FR_Elec_FD  
L1.   -.1981601 .0357742 -5.54 0.000    -.2682762 -.1280439 
L2.   -.0855974 .0353721 -2.42 0.016    -.1549254 -.0162694 
Gas_FR_FD  
L1.    .3347001 .0697605 4.80 0.000     .1979721 .4714281 
L2.    .0710708 .0692822 1.03 0.305    -.0647198 .2068614 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .4663023 .0722188 6.46 0.000      .324756 .6078486 
L2.   -.0612369 .0731203 -0.84 0.402    -.2045501 .0820762 
Coal_FD  
L1.    .3727503 .1251659 2.98 0.003     .1274297 .618071 
L2.   -.0366839 .1253539 -0.29 0.770    -.2823731 .2090053 
FR_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0006893 .0003539 -1.95 0.051    -.0013829 4.32e-06 
L2.   -.0003803 .0003525 -1.08 0.281    -.0010711 .0003105 
_cons   -.0121427 .0211848 -0.57 0.567    -.0536641 .0293786 
     
Gas_FR_FD     
FR_Elec_FD  
L1.    .0555437 .0175746 3.16 0.002     .0210981 .0899893 
L2.   -.0135715 .0173771 -0.78 0.435    -.0476299 .0204869 
Gas_FR_FD  
L1.   -.0061673 .0342709 -0.18 0.857    -.0733369 .0610023 
L2.   -.0388589 .0340359 -1.14 0.254     -.105568 .0278502 
Carbon_FD  
L1.    .0647003 .0354786 1.82 0.068    -.0048364 .134237 
L2.   -.0454591 .0359214 -1.27 0.206    -.1158638 .0249456 
Coal_FD  
L1.    .1590514 .0614896 2.59 0.010      .038534 .2795687 
L2.    .0346761 .061582 0.56 0.573    -.0860223 .1553745 
FR_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0002672 .0001739 -1.54 0.124     -.000608 .0000735 
L2.    .0000858 .0001732 0.50 0.620    -.0002535 .0004252 
_cons    .0009627 .0104073 0.09 0.926    -.0194353 .0213607 
     
Carbon_FD     
FR_Elec_FD  
L1.    .0065512 .0158562 0.41 0.679    -.0245264 .0376287 
L2.    -.004741 .0156779 -0.30 0.762    -.0354692 .0259872 
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Gas_FR_FD  
L1.   -.0050234 .0309199 -0.16 0.871    -.0656252 .0555785 
L2.   -.0214548 .0307079 -0.70 0.485    -.0816411 .0387315 
Carbon_FD  
L1.     .127623 .0320095 3.99 0.000     .0648856 .1903604 
L2.   -.0373688 .032409 -1.15 0.249    -.1008894 .0261517 
Coal_FD  
L1.    -.185166 .0554772 -3.34 0.001    -.2938992 -.0764328 
L2.   -.0777594 .0555605 -1.40 0.162     -.186656 .0311372 
FR_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0003083 .0001569 -1.97 0.049    -.0006157 -8.33e-07 
L2.   -.0000494 .0001562 -0.32 0.752    -.0003556 .0002568 
_cons   -.0125793 .0093897 -1.34 0.180    -.0309827 .0058242 
     
Coal_FD       
FR_Elec_FD  
L1.     .023529 .0093931 2.50 0.012     .0051189 .0419391 
L2.    .0109823 .0092875 1.18 0.237    -.0072208 .0291855 
Gas_FR_FD  
L1.    .0633561 .0183167 3.46 0.001      .027456 .0992562 
L2.    .0420947 .0181911 2.31 0.021     .0064407 .0777487 
Carbon_FD  
L1.   -.0036143 .0189622 -0.19 0.849    -.0407795 .033551 
L2.   -.0410323 .0191989 -2.14 0.033    -.0786615 -.0034032 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -.0289724 .0328643 -0.88 0.378    -.0933853 .0354404 
L2.   -.1252925 .0329137 -3.81 0.000    -.1898021 -.0607829 
FR_Index_FD  
L1.    .0001132 .0000929 1.22 0.223    -.0000689 .0002954 
L2.    .0000817 .0000925 0.88 0.378    -.0000997 .000263 
_cons    .0001853 .0055624 0.03 0.973    -.0107168 .0110874 
     
FR_Index_FD   
FR_Elec_FD  
L1.    .9241087 2.954235 0.31 0.754    -4.866085 6.714302 
L2.   -3.920922 2.921028 -1.34 0.179    -9.646032 1.804189 
Gas_FR_FD  
L1.   -1.887777 5.760823 -0.33 0.743    -13.17878 9.403228 
L2.    -.951335 5.721325 -0.17 0.868    -12.16493 10.26226 
Carbon_FD  
L1.   -6.982138 5.963833 -1.17 0.242    -18.67104 4.70676 
L2.      .97055 6.038278 0.16 0.872    -10.86426 12.80536 
Coal_FD  
L1.   -22.20211 10.3362 -2.15 0.032    -42.46069 -1.943522 
L2.    -2.80657 10.35173 -0.27 0.786    -23.09559 17.48245 
FR_Index_FD  
L1.   -.0373549 .0292242 -1.28 0.201    -.0946332 .0199234 
L2.   -.0251645 .0291069 -0.86 0.387     -.082213 .031884 
_cons   -1.599226 1.749438 -0.91 0.361    -5.028061 1.829609 
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Granger causality Wald tests FRANCE 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
FR_Elec_FD          Gas_FR_FD   23.408     2    0.000     
FR_Elec_FD          Carbon_FD   41.793     2    0.000     
FR_Elec_FD            Coal_FD   9.0722     2    0.011     
FR_Elec_FD        FR_Index_FD   4.8902     2    0.087     
FR_Elec_FD                ALL   106.62     8    0.000     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Gas_FR_FD         FR_Elec_FD   12.567     2    0.002     
Gas_FR_FD          Carbon_FD   4.5869     2    0.101     
Gas_FR_FD            Coal_FD   6.8728     2    0.032     
Gas_FR_FD        FR_Index_FD   2.6341     2    0.268     
Gas_FR_FD                ALL   38.521     8    0.000     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Carbon_FD         FR_Elec_FD    .3442     2    0.842     
Carbon_FD          Gas_FR_FD   .49893     2    0.779     
Carbon_FD            Coal_FD    12.64     2    0.002     
Carbon_FD        FR_Index_FD   3.9429     2    0.139     
Carbon_FD                ALL   26.366     8    0.001     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Coal_FD         FR_Elec_FD   6.6177     2    0.037     
Coal_FD          Gas_FR_FD   16.082     2    0.000     
Coal_FD          Carbon_FD   4.6995     2    0.095     
Coal_FD        FR_Index_FD   2.2288     2    0.328     
Coal_FD                ALL   43.595     8    0.000     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
FR_Index_FD         FR_Elec_FD   2.2407     2    0.326     
FR_Index_FD          Gas_FR_FD   .12674     2    0.939     
FR_Index_FD          Carbon_FD   1.3752     2    0.503     
FR_Index_FD            Coal_FD   4.6387     2    0.098     
FR_Index_FD                ALL    15.62     8    0.048      
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Vector autoregression NORD POOL 
 
Sample:  3 - 1303                                  No. of obs      =      1301 
Log likelihood = -3276.776                         AIC             =  5.121869 
FPE            =  .0001154                         HQIC            =  5.203885 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   .000106                         SBIC            =  5.340469 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
NO_Elec_FD           11     .848491   0.0185   24.48007   0.0064 
Gas_NO_FD            11     .378242   0.0252   33.66165   0.0002 
Carbon_FD            11     .339398   0.0314   42.17231   0.0000 
Coal_FD              11     .202848   0.0265   35.35316   0.0001 
NO_Index_FD          11     .831331   0.0051   6.711272   0.7524 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
NO_Elec_FD   | 
  NO_Elec_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0747623   .0344149    -2.17   0.030    -.1422142   -.0073103 
         L2. |  -.0815273    .034449    -2.37   0.018     -.149046   -.0140085 
   Gas_NO_FD | 
         L1. |   .0934199   .0781691     1.20   0.232    -.0597888    .2466286 
         L2. |  -.0915083   .0778711    -1.18   0.240    -.2441328    .0611162 
   Carbon_FD | 
         L1. |   .1725342    .079886     2.16   0.031     .0159605    .3291078 
         L2. |  -.0713425   .0794993    -0.90   0.370    -.2271583    .0844732 
     Coal_FD | 
         L1. |   .0774405   .1404429     0.55   0.581    -.1978225    .3527034 
         L2. |   .1918224   .1404355     1.37   0.172    -.0834262     .467071 
 NO_Index_FD | 
         L1. |   .0221326   .0311772     0.71   0.478    -.0389736    .0832388 
         L2. |   .0750528   .0311109     2.41   0.016     .0140765    .1360291 
       _cons |  -.0127972   .0234647    -0.55   0.585     -.058787    .0331927 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Gas_NO_FD    | 
  NO_Elec_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0163338   .0153416    -1.06   0.287    -.0464026    .0137351 
         L2. |   -.000155   .0153567    -0.01   0.992    -.0302537    .0299436 
   Gas_NO_FD | 
         L1. |   .0882253   .0348464     2.53   0.011     .0199276     .156523 
         L2. |   .0302195   .0347136     0.87   0.384    -.0378178    .0982569 
   Carbon_FD | 
         L1. |   .0889947   .0356118     2.50   0.012     .0191969    .1587924 
         L2. |  -.0567286   .0354394    -1.60   0.109    -.1261885    .0127313 
     Coal_FD | 
         L1. |   .0646429   .0626069     1.03   0.302    -.0580645    .1873503 
         L2. |   .0089269   .0626037     0.14   0.887     -.113774    .1316279 
 NO_Index_FD | 
         L1. |   .0076018   .0138983     0.55   0.584    -.0196383    .0348419 
         L2. |   .0197489   .0138687     1.42   0.154    -.0074333    .0469311 
       _cons |   .0006816   .0104601     0.07   0.948    -.0198199     .021183 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Carbon_FD    | 
  NO_Elec_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0056383    .013766    -0.41   0.682    -.0326192    .0213426 
         L2. |  -.0213211   .0137796    -1.55   0.122    -.0483287    .0056865 
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   Gas_NO_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0086624   .0312678    -0.28   0.782    -.0699461    .0526212 
         L2. |   .0102969   .0311485     0.33   0.741    -.0507531    .0713469 
   Carbon_FD | 
         L1. |   .1368857   .0319545     4.28   0.000     .0742561    .1995154 
         L2. |  -.0353415   .0317998    -1.11   0.266     -.097668     .026985 
     Coal_FD | 
         L1. |  -.1647525   .0561773    -2.93   0.003     -.274858    -.054647 
         L2. |  -.0735508   .0561744    -1.31   0.190    -.1836506     .036549 
 NO_Index_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0192798   .0124709    -1.55   0.122    -.0437223    .0051628 
         L2. |   .0050442   .0124444     0.41   0.685    -.0193464    .0294348 
       _cons |  -.0122498   .0093859    -1.31   0.192    -.0306458    .0061462 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Coal_FD      | 
  NO_Elec_FD | 
         L1. |   .0032669   .0082275     0.40   0.691    -.0128588    .0193925 
         L2. |   .0117487   .0082357     1.43   0.154    -.0043929    .0278903 
   Gas_NO_FD | 
         L1. |   .0443252   .0186878     2.37   0.018     .0076978    .0809526 
         L2. |     .00846   .0186165     0.45   0.650    -.0280277    .0449477 
   Carbon_FD | 
         L1. |   .0122801   .0190982     0.64   0.520    -.0251518    .0497119 
         L2. |  -.0294528   .0190058    -1.55   0.121    -.0667035    .0077978 
     Coal_FD | 
         L1. |   .0108978   .0335755     0.32   0.746    -.0549089    .0767045 
         L2. |  -.0939565   .0335737    -2.80   0.005    -.1597597   -.0281532 
 NO_Index_FD | 
         L1. |    .012335   .0074535     1.65   0.098    -.0022736    .0269435 
         L2. |   .0097487   .0074376     1.31   0.190    -.0048288    .0243262 
       _cons |  -.0000506   .0056097    -0.01   0.993    -.0110454    .0109441 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
NO_Index_FD  | 
  NO_Elec_FD | 
         L1. |   .0242694   .0337189     0.72   0.472    -.0418184    .0903571 
         L2. |   .0110679   .0337523     0.33   0.743    -.0550853    .0772211 
   Gas_NO_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0390499   .0765882    -0.51   0.610      -.18916    .1110601 
         L2. |   .0417077   .0762961     0.55   0.585      -.10783    .1912454 
   Carbon_FD | 
         L1. |  -.0475679   .0782703    -0.61   0.543    -.2009749     .105839 
         L2. |  -.0598945   .0778914    -0.77   0.442    -.2125589    .0927699 
     Coal_FD | 
         L1. |  -.2370725   .1376024    -1.72   0.085    -.5067682    .0326233 
         L2. |  -.0138382   .1375952    -0.10   0.920    -.2835199    .2558435 
 NO_Index_FD | 
         L1. |   .0173221   .0305467     0.57   0.571    -.0425482    .0771925 
         L2. |  -.0100983   .0304817    -0.33   0.740    -.0698414    .0496448 
       _cons |   .0019998   .0229901     0.09   0.931      -.04306    .0470595 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Granger causality Wald tests NORD POOL 
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Equation           Excluded    chi2     df Prob > chi2  
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
NO_Elec_FD          Gas_NO_FD   2.6437     2    0.267     
NO_Elec_FD          Carbon_FD    5.084     2    0.079     
NO_Elec_FD            Coal_FD   2.1691     2    0.338     
NO_Elec_FD        NO_Index_FD   6.3853     2    0.041     
NO_Elec_FD                ALL   18.665     8    0.017     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Gas_NO_FD         NO_Elec_FD   1.1367     2    0.566     
Gas_NO_FD          Carbon_FD   7.9762     2    0.019     
Gas_NO_FD            Coal_FD   1.0863     2    0.581     
Gas_NO_FD        NO_Index_FD   2.3547     2    0.308     
Gas_NO_FD                ALL   12.182     8    0.143     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Carbon_FD         NO_Elec_FD   2.4925     2    0.288     
Carbon_FD          Gas_NO_FD   .17525     2    0.916     
Carbon_FD            Coal_FD   10.312     2    0.006     
Carbon_FD        NO_Index_FD   2.5333     2    0.282     
Carbon_FD                ALL   27.086     8    0.001     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
Coal_FD         NO_Elec_FD   2.1304     2    0.345     
Coal_FD          Gas_NO_FD   5.9908     2    0.050     
Coal_FD          Carbon_FD   2.6166     2    0.270     
Coal_FD        NO_Index_FD   4.5336     2    0.104     
Coal_FD                ALL   20.677     8    0.008     
--------------------------------------+--------------------------- 
NO_Index_FD         NO_Elec_FD   .59847     2    0.741     
NO_Index_FD          Gas_NO_FD   .52596     2    0.769     
NO_Index_FD          Carbon_FD   1.0857     2    0.581     
 
NO_Index_FD            Coal_FD   2.9783     2    0.226     
NO_Index_FD                ALL   6.4199     8    0.600     
+------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
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ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances and mult. heteroskedasticity 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Sample:  1 - 1303                               Number of obs      =      1303 
Wald chi2(8)       =   1144.54 
Log likelihood = -1509.056                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
 
OIM 
GB_Elec_FD       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
GB_Elec_FD    
Gas_GB_FD      .50109   .0352415    14.22   0.000      .432018     .570162 
Carbon_FD    .6512995   .0522363    12.47   0.000     .5489183    .7536808 
Coal_FD    1.084503   .1222952     8.87   0.000     .8448085    1.324197 
GB_Index_FD    .0016096   .0002183     7.37   0.000     .0011818    .0020374 
_cons    .0147384   .0164047     0.90   0.369    -.0174141    .0468909 
 
ARCHM         
sigma2  
--.   -.0059598   .0066251    -0.90   0.368    -.0189448    .0070251 
L1.    .0003358   .0029819     0.11   0.910    -.0055087    .0061802 
L3.    .0008229    .000976     0.84   0.399    -.0010901     .002736 
 
ARMA          
ar  
L1.     .002007   .0401486     0.05   0.960    -.0766828    .0806967 
 
HET           
Gas_GB_FD    .9383736   .0719866    13.04   0.000     .7972824    1.079465 
Carbon_FD    -.858307   .2762807    -3.11   0.002    -1.399807   -.3168069 
Coal_FD   -.4800075   .4113791    -1.17   0.243    -1.286296    .3262806 
GB_Index_FD   -.0028269   .0012536    -2.26   0.024    -.0052838     -.00037 
_cons   -1.583631   .0968995   -16.34   0.000    -1.773551   -1.393712 
 
ARCH          
arch  
L1.    1.080717   .1229361     8.79   0.000     .8397666    1.321667 
garch  
L1.    .1355674   .0362645     3.74   0.000     .0644902    .2066446 
 
 
. arch GB_Elec_FD Gas_GB_FD Carbon_FD Coal_FD GB_Index_FD, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) 
>  archm archmlags("1 3") arima(1,0,0) het(Gas_GB_FD Carbon_FD Coal_FD GB_Index 
> _FD) savespace trace hessian difficult iterate(160) 
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ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances and mult. heteroskedasticity 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Sample:  1 - 1303 Number of obs      =      1303 
 Wald chi2(8)       =    672.19 
Log likelihood = -1605.553 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
  
OIM 
GB_Elec_FD       Coef.   Std. Err.      z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
GB_Elec_FD    
Gas_GB_FD    .7112867   .0476593    14.92 0.000     .6178762    .8046971 
Carbon_FD    .6362082   .0724699     8.78 0.000     .4941699    .7782465 
Coal_FD    1.344011   .1459685     9.21 0.000     1.057918    1.630104 
GB_Index_FD    .0006539   .0003529     1.85 0.064    -.0000377    .0013455 
_cons    .0046213   .0231168     0.20 0.842    -.0406868    .0499293 
  
ARCHM         
sigma2  
--.   -.0639297   .0918755    -0.70 0.487    -.2440023     .116143 
L1.    .0673185   .0986729     0.68 0.495    -.1260769    .2607138 
L3.   -.0107486    .052551    -0.20 0.838    -.1137466    .0922494 
  
ARMA          
ar  
L1.   -.0970208   .0338529    -2.87 0.004    -.1633712   -.0306704 
  
HET           
Gas_GB_FD    .6145371   .0548484    11.20 0.000     .5070363    .7220379 
Carbon_FD   -.0414512   .2519881    -0.16 0.869    -.5353388    .4524364 
Coal_FD    1.634588   .3074138     5.32 0.000     1.032068    2.237108 
GB_Index_FD   -.0165406   .0008151   -20.29 0.000    -.0181381   -.0149431 
_cons   -3.100562   .1159293   -26.75 0.000    -3.327779   -2.873345 
  
ARCH          
arch  
L1.    .0333573    .010337     3.23 0.001     .0130971    .0536175 
saarch  
L1.   -.1254247   .0220359    -5.69 0.000    -.1686142   -.0822353 
garch  
L1.    .8102723   .0171377    47.28 0.000     .7766829    .8438617 
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ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances and mult. heteroskedasticity 
GERMANY 
Sample:  1 - 1303 Number of obs      =      1303 
 Wald chi2(8)       =   1689.78 
Log likelihood = -485.5186 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
  
OIM 
DE_Elec_FD       Coef.   Std. Err.      z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
DE_Elec_FD    
Gas_DE_FD    .5132216   .0348512    14.73 0.000     .4449146    .5815286 
Carbon_FD    .6555258   .0319386    20.52 0.000     .5929274    .7181242 
Coal_FD    1.086496   .0730897    14.87 0.000     .9432424    1.229749 
DE_Index_FD    .0003528   .0000951     3.71 0.000     .0001663    .0005392 
_cons   -.0130955    .009291    -1.41 0.159    -.0313055    .0051145 
  
ARCHM         
sigma2  
--.   -.0975156   .2064514    -0.47 0.637     -.502153    .3071218 
L1.     .049558   .2350058     0.21 0.833    -.4110449     .510161 
L3.    .0510576   .1131814     0.45 0.652    -.1707739     .272889 
  
ARMA          
ar  
L1.   -.1067122   .0304111    -3.51 0.000    -.1663169   -.0471074 
  
HET           
Gas_DE_FD    1.146334   .2046761     5.60 0.000     .7451768    1.547492 
Carbon_FD    1.872559   .3137038     5.97 0.000      1.25771    2.487407 
Coal_FD    2.890047   .4195733     6.89 0.000     2.067698    3.712395 
DE_Index_FD    .0024819   .0017152     1.45 0.148    -.0008798    .0058437 
_cons   -5.259548   .2581212   -20.38 0.000    -5.765456    -4.75364 
  
ARCH          
arch  
L1.    .1178612   .0241578     4.88 0.000     .0705129    .1652096 
garch  
L1.    .8002959   .0320378    24.98 0.000      .737503    .8630888 
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ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances and mult. heteroskedasticity 
FRANCE 
Sample:  1 - 1303 Number of obs      =      1303 
 Wald chi2(8)       =    763.68 
Log likelihood = -774.3081 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
  
OIM 
FR_Elec_FD       Coef.   Std. Err.      z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
FR_Elec_FD    
Gas_FR_FD    .6362577   .0441892    14.40 0.000     .5496485     .722867 
Carbon_FD    .3780179    .039215     9.64 0.000     .3011579    .4548778 
Coal_FD     .831411   .0835566     9.95 0.000     .6676431     .995179 
FR_Index_FD    .0002419   .0001969     1.23 0.219    -.0001439    .0006278 
_cons   -.0148034   .0107027    -1.38 0.167    -.0357802    .0061735 
  
ARCHM         
sigma2  
--.    .3022072   .3028276     1.00 0.318    -.2913241    .8957384 
L1.   -.2825722   .3365581    -0.84 0.401    -.9422139    .3770695 
L3.    .0005179   .1794278     0.00 0.998    -.3511542      .35219 
  
ARMA          
ar  
L1.   -.1387053   .0297685    -4.66 0.000    -.1970505     -.08036 
  
HET           
Gas_FR_FD    3.103147   .1617839    19.18 0.000     2.786057    3.420238 
Carbon_FD    1.458865   .3586846     4.07 0.000     .7558563    2.161874 
Coal_FD   -1.154892   .9054764    -1.28 0.202    -2.929593    .6198096 
FR_Index_FD    .0072366   .0013069     5.54 0.000     .0046751    .0097981 
_cons   -6.223939   .3240875   -19.20 0.000    -6.859139    -5.58874 
  
ARCH          
arch  
L1.    .0380301    .012821     2.97 0.003     .0129014    .0631589 
garch  
L1.    .9257498    .016485    56.16 0.000     .8934397    .9580599 
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ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances and mult. heteroskedasticity 
NORWAY 
Sample:  1 - 1303 Number of obs      =      1303 
 Wald chi2(8)       =    716.76 
Log likelihood = -1081.124 Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
  
OIM 
NO_Elec_FD       Coef.   Std. Err.      z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
NO_Elec_FD    
Gas_NO_FD    .4939694   .0506832     9.75 0.000     .3946321    .5933067 
Carbon_FD    .5190974   .0483195    10.74 0.000     .4243929    .6138019 
Coal_FD    .9030003   .1061811     8.50 0.000     .6948891    1.111112 
NO_Index_FD    .0889868   .0179188     4.97 0.000     .0538666    .1241071 
_cons    .0108688   .0137141     0.79 0.428    -.0160104    .0377479 
  
ARCHM         
sigma2  
--.   -.0550947   .0839974    -0.66 0.512    -.2197266    .1095373 
L1.   -.0382024   .0930339    -0.41 0.681    -.2205455    .1441408 
L3.   -.0171453   .0526003    -0.33 0.744    -.1202399    .0859494 
  
ARMA          
ar  
L1.   -.0817852   .0311272    -2.63 0.009    -.1427934    -.020777 
  
HET           
Gas_NO_FD    .1335908   .3997988     0.33 0.738    -.6500004    .9171821 
Carbon_FD    3.040832   .4724239     6.44 0.000     2.114898    3.966766 
Coal_FD    2.669648   .4600836     5.80 0.000     1.767901    3.571396 
NO_Index_FD    -.188531   .2510597    -0.75 0.453     -.680599    .3035369 
_cons   -4.882791   .3021583   -16.16 0.000     -5.47501   -4.290571 
  
ARCH          
arch  
L1.     .179852   .0286286     6.28 0.000     .1237411     .235963 
garch  
L1.    .7980144   .0273884    29.14 0.000      .744334    .8516947 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity and Energy Price Interactions in Modern EU Markets                           G. Castagneto-Gissey 
 254 
 
Appendix A2 
Figures 5A.1-5A.4 depict the time courses relative to the one-year forward prices of 
electricity, coal and gas and carbon for the markets of: UK, Germany, France and Nord Pool, 
respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 5A.1 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in Germany (DE). 
 
 
Fig. 5A.2 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead pricesin France (FR). 
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Fig. 5A.3 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in the United Kingdom (UK). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5A.4 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in the Nord Pool market (NO). 
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Fig. 5B.1 - Electricity one-year forward price first difference (DE, FR, UK, NO). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5B.2 - EU ETS Phase II carbon emission allowance one-year forward price difference. 
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Fig. 5B.3 - Gas one-year forward price first difference (DE, FR, UK, NO). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5B.4 - Stock market indices (DE, FR, UK, NO). 
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Fig. 5C.1- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in the UK during 2008-12. 
 
 
Fig. 5C.2- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in Germany during 2008-12. 
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Fig. 5C.3- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in France during 2008-12. 
 
 
Fig. 5C.4- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in the Nord Pool market during 2008-12. 
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Appendix A3 
Figure 6A.1 and 6A.2 report the in-strength and out-strength strength values, respectively, for 
all 13 European electricity prices. Figure A3 depicts the in-strength and out-strength values 
over time for each of the countries in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6A.1 - Behaviour of all 13 price in-strength series throughout the 7,651 shifts (i.e. Aug-2007 to 
Jun-2012) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6A.2 - Behaviour of all out-strengths throughout the 7,651 shifts (i.e. Aug-2007 to Jun-2012)  
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Fig. 6A.3 - The set of graphs shown above depicts the estimated in- and out-strengths for 
each of the 13 European markets in the sample. The 13 markets under study are: APX 
ENDEX (Belgium (BL), The Netherlands (NL), and The United Kingdom (UK)), Nord Pool 
Spot (Denmark, (DM), Finland (FI), Norway (NO) and Sweden (SW)), Powernext (France 
(FR)), the European Energy Exchange (EEX) (Germany (DE) and Switzerland (SU)), 
Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME) (Italy, IT),  OMI-Polo Portugués (OMIP)(Portugal 
(PO), Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad (OMEL) (Spain (ES)). The 
time frame comprises the period 02/07/2007 - 29/06/2012. 
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Exchange Rates, Oil Prices & Electricity Spot Prices:                            
Empirical Insights from EU markets 
 
Giorgio Castagneto Gissey*, Richard Green* 
 
 
This study investigates the relationship between daily electricity spot price returns and both 
the crude oil spot price return (in US dollars) and the exchange rate return in six European 
countries - namely France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom - during 
the time periods 2005-2007 and 2008–2011, i.e. before and after the contagion of the 
subprime crisis on European markets.  The conditional mean and conditional variance are 
modelled by AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) and AR(1)-NGARCH(1,1). The performance superiority of 
the NGARCH model suggests that the leverage effect is well represented. 
In many cases, the level of returns in either the oil price or the exchange rate had little impact 
on the level of electricity price returns, but the volatility of these prices affected the volatility 
of electricity prices in all the European countries examined, except for the United Kingdom. 
However, in the succeeding time period (2008-2011), the volatility of electricity prices in 
each of the studied countries, including the UK, was significantly and asymmetrically 
affected by both exchange rate and oil price returns.  This volatility, or risk, has implications 
for the way in which low-carbon generators should be supported. 
 
Keywords: Electricity prices, Oil Prices, Exchange Rates, Volatility analysis, GARCH 
regressions. 
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1 Introduction 
Electricity is priced in national currencies but produced using fuels (oil, for example) that are 
often traded on world markets and priced in US dollars (USD). We might therefore expect 
that electricity spot market prices depend on the exchange rate between the local currency 
and the USD, and on the oil price. This paper tests that hypothesis for a sample of EU 
countries between 2005-2007 and 2008-2011, i.e. before and after the contagion of the US 
subprime mortgage crisis on European markets. Five of our sample (France, Germany, Italy, 
The Netherlands and Spain) use the Euro (EUR), while the United Kingdom utilises the 
sterling pound (GBP), as exchange currency. 
Muñoz and Dickey (2009) have investigated the relationship between Spanish electricity spot 
prices, oil prices and the USD/EUR exchange rate during the period 2005-2007. They 
showed that these variables were co-integrated, implying the existence of a long-run 
equilibrium among them. A transmission of volatility from the USD/EUR exchange rate and 
oil prices to Spanish electricity prices was also observed, although the electricity price level 
remained unaffected. 
This field of research was initiated by Sadorsky (2000), who used co-integration procedures 
to study the interaction between prices for crude oil, heating oil and gasoline and a trade-
weighted index of exchange rates. Granger causality analysis found a long-run relationship 
between the energy prices and exchange rates, thereby providing evidence in favour of a 
transmission of exogenous exchange rate shocks to energy prices. 
We hypothesise that the volatility and levels of electricity prices in our sample of European 
countries can be significantly affected by oil prices and exchange rates towards the USD.  
Furthermore, we investigate whether volatility responds symmetrically to positive and 
negative oil and exchange rate shocks.  
The response of electricity prices to oil prices and exchange rates will depend on the fuel mix 
in each country, and on the way in which gas prices respond to changes in the oil price.  
Figure 1 shows these fuel mixes.  Because the price of electricity is linked to the marginal 
cost of production, some technologies with high average shares may rarely set the price – the 
obvious example of this is nuclear power, which has very low marginal costs.  In contrast, 
oil-fired stations are frequently reserved for peaking use, running relatively infrequently but 
almost always setting the price when they do, so that their share of price-setting is above their 
share of generation.  Natural gas and coal plants can also set electricity prices – in most of the 
countries in our sample, the fuel which is more expensive (per MWh of electricity it can 
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produce) is the one which will set the price more often.  Finally, we should note that while 
the fuel for hydroelectric generation (important in several of our countries) is free, stations 
would offer power to the market based on the opportunity cost of using their water now, 
rather than saving it for later use, and that opportunity cost is based on expected power prices 
(and hence fossil fuels).  We should also note that all of these countries trade power amongst 
themselves (European Commission Eurostat, Energy Production and Imports, 2012), and 
while prices in adjacent markets can differ when the transmission lines between them are 
congested, at other times, the price in, say, the Netherlands may actually be set by the 
marginal power station in France.   
The dependency of EU countries on energy imports from non-member countries is very large 
and increasing over time. However, even when a country is self-sufficient in a fuel, its price 
may still be set on world markets (as for oil) or sold at prices indexed to the oil price (as was 
the case for gas for many years).  In the 1990s, British generators had to pay more than the 
price of imported coal for large volumes of domestic output, but power prices were based on 
the cost of the imported coal that would compete for marginal supplies.  In contrast, gas 
prices in North West Europe (including the UK) have increasingly been set in national 
markets, based on national supply and demand, although obviously influenced by the cost of 
imports or potential value of exports – where capacity exists.   
In the present study we chose three European countries - which utilise greater amounts of 
nuclear, hydro and alternative sources for electricity production (France, Spain and Germany) 
- as being less sensitive to changes in crude oil prices and to the EUR/USD exchange rate, 
and compared them with three EU-27 countries which are more dependent on fossil fuels (the 
Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom), see Figure 1 (reported below). 
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Fig. 1 – Fuels used for electricity generation in Europe in 2010 (percentage shares). 
 
Crude oil prices and the exchange rate will feed through to the cost of oil-fired power 
generation in national currencies.  The exchange rate will also affect the cost of coal in 
national currencies, when this is traded in dollars.  Gas prices can depend on the oil price and 
the exchange rate in countries where they are still oil-indexed, such as Italy, which still 
imports much of its gas through pipelines with long-term oil- 
indexed contracts.  In countries with so-called “gas-on-gas” competition, these factors may 
have less impact – for example, the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported into Spain 
is linked to the price that LNG cargoes could obtain in other markets. 
We studied the volatility of electricity prices during two different time frames, the first 
corresponding to that studied by Muñoz and Dickey (2005), i.e. January 2005 - September 
2007, and the second following that period, i.e. from January 2008 - December 2011.  Our 
first period covers the end of the noughties boom; the second coincides with the subprime 
crisis and its aftermath. 
Our study examines the volatility of daily electricity price returns using two alternative 
classes of volatility models: the Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) and the Non-linear Asymmetric GARCH (NGARCH) models. GARCH models 
assume that a data series is normally distributed and that the volatility response to innovations 
in the market is symmetric. However, empirical evidence also applies to the present case, 
suggesting that positive and negative returns of equal magnitude may not generate the same 
response in volatility (Black, 1976; Nelson, 1991). The leverage effect, i.e. negative 
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correlations between returns and volatility, is often observed in financial time series. Some of 
these effects can be captured only by non-linear models. 
The main contribution of our study is to show that there is a transmission of volatility 
between both the exchange rate and oil prices, and electricity prices.  Furthermore, we have 
shown that the electricity price level is affected by changes in the exchange rate and the price 
of oil. 
The manuscript is organised as follows: data and preliminary statistical analyses are reported 
in section 2. Models and econometric methodology are provided in section 3. Section 4 
summarises the main findings. Section 5 discusses the findings in relation to previous studies 
reported in the literature and provides suggestions for further related research, before a brief 
conclusion (section 6). 
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2 Data 
Daily data relative to the price of the OPEC basket of crude oil, for weekdays covering the 
two time frames, January 3, 2005 - September 28, 2007 and January 2, 2008 - December 30, 
2011, were obtained from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) (source key: 
OILOPEC).  For the same periods, time series relative to spot prices (EUR/MWh or 
GBP/MWh) of wholesale electricity - for the following countries: France (Powernext), 
Germany (EEX), Italy (GME), The Netherlands (APX), Spain (OMEL), and the United 
Kingdom (APX UK) - and for the EUR/USD or GBP/USD exchange rates were obtained 
from Thomson Reuters. The electricity prices used in this study are the mean of hourly 
reference prices, or half-hourly in the case of the British market, APX UK. Five of our 
electricity price series are based on day-ahead auctions, whereas the data from APX UK are 
from continuous bilateral trading until shortly before real time. These prices are therefore 
formed at slightly different times from the oil prices we report; using several lagged variables 
in the regression will capture the potentially varying rate at which information feeds through 
to these prices. 
The choice of the two time frames depends on the intention to study two specific periods: the 
first being one previous to the subprime mortgage crisis, whilst the second time frame depicts 
the period during the crisis, which hit European countries after its origination in the United 
States. In fact, Kazi et al. (2011) estimated the break date of the contagion effect between US 
stock markets and those of sixteen OECD countries  due to the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis, by means of a single break (dynamic conditional correlation GARCH) model. They 
found it to be exactly the day of October 1
st
, 2007, which conveniently coincides with the end 
of Munoz and Dickey’s (2009) sample period.   
Descriptive statistics for the daily return series are shown in Table 1, below. 
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The mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera, Ljung–Box Q tests and 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics are reported. 
An examination of sample autocorrelations, partial autocorrelations, as well as formal unit 
root tests revealed that the data were non-stationary in levels. Given the stationarity 
requirements of the analysis, the log-returns of each single variable were computed 
(applicable to electricity prices, oil prices and exchange rates).   
Mean returns are quite small, but the corresponding standard deviations are larger, by an 
order of several magnitudes. The distributions of the electricity price returns demonstrate 
high positive skewness and high positive kurtosis, as shown by the highly significant Jarque-
Bera test. Positive skewness suggests significant asymmetric response to positive shocks, 
while the negative skewness values for the oil price returns suggest a greater probability of 
large decreases during the sample period.  
The high value of kurtosis statistics suggest that extreme price changes occur very frequently. 
The stationarity of the time series data was explored by using informal and formal approaches 
available in the econometrics literature including the autocorrelation functions and unit root 
tests, respectively. Finally, autocorrelation is not anymore present in the log-returns. 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests the null hypothesis that a time series yt is I(1) 
against the alternative that it is trend stationary I(0), assuming that the dynamics in the data 
have an ARMA structure. 
The ADF test clearly rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in the first differenced series 
without exception at the 1‰ significance level, suggesting that the electricity price returns 
are stationary. The Box-Pierce Q-statistics do not reject autocorrelations up to 20 orders in 
returns. The returns are thus serially autocorrelated and subject to time-varying volatility. 
The evolution of returns of the electricity prices are graphed in Figure 3A and Figure 3B for 
the time frames 2005-2007 and 2008-2011 respectively, with their shape suggesting that the 
time series display volatility and volatility clustering. 
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3 Empirical Models 
The distribution of electricity price returns is asymmetric, as shown by the highly positive 
skewness and leptokurtic values for all the examined countries.  Spanish and Italian 2008-
2011 electricity price data were corrected by removing outliers - identified as values 
exceeding by five standard deviations the autoregressive mean - and were replaced by 
polynomial interpolation. This follows Trück et al. (2007), who observed that the robustness 
of the findings can be improved by removing outliers from the data before applying a test. In 
particular, three points were removed and substituted within the Spanish time series and five 
points within the Italian one. 
Modelling electricity price returns and their volatility consists of two essential steps: the first 
involves the specification of the ARMA(p,q) model for mean returns, comprising specific 
diagnostic tests on the residuals, whilst the second relates to the specification of the GARCH 
(p,q) models for conditional volatility (followed by relative diagnostic tests). 
Seasonality is usually present in electricity price data. Therefore, we tried to capture it using 
two deterministic seasonal functions, a weekly and a monthly seasonality, by means of daily 
and monthly dummy variables in both the conditional mean and conditional variance. Indeed, 
the use of monthly variables did not improve and, in some cases, still worsened the 
performance of the model. Therefore, only the daily dummy variables were used. 
 
3.1 Conditional mean 
We assume that returns follow an AR(1) process with stochastic variance. In fact, the AR(1) 
model provides a better fit than the MA(1) model, given that it exhibits the lower standard 
deviation of the residual series. Furthermore, the residuals correlogram indicates that an 
MA(1) model does not provide a satisfactory fit, as the residual series is clearly not a realistic 
realisation of white noise. 
The model for the mean is reported below: 
𝑧𝑡 = η𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  
𝑘
𝑖=1
;   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑘                                       [𝐸𝑞. 1] 
Where z is the time series, the coefficient δ is the autoregressive parameter,η𝑡 = 𝜃 + λ𝜎
2and 
σ2 is defined in Eq. 2. 
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After testing the residual series of the model, a significant high order ARCH effect with 
respect to the time series studied was observed and, therefore, a generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedastic model (GARCH) was applied.  
 
3.2 Conditional variance 
In the Bollerslev(1986) GARCH(1,1) model, the equation describing the conditional variance 
is specified as follows: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                               [𝐸𝑞. 2] 
where the real valued parameters ω, α and β satisfy the conditions ω> 0, α ≥ 0 and  β ≥ 0 and 
(α + β) < 1. However, in many cases it was shown that the sum of the α and β parameter 
estimates is relatively close to unity and, therefore, the stationarity condition is violated. The 
estimate of β allows for an evaluation of the persistence of the shocks, with an absolute value 
of β<1 ensuring stationarity and ergodicity for the model.   Often, the β parameter estimate is 
too large and mistakenly shows an exaggerate volatility persistence.  
The GARCH model assumes the conditional variance is a linear function of the lagged 
squared returns. Therefore, one potential short-coming of the GARCH model is the 
assumption that 𝜎𝑡
2 symmetrically responds to news about volatility from the previous period. 
A special case and alternative of a non-linear GARCH (Higgins and Bera, 1992) is given by: 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾1𝐺1(𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                                          [𝐸𝑞. 3] 
where ω, α and β are as in Eq. 2,  |γ|≥0 and  G1:(0,∞)→[0,1] is an increasing function, similar 
to the cumulative distribution function of a positive continuous random variable. The 
function G1 can be used to allow for a smooth shift in the parameter ω, which determines the 
level of the conditional variance, 𝜎𝑡
2.When 𝜎𝑡−1
2  takes a small value the NGARCH model 
approaches the GARCH(1,1) model and the relation is symmetric. Since the G1 function is 
taken as continuous, the change in the level parameter is smooth, in contrast with the abrupt 
change which is observed in the threshold models. The introduction of this G1 function can 
remove the non-stationary behaviour of the conventional GARCH(1,1) model. 
In order to ensure a well-defined process, all the parameters of the infinite-order ARCH 
representation must be positive. When the γ-parameter, which reflects the leverage effect, is 
estimated to be positive, it implies that negative shocks have a greater impact on the 
conditional volatility compared to positive shocks. 
Both models were estimated by maximum likelihood. Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) 
information criteria were also used to compare the two models. Since information criteria 
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penalise models with additional parameters, the AIC and BIC criteria for model order 
selection are based on parsimony as well as goodness of fit. 
To capture the spillover of exchange rate and oil price return volatility into domestic 
electricity price return volatility, in addition to ARCH and GARCH terms, we embed 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity components into the standard GARCH model. Following 
Judge et al. (1985), the functional form of the multiplicative heteroscedasticity employed in 
this paper is exponential. The estimator of the variance of the error  is the expected value of 
the square of the errors 
𝜖2 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑥2𝑡                                                       [𝐸𝑞. 4] 
Eq. 4 can be easily estimated using OLS, and where 𝜖has a mean of 0and is independent of x 
by assumption. 
In Eq. 4, the coefficients 𝜑𝑖 denote the effect of external factors, namely exchange rate and 
oil price returns, on the electricity price volatility. One of the advantages of using the 
exponential function for conditional volatility is that it rules out the possibility of negative 
variance.  
The estimates of 𝜑1and 𝜑2capture the spillover of the external factor volatility into the 
conditional variance. and therefore, in our case, the effect of the exchange rate and oil price 
returns on the volatility of the domestic electricity price returns. 
The introduction of weekly dummy variables in the conditional variance resulted in the lack 
of identifiability of the GARCH models due to a flat likelihood surface that gave rise to 
numerical instabilities in the estimation of the parameters. Therefore, we avoided to study the 
effect of the weekly seasonality on the conditional variance. 
 
 
3.3 Sign and Value Expectations of Model Parameters 
For the oil price, for example, a 10% increase would lead to a 2% direct increase in power 
prices, if oil-fired power stations set the market price in 20% of the hours – assuming power 
prices are directly proportional to the cost of the marginal fuel.  If gas-fired stations set the 
price in another 40% of hours, and the price of gas is directly indexed to that of oil, we would 
get an overall effect of a 6% increase, and a coefficient of 0.6.  The coefficient would be 
lower if gas prices were only partially linked to those of oil.   
We measure the exchange rate in terms of EUR (or GBP) per USD.  This implies that an 
increase in our variable (which implies a depreciation of the EUR) will lead to an increase in 
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the price of electricity (as imported fuel becomes more expensive) and so the sign should also 
be positive.  A 10% depreciation of the exchange rate would lead to a 10% rise in the 
domestic oil price, all else being equal, which would feed through to a 2% increase in power 
prices, as above; however, the exchange rate would also affect the domestic cost of coal 
priced in dollars and so the coefficient might be greater than that for the oil price. 
The combined effect of fuel price and exchange rate should be additional in terms of ARCH-
in-mean. For  
example, if the oil price increases by 20% from $60/barrel to $72/barrel and meanwhile there 
is a 10% depreciation of the EUR against the USD (from EUR 1 per USD to EUR 1.1 per 
USD), then the local cost of the oil per barrel would be €79.20 instead of €60, which 
corresponds to an overall price increase of 32%.  
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4 Results 
The time courses of the European electricity spot prices for the time frames 2005-2007 and 
2008-2011 are reported in Figures 2A and 2B (see paper Appendix), respectively. The natural 
log of the daily electricity spot price returns for the time period 2005-2007 are depicted in 
Figure 3A, while those referred to the interval 2008-2011 are shown in Figure 3B (see 
Appendix). 
Tables 2A and 3A present the estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values for the 
conditional mean equations of AR-GARCH and AR-NGARCH models, along with the log 
likelihood, AIC and BIC and Q-test, for the two periods of time under inspection (2005-2007 
and 2008-2011, respectively). Similarly, the results relative to each of the two GARCH 
specifications are reported in Tables 2B (time frame 2005-2007) and 3B (2008-2011). Tables 
2A and 3A (below) report the results from fitting the two GARCH specifications. In all 
models, the lags of the dependent variables are included as exogenous variables for the 
underlying equations. 
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As shown in Tables 2B and 3B, the volatility of the exchange rates and oil price returns 
significantly affects domestic electricity price return volatility and, in some cases, also its 
mean (see Tables 2A and 3A).  In the first period, the positive sign and significant t-statistic 
for the coefficient on the exchange rate, within the mean equation for the Italian case, 
indicates that the appreciation of the EUR against the USD leads to a lower electricity price 
in that country, as expected.  In contrast, there is a statistically significant, and anomalous, 
negative correlation between the level of the oil price and electricity prices in The 
Netherlands.  The contribution of natural gas in electricity production is quickly growing in 
The Netherlands and in 2009 represented about 60% of its total production. In order to fulfill 
the Kyoto Protocol commitments, the use of natural gas is growing within the country while 
the share of coal-fired electricity production is progressively decreasing; in fact, coal 
contribution accounted for a large 40% of total electricity generation in 1990 and decreased 
to 25% in 2009. 
The Netherlands is the largest gas producer in Europe (National report on the Dutch Energy 
Regime, 2008) and over 60% of electricity is from gas‐fired generation. It is likely that a 
depreciation of the USD against the Euro could increase the utilisation of domestic natural 
gas with a subsequent reduction of gas imports, thus explaining the negative sign.  
Daily electricity prices are characterized by clear seasonal patterns associated with time 
intervals, such as the day of the week or the month. Seasonality in prices is due to the 
dependence of electricity demand on weather conditions as well as on social and economic 
activities, with consequent different holiday and seasonal effects. The relevance of 
periodicity is acknowledged for instance by Wilkinson and Winsen (2002) and Hernáez et al. 
(2004) who show that the pattern of prices varies across day-types. For instance, the Monday 
effect refers to the well-known tendency for stock prices to fall on Mondays, and a similar 
behaviour is also present in the electricity spot prices. The daily periodicity positively affects 
the electricity price returns in all the examined markets with the exception of Spain both in 
the first and second time frame. In contrast, in the Spanish case we observed a negative effect 
of Wednesday and Thursday on the electricity prices.  
The ARCH-M test shows that the volatility of electricity prices affected their level only in 
Italy in the first period. The conditional variance is significantly influenced by the EUR/USD 
exchange rate returns for Spain - in agreement with the findings of Muñoz and Dickey (2005) 
in spite of the different methodological approach used - by the oil price returns for both 
Germany and UK and by both exchange rate and oil price returns for Italy and The 
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Netherlands, although the magnitude of the effect, i.e. the spillover, is different among the 
countries.  
If we consider the second time frame, i.e. the period 2008-2011 (Table 3A),  the level of 
electricity prices is not affected by the level of the exchange rate for all countries, except the 
UK. The level of the oil price has a statistically significant effect for Italy.  For France and 
Spain, the t-statistics resulting from the one-period lagged ARCH-M test are significant for 
both GARCH models, indicating that there is statistical evidence implying the conditional 
variance affects the conditional mean in those countries (alone). 
Instead, as far as the conditional variance is concerned, the ARCH (α) and GARCH (β) 
parameters are positive and significant in both models, indicating the presence of ARCH and 
GARCH effects in the conditional variance equations. The highest own-innovation or ARCH 
spillovers(𝛼) are observed for Germany and Spain, indicating the presence of strong ARCH 
effects. The lagged volatility or GARCH spillovers (𝛽) are also significant for all countries, 
but larger in magnitude for Italy and UK. In addition, the GARCH parameters for the Spanish 
electricity market exceed unity implying that the model is not stationary for the presence of a 
unit root in the conditional variance; past shocks do not dissipate but persist for very long 
periods of time. 
The GARCH model assumes that the conditional variance is governed by a linear 
autoregressive process of past squared returns and variances. Although this model is able to 
capture heteroscedasticity and volatility clustering, excess kurtosis with fat tails and the 
leverage effect of conditional distribution cannot be described by the classical GARCH 
model. Accordingly, in the present study the log likelihood, AIC and BIC criteria provide 
evidence that augmenting the GARCH model with leverage terms enhances the model’s 
performance. In fact, the sum of the NGARCH parameters α, β and γ is always lower than 
one, indicating model goodness. 
The parameter for the asymmetric volatility response (γ) is negative and significant for all the 
examined countries, representative of an asymmetric response to positive innovations in the 
conditional variance equation. This result is generally consistent with the skewness values 
reported in Table 1 and reflects the conditions that electricity price volatility tends to rise in 
response to positive spikes. 
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5 Discussion 
In the time period 2005-2007, the effect of exchange rate returns volatility on electricity price 
return volatility was significant only for Italy, The Netherlands and Spain, but became 
significant for all the examined countries within the time frame 2008-2011. This increased 
volatility transmission may reflect the greater correlation between a wide variety of markets 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis contagion.  There was also more volatility to 
transmit: the coefficient of variation of the daily EUR/USD exchange rate rose by a third 
between the two periods, while that for the GBP/USD rate doubled. 
Exchange rate log-returns only had a statistically significant effect on the Italian electricity 
price level in the first period.  In the second period, we find significant coefficients for France 
and for The Netherlands.  This divergence is surprising, given the strong process of price 
convergence which has been observed among the electricity markets of The Netherlands, 
Germany and France (see Bijkgraaf and Jansen, 2007).  
For Italy, Netherlands and Spain, at least within the period 2005-2007, oil price return 
volatility significantly affected the volatility of electricity prices. This is not surprising given 
the importance of fossil fuels in European electricity production, as shown in Figure 1. 
The better performance of the NGARCH- over the GARCH-model indicates that the effect of 
exchange rates and oil prices on electricity price volatility is asymmetric. The negative 
asymmetry parameter can be interpreted as an inverse leverage effect (Knittel and Roberts 
2005 and Janczura and Weron 2010), implying that exchange rate and oil price increases 
have a clear negative impact on electricity price volatility while exchange rate and oil price 
decreases do not significantly affect the electricity price. 
A volatile environment weakens the effect on price level changes since it reduces the 
surprise.  While there is no literature regarding the asymmetric effects of the EUR exchange 
rate against the USD, the presence of asymmetric effects of oil prices on electricity price 
volatility was previously described by Hadsellet al. (2004) and Higgs and Worthington 
(2005). 
It is interesting to note that, in spite of the different methods used to measure the electricity 
price volatility,  
our study exhibits a similar outcome for the Spanish electricity price volatility to that 
previously shown by Muñoz and Dickey (2005), i.e. the volatility of Spanish electricity spot 
prices was affected by the EUR/USD exchange rate. In relation to the different approaches, 
while we used GARCH models to assess the conditional variance and the conditional mean of 
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electricity price returns, Muñoz and Dickey (2005) defined the current time volatility as the 
squared difference of present and one-period lagged electricity prices, to then apply a vector 
error correction model. 
The few other studies reported in the literature regarding the effect of oil prices and/or 
exchange rates on electricity price volatility reach differing results. Mohammadi (2009) did 
not find a long-term relationship between oil and US electricity prices. In contrast, Narayan et 
al. (2008) observed that previous values of oil price and USD/EUR exchange rates affect the 
evolution of future values of the exchange rate, both in terms of levels and volatility. 
Future studies including a larger number of countries where there is a working electricity spot 
market to set the price, such as those in Latin America, Australia and New Zealand, might 
help to clarify the role of these or other countries’ currencies exchange rate against the USD 
and that of the oil price in the conditional variance and the conditional mean of the electricity 
price.  
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6 Conclusions 
The present study investigates the effect of daily exchange rate returns and crude oil spot 
price returns on the electricity spot price return for a sample of European countries. The EU 
countries investigated were selected on the basis of their national currency (EUR/USD or 
GBP/USD) and their dependency on fossil fuels for electricity production, with France, Spain 
and Germany using more nuclear, hydro and alternative sources than UK, the Netherlands 
and Italy. Furthermore, Spain was also chosen in order to provide terms of comparison with 
the results reported in Muñoz and Dickey (2005).  
We show that there is in many cases a transmission of volatility between both the exchange 
rate and the oil price returns towards the price return of wholesale electricity and that, for 
some countries, the level of the electricity price return is also affected by changes in the 
exchange rate and oil price returns. The effects become greater for all the countries studied in 
the time frame 2008-2011, likely as a consequence of the economic crisis that struck the 
Eurozone after contagion derived from the US subprime mortgage crisis. 
A volatile wholesale price that will be passed through to electricity consumers implies 
significant risks to their bills.  It is also unattractive to most low-carbon generators whose 
costs are not linked to fossil fuel prices.  Ensuring that payments to these generators are 
largely de-linked from the overall level of power prices (as with Feed-in-Tariffs or the UK 
government’s proposed Electricity Market Reform) would reduce risks for generators and 
consumers alike. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 2A – Behaviour of the six European electricity spot prices within the first period, i.e. 
January 2005 - September 2007. 
 
 
Figure 2B  – Behaviour of the six European electricity spot prices within the second period, 
i.e. January 2008 - December 2011. 
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Figure 3A – Daily data of electricity price returns covering January 2, 2005 - September 20, 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B – Daily data of electricity price returns covering January 2, 2008 - December 30, 
2011. 
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An Assessment of ETS Phase II 
 
Giorgio Castagneto-Gissey
*
 
 
This paper studies the interactions between electricity and carbon allowance prices in the 
year-ahead energy markets of France, Germany, United Kingdom and Nord Pool, during 
Phase II of the EU ETS. VAR and Granger-causality methods are used to analyse causal 
interfaces, whereas the volatility of electricity prices is studied with basic and asymmetric 
AR-GARCH models. Among the main results, the marginal rate at which carbon prices feed 
into electricity prices is shown to be ca. 135% in the EEX and Nord Pool markets, where 
electricity and carbon prices display bidirectional causality. Therefore, generators 
internalized the cost of freely allotted emission allowances into their electricity prices 
considerably more than the proportionate increase in costs justified by effective carbon 
intensity. Moreover, electricity prices in France and the United Kingdom are found to 
Granger-cause the carbon price, even though there is no good economic explanation for this. 
This study also shows how European electricity prices are deeply linked to coal prices among 
other factors, both in terms of levels and volatility, regardless of the underlying fuel mix. EU 
policies aimed at increasing the carbon price are likely to be crucial in limiting the 
externalities involved in the transition to a low-carbon system. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the establishment of the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), carbon 
prices represent a major cost for EU electricity producers. As such, the carbon price should 
feed into the marginal cost of electricity and hence, the power price. Traditional economic 
theory suggests that the rate at which additional costs feed into product prices is greater, or 
less, than 100 percent when the underlying market is imperfectly competitive. For instance, 
Bonacina and Gulli (2007) found that carbon prices are fully incorporated in power prices 
when the electricity market is, conversely, perfectly competitive. However, it is not clear to 
what extent carbon costs are passed through to electricity prices in practice. Various studies 
have reported the “pass-through” rate of carbon prices into electricity prices in Europe. Sijm 
et al. (2006), for example, conclude that pass-through rates generally varied from 40 to 100 
percent during Phase I. Others, such as Bunn and Fezzi (2008) found pass-through rates to be 
as low as 42 percent. On the other hand, Fell et al. (2013) found that carbon costs are fully 
passed through in most countries, perhaps by even more than 100 percent. 
This paper investigates the extent by which EU electricity generators internalized the 
marginal costs of carbon emissions into their electricity prices during Phase II of the EU ETS. 
We look into this question by analyzing four of the major EU markets, namely those of: 
Germany, France, United Kingdom and the Nordic countries. This work also studies the 
influence of fuel prices on the dynamics of electricity forward price levels and volatility. 
It is expected that, in many sectors, businesses will pass on their extra carbon costs through to 
consumers, thus earning net profits as a result of the impact on product prices combined with 
the extensive free allocations of emission allowances (Smale et al., 2006). 
In fact, a major characteristic of the pilot phase of the EU ETS was that almost all emission 
allowances were allocated for free to the installations covered by the scheme. The over-
allocation of free emission permits during Phase I of the EU ETS, starting from 2005, was the 
cause of severe market distortions. During the first phase of the EU ETS (2005-2007), more 
than 2.2 billion allowances of 1 tonne each were allocated each year. At average current 
market prices for 2005, this represented a social value of approximately EUR 40 billion p.a., 
ca. 60% of which was allocated to the power sector (Sijm et al., 2006). 
The generous rounds of free allocation, which continued until the end of Phase II (i.e. until 
2012) provided windfall profits for EU power generators and resulted in the carbon market 
crashing in Phase I. In addition, the general economic outlook in Europe, originating from the 
2008 US subprime crisis, resulted in the carbon market crashing once again in Phase II. This 
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resulted in an extremely low carbon price and proved to be detrimental to the incentives for 
producers to abandon carbon intensive generation.  
Since 2008, an increasing number of studies have focused on the analysis of the EU ETS. 
Studies such as Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) and Chevallier (2009) focused on 
the drivers of electricity and carbon prices, respectively. Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 
(2010) were the first to analyse the interplay between energy prices during Phase I. They also 
considered the first of five years of Phase II, in the context of the French Powernext, albeit 
that market alone. However, as Phase I is widely considered a ‘learning’ Phase, given the 
excessive over-allocation of free permits, and Phase III was only recently launched (in 
January 2013), Phase II (2008-2012) currently remains the only complete and potentially 
informative period available to us in the examination of the interactions between electricity 
and carbon prices within European markets. 
Since the launch of the EU ETS, the interactions between electricity and carbon prices have 
been source of thorough debates. It is not clear whether the rate at which carbon prices feed 
into the electricity prices of EU markets reflects the perfectly competitive market structure 
advocated by the EU Commission. In addition, there is a lack of studies analyzing the causal 
relationship between carbon and electricity prices during the full length of Phase II whilst 
comparing the main electricity markets in Europe. 
This paper aims at: (i) defining the causal interface between carbon and electricity prices in 
four of the major European electricity markets, (ii) inferring whether price setting in these 
markets represents the competitive practice of EU electricity generators and (iii) providing an 
analysis of the impact of fuel prices on European electricity prices and their volatility, during 
Phase II of the EU ETS. 
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows: the next section introduces the main 
concepts related to this study, describes the market data used and outlines the main 
methodologies of this study. Section 3 reports the main results, whereas section 4 discusses 
them and compares the four European markets under study. Finally, Section 5 summarizes 
the main findings and policy implications, thereby concluding the paper. 
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2 Methods 
Section 2.1 provides the relevant background in the form of a review of the studied electricity 
markets (section 2.1.1), a description of the relevant theories (section 2.1.2) and an analysis 
of the data (section 2.2). Section 2.3 finally introduces the main econometric methods 
employed in this study, i.e. VAR-based analysis, Granger-causality and the AR-GARCH 
model, used to study the volatility interactions between our variables and the different 
electricity prices. 
 
2.1 Background 
This section briefly introduces the markets under study and the theories related to the causal 
relationships between carbon and electricity prices. 
 
2.1.1 European Electricity Markets 
Fig.1 depicts electricity generation by fuel for each of the studied markets. 
 
Fig.1 – The selected countries’ electricity generation fuel mix (2011). Data sources: World 
Bank (Germany, France and United Kingdom shares) and ENTSOE-Memo (Nord Pool 
shares). 
 
Germany mainly uses coal and lignite (46%), and some natural gas (14%). France, instead, 
generates electricity mostly using nuclear power (79%), but employs small quantities of coal 
(4%) and natural gas (4%). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, is largely based on 
natural gas (40%) and coal-fired generation (30%) (World Bank, 2012). Finally, the Nord 
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Pool market is mainly dependent on hydro (53%) and nuclear power (21%) for baseload 
electricity generation, as well as some fossil fuels (15%) designed to serve peaking demand 
(Entsoe Memo, 2011). 
The EU carbon scheme is subdivided in different trading periods. This paper relates to Phase 
II of the EU ETS carbon market (2008-12). Phase II saw a sharp reduction in the number of 
issued permits and represented a step towards the abolition of free allocation in favor of 
auctioning, which occurred from Phase III forward. Fig.2 shows the behavior of the carbon 
year-ahead price during Phase II. 
 
 
Fig.2 – The behavior of the EU ETS Phase II carbon forward price (2008-12). 
 
The Phase II carbon forward price rose over EUR 25 per metric ton of carbon dioxide during 
the first half of 2008, almost reaching 30 EUR/MT. Carbon prices then crashed from July 
2008, from a high of 28 EUR/MT to about 8 EUR/MT in February 2009, or a drop of about 
72% in just over 7 months. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) gave two main reasons for this substantial fall: reduced output in energy 
intensive sectors due to the economic recession
48
 and the fact that the European markets’ 
perception of future fuel prices was revised downwards (UNFCCC, 2009), as shown by the 
behavior of the gas year-ahead prices
49
. 
 
 
                                                          
48
 This implies that a lower extent to abatement is required to meet the cap, thereby providing a decrease in the 
carbon price.  
49
 Appendix C shows the behavior of the gas and coal one-year forward price levels. Please refer to Appendix B 
(Figs. B1-B4) for the energy forward price levels behavior in each of the 4 markets. 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 297 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical Background and Previous Work 
The long-run cost abatement, or “pass-through”, effect relates to the percentage of the carbon 
price which is passed-through to the electricity price, representing a causal effect running 
from the carbon price to the electricity price. A fully competitive electricity market is 
expected to deliver a pass-through rate of 100%, which is the case with internalization of any 
costs incurred in the competitive generation process. 
Since the start of Phase I, there have been large debates in relation to the applicability and 
empirical findings of the pass-through theory. This was primarily due to the fact that power 
producers were experiencing large abnormal profits due to the free allocation of emission 
allowances. In the case of the German electricity market, econometric simulations by Sijm et 
al. (2005, 2006) found a pass-through rate on the EEX electricity price of about 80%. Other 
markets exhibited a slightly lighter effect, though still at a minimum of 60%. Empirical 
support for this measure was provided in various studies, however most of these considered 
Phase I. Bunn and Fezzi (2009) were the first to address this issue by using equilibrium 
models, thereby finding evidence of a positive carbon price pass-through effect for the United  
Kingdom. Fell (2010) similarly reported this relationship in relation to the Nordic countries. 
On the other hand, by using gas as an explanatory variable in a VECM for Germany, 
Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) provided evidence of an asymmetric pass-through 
effect, implying that rising carbon prices had a larger magnitude of effect on the electricity 
price compared to falling prices. 
Whereas the pass-through theory relates to the effect of the carbon price on the electricity 
price, the inverse situation happens in the short-run, when carbon abatements cannot be 
performed, aside from the important potential of running gas instead of coal-fired stations, 
and entails the power producers increasing their output by using more carbon allowances. 
Some authors have reported the causal link directed from the electricity price toward the 
carbon price. For example, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) show how the electricity 
price directly and significantly impacts on the carbon price in Phase II (although, only one 
year of data was employed). Moreover, Nazifi and Milunovich (2010) isolate the influence of 
the Nord Pool electricity price on the carbon price using a VAR model for Phase I. However, 
Phase II is not analysed in this study. Some of these authors refer to the causal link running 
from the electricity price to the carbon price as proof of the so-called ‘short-term rent capture 
theory’. This theory refers to the scenario in which selling allowances on the carbon market 
results in an opportunity cost for electricity generators with a degree of market power. As the 
author notes, in avoiding producing in order to sell allowances, these producers give up their 
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electricity market rent. Thus selling allowances also entails an opportunity cost which may be 
passed through to the carbon price (Convery et al., 2008; Ellerman, 2010). Supporters of this 
theory suggest how the allocation of free permits affects generators’ cost curves in different 
ways. Most importantly, it does not affect average costs at the level of output compatible with 
free allocation. Given the absence of an increase in average costs and the increased marginal 
costs of production, this scenario implies an increase in the levels of profits by electricity 
producers, at each level of output, thereby increasing total profits (Keppler and Cruciani, 
2010)
50
. This is depicted in Fig.3 which shows how monopolistic profits increase due to free 
permit allocation. 
 
Fig.3 -An increase in marginal costs implies higher monopolistic profits deriving from free 
permit allocations. Q’ is the output level corresponding to free allocation. AC is average cost, 
MC is marginal cost, D is demand and MR is marginal revenue. 
 
The fact that the average cost curve fails to increase by the right amount, in proportion to the 
marginal cost rise, implies a larger amount of profit to be gained by the electricity producer. 
The increase in profits is given by the difference between the two areas (P’,D,AC’,c’)-
(P,D,AC,c)>0. In this situation, the electricity output has decreased from Q to Q’ whereas the 
price level has increased from P to P’. However, as can be seen from Fig.3, there is reason to 
believe that the change in profits can be small
51
. Thus, in this paper we will refer to the causal 
link directed from the electricity price to the carbon price as a purely statistical relation. 
 
                                                          
50
 However, this may only occur if power prices rise with marginal costs. 
51
 The increase in profits is small if we consider a simple model with the demand, average costs, marginal costs 
and marginal revenue curves assumed to behave according to standard shapes, as those shown in Fig.3. In 
addition, there is no substantial and widely accepted proof, or theoretical reason to believe that national 
electricity prices can considerably affect the European price of carbon. 
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2.2 Data Analysis 
This section introduces the time series and analyses their stationarity properties. It then 
describes the main econometric techniques employed in this study, i.e. Vector autoregression 
and Granger-causality. Finally, the GARCH models, used to analyse the volatility 
interactions between the energy price and electricity prices, are introduced. 
 
2.2.1 Data Choice and Description 
We consider the forward power market, specifically the year-ahead market where, for 
example, electricity delivered in 2014 is traded during every weekday of the year 2013. The 
data runs from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012 (ie, 1,304 datapoints), covering the full 
length of EU ETS Phase II. All data were obtained from Bloomberg and transformed in 
EUR/MWh, except for the carbon price, which is kept in EUR/metric ton of CO2, in order to 
take into account the carbon intensity of the different generation units (such as coal and gas, 
which possess different carbon contents). The choice of considering year-ahead markets 
relates to the fact that spot, or day-ahead, prices are contaminated by demand changes on a 
daily basis that long-period forward prices are hardly affected by. 
Daily data relative to gas, coal and carbon one-year forward prices were selected to explain 
the electricity prices of the four major European markets, namely those of: the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX, Germany), Powernext (France), APX UK (United Kingdom) and 
Nord Pool (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark; specifically, we use the system price). Fig.4 
reports the time courses relative to the one-year forward prices of electricity for the four 
considered markets. 
 
Fig.4 – The behavior of the 4 electricity forward prices during EU ETS Phase II (2008-12), 
i.e. Germany, France, UK and Nord Pool 
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The highest electricity prices (in EUR) between 2008 and 2012 are generally those in the 
United Kingdom (on average, ca. 62 EUR/MWh), followed by French prices (57 
EUR/MWh). Electricity prices in Germany (55 EUR/MWh) are slightly lower than those in 
France, whereas the lowest prices are those prevailing in the Nord Pool market, at around 44 
EUR/MWh. The natural gas forward price data are from three of the major European natural 
gas trading hubs; i.e. Bunde (situated in Bunde/Oude at the Dutch-German border, EEX), the 
Title Transfer Facility (TTF, or the Dutch hub) and the National Balancing Point (NBP, the 
British hub). The Dutch forward price is used in the model for France, whereas the NBP price 
is used in that for the United Kingdom
52
. In the models for Germany and Nord Pool the 
Bunde gas price is employed, given that Norway, a major gas supplier, exports its gas mainly 
to Germany. By coal, we refer to the internationally traded commodity classified as coal CIF 
AP#2, or the first-year Generic CIF ARA steam coal price
53
, delivered to the Dutch ARA 
region, which represents a European coal price benchmark.  
 
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section reports the main descriptive statistics of the raw data relative to the considered 
variables. The next section examines the data’s stationarity properties, ensuring the 
applicability of the data for the econometric analyses introduced in section 2.3. Table 1 
reports the mean values, standard deviations and ranges of the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52
 Note that some data have been reported in more than one figure: for instance, the electricity forward price 
levels for France, Germany, UK and Nord Pool are reported together in Fig.4 to show the similarities between 
their behaviors. They are also individually reported in Figs. B1-B4, along with the relative fuel prices and 
carbon prices in order to exhibit the relationship between electricity, fuel and carbon prices, in each market. 
53
 Coal prices are cost, insurance and freight inclusive. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of carbon, electricity, gas, coal and stock index 
prices. 
 
The highest forward prices (Nord Pool and United Kingdom) also present the highest 
variances. Table 2, shown above, depicts the values of skewness and kurtosis relative to the 
distribution of the studied time series. The JB tests are also reported. 
 
Price Skewness Kurtosis Prob(JB) 
Carbon 0.261 0.585 <0.0001 
UK electricity 1.240 1.235 <0.0001 
DE electricity 1.663 2.346 <0.0001 
FR electricity 1.936 3.048 <0.0001 
NO electricity 0.83 0.26 <0.0001 
UK gas 0.369 0.744 <0.0001 
DE gas 0.537 0.628 <0.0001 
FR gas 0.503 0.505 <0.0001 
NO gas 0.537 0.628 <0.0001 
Coal 0.822 1.269 0.0004 
FTSE Index -0.64 -0.11 <0.0001 
DAX Index -0.56 -0.39 <0.0001 
CAC Index 0.79 0.43 <0.0001 
OBX Index -0.78 -0.28 <0.0001 
 
Table 2 Skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque–Bera test results. 
As shown in Table 2, none of the variables have a normal distribution
54
. In particular, the 
French electricity price presents positive leptokurtosis. Platykurtic distributions are instead 
observed for all other prices. In addition, all stock indexes besides the French CAC, which is 
skewed rightwards, are skewed to the left, whereas all energy prices are skewed to the right. 
All JB tests identify the statistical significance of results at the 5% level (alpha<1.96). 
                                                          
54
 See Appendix Figs.D1-4 for an illustration of the time series’ behaviors in terms of first differences. 
Price Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Carbon 14.08 5.30 5.72 29.33 
UK electricity 62.21 13.83 40.15 108.45 
DE electricity 54.91 9.25 42.60 90.70 
FR electricity 56.90 10.06 43.85 93.45 
NO electricity 44.17 7.81 27.60 69.75 
UK gas 20.59 6.20 7.17 36.79 
DE gas 24.51 5.71 12.00 42.48 
FR gas 24.19 5.74 11.75 42.20 
NO gas 24.51 5.71 12.00 42.48 
Coal 11.39 2.24 7.60 19.72 
FTSE Index 6,378.08 900.24 3,872.26 8,523.71 
DAX Index 6,169.17 899.13 3,666.41 7,849.99 
CAC Index 3,671.07 546.90 2,519.29 5,495.67 
OBX Index 427.08 100.35 178.73 587.51 
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2.2.3 Stationarity tests 
Table A1 (Appendix A) shows the mean values, standard deviations and ranges relative to the 
first differences of electricity, carbon, coal and gas year-ahead prices and stock indexes. The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Peron tests (PP) were used to check the 
stationarity properties of the data. To check for the presence of a unit root we test the null 
hypothesis that the difference is assumed to be stationary, against the alternative that the 
trend is a non-stationary process. Under the null hypothesis, the autoregressive polynomial of  
the underlying time series series has a root equal to 1. The results of the stationarity tests on 
the level and differenced series are reported in Table A2 and A3, respectively. Estimation by 
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC, BIC) suggested the selection of one lag. If 
the ADF statistics was less than -2.87, the null hypothesis was rejected. The raw data 
appeared to exhibit non-stationary behavior, as the performed ADF tests were greater than          
-2.87, whereas stationarity was achieved after first differencing. The results summarized in 
Tables A2 and A3 indicate that the first differences of the variables tested are stationary and 
integrated of first-order, thus they are I(1). Johansen’s maximum likelihood procedure can be 
used to examine the possible existence of cointegration between the variables examined. The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration was not rejected and the first difference or innovations of 
the variables can be used to test for Granger-causality. 
 
2.3 Econometric models 
2.3.1 VAR-based Granger-causality analysis 
A VAR model is used as the benchmark for the Granger-causality analysis, which will 
determine the direction of causation between our variables. The pass-through rates of carbon 
prices into electricity prices, depending on the existence of such relationship, will be 
established by the respective GARCH conditional mean model parameters and the effective 
carbon intensity of the units on margin, as described in section 4.3. The VAR modeling 
approach, introduced by Sims (1980), often provides an accurate representation of the 
dynamic behavior of a system of variables. However, its main drawback entails the economic 
interpretability of its parameter estimates. The VAR coefficients only represent reduced form 
model parameters because the instantaneous interactions of the endogenous variables are not 
explicitly modeled but are included in the covariance matrix of the residuals (see Cooley and 
Le Roy, 1985 and Bunn and Fezzi, 2008). The VAR(p) equation is expressed as: 
𝑦𝑡=𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵0𝑥𝑡+𝜀𝑡                                                     [Eq. 1] 
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where, for each market considered, yt is K x1 vector of endogenous variables (in this case the 
electricity price) and xt is M x 1 vector of exogenous variables (in this case containing coal, 
natural gas and carbon prices and the stock index), A is a K x Kp matrix of coefficients and B0 
is a K x M matrix  of  coefficients, Yt is the Kp x 1 vector given by 𝑌𝑡 = (
𝑦𝑡
⋮
𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1
) and εt is a 
vector of innovations which can be simultaneously correlated but which are uncorrelated with 
their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all variables on the right hand side of Eq.1. 
The Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) information criteria were used to determine 
the most appropriate lag lengths of the model. The conditional maximum likelihood estimator 
is used as estimator for the coefficient matrix and is consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
The latter involves employing the Kronecker product as well as the vectorization of the 
matrix containing the endogenous variables. 
Granger causality (Granger, 1969) describes the dependency relationships between two time 
series and is then used to reveal the causal relationships between the variables under study. 
According to this test, if two series {𝑋𝑡} and {𝑌𝑡}  are strictly stationary, {𝑌𝑡} Granger-causes 
{𝑋𝑡} if past and current values of Y embody further information regarding the future values of 
X. In fact, supposing that FX,t and FY,t denote the relevant information set of past values of 
both Xt and Yt, at time t, {Yt} is said to Granger-cause {Xt} if the following condition is 
satisfied: 
(𝑌𝑡+1, … , 𝑌𝑡+𝑘) |(𝐹𝑋,𝑡, 𝐹𝑌,𝑡)~ (𝑌𝑡+1, … , 𝑌𝑡+𝑘) | 𝐹𝑋,𝑡                            [Eq. 2] 
where ‘~’ denotes distribution equivalence. Supposing that 𝑋𝑡
𝑙𝑋= (𝑋𝑡−ℓX+1,…, Xt) and that 
𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑌= (𝑌𝑡−ℓY+1,…, Yt) represent the lag-vectors, where ℓX, ℓY ≥ 1, the null-hypothesis states 
that realized values of𝑋𝑡
𝑙𝑋  embed further evidence on Yt + 1, beyond that present in𝑌𝑡
𝑙𝑌 
(Karagianni et al., 2009). 
 
2.3.2 GARCH models 
The previous analysis of skewness and kurtosis (see Table 2) suggests that the distributions of 
the first differences of the electricity prices are asymmetric. All outliers – identified as values 
exceeding by five standard deviations the autoregressive mean – were removed and replaced 
by polynomial interpolation, following Trück et al. (2007). The electricity price series are 
adequate for an investigation using heteroscedastic volatility models given that their first 
differences are serially autocorrelated and display time-varying volatility. In addition, 
inspection of the differenced prices (see Appendix Figs. D1-4) also shows how the series 
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exhibit the property of volatility clustering. The possibility of transforming the series into 
natural logs was abandoned given that it would have implied a reduction of the volatility 
magnitude observed in the electricity prices, thereby potentially disguising the explored 
statistical links (see Karakatsani and Bunn, 2008). Seasonality is typically an important issue 
to be considered when analyzing electricity price data. However, we didn’t expect year-ahead 
seasonality but checked it through the use of Boolean indicators; however, no seasonality was 
detected. 
We empirically formulate the following specification for the conditional mean model, applied 
to explain the first differences of electricity prices, 𝑦𝑡, as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                              [Eq. 3] 
where Xt is (𝑖)ℎ?̂?. The GARCH process (Bollerslev, 1986) is represented by: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1
𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
ℎ𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑦𝑡                                    [Eq. 4] 
where yt is a vector with one-period lagged exogenous variables (i.e. carbon, gas and coal 
future prices and stock market index) that explains the time varying variance process ht  
The model assumes that 𝜃 >0, α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0, as well as (α + β) < 1. The sum of the 
estimates for α and β is, in many cases, considerably close to one, thereby violating the 
condition for stationarity. The estimated value of β enables for an assessment of the 
persistence of shocks; in fact, an absolute value of β<1 ensures the convenient properties of 
stationarity and ergodicity for our model. Finally, the GARCH model assumes that h 
responds in a symmetric fashion to the innovations to one-period lagged volatility; different 
specifications of the GARCH model are fitted to the data and the most parsimonious model is 
selected. In fact, we will use the simple asymmetric ARCH (SAARCH) model by Engle 
(1990) for one of the four countries examined (United Kingdom). The SAARCH model 
basically adds the γ term that makes the GARCH model respond asymmetrically to positive 
and negative shocks. 
 
2.3.3 A Priori Evaluation of Model Parameters 
Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly intensive in coal- and gas-fired electricity 
production, as indicated by their generation fuel mix (see Fig.1). Therefore, their models are 
expected to yield the largest coefficients for the relationship between electricity prices and 
both the coal and natural gas prices. France, on the other hand, uses tiny fractions of coal and 
gas (both about 4%) in producing electricity, instead largely based on nuclear power. The 
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same applies to the Nord Pool market, which only uses about 15% of fossil fuel generation. 
Thus, we would expect gas and coal prices to have a relatively small impact on the electricity 
prices of Nord Pool and Powernext. However, it should be noted that countries such as those 
comprising the Nord Pool market can also be reliant on coal prices for baseload generation as 
coal represents the opportunity cost of current hydro generation. However, local prices may 
also be set by the electricity imports from neighboring countries as well as by the opportunity 
cost of not exporting. The above hypotheses are also expected to be qualitatively valid in the 
conditional variance models, although it is possible for results to be larger in relative 
magnitude in terms of volatility. 
 
2.3.4 Calculation of Pass-through rates 
The cost pass-through rate (PTR) of the carbon price into electricity prices is calculated as the 
GARCH conditional mean coefficient, or the derivative of the electricity price with respect to 
the carbon price (𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛), divided by the ‘theoretical’ value of the carbon cost (TCC): 
PTR =
𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛
TCC
                                                                [Eq. 5] 
The theoretical carbon cost (TCC), or the effective carbon intensity of coal and gas-fired 
generation, is given by the sum of the carbon intensities of gas- (0.35) and coal-fired 
generation (0.9) times their average shares in electricity generation at the margin, as: 
TCC = 0.9𝜁𝐶 + 0.35𝜁𝐺 ,                                                   [Eq. 6] 
where C (G) stands for coal (gas) and 𝜁𝐶  and 𝜁𝐺  are the coal and gas average shares at the 
margin in the market’s electricity generation, respectively. In turn, 𝜁𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 and 𝜁𝑔𝑎𝑠 are given 
by the efficiency of coal times the GARCH coefficient on the coal price (the marginal change 
in the electricity price given a unit change in the coal price; i.e. 𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙) and the efficiency of 
gas times the GARCH coefficient on the gas price (the marginal change in the electricity 
price given a unit change in the gas price; i.e. 𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠), as: 
𝜁𝐶 = 𝜑𝐶𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙                                                       [Eq. 7]  
and 
𝜁𝐺 = 𝜑𝐺𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠.                                                       [Eq. 8] 
The efficiency of gas, 𝜑𝐺, is set as equal for all markets (0.53), whereas that of coal, 𝜑𝐶, is 
known to vary across countries
55
. We use an efficiency factor of 0.36 for United Kingdom 
                                                          
55
 Thermal efficiencies are assigned according to Efficiency of conventional thermal electricity production of the 
European Environment Agency (2013). 
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and Nord Pool, while a factor of 0.4 is used to represent the efficiency of coal-fired 
generation in Germany and France. 
As 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 approaches the ‘theoretical’ carbon price value (PTR), the marginal rate at which 
the carbon price feeds into the electricity price approaches 100%, indicating a competitive 
internalization of carbon costs. Consequently, values <100% suggest some degree of market 
power, whereas values >100% indicate that costs are integrated within electricity prices more 
than proportionately. 
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3 Results 
This section reports the main estimation results relative to the employed time series models. 
Section 3.1 presents the VAR model and Granger causality test results, whereas the GARCH 
volatility results are reported in section 3.2. Finally, section 3.3 presents the observable cost 
pass-through rates. 
 
3.1 VAR analysis and Granger-causality test results 
The VAR model estimation by the eigenvalues of the companion matrix of the system 
showed that the variables were jointly ergodic, implying that the effects of shocks die out, 
thereby demonstrating the applicability of the models. The Lagrange multiplier test was not 
able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlations even with a single lag, thus the 
optimal lag length was set at 1. This was further confirmed by the values of AIC and BIC, as 
well as the Wald test statistics. Table A4 (Appendix) shows the VAR results. The significant 
correlations found through the VAR model do not imply causality, rather they simply indicate 
that one variable can cause changes in the other variable or that both variables can be caused 
by a different, omitted factor. However, given the choice of variables included in the model, 
this should not be the case. In fact, an indicator of economic activity and all major fuel costs 
were incorporated to comply with this analysis. The Granger-causality test results are 
reported in Table 3, for each market. 
 
Table 3 Granger causality test null hypothesis for the causal relationship between electricity and 
carbon prices in Germany, Nord Pool, France and United Kingdom. F is the F-statistic and P is the 
probability value. At a p-value less than 0.05 we reject the null hypothesis, thus the inverse of the 
statement can be stated with 95% confidence. 
 
The probabilities in bold indicate the rejected hypotheses and thus that the inverse statement 
is considered valid. Tables A5-A8 (Appendix) provide the complete set of results relating to 
the Granger-causality tests for Nord Pool, France, Germany, Nord Pool and the United 
Kingdom. 
HO 
DE NO FR UK 
F Pr. F Pr. F Pr. F Pr. 
Electricity prices do not 
cause carbon prices 
0.368 0.215 1.101 0.288 0.344 0.842 0.357 <0.0001 
Carbon prices do not 
cause electricity prices 
1.450 0.068 1.064 0.079 41.793 <0.0001 3.837 0.441 
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In Germany, the relationship between carbon and electricity future prices is bidirectional, 
although with a stronger effect of electricity prices on carbon prices than vice-versa, as 
shown by the relatively higher probability value for this direction of causation. In addition, 
the coal price Granger-causes the electricity future price, even though Germany uses large 
amounts of coal in electricity generation. Finally, the significant relationship between coal 
and carbon future prices observed in the VAR model is likely driven by a third, unknown 
factor. 
In the case of the Nord Pool data, all relationships established throughout the VAR model 
were successfully reflected by the Granger-causality tests. In particular, there is a 
bidirectional causal relationship between Phase II carbon price and the electricity price. 
However, the relationship by which the electricity price drives the carbon price is stronger 
compared to the inverse relationship. In addition, the natural gas price affects the carbon 
price. Furthermore, there is evidence of a bidirectional causal relation between coal and gas 
prices in the Nord Pool market, whereby coal prices affect gas prices comparatively more 
than vice-versa. Finally, the carbon price negatively affects the coal price, as recorded in all 
other markets. 
In France, a unidirectional relationship between electricity and carbon future prices is 
recorded. In addition, the CAC Index and the Phase II carbon future price display a 
bidirectional causal relation, even though this is not supported by a strong coefficient. The 
model for France also indicates that the carbon price affects the coal price. However, coal and 
gas prices do not display Granger-causality, meaning that a third factor should be responsible 
for the significant relationship observed in the VAR model. Finally, a strong bidirectional 
link is recorded between coal and stock prices in France. 
The electricity future price Granger-causes the carbon future price in the United Kingdom. In 
contrast, the coal price does not Granger-cause the electricity price, neither vice-versa, 
suggesting that a third variable can be responsible for the strong cointegration observed 
between coal and electricity prices (see Appendix Table A8). This could perhaps be related to 
some form of expectations about the markets. Furthermore, the carbon future price negatively 
affects the ARA coal future price. In addition, the UK gas future price Granger-causes the 
coal price. Finally, a third factor must be responsible for affecting both electricity and coal 
future prices since the detection of Granger-causality between these two variables was not 
possibly verified. 
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3.2 GARCH analysis results 
The electricity prices represent the endogenous variables in each of the four models and were 
regressed against the carbon, gas and coal prices, and national stock market indexes. Since 
the time series showed a significant volatility clustering property, the ARCH class of models 
was used to depict these properties. More complex volatility models, such as TGARCH or 
EGARCH or APARCH did not improve the significance of the models and therefore the most 
parsimonious model, the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model, was applied in all cases except for the 
United Kingdom, for which the SAARCH model was used. Table 4 reports the estimation 
results for each of the studied markets. 
 
 UK DE FR NO 
Conditional mean model 
Carbon  
0.621 
(0.054) 
<0.0001 
0.668 
(0.032) 
<0.0001 
0.378 
(0.039) 
<0.0001 
0.521 
(0.048) 
<0.0001 
Gas 
0.697 
(0.034) 
<0.0001 
0.472 
(0.035) 
<0.0001 
0.628 
(0.042) 
<0.0001 
0.505 
(0.051) 
<0.0001 
Coal 
1.366 
(0.119) 
<0.0001 
1.132 
(0.079) 
<0.0001 
0.870 
(0.089) 
<0.0001 
0.883 
(0.104) 
<0.0001 
SMI 
0.0006 
(0.0002) 
0.007 
0.0004 
(0.00009) 
<0.0001 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.289 
0.087 
(0.018) 
<0.0001 
Constant 
0.021 
(0.016) 
0.178 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
0.131 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
0.194 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.437 
Conditional variance model 
Carbon 
0.540 
(0.367) 
0.141 
1.604 
(0.360) 
<0.0001 
1.665 
( 0.421) 
<0.0001 
2.965 
(0.479) 
<0.0001 
Gas 
1.253 
(0.078) 
<0.0001 
0.378 
(0.208) 
0.070 
0.569 
(0.134) 
<0.0001 
0.500 
(0.157) 
<0.0001 
Coal 
-0.063 
(0.389) 
0.871 
4.094 
(0.281) 
<0.0001 
2.897 
(0.332) 
<0.0001 
2.195 
(0.526) 
<0.0001 
SMI 
0.012 
(0.0008) 
<0.0001 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.786 
0.008 
(0.001) 
<0.0001 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.137 
Constant 
-2.329 
(0.093) 
<0.0001 
-4.764 
(0.242) 
<0.0001 
-5.995 
(0.268) 
<0.0001 
-5.036 
(0.361) 
<0.0001 
 
Table 4 Parameter estimates from the AR-GARCH (Germany, France and Nord Pool) and SAARCH 
(United Kingdom) models. Standard errors are given in brackets. Note that the parameter “Carbon” in 
the conditional mean model corresponds to 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 in Eq.5; the same applies to “Gas” and “Coal” in 
the same model, which correspond to 𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠 and 𝜔𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙, respectively, in Eqs. 7 and 8. SMI stands for 
stock market index. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the future prices of carbon, gas and coal are all relevant factors in the 
determination of the levels and volatilities of electricity future prices in the Nord Pool, 
Powernext, EEX and APX UK markets. The conditional mean model results imply that the 
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first differences of carbon, gas and coal determine the electricity price first difference in all 
markets. The coefficient estimates of 𝜔𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 range from 0.38 to 0.67. 
The volatility of electricity future prices is also determined by the carbon, gas and coal future 
price volatilities, in all markets. The most important determinant
56
 of electricity price 
volatility is the volatility of coal prices, with coefficients for 𝛾1
𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙 ranging from 2.2 (Nord 
Pool) to 4.1 (France). However, the relation did not reach statistical significance in the United 
Kingdom. Carbon price volatility is also shown to have a large impact on electricity price 
volatility in France, Germany and, especially, in the Nord Pool market, but slightly less in the 
United Kingdom. Finally, gas price volatility was the most considerable in terms of its impact 
on electricity price volatility in the UK and considerably less in other markets. Moreover, the 
volatility of carbon and coal prices are significant predictors of electricity price volatility in 
all markets except for the UK. In addition, natural gas price volatility predicts electricity 
volatility in all markets except in Germany. Overall, as expected, the volatility transmission 
of fuel prices onto electricity prices was notable and confirms previous findings (e.g., 
Mansanet-Bataller and Soriano, 2009 and Castagneto-Gissey and Green, 2014). 
The presence of an asymmetric parameter for the British model reflects the so-called leverage 
effect (the parameter γ1), which occurs when past price changes are negatively correlated 
with future changes in volatility. The observed negative gamma coefficient indicates that 
positive price level shocks induce a greater effect on volatility compared to negative shocks. 
Furthermore, relative to the ARCH-M estimation, the conditional mean of electricity prices 
was not significantly affected by the volatility of the respective electricity prices in any of the 
four markets, at any of the three lags employed. The high GARCH coefficient for all 
countries, except for the United Kingdom, suggests the existence of a large degree of 
volatility persistence, considered to be a common feature in financial series, especially with 
electricity prices. The ARCH and GARCH parameters are positive and significant, indicating 
the presence of ARCH and GARCH effects in the electricity differenced future prices. Since 
α1+β1 < 1 (α1+β1+γ1 < 1 for the SAARCH model), it can be argued that there is stability in 
volatility, although the volatility persists over time, as shown by the high values of the 
GARCH parameter, for each of the examined markets
57
. 
 
 
                                                          
56
This is measured by the GARCH conditional variance model coefficient estimate times one standard deviation 
of the independent variable. Note that the estimated coefficient is a result of the employed units. 
57
 Please refer to Tables A9 for the complete set of GARCH results, including the ARCH-in-mean and ARCH 
results, for each of the four markets. 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 311 
 
3.3 Pass-through rates 
The carbon price pass-through rate into the electricity prices is calculated based on the 
conditional mean results, as explained in section 2.3.4. The implied gas and coal shares at the 
margin are computed assuming that the pass-through rate of gas and coal prices into 
electricity prices is equal to one
58
. Table 5 shows the implied gas and coal shares at the 
margin and the derived carbon price pass-through rates: 
 
Market 
Implied coal 
share at margin 
Implied gas 
share at margin 
Carbon price 
Pass-through rate (%) 
DE 0.45 0.25 135 
FR 0.35 0.33 88 
UK 0.49 0.37 109 
NO 0.32 0.27 137 
  
Table 5 Implied gas and coal shares at the margin and carbon price pass-through rates. The standard 
errors of the carbon price GARCH conditional mean model coefficients, representing the change in 
the electricity price per unit change in the carbon price are 0.032, 0.039, 0.054 and 0.048 for 
Germany, France, UK and Norway, respectively. However, these were not used to calculate the pass-
through rates. The PTRs in bold indicate the direction of causation running from carbon prices toward 
electricity prices. 
 
The causal relationship running from the electricity price toward the carbon price is 
observable only in the Nord Pool and EEX markets, where the recorded pass-through rates 
exceed 134%. The inverse direction of causation is recorded for The United Kingdom and 
France, thus the pass-through rate cannot be confirmed. In any case, the obtained value for 
this relationship is substantially lower in both France and the United Kingdom. For France 
the lowest value in the sample was obtained (88%) and represents the only falling behind the 
full pass-through rate of 100%. This can be considered a reasonable result given that France 
is more heavily regulated compared to other markets, implying that carbon prices are 
relatively less integrated into French electricity prices as opposed to other markets. 
Table 5 shows the gas and coal shares at the margin implied by our models, which should be 
equal to the average ratio recorded over the studied period between the marginal change in 
CCGT and coal output with respect to the marginal change in total generation, respectively. 
                                                          
58
 For example, the pass-through rate of gas prices into electricity prices is given by the change in electricity 
price per unit change in gas price (or the gas price GARCH coefficient in the conditional mean; i.e., 𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠) 
times the thermal efficiency of gas power plants (53%), divided by the percentage of time gas plants are at the 
margin. This enables us to solve for the implied share of gas at the margin; i.e., 0.53𝜔𝑔𝑎𝑠. The same applies to 
the derivation of the implied coal share at the margin, calculated using a thermal efficiency of 0.4 for Germany 
and France and 0.36 for UK and Nord Pool. 
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We validate the gas and coal price coefficients by considering the British case, for which 
hourly generation-by-fuel-type data was available
59
. The average ratios of marginal changes 
of CCGT and coal to total output were calculated as 0.41 and 0.44, respectively. These values 
are very close to the implied gas and coal shares at the margin, shown in Table 5, i.e. 0.37 
and 0.49, respectively. Moreover, if the actual marginal shares are substituted into the 
‘theoretical’ gas and coal shares in Eq.6, we derive an even higher pass-through rate of 115%, 
which emphasizes non-competitive practices in the UK. Using these values, the pass-through 
rates of gas and coal prices into electricity prices were derived as 90% and 112%. Therefore, 
these results suggest that British generators integrated the cost of coal substantially more than 
the cost of gas. 
Similarly, the implied shares of gas and coal for France, Germany and Norway should reflect 
the effective marginal shares in electricity generation in these countries. In fact, Germany is 
mostly reliant on coal, thereby explaining the relatively higher implied share of coal 
compared to gas. On the other hand, France and the Nord Pool countries are mostly based on 
nuclear and hydropower and use only very small amounts of both fossil fuels, which might 
explain the similar implied shares of coal and gas, which are noticeably lower than the same 
implied shares derived for Germany and the UK. 
Nevertheless, the implied shares of coal are larger compared to those of gas in all the studied 
markets, suggesting the importance of coal in electricity generation during Phase II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59
 This data was retrieved from the Elexon Portal.  
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4 Discussion 
The excessive carbon price pass-through rates observed in the EEX and Nord Pool markets 
suggest that prices in those countries might be driven by prices in trading partners with more 
emissions, or that additional, unknown transmission mechanisms are occurring 
contemporaneously to the changes in carbon prices. However, it is also possible that 
generators are somehow pushing through larger increases in their electricity prices, 
suggesting anti-competitive behavior. To a similar extent, Mokinski and Wölfing (2014) 
recently found an asymmetric pass-through of EUA prices into wholesale electricity prices in 
Germany. In addition, they found that this asymmetry had disappeared in response to a report 
on investigations by the competition authority. The present study similarly finds asymmetric 
innovation effects in the UK
60
. Moreover, we find evidence that German and Norwegian 
generators took advantage of the changes in carbon prices to increase their electricity prices 
more than proportionately, and that electricity market power seems to particularly evident in 
France. 
Soon after the institution of the EU ETS, some energy intensive firms in Germany called on 
the local competition authority to scrutinize the practice of price setting by German 
generators. Their main complaint was that internalizing the actual cost of freely allocated 
allowances constitutes an abuse of market power and should be disallowed. On the other 
hand, the producers argued that the generation of additional units of electricity required the 
use of additional allowances, which could have otherwise been sold, regardless of whether 
they were bought on the market or initially allocated as a free endowment. In fact, they 
claimed to be in line with competitive practice having increased prices by the additional 
opportunity costs. The German competition authority thus undertook investigations in the 
matter and issued hearing summons to RWE and E.ON, which accounted for over 60% of 
German installed capacity. The progress report was published in 2006 (BKartA, 2006). Thus, 
concerns seem to remain for both Germany and the Nord Pool countries, as the low and 
continually falling prices during Phase II cannot justify the excess internalization of 
additional costs. This suggests that structural and behavioral remedies would be sensible. As 
Borenstein et al. (1997) note, relatively small investments in transmission capacity may yield 
surprisingly large payoffs in the form of increased competition. It is thus crucial for the EU 
Commission to introduce new competition policies. Policies aimed at improving and 
                                                          
60
 The asymmetric effect recorded for the UK implies that positive innovations have a larger effect compared to 
negative innovations. However, the innovations derive not only from carbon prices but also coal and gas prices. 
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increasing internal and external transmission, widening the market, and enhancing market 
operations between countries can be seen as appropriate remedies. Furthermore, it can be 
crucial to deploy additional resources towards investments in renewable energy, which could 
contribute by reducing power prices. 
This study has also demonstrated that, during Phase II, the price of coal represents the 
primary determinant of electricity prices both in terms of their levels and volatility. Their 
effect is the largest in the electricity markets of Germany and UK, which use the largest 
amounts of coal in electricity generation in our sample compared to France and Nord Pool. 
Even though in most cases causality was not detected via the VAR-Granger method, our 
GARCH results suggest that there is a strong link between coal and electricity prices across 
all countries. Fuel prices can therefore set the price of electricity in countries where little 
amounts of coal are used. Indeed, the future electricity price in a hydro-dependent market 
such as Nord Pool will depend on the expectation of future coal prices as fuel-based 
generation determines the primary opportunity cost of producing electricity. 
In Phase II, the combination of low coal prices, high gas prices and an ultra-low carbon price 
resulted in coal-fired generation revealing as increasingly profitable in a number of European 
countries, where gas-fired power plants operated at a loss. For example, in 2010, Germany’s 
largest utility spent EUR 400 million building a gas-fired power station (EON SE’s Irsching-
5 in Bavaria), declared just three years later as largely unprofitable although it represented 
one of the most efficient gas plants in the world. In fact, it operated less than 25 percent of 
the time as falling power prices made burning natural gas unprofitable by record margins. 
More generally, European utilities, including the GDF Suez SA and Centrica Plc gas plants in 
France were stuck in a similar crisis. In addition, production from gas plants in France 
decreased by 24% in 2012. As European weakness held back electricity demand, cheaper 
coal and the collapsing cost of carbon permits are alienating the use of gas-fired plants. 
Switching to coal-fired generation not only increases emissions but also lowers profits for 
gas-fired plants. It should be noted that this reflects heavily on the European economy as 
these plants generate about a quarter of European power (Andersen and Patel, 2013).   
As can be appreciated from Fig.5, the marginal profitability of coal over gas-fired 
generation
61
 was generally positive throughout Phase II. 
                                                          
61
 The marginal profitability of coal over gas-fired generation was calculated as the clean dark spread minus the 
clean spark spread. The clean spreads are calculated as: Clean Spark Spread = Spark Spread – (Carbon 
Price*0.411); Clean Dark Spread = Dark Spread – (Carbon Price*0.971). The spark spread, instead, is given by: 
Wholesale electricity price – Price of gas/0.53, whereas the dark spread by Wholesale electricity price – Price of 
coal/0.36. An efficiency of 0.36 is used for UK and Nord Pool and 0.4 for Germany and France. Please see 
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Fig.5 – The marginal profitability of coal over gas-fired electricity generation in the markets of 
Germany, France, UK and Nord Pool, calculated as the clean dark spread minus the clean spark 
spread. It is possible to note how for the majority of the period considered, coal was more profitable 
than gas. One of the reasons for this entailed the low coal and carbon prices in Europe. 
 
However, there seems to be an upwards trend in the marginal profitability of coal over gas 
starting slightly after the start of 2010 and lasting until the end of Phase II. One of the reasons 
why coal has become so profitable is because it became cheap on world markets, also as a 
result of the new shale gas bonanza prevailing in the US, where gas prices have sharply and 
unexpectedly dropped. An additional factor behind the increase in coal-fired generation is 
undoubtedly represented by the EU regulations in force at the time, such as the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive, which have pushed generators to maximize their coal use before 
shutting down. German and British emissions also rose. Coal use soared in 2011, and EU 
carbon emissions increased after years of consistently falling. Therefore, reducing the number 
of emission permits might represent a viable solution as the price of carbon would likely rise 
and possibly provide an increasing use of gas rather than coal. Back-loading was adopted by 
the EU Commission and Parliament in 2013, however representing only a temporary 
measure
62
. A sustainable solution aimed at correcting the imbalance between permit supply 
and demand requires structural changes to the ETS. 
This increased use in the utilization of coal could have represented a substantial drawback in 
consideration of the strict emission reduction objectives set by the European Commission in 
order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol agreements. However, it should be noted that, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Appendix Figs.E1-4 for the clean spreads and marginal profitability of coal over gas during Phase II, relative to 
the markets of: Norway, UK, France and Germany. 
62
 Back-loading does not reduce the overall number of allowances to be auctioned during Phase III, but only the 
distribution of auctions over the period. 
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May 2002, the EU ratified KP1, using in particular Article 4 of the Protocol which allows 
parties to fulfill the requirements for emission reduction jointly.  Thus, all EU member states 
in the so-called ‘bubble’, or the EU-1563 states, were required to comply with a combined 
reduction of 8% by 2012, compared to their 1990 levels. Therefore, the consequences of 
increased carbon emissions of individual countries might have perhaps negatively reflected 
on the requirements in the EU burden sharing agreement. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily represent a setback for the EU as a whole as the severe economic situation in 
Europe deriving from the US subprime crisis notably decreased production across EU 
countries, thereby driving down carbon emissions. In fact, the EU has over-achieved its first 
Kyoto emissions target and is on track to meet the 2020 objective (European Commission, 
2014). However, if the profitability of coal were to encourage an even increased use of coal 
in the coming years, there could be a chance for the EU not to fully meet its future emission 
reduction targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63
 The EU member states in the ‘bubble’ were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. 
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study considered the interactions between electricity and carbon year-ahead prices 
during Phase II of the European Union Emission Trading System (2008-12) and investigated 
the drivers of electricity future prices in terms of levels and volatility. 
Among the main results, the causal relationship between carbon and electricity forward prices 
is bidirectional in the Nord Pool and EEX markets. In addition, there is evidence that the 
French and British electricity prices Granger-cause the carbon price. Based on the results 
obtained in this study we conclude that the average electricity generator in Germany and the 
Nordic countries internalized the cost of carbon into their electricity prices considerably more 
than proportionately in relation to the increase in costs deriving from effective carbon 
intensity, even though permits were freely allocated. In addition, given the progressively 
falling carbon prices, the marginal opportunity costs of carrying these allowances were likely 
not sufficient to justify the excessive increases in electricity prices. To this extent, 
safeguarding a healthy level of international competition among European generators must be 
ensured in order not to deviate from the path toward full integration. 
In addition, coal prices are shown to be the most influential determinants of electricity prices 
in Europe during Phase II, both in terms of levels and volatility, although coal represents an 
inframarginal production unit. This fundamental reliance on coal, which mainly derives from 
low coal and carbon prices, may represent an obstacle in the accomplishment of EU emission 
reduction goals, despite the EU burden sharing agreement. Moreover, policies aimed at 
limiting the supply of emission permits should be considered an appropriate measure to 
discourage coal use and support natural gas-fired or carbon-free electricity generation. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics of the first differences of electricity, carbon, coal 
and gas forward prices, and stock prices. 
 
 
 
Levels ADF PP 
Carbon price -2.63 -2.72 
UK Electricity price -1.74 -1.72 
DE Electricity price -1.28 -1.38 
FR Electricity price -1.32 -1.36 
NO Electricity price -2.05 -1.96 
UK gas -1.75 -1.65 
DE gas -1.18 -1.38 
FR gas -1.18 -1.35 
NO gas -1.18 -1.38 
Coal -1.65 -1.79 
FTSE Index -2.47 -2.34 
DAX Index -2.02 -1.98 
CAC Index -3.37 -3.30 
OBX Index -1.36 -1.33 
 
Table A2 ADF and PP t-statistics for unit root tests on the level series. Values lower than the 
5% critical value of -2.87 (boldface-marked) imply acceptance of the null hypothesis that the 
series are stationary. Clearly, all level series are non-stationary. 
 
 
 
 
First Difference Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Carbon price -0.013 0.343 -1.72 1.62 
UK Electricity price -0.010 1.152 -13.33 9.44 
DE Electricity price -0.014 0.71 -3.65 4.45 
FR Electricity price -0.012 0.79 -7.40 7.00 
NO Electricity price -0.012 0.85 -10.47 4.20 
UK Gas 0.002 0.63 -2.45 8.03 
DE gas 0.0006 0.381 -1.72 3.40 
FR gas 0.0003 0.382 -2.55 2.30 
NO gas 0.0006 0.381 -1.72 3.40 
Coal 0.0007 0.205 -1.43 1.38 
FTSE Index -0.94 92.88 -492.98 594.69 
DAX Index -0.15 95.63 -523.98 518.14 
CAC Index -1.39 63.53 -368.77 367.01 
OBX Index 0.003 0.830 -3.50 3.57 
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First Differences ADF PP 
Carbon price -34.33 -34.33 
UK Electricity price -37.29 -37.28 
DE Electricity price -32.58 -32.50 
FR Electricity price -35.84 -35.84 
NO Electricity price -36.32 -36.38 
UK gas -35.44 -35.51 
DE gas -31.77 -31.93 
FR gas -32.69 -32.85 
NO gas -31.77 -31.93 
Coal -33.24 -33.23 
FTSE Index -35.23 -37.55 
DAX Index -35.23 -35.24 
CAC Index -38.05 -38.30 
OBX Index -36.08 -36.09 
 
Table A3 ADF and PP t-statistics for unit root tests on the series’ first-differences. Values 
lower than the 5% critical value of -2.87 (boldface-marked) imply acceptance of the null 
hypothesis that the series are stationary. Note that all series become stationary if expressed in 
first differences. 
 
 
 
Endogen. 
Variable 
 
Exogen. 
Variable 
 
UK DE FR NO 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
Coeff. 
(S.E.) 
P 
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 
Electricity 
-0.107 
(0.033) 
0.001 
0.033 
(0.043) 
0.438 
-0.198 
(0.036) 
<0.0001 
-0.075 
(0.034) 
0.030 
Carbon 
0.387 
(0.103) 
<0.0001 
0.162 
(0.071) 
0.024 
0.466 
(0.072) 
<0.0001 
0.173 
(0.080) 
0.031 
Gas 
0.004 
(0.055) 
0.938 
0.0044 
 (0.066) 
0.947 
0.335 
(0.070) 
<0.0001 
0.093 
(0.078) 
0.232 
Coal 
0.475 
(0.179) 
0.008 
0.204 
(0.122) 
0.094 
0.373 
(0.125) 
0.003 
0.077 
(0.140) 
0.581 
SMI -0.00029 (0.00036) 0.419 -0.00020 (0.00021) 0.349 
-0.00069 
(0.00035) 
0.051 
0.022 
(0.031) 
0.478 
Constant 
-0.005 
(0.032) 
0.876 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
0.487 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
0.567 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
0.585 
LL -10751.190 -8944.367 -8806.76 -3276.776 
AIC 16.612 13.834 13.623 5.122 
BIC 16.831 14.053 13.842 5.340 
 
 
Table A4 VAR parameter estimates. SMI is short for stock market index (i.e. DAX for 
Germany, CAC for France, FTSE for the United Kingdom and OBX for the Nord Pool 
countries). 
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Null hypothesis for GERMANY F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 1.450 0.068 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.0002 0.010 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 2.196 0.146 
The DAX  future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.275 0.643 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.368 0.215 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.131 0.897 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 7.631 0.043 
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.714 0.485 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 12.481 0.006 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.269 0.501 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.038 0.950 
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.057 0.892 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 24.244 <0.0001 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 1.726 0.019 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.192 0.656 
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.099 0.055 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 0.0039 0.076 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 0.196 0.679 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 1.231 0.104 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 7.273 0.059 
 
Table A5 Granger-causality test results for the German model (1 lag considered). The 
numbers in bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying 
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
 
 
 
Null hypothesis for NORD POOL F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 1.064 0.079 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.661 0.267 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.409 0.338 
The OBX  future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.120 0.041 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.101 0.288 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.199 0.916 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 8.335 0.006 
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.579 0.282 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.424 0.566 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.484 0.019 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.906 0.581 
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.824 0.308 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.226 0.345 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.122 0.270 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.758 0.050 
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.289 0.104 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.234 0.741 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.628 0.581 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.404 0.769 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 3.465 0.226 
  
Table A6 Granger-causality test results for the Nord Pool model (1 lag considered). The 
numbers in bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying 
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
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Null hypothesis for FRANCE F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 41.793 <0.0001 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 23.408 <0.0001 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 9.072 0.011 
The CAC  future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 4.890 0.087 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.344 0.842 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.499 0.779 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 12.64 0.002 
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 3.943 0.139 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 12.130 <0.0001 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.844 0.358 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 7.307 0.007 
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.060 0.303 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 6.618 0.037 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.699 0.095 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 16.082 <0.0001 
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 2.229 0.328 
 
The electricity  future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 2.241 0.326 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 1.375 0.503 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 0.127 0.939 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 4.639 0.098 
 
Table A7 Granger-causality test results for the French model (1 lag considered). The 
numbers in bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying 
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
 
 
Null hypothesis for UNITED KINGDOM F-stat Prob. 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future  prices 0.357 <0.0001 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.066 0.977 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 11.057 0.029 
The FTSE Index future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.998 0.309 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 3.837 0.441 
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 2.607 0.747 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 11.031 0.001 
The FTSE Index future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.699 0.429 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 5.989 0.024 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas   future prices 0.270 0.256 
The coal  future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 6.393 0.048 
The FTSE Index future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.606 0.532 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 16.657 <0.0001 
The carbon  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.534 0.436 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 0.692 0.694 
The FTSE Index prices do not Granger-cause coal  future prices 4.353 0.129 
 
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 1.363 0.609 
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 1.231 0.314 
The gas  future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 1.210 0.618 
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 3.078 0.364 
 
Table A8 Granger-causality test results for the British model (1 lag considered). The 
numbers in bold denote the P>0.05 at alpha<1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying 
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds. 
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 UK DE FR NO 
ARCH-in-mean 
L1 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.374 
0.062 
(0.163) 
0.705 
0.327 
(0.260) 
0.070 
-0.045 
(0.083) 
0.587 
L2 
-0.0025 
(0.008) 
0.740 
-0.016 
(0.208) 
0.939 
-0.372 
(0.389) 
0.340 
-0.044 
(0.108) 
0.682 
L3 
0.0032 
(0.006) 
0.564 
-0.041 
(0.129) 
0.748 
0.064 
(0.237) 
0.788 
-0.015 
(0.075) 
0.838 
AR 
-0.149 
(0.036) 
<0.0001 
-0.106 
(0.031) 
0.001 
-0.139 
(0.031) 
<0.0001 
-0.083 
(0.031) 
0.007 
ARCH 
ARCH (α1) 
0.492 
(0.055) 
<0.0001 
0.145 
(0.027) 
<0.0001 
0.075 
(0.012) 
<0.0001 
0.178 
(0.029) 
<0.0001 
GARCH 
(β1) 
0.396 
(0.025) 
<0.0001 
0.750 
(0.039) 
<0.0001 
0.894 
(0.014) 
<0.0001 
0.803 
(0.029) 
<0.0001 
SAARCH 
(γ1) 
-0.181 
(0.032) 
<0.0001 -  -  -  
α1+ β1 -  0.895  0.969  0.981  
α1+ β1+γ1 0.707  -  -  -  
LL -1483.878  -509.475  -793.419  -1079.276  
AIC 3001.757  1050.950  1618.839  2190.553  
BIC 3089.688  1133.709  1701.598  2273.312  
Prob>chi
2
 <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001  
Q(20) 107.959  58.782  59.932  123.931  
 
Table A9 Parameter estimates from the AR-GARCH (Germany, France and Nord Pool) and 
SAARCH (United Kingdom) models. Standard errors are given in brackets. 
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Appendix B 
 
Fig.B1 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in Germany (DE). 
 
 
Fig.B2 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in France (FR). 
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Fig.B3 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in the United Kingdom (UK). 
 
 
 
Fig.B4 - Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in the Nord Pool market (NO). 
 
 
 
 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 329 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
 
Fig.C1 – The behaviour of the NBP, EEX and TTF natural gas forward prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.C2 – The behaviour of the ARA CIF coal forward price (2008-12). 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Fig.D1 - Electricity one-year forward price first difference (DE, FR, UK, NO). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.D2 - EU ETS Phase II carbon emission allowance one-year forward price difference. 
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Fig.D3 - Gas one-year forward price first difference (DE, FR, UK, NO). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.D4 - Stock market indexes first differences (DE, FR, UK, NO). 
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Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.E1- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in the United Kingdom during 2008-12. 
 
 
Fig.E2- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in Germany during 2008-12. 
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Fig.E3- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in France during 2008-12. 
 
 
 
Fig.E4- Behaviour of the Clean spark and clean dark spreads, and their difference (i.e. the 
marginal profitability of gas over coal) in the Nord Pool market during 2008-12. 
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This study uses graph theory to analyse the interactions of a representative sample of 13 
European electricity spot prices during the period 2007–2012. We construct 7,651 dynamic 
multivariate networks, with electricity prices corresponding to the graph’s nodes and the 
edges in between them denoting the significant degrees of pair-wise linear Granger-causality 
between them. Global connectivity is then characterized by the system’s density, or the total 
quantity of causal interactivity sustained by the network system, which informs about the 
occurrence of abnormal changes in connectivity. We report a considerably large peak lasting 
from October 2011 to April 2012, where the graph’s density over-basal jump reached a 
magnitude of 2.4 times, suggesting an improved degree of connectivity of electricity markets 
during this period. By applying the Markov regime-switching model on the network density 
we find that this change coincides with the implementation of the European Commission’s 
Third Energy Package. Our local integration indicators, the in-strengths, validate the 
reliability of our technique by verifying historical events such as the occurrence of 
interconnectors commissioning and market coupling. On the path to full market integration, 
market networks should be periodically monitored. Our model, which is able to create a time-
varying network describing the evolving influences between the European electricity price 
behaviours, is able to detect important changes in market integration and can be considered a 
suitable and promising approach for this task. 
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1 Introduction 
The Single European Act, signed in 1986, was mainly intended to complete the internal 
European market, created at the start of 1956 with the Treaties of Rome. The central aims 
prefixed by the EU were those of increasing security of supply and harmonizing energy 
prices in Europe, with the ambition of creating an Internal Energy Market (IEM) by 2014. 
The main obstacles to achieving integration are structural market distortions, such as the low 
level of liberalisation of some European electricity markets, regulated prices, but also high 
market concentration and continued massive subsidies in favor of fossil fuels and nuclear 
energy causes, as well as a high degree of market power in generation at lower merit. Market 
opening and increased cross-border trade fostered by EU legislation should keep energy 
prices at lower levels, thereby enforcing competition. 
The issue of whether European electricity markets are integrated was explored by various 
authors, using diverse methodological approaches and achieving contrasting results, with 
some authors accepting the integration hypothesis, and others rejecting it. Studies in this field 
typically investigate pairs of electricity prices exhibit an equilibrium relationship, the latter 
implying that at least one of them is causing movements in the other and therefore that one 
variable is statistically able to provide useful information to predict the other variable’s 
activity. This concept is referred to as Granger-causality and is an established time series 
technique for the analysis of economic and financial processes. 
This study applies Granger-causality analysis through complex network theory to study the 
interactivity between European electricity prices during the period 2007-2012. This enables 
us to detect any abnormal changes occurred during this period, indicating the potential 
presence of events which disrupted the normal functioning of markets. The novelty of our 
study resides in the use of graph theoretical networks to model the dynamic interactions 
among European wholesale electricity prices. Our aim is that of providing inferences 
regarding the European network’s state and evolution over time. We model the causal 
interactions between the electricity spot prices as a connectivity network, where nodes 
represent the different countries in our sample and the relative links in between them 
denoting the significant influences between relative pair-wise price variations. 
This study explores the time-varying degree of connectivity among a representative sample of 
European electricity markets by exploiting the degrees of Granger-causality in electricity 
price dynamics. We intend to address the question of whether electricity markets in the 
European area exhibit any abnormal behaviour which can be explained by historical events. 
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In addition, we validate the technique’s reliability by verifying the commissioning date of 
European interconnectors, as well as the implementation of different market coupling 
initiatives, established during the studied period, in relation to the generated local 
connectivity data. 
The proposed approach takes advantage of modern network theory, a mathematical 
framework capable to characterize connected systems with great efficacy (Boccaletti et al, 
2006; see also Latora and Marchiori, 2001, Sporns, 2002, and Watts and Strogatz, 2008, on 
complex networks). The complex pattern of propagation between the different countries’ 
electricity prices gives rise to an interconnected system, a network, which changes over time 
and informs us on how the prices of different markets influence each other. Our purpose is 
that of extracting information from this time-varying network in order to draw conclusions 
regarding the development of the European electricity market integration process. Our 
innovation in this sense relates to the use of a system approach describing the multivariate 
interactions between the electricity prices of the countries constituting the European market, 
rather than only investigating their simple univariate profiles.  
Whereas past studies have provided evidence that only some electricity markets are 
converging (see for example Zachmann, 2008, or Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010), in the sense 
that their electricity prices have a long-run cointegration or equilibrium relationship, we 
instead use such information, concerning the short-run causality interactions among these 
prices, to determine the dynamic behaviour of the entire system. 
Our study shows that, until 2011, the connectivity of European electricity markets remained 
at a substantially low level, around 2% on our measure, with a large jump to ca. 7% occurring 
during the final quarter of the same year. Aside such relatively large jump, abnormal changes 
in connectivity were essentially similar in numbers and magnitude. We can therefore 
conclude that the way toward the attainment of a reasonable rate of electricity market 
integration in Europe seems to still be very long. 
The modern theory of networks, originated through the discovery of small-world networks 
and scale free networks at the end of the last millennium, represents the most recent approach 
to complex systems. The study of complex networks has attracted a large amount of interest 
in the last years and was applied to metabolic systems, social networks and the brain (Stam 
and Reijneveld, 2007). We apply this promising technique to the electricity system with 
focusing on the widely debated issue of European market integration. 
The remainder of the manuscript is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the main  
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background information related to this work, whereas section 3 outlines the relevant 
methodologies. Section 4 reports the main results, thereafter discussed in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 concludes this study. 
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2 Background 
The following section introduces the main background information. We first discuss about 
the organization and structure of electricity spot markets in Europe (section 2.1), to then 
focus on the previous work dealing with European electricity market integration (section 2.2). 
 
2.1 European Electricity Spot Markets 
Energy utilities, in particular gas and electricity companies, were considered to be 
conventionally regulated monopolies, at least until the EU finalized its verdict of bringing 
forward the liberalisation process across the various European markets. The EU’s aim was 
primarily that of correcting energy market distortions and, among other measures, it decided 
to implement a competition policy throughout the enforcement of Directives 1996, 2002 and 
2009. 
The main difference between traditional financial markets and electricity markets is 
represented by the inherent limitations in transmission capacity, or supply deliverability, of 
electricity markets, as well as the non-storable nature of electricity, which causes the spot 
market to really be a one-day forward market. Although electricity markets are very different 
from financial markets, making it rather difficult to exercise time and space arbitrage for a 
series of reasons (including the fact that electricity markets normally serve national needs), 
decisions and price strategies are ever more taken simultaneously over several European 
electricity markets, based on shared sets of accessible information and regulations. The 
diversity between commodity markets and electricity markets can also be traced back to the 
fact that additional security components exist in the case of electricity markets given that 
electricity is delivered at the exact instant of time in which the consumer requires it. 
Effectively, it is the demand inelastic nature of electricity prices, which is caused by the 
instantaneous nature of the product, which causes the difference between electricity and 
financial markets (Hjalmarson, 2013).  
Most electricity spot price formation processes in the European area rely on the mechanism 
of marginal pricing. This reflects the merit order of wholesale electricity supply under which, 
the most expensive power plants operate during periods of high demand and prices, whereas 
the least expensive (and usually the least carbon intensive) are activated when demand is 
relatively low. This emphasizes the importance of the fuel mix present in electricity 
generation within each market as well as the underlying role of competition. In addition, a 
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fully competitive and integrated network of electricity markets should provide rapid price 
adjustments throughout. 
It is possible that, although the European electricity system is a young and imperfectly 
connected one, and considering the presence of physically separated pairs of markets, 
signaling may still quickly spread throughout European energy markets, perhaps suggesting 
that an efficient competition structure might prevail. 
 
2.2 Previous Work 
Within the past few years, different authors have addressed their efforts in trying to ascertain 
whether electricity markets in the European area are establishing concrete steps toward the 
completion of an internal market and thus whether price coupling and harmonization are 
being effectively achieved. Since 2004 until today, a series of contrasting studies have 
emerged with some showing a certain degree of price convergence between couples of 
electricity prices, and some others rejecting it. In fact, none of these has ever studied the 
dynamic integration of a substantial collection of electricity prices in order to understand 
whether there have been global changes in market integration. For example, based on a 
principal component analysis, Zachmann (2008) rejects the overall market integration 
hypothesis except for some pairs of countries. Studies such as that by Robinson (2007), who 
uses B-convergence and co-integration tests, on the other hand, suggest that convergence did 
in fact occur for most countries. The truth would probably depend on the proximity of the 
markets under study, which increases the probabilities of market coupling or interconnector 
commissioning, as well as the period of time under scrutiny. However, this is not fully 
proven, as shown by the contrasting conclusions which have so far been reached in this 
context. Indeed, more recently, Bunn and Gianfreda (2010) demonstrated increased market 
integration for Germany, France, Spain, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Integration was found not to increase with geographical proximity but rather with 
interconnector capacity. Moreover, Kalantzis and Milonas (2010) found that interconnection 
but also geographical distance play a central role in price dispersion. Furthermore, using a 
correlation and co-integration analysis, Boisseleau (2004) did not find convergence among 
wholesale electricity day-ahead prices. In contrast, Armstrong and Galli (2005) observed 
convergence among wholesale price differentials in the markets of France, Germany, The 
Netherlands and Spain, from 2002 to 2004. A clear trend of converging retail prices was also 
shown by Robinson (2008) for ten European countries, within the time frame 1978-2003.  
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Very recently, by using a fractional co-integration analysis, Houllier and de Menezes (2013) 
showed that long memory for price shocks and co-integration exist only for a few markets, 
such as Germany, The Netherlands and France. 
The creation of a competitive, single electricity market in Europe should, principally in the 
absence of transmission constraints, determine the convergence of electricity prices in the 
direction of a single price for all national markets. In such scenario, we would expect the 
global integration of European electricity markets to be generally improving throughout the 
years. 
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3 Methodologies 
This section explains the methodology of our work, as we aim at understanding how 
European electricity markets are integrating over time. We compute a measure of 
connectivity between the dynamics of our sample of electricity prices by referring to the 
system’s global connection density, based on the in-degrees of the studied prices, which are 
in turn based on the principle of Granger-causality between pairs of electricity prices. 
3.1 Data Analysis 
We use hourly time series data relative to a sample of 13 European wholesale electricity day-
ahead prices, covering the period 02/07/2007 to 29/06/2012. The markets considered are: 
Belpex (Belgium), APX UK (United Kingdom), APX Endex (The Netherlands), Nord Pool 
Spot (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Powernext (France), European Energy Exchange 
(EEX) (Germany, Switzerland), Gestore dei Mercati Energetici (GME) (Italy),  OMI-Polo 
Portugués (OMIP) (Portugal) and Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad 
(OMEL) (Spain). The electricity prices (Thomson Reuters) were obtained with a time 
sampling of one hour. This applies to all markets aside from the British one (APX UK), for 
which trading observations are recorded at every half-hour of each day. The total amount of 
available data points for each market is therefore 31,320 (62,640 in the case of British prices, 
for which we take hourly averages to make them compatible with the other series). We only 
use data relative to weekdays given it reflects electricity markets during normal functioning 
hours in which all agents (e.g., firms) are actively operating, as well as because the usage and 
diversity of weekend data might induce an adverse effect on the overall treatment and 
assessment of the data. Time normalization is also applied to account for the difference in 
space distribution of the countries under study (the maximum time difference between the 
studied countries is two hours, with the majority of countries residing within the Central 
European Time Zone, or UTC+01:00). The 13 hourly electricity day-ahead prices (in 
EUR/MWh) can be described as depicted by the table below (Table 1): 
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 Mean StdDev 
Prob. 
(Skewness) 
Prob. 
(Kurtosis) 
JB test 
Belgium 56.090 26.450 1.865 14.016 <0.0001 
Denmark 50.064 20.360 4.686 84.000 <0.0001 
Finland    31.855 16.244 16.325 563.686 <0.0001 
France 57.485 46.211 36.837 2204.547 <0.0001 
Germany 54.115 25.095 1.678 9.835 <0.0001 
Italy 75.639 29.088 0.832 1.490 <0.0001 
The Netherlands 55.452 24.451 1.548 5.364 <0.0001 
Norway 28.581 10.031 0.670 3.977 <0.0001 
Portugal 50.619 17.146 0.160 0.441 <0.0001 
Spain 47.799 16.142 0.082 0.757 0.003 
Sweden 31.663 15.854 17.287 620.242 <0.0001 
Switzerland 60.233 25.243 1.470 7.362 <0.0001 
United Kingdom 48.230 25.242 3.563 24.205 <0.0001 
 
Table 1 Mean and standard deviation of wholesale day-ahead electricity prices in the time frame 
2007-2012. The normality distribution test (JB), including skewness and kurtosis values, are also 
reported. 
 
The highest electricity price is the Italian one (ca. 76 EUR/MWh), possibly due to the large 
amounts of imports as well as the carbon intensity pertinent to the electricity generation 
process in Italy (even though prices in EU ETS Phases I and II were very low), whereas the 
lowest price is registered in Norway (ca. 29 EUR/MWh), perhaps due to their efficiency 
stemming from an almost exclusive usage of hydropower to produce electricity. France, 
Sweden and Finland display price values which are highly skewed to the right and 
accompanied by a large excess kurtosis, i.e. a leptokurtic price distribution. Finally, the UK is 
the country which exhibits an electricity price which is closest to the mean price of wholesale 
electricity in our European sample (i.e. EUR 49/MWh). Based on the characteristics of the 
technique we employ, all electricity prices are used in raw form, i.e. they are not normalized, 
in order to capture more information from the movements in in order to capture more 
information from the movements in every price series at each point in time. 
 
3.2 Creating a European Electricity Spot Price Connectivity Network 
This section briefly introduces the implementation of our network of electricity spot prices. 
The individual autoregressive (AR) representation of each electricity price series is given by: 
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𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎1𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜖1(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑘=1
,        𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖1(𝑡)) = 𝛴1                                 [Eq. 1] 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑑1𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜂1(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑘=1
,        𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜂1(𝑡)) = 𝛤1                                 [Eq. 2] 
where 𝑎1𝑘 and 𝑑1𝑘 are the autoregressive coefficients, 𝜖1(𝑡) and 𝜂1(𝑡) are noise terms and 
𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑝. The joint description of the bivariate series [𝑥(𝑡), 𝑦(𝑡)]𝑇 can be given by the pth-
order AR: 
𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎2𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + ∑ 𝑏2𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜖2(𝑡)                                    [Eq. 3]
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑐2𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + ∑ 𝑑2𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜂2(𝑡)                                    [Eq. 4]
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
where the noise terms are uncorrelated over time and their covariance matrix is expressed as: 
Σ = [
𝛴2 𝛶2
𝛶2 𝛤2
]                                                                       [Eq. 5] 
where 𝛴2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖2(𝑡)), 𝛤2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜂2(𝑡)) and 𝛶2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜖2(𝑡), 𝜂2(𝑡)). If x(t) and y(t) are 
independent, then 𝑏2𝑘 and 𝑐2𝑘 are zero. 
We can notice that the value of 𝛴1 measures the accuracy of the autoregressive prediction of 
x(t), based on its own past values, whereas the value of 𝛴2 represents the accuracy of 
prediction of the present values of x(t) based on the past values of both x(t) and y(t). Granger-
causality is then defined as (Lin et al., 2009): 
𝐺𝐶𝑦⟶𝑥 = 𝑤𝑦𝑥 = log (
𝛴1
𝛴2
).                                                       [Eq. 6] 
We apply a multivariate autoregressive (MVAR) approach to create the Granger-causality 
networks between the electricity spot price time series of the 13 European markets 64. Given 
the set 𝑌(𝑡) = [𝑦1(𝑡), … , 𝑦13(𝑡)]
𝑇 of the 13 simultaneously observed stationary time series, the 
MVAR model of order p is defined: 
𝑌(𝑡) = ∑ 𝐴𝑚𝑌(𝑡 − 𝑚) + 𝐸(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑚=1
                                                    [Eq. 7] 
where each matrix 𝐴𝑚 (of dimension 13x13) is formed by elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 describing the linear 
interaction of 𝑦𝑗(𝑡 − 𝑚) on 𝑦𝑖(𝑡), 𝑝 represents the number of lags of each explanatory 
variable, and E(t) is the vector of error terms. The MVAR model of country y’s electricity 
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 For more details of the methodological procedures, please refer to Appendix A. 
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price treats each of the remaining 12 electricity prices as well as their lags, as explanatory 
variables. We estimated each MVAR model using the Burg algorithm (Burg, 1967, and Burg, 
1975). 
Stage III of our analysis represents our innovation: the creation of a Granger-causal 
connectivity65 network system. In our case, which relates to MVAR estimation, the necessary 
data for fitting a multivariate AR model of order p must be larger than 𝑀2𝑝, where M is the 
number of time series (Schlögel and Supp, 2006). For this reason, the Granger-causality was 
computed with an MVAR model of order 𝑝 = 4 (set by the Akaike criterion, discussed in 
Appendix A) over temporal windows of 720 points, which corresponds to a time scale of of 
30 days. 
In order to have a time-varying estimation of the network we referred to a sliding window 
with a shift of 4 points, i.e. we estimated a network every 4 hours, resulting in a total of 7,651 
total shifts, or estimated networks. In other words, we are creating a matrix 13x13 for each of 
the 7,651 time shifts from the original 31,320 hourly price data points available for each 
market.  
Each 13x13 matrix of causality values was converted into a weighted adjacency matrix A by 
applying a threshold Wth such that the Granger-causality values were significantly stronger 
(p<0.05, with false discovery rate, corrected for multiple comparisons) than the null 
hypothesis of no causal relationship. The weight of the link between nodes i and j is set such 
that Aij = wij if wij ³  Wth, and wij = 0 otherwise (diagonal elements were set to wii = 0). This 
operation resulted in the generation of sparse weighted networks. 
 
3.2.1 Network Theoretical Indices 
In mathematics and computer science, graph theory is the study of mathematical structures 
used to model pair-wise relations between objects from a certain collection. A graph is an 
abstract representation of a network. It consists of a set of N vertices (or nodes), our 
electricity prices, and a set of L edges (or connections), indicating the presence of causal 
interaction between the vertices. The adjacency matrix A contains the information concerning 
to the relative graphs’ connectivity structure (see Fig.1). When a weighted and directed edge 
exists from node i to node j, the corresponding entry of the adjacency matrix is Aij≠ 0; 
otherwise Aij= 0. 
                                                          
65
 All calculations are run on MATLAB 12.0. For information about the standard Granger-causal connectivity 
computational technique, please refer to Seth (2010). See also Seth (2008, 2011) for a more theoretical approach 
to causal networks. Appendix H includes further information on the employed simulation code. 
Electricity and Energy Price Interactions in Modern EU Markets                           G. Castagneto-Gissey 
 346 
 
3.2.1.1 Node Strength  
The simplest attribute of a node is its connectivity degree, or strength, which is the total 
number of connections established with other vertices. This quantity is subdivided into the in-
strength, din, and out-strength, dout, when directed relationships are being considered. The 
formulation of the in-strength index, din, can be introduced as: 
    𝑑𝑖𝑛(𝑖) = ∑ 𝐴𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑉                                                           [Eq. 8]  
Eq.8 represents the total amount of links incoming to the vertex i. V is the set of available 
nodes (electricity prices) and Aij indicates the presence of an arc from point j to point i, with a 
weight given by the relative node’s pair-wise linear Granger-causality in the time domain 
(see Eq.6). Interactions that do not reach statistical signiﬁcance are set to zero. The value of a 
given in-strength will depend on the degree of linear pair-wise Granger-causality between 
two nodes, which can be a number between 0 and 1; therefore, we can expect to see values 
between 0 and 12 in the extreme case in which a given price is fully Granger-caused (i.e. 
GC=1) by the remaining 12 prices in the sample. It shall be noted that connectivity strength 
values are solely positive. 
Conversely, for the out-strength: 
𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝑖) = ∑ 𝐴𝑗,𝑖                                                                [𝐸𝑞. 9]𝑗∈𝑉   
Eq.9 represents the total amount of links outgoing from the vertex i. It shall be noted that 
Aj,i ≠ Ai,j because of the reciprocal asymmetry in Granger-causal relations in the time 
domain. 
In-strengths and out-strengths have clear functional interpretations. A high in-strength value 
indicates that a unit is influenced by a large number of other units, while a high out-strength 
value specifies the existence of a large number of potential functional targets (Boccaletti et 
al., 2006). The figure below (Fig.1) depicts an illustrative example of in- and out-strength 
computations. 
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Fig.1 - Example of in-strength and out-strength computation in a simple n-node network (in this example, n =
5). The network’s adjacency matrix is shown on the right while the graph is given in the left panel. 
 
A simple example of how to calculate in-strengths (and out-strengths) is provided in the 
figure above. For simplicity, we depict a 5-node network.  Note that the network graph (for a 
given time shift) is given on the left whereas the relative adjacency matrix is shown on the 
right. Therefore, the network graph is one composed of 5 nodes whereas the adjacency matrix 
is a 5x5 matrix, with each entry representing the degree of pair-wise linear Granger-causality 
between the nodes. Therefore, the main diagonal of this matrix is effectively disregarded and 
set at zero. If we take node 3 as the node of interest, it is possible to see that the only nodes, 
which are affecting node 3 (as indicated by arrows directing towards node 3) are nodes 1 and 
5. Therefore, column 3 shows non-zero entries at the corresponding positions for rows 1 and 
5. The sum of these column entries is the node’s in-strength. On the contrary, the network 
graph shows that node 3 is significantly affecting (with outgoing links) only nodes 2 and 4. 
Therefore, row 3 shows positive values at the corresponding positions for columns 2 and 4. 
Similarly, the sum of entries in this row (i.e. 0.54 and 0.09) represents the out-strength for 
price 3 at the given time shift. 
 
3.2.1.2 Network Global Connection Density 
In order to capture the general level of interconnectivity of a system throughout a certain 
period of time, we refer to the network system’s global connection density, D, defined as: 
𝐷 =
1
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
∑ 𝐴𝑖,𝑗
𝑖,𝑗∈𝑉
                                                     [Eq. 10] 
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where V is the set of available nodes, or electricity prices. Global density is the actual number 
of edges in the graph as a proportion of the overall number of potential edges, and is the 
simplest indicator of the physical cost — for example, the energy or other resource 
requirements (in metabolic and brain activity networks, respectively) — of a given network 
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). Causal density is a measure of the overall quantity of causal 
interactivity, which is sustained by a network over a given period of time. In our case it 
represents the connectivity, or causal activity, supported by the network of electricity prices 
throughout the period of time under study. In fact, a large degree of causal density indicates 
that the system is strongly coordinated in terms of individual market activities or pricing 
processes. Note that the in-strength, which we will mainly focus on, is the only variable used 
in the calculation of the global connection density. Values of global density (Eq.10) lie 
between 0 and 1 and depend on the sum of each node’s in-strength (see Eq.9) which, in turn, 
depends on the sum of individual causalities (see Eq.6 and Fig.1), at each time interval. 
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4 Results 
The following section reports the main results. Firstly, the electricity price in-degree 
estimations are presented. The reliability of our technique is then verified by providing 
evidence that the computed local connectivity data successfully reflects the occurrence of 
historical events. Finally, the results relative to global connectivity are reported. 
 
4.1 Node Strength Estimations 
Following our estimations, the electricity price which displayed the largest number of in-
strengths, i.e. the one which is mostly Granger-caused by other electricity prices in the 
sample, is the Dutch electricity price. In fact, the Netherlands was a net importer of electricity 
since the 1980s and for almost the entire period under analysis (until 2010), thus, its 
electricity price might have been determined by a number of other markets. During the 
studied period (i.e. 2007-12), large-scale maintenance projects were ongoing in its 
neighboring countries (CBS Statistics Netherlands, 2010) and this could have perhaps been 
the reason for a large mean value of incoming Granger-causality, one of about 24%. On the 
other hand, the market which was less affected (with a mean in-strength value of 14%), as 
shown by the lower number of incoming causalities, was the Norwegian one. This is 
comprehensible since Norway tends to export extensively given its low marginal cost 
production through hydropower. 
In addition, if we consider the Granger-causalities between the Nordic countries’ electricity 
prices the result is not surprising. For example, during the first window (i.e. 02-Jul-2007 
01:00 -> 11-Aug-2007 00:00), Norway significantly affected the electricity prices in Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark. On the contrary, the electricity prices in Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark did not significantly influence the Norwegian price. 
The behaviour of the 13 market’s electricity price in-strength values over the studied period 
are given in the figure below (Fig.2): 
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Fig.2 - Behaviour of the 13 European price in-strength values between 2007 and 2012. The darker 
colour indicates the intensity, or strength, of the connectivity in-strength, as shown on the right-hand 
side bar. Each unit on the y-axis represents one of the 13 markets. 
 
The above figure depicts the behaviour of the connectivity in-strength66relative to each of the 
thirteen European markets over the period 2007-2012. It is possible to note a substantial 
increase in node in-strength values during 2011Q4. This implies that the causality 
interactions between the electricity prices in our sample have considerably increased during 
the final quarter of 2011. 
 
4.1.1 Applying the Model to Verify Historical Occurrences 
In this section we verify the reliability of our model. This is examined by checking whether 
the electricity price mean in-strengths (or the sum of a country’s incoming Granger-causality 
in one window) and pairwise correlation with other coupled markets in-strengths had 
effectively increased since the introduction of transmission interconnectors67. This would 
indicate that our technique is able to detect the presence of market integration. We perform: 
(i) simple t-tests to investigate whether the mean in-strength relative to the coupled markets’ 
electricity prices had increased after the commissioning/coupling date compared to the period 
preceding that date and (ii) correlation tests to check if the correlation among the coupled 
markets’ price in-strengths had increased in the period succeeding the 
                                                          
66
 Please refer to Appendix C for the respective out-strength representation. 
67
 Please refer to Appendix D for a more extensive explanation of the employed t-tests and correlation tests. 
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commissioning/coupling date compared to the previous period. If a country’s transmission 
system has physically connected with another transmission system then the average of 
incoming causalities must be larger after the occurrence of electricity interconnector 
commissioning between two countries. Similarly, the correlation between the in-strength 
series after the coupling date should increase. 
Market coupling events occurred between 2007 and 2012 are: the Central Western Europe 
(CWE) Initiative (November 2010; coupling of France, Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Germany), Interim Tight Volume Coupling (November 2010; involving Germany and 
Denmark), the NorNed cable  (February 2011; connecting and coupling The Netherlands and 
Norway), APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool (February 2011; coupling the markets of Belgium, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and the BritNed cable (March 
2011; connecting and coupling the United Kingdom and The Netherlands) (EU Commission, 
Energy Observatory, 2007-12). Table 2, reported below, depicts the t-test results and changes 
in mean values, for each coupled market’s price in-strengths, in the periods before and after 
the commissioning/coupling date68. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68
 The date used to indicate a certain period in time corresponds to the second of the two dates indicated in a 
given network time shift. For example, it is possible to refer to the shift “04-Nov-2011 09:00:00 to 16-Dec-2011 
08:00:00” as “16-Dec-2011 08:00:00” in order to denote a specific point in time. 
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Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative: November 2010 
Coupled 
Markets 
µ
𝟐
≠ µ
𝟏
? 
µ
𝟐
 µ
𝟏
 µ
𝟐
> µ
𝟏
? Δ µ 
H p-value 
FR 1 P<0.0001 0.2590 0.1871 ✓ +38.50% 
BL 1 P<0.0001 0.2455 0.2120 ✓ +15.80% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2675 0.2118 ✓ +26.30% 
DE 1 P<0.0001 0.2538 0.1530 ✓ +65.88% 
Interim Tight Volume Coupling: November 2010 
DE 1 P<0.0001 0.2538 0.1530 ✓ +65.88% 
DM 1 P<0.0001 0.3221 0.1284 ✓ +150.86% 
NorNed cable: February 2011 
NO 1 P<0.0001 0.1940 0.1111 ✓ +74.62% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2675 0.2345 ✓ +14.07% 
APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool: February 2011 
BL 1 P<0.0001 0.2510 0.2154 ✓ +16.53% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2675 0.2345 ✓ +14.07% 
NO 1 P<0.0001 0.1940 0.1111 ✓ +74.62% 
SW 1 P<0.0001 0.3051 0.1265 ✓ +141.19% 
FI 1 P<0.0001 0.2015 0.1292 ✓ +55.96% 
DM 1 P<0.0001 0.3177 0.1784 ✓ +78.08% 
BritNed: March 2011 
UK 1 P<0.0001 0.1809 0.1138 ✓ +58.96% 
NL 1 P<0.0001 0.2695 0.2408 ✓ +11.92% 
 
Table 2 Price in-strength mean values before (µ
t−1
) and after (µ
t+1
) the known coupling dates for each 
occurred market coupling event which took place between 2007 and 2012. H=1 implies acceptance of the null 
that µ
t+1
 is significantly different from µ
t−1
. 
 
 
The table reported above (Table 2) shows that the mean value of coupled markets’ electricity 
price in-strengths generally increases after the date of interconnector commissioning or 
market coupling. The average increase is one of over a half, i.e. 0.56%, across all considered 
markets. This was also the case for the correlation tests, which provided evidence that 
Pearson pairwise correlation between the coupled markets’ price in-degree strengths 
increased considerably in the period after coupling/commissioning took place. This can be 
appreciated from the following tables (Tables 3-7), which indicate the change in the degree of 
in-strength correlation after the coupling date, for each case occurred during the studied time 
period69. 
 
 
                                                          
69
 We were able to consider all cases of market coupling and interconnector commissioning occurred between 
2007 and 2012, with the exception of the coupling of Italy and Slovakia in 2011 due to unavailability of 
Slovakian data. 
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Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative: November 2010 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
03-Mar-2009 08:00  > 
01-Nov-2010 04:00 
01-Nov-2010 04:00  > 
30-Jun-2012 00:00  
FR, BL 0.739 0.838 +13.40% 
FR, NL 0.420 0.645 +53.60% 
FR, DE 0.341 0.491 +44.23% 
BL, NL 0.749 0.727 -0.03% 
BL, DE 0.533 0.581 +9.01% 
NL, DE 0.755 0.865 +14.57% 
 
Table 3 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and  after 
the Central Western Europe Initiative coupling of France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany (November 
2010). P<0.0001 in all cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interim Tight Volume Coupling: November 2010 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
03-Mar-2009 08:00  > 
01-Nov-2010 04:00 
01-Nov-2010 04:00  > 
30-Jun-2012 00:00  
DM, DE 0.146 0.373 +155.16% 
 
Table 4 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and after 
the Interim Tight Volume Coupling of Denmark and Germany (November 2010). P<0.0001 in all cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NorNed cable: February 2011 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 02-Sep-2009  > 
01-Feb-2011 
01-Feb-2011  > 
30-Jun-2012  
NO, NL 0.217 0.307 +41.94% 
 
Table 5 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and after 
the introduction of the NorNed cable coupling The Netherlands and Norway (February 2011). P<0.0001 in all 
cases. 
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APX-Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool: February 2011 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
02-Sep-2009  > 
01-Feb-2011 
01-Feb-2011  > 
30-Jun-2012  
BL, NL 0.653 0.754 +15.42% 
BL, NO 0.386 0.497 +28.65% 
BL, SW -0.082 0.579 +808.08% 
BL, FI -0.200 0.5462 +373.10% 
BL, DM 0.313 0.536 +70.93% 
NL, NO 0.217 0.307 +41.94% 
NL, SW -0.033 0.386 +1,269.70% 
NL, FI -0.170 0.407 +339.60% 
NL, DM 0.180 0.315 +75.42% 
NO, SW 0.458 0.824 +79.83% 
NO, FI 0.108 0.793 +636.62% 
NO, DM 0.726 0.829 +14.19% 
SW, FI 0.668 0.849 +27.14% 
SW, DM 0.313 0.782 +149.71% 
FI, DM 0.225 0.788 +249.38% 
 
Table 6 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and  after 
the APX Endex-Belpex-Nord Pool coupling of Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark (February 2011). P<0.0001 in all cases. 
 
 
BritNed cable: March 2011 
 
Corr. before Corr. after 
Change in  
correlation 
28-Oct-2009  > 
01-Mar-2011 
01-Mar-2011  > 
30-Jun-2012  
GB, NL 0.235 0.295 +25.82% 
 
Table 7 Change in correlation between the indicated markets’ electricity spot price in-strengths before and after 
the introduction of the BritNed cable coupling The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (March 2011). 
 
Furthermore, we detected similarities between countries whose electricity markets have been 
more closely linked in the past. The behaviour of the price in-strength values during the 
month of February 2011 are shown for Belgium and The Netherlands in Fig.3 (left panel) and 
for the four Nord Pool countries in (right panel)70. For greater visual clarity, we depict a 
shorter period of time compared to the full-length of the data. The behaviour of the price in-
strength values during the month of February 2011 are shown below, for both sets of markets. 
 
                                                          
70
 Please refer to Table 6 for the coupling of APX-Endex, Belpex and Nord Pool. 
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Fig.3 – Left Panel: Representation of Belgian and Dutch price in-strengths during the month after their 
coupling date, i.e. February 2011. Their behaviours are closely related and much different in comparison to the 
Nord Pool countries’ electricity price in-strengths, shown on the right: Right Panel: Representation of 
Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Danish price in-strength values during the month after their coupling, i.e. 
February 2011. 
 
 
The figure above (Fig.3) shows that electricity price in-strength behaviour was very similar 
among Nord Pool countries, showing clear differences compared to Belgium and the 
Netherlands, which were similar among themselves. The latter may be linked to the fact that 
the Nord Pool countries are more integrated compared to the markets of Belgium and the 
Netherlands. This suggests that proximity, as well as past integration are relevant elements in 
the determination of electricity market integration. Moreover, the correlation among Nord 
Pool countries’ price in-strengths indicates that their relationship can be considered very 
similar among them but is very different from behaviour assumed by Belgian and Dutch price 
in-strength values. The latter is in agreement with Kalantzis and Milonas (2010) who found 
that geographical proximity plays a significant role in price integration. In contrast, studies 
such as Bunn and Gianfreda (2010), found that proximity does not play an important part. 
Nevertheless, further research should be devoted to answer this question. 
Finally, our hypothesis relating to an increased correlation between the coupled markets’ 
electricity price in-strengths is shown to be accepted in all cases. The same applies to the 
observation of larger price mean in-strengths after the commissioning/coupling date, which is 
also shown to be true in all cases. Such result is not biased by the individual price in-strength 
peaks (see Fig.B1 in the Appendix) that some countries display toward the end of the period 
under study. In fact, most of the countries which actually coupled their transmission lines 
with other markets did not exhibit a peak during the final part of the studied time period, 
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which might have otherwise provided an upward bias for the mean in-strength value in the 
second time interval. 
 
4.2 Global Connectivity of EU Electricity Prices 
Global connection density represents the actual number of edges in the graph as a proportion 
of the overall number of potential edges and represents our overall connectivity indicator. 
The value of global connection density varies from zero (‘empty’ network) to one (perfectly 
connected network). Global density floated around a relatively low mean level of 2% 
throughout the entire time frame, with a standard deviation of 0.0086. The maximal value of 
global connectivity is shown as the largest peak in the figure below (Fig.4), which displays 
the behaviour of the system’s global connection density during the period 2007-2012: 
 
Fig.4 - Behaviour of global connectivity of the 13 European spot prices in the sample throughout the period 
2007-2012. The dotted horizontal lines represent the upper and lower confidence bounds (Z>1.96). Time is on 
the x-axis, whereas the value of global connection density (expressed in percentage terms) is shown on the y-
axis. The two regimes are: [1] 11-Aug-2007 to 24-Oct-2011, [2] 24-Oct-2011 to 9-Apr-2012 (0.0265). The third 
regime, i.e. 9-Apr-2012 to 30-Jun-2012 (0.0404) is not significantly different from regime [1]. The peak in 
global connectivity occurred on 24-Oct-2011, whereas the Commission’s network guidelines were introduced 
on 19-Oct-2011. 
 
By exploiting the Granger-causal interactions between EU electricity prices, our model yields 
a time-varying indicator of European price connectivity, the system’s global density, which 
exhibits a clearly stochastic behaviour. In our work, we calculated the distribution of the 
global connection density series for the entire time length and extracted the relative z-score 
values in order to understand in what instants of time global connectivity was 3 standard 
deviations above the mean (Z>1.96, p<0.05). In complex theory, all values above (below) the 
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upper (lower) confidence bound imply ‘abnormal’ values and thus point to an unusually large 
(low) connectivity. As discussed at later stages, this coincides with the implementation of an 
important energy package dealing with European electricity market integration. Periods of 
lower-than-normal connectivity occurred as frequently as greater-than-normal connectivity, 
indicating that the process of electricity market integration is not particularly pronounced. 
Results relative to global connectivity denote a very large spike occurring in December 2011 
and reachnig a magnitude of ca. 7% in December 2011. This implies that an average 7% of 
causality increases was recorded at the very most.  Furthermore, an initial interconnectivity 
peak, one of around 4%, can be observed within by the first 592 shifts of our model (i.e. 
November-December 2007). The succeeding two peaks reached values of about 3%. 
Generally, European electricity market connectivity remained at a mean level of ca. 2%. The 
largest peak in global density was recorded during the period between 29-Nov-2011 04:00 
and 17-Apr-2012 08:00, with an over-basal increment of 2.4 times71. 
We applied the Markov chain regime-switching model to the global connection density series 
in order to detect the precise point in which the largest peak starts. The observed jump in 
global connectivity was considered as a change to another regime. The switching mechanism 
is typically assumed to be governed by a random variable that follows a Markov chain with 
different possible states. The date of global density jumping from regime 1 to regime 2 was 
24 October 2011, returning to regime 1 on 9 April 2012. The two regimes are shown in 
Fig.472. On 19 October 2011, the Commission implemented the Guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure, which ensures that strategic energy networks and storage 
facilities will be completed by 2020. To this end, the EC has identified a dozen priority 
corridors and areas covering electricity, gas, oil and carbon dioxide transport networks. 
Therefore, it is likely that the technique picked up the large change in EU regulations with 
only a four-day delay. This date also reflects the implementation of further rules on network 
system operation and balancing, discussed in section 5.1.1. 
A possible cause of the 2011Q4 peak might have perhaps entailed the impact of a potentially 
major occurrence of extreme temperatures throughout Europe. Such increase was in fact 
observed across different market price in-strengths (see Appendix Figure C1). However, by 
analyzing the density time series relative to the heating degree days (and cooling degree days) 
                                                          
71
 Please refer to Appendix E for a representation of the values of all recorded global connection density peaks 
and their date of occurrence. 
72
 Please refer to Appendix F for more information on the applied regime-switching model. 
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of different major European cities73, we found their correlation not able to explain the 
dramatic jump in global connection density, thereby excluding the possibility of a cold (or 
heat) wave. 
We additionally used a simple ARIMA (1,0,0) model to check whether European electricity 
price global system connectivity represents a random walk process74. The estimation results 
show that a random walk process could have produced the generating process underlying the 
data and therefore an AR(1) model is a suitable representation of EU electricity price 
connection density. In fact, the  
AR(1) parameter coefficient estimate displays a highly significant value of 0.99. Therefore, 
the expected value of current changes in connectivity is given by white noise, thus the best 
estimate of connectivity at time t is represented by its value at t-1. 
 
4.3 Network Representations 
The system of electricity price interactions, summarized by the computed global connection 
density series gives, rise to a network which varies over time. An example of a network 
estimated at a given point in time is shown in Fig.5, below. The following image shows the 
network graph and relative adjacency matrix at two points in time. The upper panel shows the 
network during its largest global connection density peak window (i.e. December 2011), 
whereas the lower panel shows the graph and relative adjacency matrix during an average 
connectivity value (i.e. April 2010): 
 
                                                          
73
 These are: Rome and Athens (controlling for the Southern European area), Oslo and Stockholm (Northern 
Europe), Lisbon and Madrid (Western Europe), Paris and Berlin (Central Europe), Warsaw and Prague (Eastern 
Europe) 
74
 Please refer to Appendix G for the autoregressive model results. 
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Fig.5 – The graph and adjacency matrices relative to high and average global connectivity relative to the shift 04-Nov-2011 
09:00:00 to 16-Dec-2011 08:00:00 (upper image) and shift 02-Mar-2010 01:00:00 -> 13-Apr-2010 00:00:00 (lower image). 
Left panels: Graph of electricity price in-strengths. The thickness of the associated arrow corresponds to a certain range of 
the in-strength coefficient, as reported in the upper left hand-side corner of the graph. Each of these arrows corresponds to a 
certain value of the relative adjacency matrix; Right panels: The color bar represents the adjacency matrix computed at the 
same network shift, where each entry of the 13x13 matrix is associated with a different in-strength value, according to the 
color-scale reported on the right. 
 
It is possible to appreciate the larger degree of Granger-causal interactions occurred during 
December 2011 compared to April 2010. This is shown by the lower amount and magnitude 
of Granger-causality recorded in April 2010, shown by the fewer and weaker arrows in the 
above graphs. 
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5 Discussion 
The regime-switching model applied to the computed global connection density series 
provided evidence that the large peak in EU electricity price connectivity coincided with the 
implementation of the Third Energy Package, issued by the European Commission in 
September 2007. 
The goodness of the model employed in this study was verified by means of t-tests and 
correlation tests. The t-tests served to understand whether electricity price mean in-strengths 
generally increased after the market coupling (or interconnector commissioning) date. We 
showed that this holds in all cases and that the mean in-strength increased, on average, by 
more than a half during the period after the dates of interconnector commissioning or market 
coupling institution. Similarly, the correlation between electricity price in-strengths increased 
in all cases, on average by a factor of 1.89. In addition, the electricity prices which exhibited 
the highest in-strength values - indicating that these countries’ electricity prices are subject to 
a great deal of influence from other countries’ electricity prices - were those of the 
Netherlands; on the other hand, the countries exhibiting the lowest in-strength values were 
the Norwegian electricity prices, implying that prices in Norway are the least subject to 
changes in other prices. The large in-strength values for the Netherlands can be explained by 
the fact that large-scale maintenance projects were ongoing in The Netherland’s neighboring 
countries (CBS Statistics Netherlands, 2010) during the studied period (i.e. 2007-12). This 
was possibly a reason for the recorded large mean value of incoming Granger-causality in the 
Dutch case. On the other hand, the low potential for Norwegian prices to be affected by 
others is comprehensible considering that Norway tends to export extensively given its 
almost exclusive use of hydropower for electricity generation. 
In relation to the out-strength results, the electricity prices with highest out-strength values 
were recorded in the United Kingdom, indicating that UK prices showed a high potential of 
influencing other prices; conversely, those with the lowest out-strength values were displayed 
by Denmark and Belgium, implying that Danish and Belgian spot prices correspond to the 
electricity prices with the lowest ability of influencing other prices. These results can instead 
be explained by the fact that larger countries are able to influence other electricity prices in a 
certain area relatively more compared to smaller countries. 
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5.1 Global Connectivity and the Third Energy Package 
So what precisely has changed during 2011Q4 that might have induced such a relatively large 
rise in electricity spot price causal interactivity? During this period, the introduction of major 
network codes relating to capacity allocation and congestion management occurred. The 
treatment of congestion is a crucial aspect in electricity pricing and changes in congestion 
management cause alterations to the formation process of electricity prices, in turn possibly 
providing the observation of an increased causation among them. Balancing also represents a 
key mechanism which might also impact on prices and was perhaps one of the mainly revised 
procedures. In fact, two main set of policies were put into action precisely during the period 
in which the largest peak occurred (i.e. in 2011Q4). These mainly regarded system operation 
and balancing, dicussed in the next section. 
During the final quarter of 2011, the eurozone, as well as other European countries, 
experienced worsening economic conditions. The latter was the reason for contracting gross 
value added in the main energy intensive sector  (e.g., construction, manufacturing and 
mining) and led to a decreasing industrial electricity demand in Europe (European 
Commission, Quarterly Reports on European electricity Markets, 2011Q4). Thus, it can also 
be possible that the large increase in connectivity might have been induced by the sharp fall 
in demand everywhere in Europe. 
Also, besides a very short cold spell in mid-November, the temperatures were generally even 
milder in most parts of Europe for the resting duration of the quarter. This is also shown by 
the reduced heating from households occurred throughout this quarter. Furthermore, the 
decreased level of industrial demand at a European-wide level brought about one of the 
lowest consumptions of electricity in Europe in the last decade. 
European electricity market connectivity remained at a substantially low mean level of 
2.32%. In addition, the ratio of the magnitudes relative to positive and negative abnormal 
behaviours suggests the lack of a strong and consistent process characterizing European 
electricity market integration. This might be the result of the presently insufficient 
interconnection among national grids (Trillas, 2010 and Bollino et al., 2013). As Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2005) note, the European energy market liberalisation process is increasingly focused 
on electricity market integration and cross-border mechanisms. They suggest how this signals 
that the liberalisation of national markets for electricity is now closer to the single European 
energy market long-term objective. However, the latter requires an increased number of 
physical interconnections and improved technical arrangements. It is crucial for European 
system operators to deploy their efforts in providing a full integration of electricity markets at 
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different levels – among which are those relating to market concentration, investments, 
security of supply and aspects of market design and regulation – which are critical for the 
dynamic performance of the single European market. 
We believe that full integration under various regimes is a necessary condition for increasing 
European market connectivity at an acceptable rate/level and that improved legislative 
integration under different aspects, among which those relating to market design, can be a 
key factor for improvements in connectivity between markets. Therefore, increasing 
interconnection among national grids should be seen as a primary need. The achievement of a 
sufficient level of physical electricity interconnection among countries principally implies the 
convergence of electricity prices in the direction of a single European price. Very 
importantly, this also reduces the impact of congestion and market power on electricity 
prices. 
 
5.1.1 Introduction of Network Code and System Balancing Rules 
The guidelines on System Operation, or the Capacity Allocation and Congestion 
Management Network Code was approved in 2009 and was effectively implemented in the 
period between 2011Q2-2011Q4 (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, EU 
Commission, 2009), or in coincidence with the large connectivity peak. The Commission 
notes that, as a minimum, each common grid model is to cover an area suitable for the 
capacity allocation method utilized, at least the synchronous area. Furthermore, the common 
grid model is by then required to include a detailed description of the transmission network 
including the location of generation units and demand. During this period, the Commission 
also required improved transparency between TSOs. Such network code requires European 
TSOs to update the common grid model and the common base case more often, as required 
for a given allocation procedure, with all data relevant for the respective calculations, such as 
the expected network topology, generation and demand forecast. In fact, from this period on, 
TSOs are required to make this data available to all European TSOs, ready for immediate use. 
The newly applied network code foresees that TSOs implement capacity allocation in the 
day-ahead market based on implicit auctions via the novel single price coupling algorithm 
which simultaneously determines volumes and prices in all relevant zones. This is done 
through the usual marginal pricing principle. Also, the implementation takes into account the 
role of the power exchanges and requires harmonization of day-ahead bidding deadlines. 
Moreover, in the case there were insufficient transmission capacity for the enabling of all 
requested trades, calculated zonal prices should differ. Moreover, this code enforcement 
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implies there can only be one price calculated for each bidding area and hour. This new 
algorithm also allows for block bids. The code also defines the price of transmission capacity 
between zones when congestion occurs. Such definition implies that, in the event of 
congestion, the price of transmission capacity is given by the difference between the 
corresponding day-ahead zonal electricity prices. 
Furthermore, a second substantial change to regulations that occurred in the period 
corresponding to our largest observed connectivity peak is represented by the Framework 
Guidelines on balancing. An integrated electricity balancing market is the last component of 
the IEM. However, integration of the different national balancing markets is a challenging 
task due to the dramatic differences present in existing national balancing market 
arrangements. However, the balancing framework guidelines are, in fact, intended to balance 
such differences by fostering cross-border competition and improved balancing efficiency, 
whilst protecting the security of supply. The code establishes common rules for electricity 
balancing across European member states, namely: the establishment of common principals 
for procurement and an EU-wide methodology for the activation of Frequency Containment 
Reserves, Frequency Restoration Reserves and Replacement Reserves as well as the 
activation of Balancing Energy from Frequency Restoration Reserves and Settlement 
(ENTSO-E Draft Network Code on Electricity Balancing, 2013). These new guidelines are in 
line with the Commission’s Regulation No. 714/2009 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
Therefore, it might be possible that such specific and wide-scale changes - in relation to 
capacity allocation, congestion management and balancing as well as the introduction of the 
single price coupling algorithm, which directly and notably influence the electricity price in 
each market, as well as the relation between electricity prices across markets - might have 
caused the large interconnectivity peak in our system of European electricity price networks. 
 
5.3 Model shortfalls and future work 
From a network perspective, the study of higher order graph indices (e.g., network’s 
efficiency, entropy, etc.) could provide depper insights into the structure and dynamics of the 
European energy system. The model could also be augmented by the use of fuel prices in the 
expressions for individual electricity prices, thereby providing a more ad-hoc representation 
of each system and thus the entire network. In addition, from an empirical side, a larger 
number of electricity markets (a total of 13 were considered in this study) could be taken 
account of, possibly together with an even more prolonged sample time frame, about 6 years 
in this work. From a theoretical viewpoint, researchers in economics and energy could benefit 
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from extending this technique in various ways, from the aforementioned application of 
exogenous (or perhaps endogenous) weights to the formulation of a system comprising more 
complicated econometric models as well as various further applications. 
We firmly hope that this paper can foster and advance the research presently focusing on 
electricity market integration as well as that relating to other energy systems. 
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6 Conclusions 
This study applies graph theory to model European electricity spot price interactions during 
the period 2007-12. Total connectivity is measured by the system’s global connection 
density, or the total quantity of causal interactivity sustained by the network system. The 
novelty of this work resides in the use of dynamic complex networks, which enable for a 
representation of Granger-causal relationships among electricity prices over time. 
The goodness of the technique is verified on the basis of the estimated local connectivity 
measures (electricity price in-strengths) in relation to historical market occurrences. In all 
cases, the electricity price mean in-strength relating to coupled markets is shown to increase, 
on average, by more than a half, a factor of 0.56, during the period succeeding the known 
interconnector commissioning (or market rules implementation) dates compared to the period 
prior to those dates. Similarly, in all cases, the correlation between the coupled markets’ price 
in-strengths is shown to increase by a factor of 1.89 after the coupling date. 
On the other hand, the analysis of global connectivity resulted in the detection of a 
substantially large abnormal spike in global connection density, one of ca. 7%, occurring in 
the final quarter of 2011, which possibly reflects the implementation of crucial market 
integration and balancing rules affecting the pricing and coordination processes of European 
electricity markets. In fact, the Third Energy Package (2007) came into force during the 
period between 2011Q2-2011Q4 and coincides with the largest peak in global connection 
density. 
Aside from such relatively large jump, abnormal positive and negative changes in 
connectivity were essentially similar in numbers and magnitude. We can therefore conclude 
that the way toward the attainment of a reasonable rate of electricity market integration in 
Europe seems to still be very long. 
On the path to full market integration, market networks should be periodically monitored. 
Our model, which is able to create a time-varying network describing the evolving influences 
between the behaviours of the different European electricity prices, is able to detect important 
changes in market integration and can be considered a suitable and promising approach for 
this task. 
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Appendices 
The Appendix to this paper comprises Appendices A-J, reported hereafter: 
Appendix A: Extended Methodologies. 
Appendix B: Local connectivity indicators behaviour for each market. 
Appendix C: Out-degree strength chromatic graph. 
Appendix D: Tests for validation of local connectivity data (Method). 
Appendix E: Global connection density peaks. 
Appendix F: Markov-chain regimes in global connectivity. 
Appendix G: Random walk representation of global connectivity. 
Appendix H: Simulation code. 
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Appendix A: Extended Methodologies 
 
A2. Stage II: Granger-causality from Multivariate Autoregressive (MVAR) models 
Granger-causality was initially proposed in the context of econometrics to enable the 
investigation of causal influence between two series75. Letting two time series x(t) and y(t) be 
jointly stationary, we can infer the existence of Granger-causality running from y(t) to x(t) if 
the combined information from both variables is able to significantly improve the forecast of 
x(t) as opposed to solely using the information from x(t) (Lin et al., 2009). The individual AR 
representation of each series is given by: 
𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎1𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜖1(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑘=1
,        𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖1(𝑡)) = 𝛴1                                 [Eq. A1] 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑑1𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜂1(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑘=1
,             𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜂1(𝑡))𝛤1                                 [Eq. A2] 
 
where 𝑎1𝑘 and 𝑑1𝑘 are the autoregressive coefficients, 𝜖1(𝑡) and 𝜂1(𝑡) are noise terms and 
𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑝. The joint description of the bivariate series [𝑥(𝑡), 𝑦(𝑡)]𝑇 can be given by the pth-
order AR: 
𝑥(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎2𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + ∑ 𝑏2𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜖2(𝑡)                                    [Eq. A3]
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑐2𝑘𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑘) + ∑ 𝑑2𝑘𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑘) + 𝜂2(𝑡)                                    [Eq. A4]
𝑝
𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑘=1
 
where the noise terms are uncorrelated over time and their covariance matrix is expressed as: 
Σ = [
𝛴2 𝛶2
𝛶2 𝛤2
]                                                                        [Eq. A5] 
where 𝛴2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖2(𝑡)), 𝛤2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜂2(𝑡)) and 𝛶2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜖2(𝑡), 𝜂2(𝑡)). If x(t) and y(t) are 
independent, then 𝑏2𝑘 and 𝑐2𝑘 are zero. 
We can notice that the value of 𝛴1 measures the accuracy of the autoregressive prediction of 
x(t), based on its own past values, whereas the value of 𝛴2 represents the accuracy of 
                                                          
75
 Because we are employing a multivariate system (MVAR), we are effectively using Granger-Geweke 
causality rather than the more common Granger causality method. In fact, Granger-Geweke causality is simply 
Granger-causality adjusted for multivariate systems (Geweke, 1982).  We henceforth use the term ‘Granger-
causality’ to refer to Granger-Geweke causality. 
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prediction of the present values of x(t) based on the past values of both x(t) and y(t). Granger-
causality is then defined as (Lin et al., 2009): 
𝐺𝐶𝑦⟶𝑥 = 𝑤𝑦𝑥 = log (
𝛴1
𝛴2
).                                                    [Eq. A6] 
Similarly, one can define causal influence from x(t) to y(t) as 
𝐺𝐶𝑥⟶𝑦 = 𝑤𝑥𝑦 = log (
𝛤1
𝛤2
).                                                    [Eq. A7] 
The model order q can be selected according to the Akaike criterion: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = 2 log[det(Σ)] + 2𝑝𝑀2/𝑛                                             [Eq. A8] 
where Σ is the estimated noise covariance matrix of the bivariate AR model, 𝑀 is the number 
of time series and n is the length of the data window, or number of samples, used to estimate 
the model. The first term decreases with increasing p, whereas the second term punishes 
models with a high order. This criterion tries to find the optimal q that minimizes the cost 
function, where the latter is defined in such way to balance the variance accounted for by the 
AR model against the number of coefficients to be estimated. 
In our case, we use the electricity spot price time series of 13 European markets. We will 
therefore use an extension to the multivariate case of Granger-causality. Given the set Y(t) of 
13 simultaneously observed stationary time series, the MVAR model of order p is defined as  
𝑌(𝑡) = ∑ 𝐴𝑚𝑌(𝑡 − 𝑚) + 𝐸(𝑡)
𝑝
𝑚=1
                                                  [Eq. A9] 
where each matrix 𝐴𝑚 (of dimension 13x13) is formed by elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 describing the linear 
interaction of 𝑥𝑗(𝑡 − 𝑚) on 𝑥𝑖(𝑡), 𝑝 represents the number of lags of each explanatory 
variable, and E(t) is the vector of error terms. The MVAR model of country y’s electricity 
price treats each of the remaining 12 electricity prices as well as their lags, as explanatory 
variables. 
We estimated each MVAR model using the Burg algorithm (Burg, 1967, and Burg, 1975), 
which makes use of the Levinson-Durbin (Levinson, 1947, and Durbin, 1960) procedure with 
a different constraint to find a solution with similar computational requirements, though 
without instability. The Levinson-Durbin method is a procedure that recursively calculates 
the solution to an equation concerning a Toeplitz matrix. The algorithm runs in θ(𝑛2) time, a 
considerable improvement in relation to the Gauss-Jordan elimination, which runs in θ(𝑛3) 
recursion. 
The original Burg algorithm was extended for multivariate AR models with the Nuttall-
Strand method (Schlögl, 2006). A detailed comparison of various MVAR estimators revealed 
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that the MVAR Burg algorithm provides the most accurate estimates (Schlögl, 2006 and 
Aydin, 2010). The Burg method is viewed as superior to the non-parametric methods due to 
different properties, these being: (i) it does not apply windows to the data and does not 
depend on the assumption that the autocorrelation series is not zero outside the window; (ii) 
both backward and forward prediction errors are effectively minimized in the least squares 
sense; (iii) it always yields an AR model which is stable; (iv) it is computationally eﬃcient 
(Proakis et al., 2005 and Aydin, 2010). 
For each pair of electricity prices, which we denote as x and y, we calculate the Granger-
causality in both directions of causation, i.e. 𝑤𝑥⟶𝑦 and 𝑤𝑦⟶𝑥. If we let: 
𝐹𝑥⟶𝑦 =
𝑛 − 2𝑝
𝑝
(exp(𝑤𝑥⟶𝑦)) − 1                                       [Eq. A10] 
under the null hypothesis of no causal relationship, 𝐹𝑥⟶𝑦 asymptotically follows a F-
distribution with 𝑝 and 𝑛 − 2𝑝 degrees of freedom, where 𝑛 denotes the length of the time 
and p is the AR model order (Gourevitch et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009). 
The creation of a connectivity network for the system of electricity spot prices is based on the 
previously described MVAR analysis and enables us to derive the connectivity between pairs 
of prices and, therefore, the system’s global connectivity. We apply graph theory to our 
system of electricity prices in order to analyse the degree of European electricity market 
connectivity. In our model, the hourly spot prices represent the network’s nodes whereas the 
causal interactions among them denote the edges linking the different nodes on the graph. 
This allows us to derive the local connectivity indicators, which will in turn reveal the 
system’s global connectivity. 
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Appendix B: Local connectivity indicators behaviour for each market 
 
Figure B1 depicts the in-strength and out-strength values over time for each of the countries 
in our sample. 
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Fig.B1 - The set of graphs shown above depicts the estimated in- and out-strengths for each 
of the 13 European markets in the sample. The 13 markets under study are: APX ENDEX 
(Belgium (BL), The Netherlands (NL), and The United Kingdom (UK)), Nord Pool Spot 
(Denmark, (DM), Finland (FI), Norway (NO) and Sweden (SW)), Powernext (France (FR)), 
the European Energy Exchange (EEX) (Germany (DE) and Switzerland (SU)), Gestore dei 
Mercati Energetici (GME) (Italy, IT),  OMI-Polo Portugués (OMIP)(Portugal (PO), 
Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad (OMEL) (Spain (ES)). The time 
frame comprises the period 02/07/2007 - 29/06/2012. 
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Appendix C: Out-degree strength chromatic graph 
 
Fig.C1 - Strength of the price out-strength values for each of the thirteen European markets 
considered. The darker colors indicate the connectivity intensity of the out-strengths. 
 
 
In relation to the node out-strengths, the electricity prices which exhibited the lowest out-
strength values during the period 2007-2012 were those of Denmark and Belgium (both with 
5.13%), meaning that, on average, these countries’ electricity prices were those which least 
influenced other prices in our sample. On the other hand, the UK displayed the highest out-
strength values indicating that its electricity prices were mostly associated with outgoing 
causality (around 42%). These results can be explained by the fact that larger countries are 
able to influence other electricity prices in a certain area relatively more compared to smaller 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.Castagneto-Gissey                                           Imperial College London 
 
 377 
 
Appendix D: Tests for validation of local connectivity data (Method) 
In order to validate the local connectivity data, we perform: 1. simple t-tests to investigate 
whether the mean in-strength relative to the coupled markets’ electricity prices has increased 
in the period succeeding the commissioning/coupling date, and 2. correlation tests to check 
whether the correlation among the coupled markets’ price in-strengths is effectively larger in 
the period after commissioning/coupling took place compared to the period preceding that 
date. 
In our model, the in-strength of an electricity price is a measure of the number of links 
incoming to that electricity price node and is calculated as the sum of significant Granger-
causality strengths that are influencing that electricity price during a given time shift. 
Therefore, it follows that if a country’s transmission system has physically connected with 
another transmission system then, by definition, the average of incoming causalities must be 
larger after the occurrence of electricity interconnector commissioning (or, more generally, 
market coupling between two countries), henceforth referred to as period t+1, than what it 
used to be before the interconnector was established (or markets rules instituted) and began 
functioning, i.e. t-1. Therefore, in the case two markets were coupled, both markets’ price 
mean in-strength should be significantly larger during t+1, or after the 
commissioning/coupling date (where the relative in-strength is denoted as 𝐷𝑡+1), compared to 
the period preceding that date (𝐷𝑡−1). The same applies to the correlation among coupled 
markets’ prices in-strengths; in fact, we would expect the price in-strengths of such markets 
to be more correlated after the commissioning/coupling date compared to the period before 
that date. 
More formally, given the time shift number (where in our case, 𝑇 = 1,2,3, … ,7651) 
corresponding to the date of a certain interconnector commissioning (or market coupling 
establishment) (𝑇𝑡) and the known end point of our series (𝑇𝐹, i.e. 7,651), it is easy to extract 
the time length of the price in-strength series to be tested against the same series preceding a 
given commissioning/coupling date, i.e. 𝐿 = 𝑇𝑡+1 − 𝑇𝑡. Therefore, the initial date relative to 
the series 𝐷𝑡−1is given by 𝑇𝑡−1 = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐿. Thus, we test whether the mean of the in-strength 
series of a certain electricity price after commissioning/coupling took place (i.e. 𝑇𝑡 to 𝑇𝑡+1) is 
significantly larger than the mean of the same series before that event (i.e. 𝑇𝑡−1 to 𝑇𝑡)  and 
thus, whether µ
𝑡+1
(𝑇𝑡+1) > µ𝑡−1(𝑇𝑡−1). In a similar fashion and using the same time lengths, 
we also test whether correlation between such markets has generally improved after the 
commissioning/coupling date, i.e. whether 𝜌(𝐷𝑡+1
𝐴 , 𝐷𝑡+1
𝐵 ) > 𝜌(𝐷𝑡−1
𝐴 , 𝐷𝑡−1
𝐵 ), where A and B 
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indicate the price in-strength series of two distinct markets and 𝜌 is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. The introduction of a physical interconnection with another country’s 
transmission line implies that the electricity price of interest should exhibit an average 
number of incoming Granger-causal links that is larger compared to those observed before 
the event. Consequently, it is expected for µ
𝑡+1
 to be significantly larger than µ
𝑡−1
. 
Estimations are carried out through the use of Student’s t-tests, by which standard inference 
methods apply (i.e. alpha is set at 0.05, with Z>1.96). 
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Appendix E: Global connection density peaks 
 
The values of the five observed significant peaks in global density are given as follows: 
 
Time of Occurred Peak    Approx. Peak Level 
𝟐𝟕 − 𝐃𝐞𝐜 − 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕  𝟏𝟐: 𝟎𝟎 4% 
𝟏𝟗 − 𝐉𝐮𝐥 − 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎    𝟎𝟒: 𝟎𝟎 3% 
𝟏𝟔 − 𝐌𝐚𝐫 − 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏  𝟏𝟐: 𝟎𝟎 3% 
𝟏𝟔 − 𝐃𝐞𝐜 − 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟏  𝟎𝟖: 𝟎𝟎 𝟕% 
𝟐𝟑 − 𝐌𝐚𝐫 − 𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟐  𝟎𝟒: 𝟎𝟎 4% 
 
Table E1 Time of occurred peak and relative approximate level of Global Connection Density reached by the 
system of electricity prices. The period of largest interactivity in the system comprehends the final 2 peaks and 
refers to 29-Nov-2011 04:00 to 17-Apr-2012 08:00. The largest peak is close to 7%. On the other hand, the 
mean value of global connection density is ca. 2%. 
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Appendix F: Markov-chain regimes in global connectivity 
 
We apply the Markov chain regime-switching model to the global connection density series 
in order to detect the precise point in which the largest peak starts. The observed  jump in the 
global connectivity was considered as a change to another regime. The switching mechanism 
is typically assumed to be governed by a random variable that follows a Markov chain with 
different possible states. We have used a simple two-regime model that distinguishes between 
a base regime (Rt = 1) and a peak regime (Rt = 2), i.e. the global density is supposed to 
display either mean reverting or jump behaviour at each point of time. The densities Yt,1 and 
Yt,2 that are linked to each of the two regimes are assumed to be independent of each other. 
The variable Rt that determines the current state is a random variable that follows a Markov 
chain with two possible states, Rt = {1,2}. The transition matrix P contains the probabilities pij 
of switching from regime i at time t to regime j at time t+1: 
𝑃 = (𝑝𝑖𝑗) = (
𝑝11 𝑝12
𝑝21 𝑝22
) = (
𝑝11 1 − 𝑝11
1 − 𝑝22 𝑝22
)                              [Eq.F1] 
The current state Rt of a Markov chain depends on the past only through the most recent 
value Rt-1. Therefore, 𝑃{𝑅𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑅𝑡−1 = 𝑖} = 𝑝𝑖𝑗. The probability of being in state j at time 
t+m starting from state i at time t is given by: 
(𝑃
(𝑅𝑡+𝑚=1|𝑅𝑡=𝑖)
𝑃(𝑅𝑡+𝑚=2|𝑅𝑡=𝑖)
) = (𝑃′)𝑚 ∙ 𝑒𝑖          [Eq.F2] 
where P’ denotes the transpose of P and ei denotes the i
th
 column of 2 x 2 identity matrix. We 
assumed that stochastic process governing the base regime (Rt=1) was a mean-reverting 
process; in the peak regime (Rt=2) we used a Gaussian distribution. 
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Appendix G: Random walk representation of global connectivity 
 
We additionally use a simple ARIMA (1,0,0) regression to check whether European 
electricity price global system connectivity represents a random walk process. A simple 
model of connectivity can be summarized by an autoregressive model, as: 
 Δ𝐺𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝜑𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜑
2𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝜑
3𝑒𝑡−3 + ⋯ + 𝜑
𝑛𝑒𝑡−𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡            [Eq.I1] 
where GCD is short for global connection density, 𝜑 is the autoregressive parameter and 
𝑒𝑡, 𝑒𝑡−1, … , 𝑒𝑡−𝑛 represents the sequence of random shocks. In the above model we test the 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the autoregressive parameters is equal to one. In that case, 
the change in global connectivity at time t is given by the weighted sum of random shocks. 
The table below (Table I1) depicts the estimation results relating to the random walk model 
fitted to the natural log of the produced sample global connectivity time series data. 
 
 
 Coeff. z P>|z| 95% LCB 95% UCB 
𝝋 
0.9929 
(0.0014) 
735.49 0.000 0.9903 0.9956 
Constant 
-3.9954 
(0.1133) 
-35.28 0.000 -4.2174 -3.773 
 
 
Table G1 ARIMA(1,0,0) regression estimation results. Wald chi2(2)=542983.05, LL=14482.2, Prob<0.0001.  
Fit to estimation data: 90.3% FPE: 6.958e-07, MSE: 6.956e-07, Standard errors are given in brackets. 
 
 
The above estimation results show that a random walk process could have produced the 
generating process underlying the data and that an AR(1) model is therefore a suitable 
representation of EU electricity price global connectivity. In fact, the AR(1) parameter 
coefficient estimate displays a highly significant value of 0.99. Therefore, the expected value 
of current changes in connectivity is given by white noise, thus the best estimate of 
connectivity at time t representing its value at t-1. This was also confirmed by inspection of 
relative autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions. 
Therefore, global sample connectivity of EU electricity prices represents an almost purely 
stochastic process. Given this is the first study applying graph theory to electricity prices, it 
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was the case to provide a documentation of the generating process underlying the global 
connection density of electricity price data. 
However, it is crucial to note that the usefulness of this technique simply relies in the 
identification of the periods in which the data exhibit abnormal behaviour, as previously 
described, the latter informing about the presence and impact of essential changes within the 
electricity system from a structural perspective. 
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Appendix H: Simulation code 
 
Some good toolboxes are publicly available to estimate the Granger-causality between times 
series. They may include many interactive graphical interfaces for data pre-processing, 
functional connectivity analysis (partial power, coherence, partial coherence, multiple 
coherence and Granger causality) and data visualization. Here we will restrict ourselves to 
those resources developed under the Matlab® software with a proven reliability and 
robustness. For multivariate analysis, the BSMART76 toolbox provides a different of 
quantities of functional connectivity, including the Granger causality. Similarly, 
eConnectome77 is an open-source MATLAB software package more oriented to causality 
between electrophysiological signals. The causality analysis toolbox used in this study was 
that publicly provided by Anil K. Seth78. The main advantage of this toolbox is that it 
includes Granger causality test in both time and frequency domains, as well as different 
statistical tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76
 http://www.brain-smart.org/ 
77
 http://econnectome.umn.edu/ 
78
 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/anils/aks_code.htm 
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A dreamer is one who can only find his way by moonlight, 
and his punishment is that he sees the dawn before the rest of the world. 
 
― Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist 
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and the United Kingdom) during the time periods 2005–7 and 2008–11, ie, before
and after the contagion of the subprime crisis on European markets. The condi-
tional mean and conditional variance are modeled by AR.1/-GARCH.1; 1/ and
AR.1/-NGARCH.1; 1/. The performance superiority of the nonlinear asymmet-
ric generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model
suggests that the leverage effect is well represented. In many cases, the level of
returns in either the oil price or the exchange rate had little impact on the level of
electricity price returns, but the volatility of these prices affected the volatility of
electricity prices in all the European countries examined, except for the United
Kingdom. However, in the succeeding time period (2008–11), the volatility of
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returns. This volatility, or risk, has implications for the way in which low-carbon
generators should be supported.
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2 G. Castagneto-Gissey and R. Green
1 INTRODUCTION
Electricity is priced in national currencies but produced using fuels (oil, for example)
that are often traded on world markets and priced in US dollars (USD).We might there-
fore expect that electricity spot market prices depend on the exchange rate between
the local currency and USD, and on the oil price. This paper tests that hypothesis for
a sample of European Union (EU) countries between 2005–7 and 2008–11, ie, before
and after the contagion of the US subprime mortgage crisis on European markets.
Five of our sample countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain)
use the euro (EUR) as exchange currency, while the United Kingdom uses pounds
sterling (GBP).
Muñoz and Dickey (2009) have investigated the relationship between Spanish
electricity spot prices, oil prices and the USD/EUR exchange rate during the period
2005–7. They showed that these variables were cointegrated, implying the existence of
a long-run equilibrium among them. A transmission of volatility from the USD/EUR
exchange rate and oil prices to Spanish electricity prices was also observed, although
the electricity price level remained unaffected.
This field of research was initiated by Sadorsky (2000), who used cointegration
procedures to study the interaction between prices for crude oil, heating oil and
gasoline and a trade-weighted index of exchange rates. Granger causality analysis
found a long-run relationship between the energy prices and exchange rates, thereby
providing evidence in favor of a transmission of exogenous exchange rate shocks to
energy prices.
We hypothesize that the volatility and levels of electricity prices in our sample of
European countries can be significantly affected by oil prices and exchange rates with
the USD. Furthermore, we investigate whether volatility responds symmetrically to
positive and negative oil and exchange rate shocks.
The response of electricity prices to oil prices and exchange rates will depend on
the fuel mix in each country, and on the way in which gas prices respond to changes
in the oil price. Figure 1 on the facing page shows these fuel mixes. Because the price
of electricity is linked to the marginal cost of production, some technologies with
high average shares may rarely set the price; the obvious example of this is nuclear
power, which has very low marginal costs. In contrast, oil-fired stations are frequently
reserved for peaking use, running relatively infrequently but almost always setting
the price when they do, so that their share of price-setting is above their share of
generation. Natural gas and coal plants can also set electricity prices: in most of the
countries in our sample, the fuel which is more expensive (per MWh of electricity it
can produce) is the one which will set the price more often. Finally, we should note
that, while the fuel for hydroelectric generation (important in several of our countries)
is free, stations would offer power to the market based on the opportunity cost of using
Journal of Energy Markets 7(2)
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FIGURE 1 Fuels used for electricity generation in Europe in 2010 (percentage shares).
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their water now, rather than saving it for later use, and that opportunity cost is based
on expected power prices (and hence fossil fuels). We should also note that all of these
countries trade power among themselves (European Commission 2012) and, while
prices in adjacent markets can differ when the transmission lines between them are
congested, at other times the price in, say, the Netherlands may actually be set by the
marginal power station in France.
The dependence of EU countries on energy imports from nonmember countries is
very large and increasing over time. However, even when a country is self-sufficient
in a fuel, its price may still be set on world markets (as for oil) or sold at prices
indexed to the oil price (as was the case for gas for many years). In the 1990s, British
generators had to pay more than the price of the imported coal for large volumes
of domestic output, but power prices were based on the cost of the imported coal
that would compete for marginal supplies. In contrast, gas prices in northwest Europe
(including the United Kingdom) have increasingly been set in national markets, based
on national supply and demand, although obviously influenced by the cost of imports
or potential value of exports, where capacity exists.
We have chosen three European countries (France, Spain and Germany), which use
greater amounts of nuclear, hydro and alternative sources for electricity production, as
being less sensitive to changes in crude oil prices and to the EUR/USD exchange rate,
and compared them with three EU27 countries (the Netherlands, Italy and the United
Research Paper www.risk.net/journal
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Kingdom) that are more dependent on fossil fuels (see Figure 1 on the preceding
page). Crude oil prices and the exchange rate will feed through to the cost of oil-fired
power generation in national currencies. The exchange rate will also affect the cost of
coal in national currencies, when this is traded in US dollars. Gas prices can depend
on the oil price and the exchange rate in countries where they are still oil-indexed,
such as Italy, which still imports much of its gas through pipelines with long-term oil-
indexed contracts. In countries with so-called gas-on-gas competition, these factors
may have less impact; for example, the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported
into Spain is linked to the price that LNG cargoes could obtain in other markets.
We will study the volatility of electricity prices during two different time frames,
the first corresponding to that studied by Muñoz and Dickey (2009), ie, January 2005
to September 2007, and the second following that period, ie, from January 2008 to
December 2011. Our first period covers the end of the noughties boom; the second
coincides with the subprime crisis and its aftermath.
Our study examines the volatility of daily electricity price returns using two alter-
native classes of volatility models: the generalized autoregressive conditional hetero-
scedasticity (GARCH) model and the nonlinear asymmetric GARCH (NGARCH)
model. GARCH models assume that a data series is normally distributed and that
there is a symmetric volatility response to innovations in the market. However, there
are cases in which the volatility response depends on whether the returns are posi-
tive or negative (Black 1976; Nelson 1991), and empirical evidence implies that this
applies here. The leverage effect, ie, negative correlations between returns and volatil-
ity, is often observed in financial time series. Some of these effects can be captured
only by nonlinear models.
The main contribution of our study is to show that there is a transmission of volatility
between both the exchange rate and oil prices, and electricity prices. Furthermore, we
show that the electricity price level is affected by changes in the exchange rate and
the price of oil.
The paper is organized as follows. Data and preliminary statistical analyses are
reported in Section 2. Models and econometric methodology are provided in Section 3.
Section 4 summarizes the main findings. Section 5 discusses the findings in relation to
previous studies reported in the literature and provides suggestions for further related
research. A brief conclusion is given in Section 6.
2 DATA
Daily data relative to the price of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) basket of crude oil for weekdays covering the two time frames (Jan-
uary 3, 2005 to September 28, 2007 and January 2, 2008 to December 30, 2011)
were obtained from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (source key:
Journal of Energy Markets 7(2)
Exchange rates, oil prices and electricity spot prices 5
OILOPEC). For the same periods, time series relative to spot prices (EUR/MWh or
GBP/MWh) of wholesale electricity for France (Powernext), Germany (EEX), Italy
(GME), the Netherlands (APX), Spain (OMEL) and the United Kingdom (APX UK),
and for the EUR/USD or GBP/USD exchange rates, were obtained from Thomson
Reuters. The electricity prices used in this study are the mean of hourly reference
prices, or half-hourly in the case of the British market, APX UK. Five of our elec-
tricity price series are based on day-ahead auctions, whereas the data from APX UK
is from continuous bilateral trading until shortly before real time. These prices are
therefore formed at slightly different times from the oil prices we report; using several
lagged variables in the regression will capture the potentially varying rate at which
information feeds through to these prices.
The choice of the two time frames was dependent on our intention to study two
specific periods: the first being one prior to the subprime mortgage crisis, the second
depicting the period during the crisis, which hit European countries after its origination
in the United States. In fact, Kazi et al (2011) estimated the break date of the contagion
effect between US stock markets and those of sixteen Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries due to the 2007–9 global financial
crisis by means of a single break (dynamic conditional correlation GARCH) model.
They found it to be exactly October 1, 2007, which conveniently coincides with the
end of Muñoz and Dickey’s (2009) sample period.
Descriptive statistics for the daily return series are shown in Table 1 on the next
page. The mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque–Bera, Ljung–BoxQ
tests and augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) statistics are reported.
An examination of sample autocorrelations, partial autocorrelations, as well as
formal unit root tests reveals that the data was nonstationary in levels. Given the
stationarity requirements of the analysis, the log returns of each single variable were
computed (applicable to electricity prices, oil prices and exchange rates).
Mean returns are quite small, but the corresponding standard deviations are larger,
by an order of several magnitudes. The distributions of the electricity price returns
demonstrate high positive skewness and high positive kurtosis, as shown by the
highly significant Jarque–Bera test. Positive skewness suggests significant asymmet-
ric response to positive shocks, while the negative skewness values for the oil price
returns suggest a greater probability of large decreases during the sample period.
The high values of kurtosis statistics suggest that extreme price changes occur very
frequently. The stationarity of the time series data was explored by using informal
and formal approaches available in the econometrics literature, including the auto-
correlation functions and unit root tests, respectively. Finally, autocorrelation is no
longer present in the log returns.
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The ADF tests the null hypothesis that a time series yt is I.1/ against the alterna-
tive that it is trend stationary I.0/, assuming that the dynamics in the data have an
autoregressive–moving-average (ARMA) structure.
The ADF test clearly rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in the first differenced
series without exception at the 1 %% significance level, implying that the electricity
price returns are stationary. The Box–PierceQ statistics do not reject autocorrelations
up to twenty orders in returns. The returns are thus serially autocorrelated and subject
to time-varying volatility.
The evolution of returns of the electricity prices are graphed in parts (a) and (b) of
Figure 2 on the facing page for the time frames 2005–7 and 2008–11, respectively, with
their shape suggesting that the time series display volatility and volatility clustering.
3 EMPIRICAL MODELS
The distribution of electricity price returns is asymmetric, as shown by the highly
positive skewness and leptokurtic values for all the examined countries. Spanish and
Italian 2008–11 electricity price data was corrected by removing outliers (identified
as values exceeding by five standard deviations the autoregressive mean) and was
replaced by polynomial interpolation. This follows Trück et al (2007), who observed
that the robustness of the findings can be improved by removing outliers from the
data before applying a test. In particular, three points were removed and substituted
within the Spanish time series, and five points within the Italian one.
Modeling electricity price returns and their volatility consists of two essential steps:
the first involves the specification of the ARMA.p; q/ model for mean returns, com-
prising specific diagnostic tests on the residuals; the second relates to the specification
of the GARCH.p; q/models for conditional volatility (followed by relative diagnostic
tests).
Seasonality is usually present in electricity price data. Therefore, we tried to capture
it using two deterministic seasonal functions, a weekly and a monthly seasonality, by
means of daily and monthly dummy variables in the equations for both the conditional
mean and the conditional variance. In fact, the use of monthly variables did not
improve, and in some cases even worsened, the performance of the model. Therefore,
only the daily dummy variables were used.
3.1 Conditional mean
We assume that returns follow an AR.1/ process with stochastic variance. In fact,
the AR.1/ model provides a better fit than the MA.1/ model, given that it exhibits
the lower standard deviation of the residual series. Furthermore, the correlogram of
residuals indicates that an MA.1/ model does not provide a satisfactory fit, as the
residual series is clearly not a realistic realization of white noise.
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FIGURE 2 Daily data of log electricity price returns. [Figure continues on next page.]
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FIGURE 2 Continued.
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The model for the mean is
zt D t C
kX
iD1
ıizt1 C "t ; i D 1; : : : ; k; (3.1)
where z is the time series, the coefficient ı is the autoregressive parameter, t D
 C 2 and 2 is defined in (3.2).
After testing the residual series of the model, a significant high-order ARCH effect
with respect to the time series studied was observed and, therefore, a GARCH model
was applied.
3.2 Conditional variance
In the Bollerslev (1986) GARCH.1; 1/model, the equation describing the conditional
variance is specified as follows:
2t D ! C ˛"2t1 C ˇ2t1; (3.2)
where the real-valued parameters !, ˛ and ˇ satisfy the conditions ! > 0, ˛ > 0 and
ˇ > 0 and .˛ C ˇ/ < 1. However, in many cases it was shown that the sum of the ˛
and ˇ parameter estimates is relatively close to unity and, therefore, the stationarity
condition is violated. The estimate of ˇ allows for an evaluation of the persistence
of the shocks, with an absolute value of ˇ < 1 ensuring stationarity and ergodicity
for the model. Often, the ˇ parameter estimate is too large and mistakenly shows an
exaggerated volatility persistence.
The GARCH model assumes the conditional variance is a linear function of the
lagged squared returns. Therefore, one potential shortcoming of the GARCH model
is the assumption that 2t symmetrically responds to news about volatility from the
previous period.
A special case of, and alternative to, nonlinear GARCH (Higgins and Bera 1992)
is given by
2t D ! C ˛1"2t1 C ˇ12t1 C 1G1.2t1/; (3.3)
where !, ˛ and ˇ are as in (3.2), j j > 0 and G1 W .0;1/ ! Œ0; 1 is an increas-
ing function, similar to the cumulative distribution function of a positive continuous
random variable. The function G1 can be used to allow for a smooth shift in the
parameter !, which determines the level of the conditional variance, 2t . When 2t1
takes a small value, the NGARCH model approaches the GARCH.1; 1/model and the
relation is symmetric. Since theG1 function is taken as continuous, the change in the
level parameter is smooth, in contrast with the abrupt change that is observed in the
threshold models. The introduction of thisG1 function can remove the nonstationary
behavior of the conventional GARCH.1; 1/ model.
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In order to ensure a well-defined process, all the parameters of the infinite-order
ARCH representation must be positive. When the  parameter, which reflects the
leverage effect, is estimated to be positive, it implies that negative shocks have a
greater impact on the conditional volatility than positive shocks do.
Both models were estimated by maximum likelihood. The Akaike information cri-
terion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) were also used to compare
the two models. Since information criteria penalize models with additional parame-
ters, our choice of model orders, based on the AIC and BIC, reflects a combination
of parsimony and goodness of fit.
To capture the spillover of exchange rate and oil price return volatility into domestic
electricity price return volatility, in addition to ARCH and GARCH terms, we embed
multiplicative heteroscedasticity components into the standard GARCH model. Fol-
lowing Judge et al (1985), this paper uses an exponential functional form for multi-
plicative heteroscedasticity. The estimator of the variance of the error is the expected
value of the square of the errors
2 D '0 C '1x1t C '2x2t : (3.4)
Equation (3.4) can be easily estimated using the ordinary least-squares method, where
 has a mean of 0 and is independent of x by assumption.
In (3.4), the coefficients 'i denote the effect of external factors, namely exchange
rate and oil price returns, on the electricity price volatility. Using the exponential form
for conditional volatility has the advantage that it is impossible to estimate a negative
variance.
The estimates of '1 and '2 capture the impact of volatility in the external factor
volatility on the conditional variance and thus, in our case, the effect of the exchange
rate and oil price returns on the volatility of the domestic electricity price returns.
The introduction of weekly dummy variables in the conditional variance resulted
in the lack of identifiability of the GARCH models due to a flat likelihood surface that
gave rise to numerical instabilities in the estimation of the parameters. Therefore, we
decided not to study the effect of the weekly seasonality on the conditional variance.
3.3 Sign and value expectations of model parameters
For the oil price, for example, a 10% increase would lead to a 2% direct increase
in power prices, if oil-fired power stations set the market price in 20% of the hours
(assuming power prices are directly proportional to the cost of the marginal fuel). If
gas-fired stations set the price in another 40% of hours, and the price of gas is directly
indexed to that of oil, we would get an overall effect of a 6% increase and a coefficient
of 0.6. The coefficient would be lower if gas prices were only partly linked to those
of oil.
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We measure the exchange rate in terms of EUR (or GBP) per USD. This implies
that an increase in our variable (which implies a depreciation of the euro) will lead to
an increase in the price of electricity (as imported fuel becomes more expensive) and
so the sign should also be positive. A 10% depreciation of the exchange rate would
lead to a 10% rise in the domestic oil price, all else being equal, which would feed
through to a 2% increase in power prices, as above; however, the exchange rate would
also affect the domestic cost of coal priced in US dollars and so the coefficient might
be greater than that for the oil price.
The combined effect of fuel price and exchange rate should be additional in terms
of ARCH-in-mean. For example, if the oil price increases by 20% from US$60/barrel
to US$72/barrel and meanwhile there is a 10% depreciation of the euro against the
US dollar (from €1 per US dollar to €1.1 per US dollar), then the local cost of the
oil per barrel would be€79.20 instead of€60, which corresponds to an overall price
increase of 32%.
4 RESULTS
The time courses of the European electricity spot prices for the time frames 2005–7
and 2008–11 are, respectively, reported in parts (a) and (b) of Figure 3 on the next
page. The natural log of the daily electricity spot price returns for the time period
2005–7 are depicted in part (a) of Figure 2 on page 9, while those that refer to the
interval 2008–11 are shown in part (b) of Figure 2 on page 10.
Part (a) of Table 2 on page 15 and part (a) of Table 3 on page 21 present the estimated
coefficients, standard errors and p-values for the conditional mean equations of AR-
GARCH and AR-NGARCH models, along with the loglikelihood, AIC and BIC
and Q test, for the two periods of time under inspection (2005–7 and 2008–11,
respectively). Similarly, the results relative to each of the two GARCH specifications
are reported in part (b) of Table 2 on page 17 (time frame 2005–7) and part (b) of
Table 3 on page 23 (time frame 2008–11). Part (a) of Table 2 and part (a) of Table 3
report the results from fitting the two GARCH specifications. Lags of the dependent
variables are included as exogenous variables for the underlying equations in all
models.
As shown in part (b) of Table 2 on page 17 and part (b) of Table 3 on page 23,
the volatility of the exchange rates and oil price returns significantly affects domestic
electricity price return volatility and, in some cases, also its mean (see part (a) of
Table 2 on page 15 and part (a) of Table 3 on page 21). In the first period, the positive
sign and significant t statistic for the coefficient on the exchange rate, within the mean
equation for the Italian case, indicates that the appreciation of the euro against the US
dollar leads to a lower electricity price in that country, as expected. In contrast, there is
a statistically significant, and anomalous, negative correlation between the level of the
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FIGURE 3 Behavior of the six European electricity spot prices within the two periods.
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oil price and electricity prices in the Netherlands. The contribution of natural gas to
electricity production grew quickly in the Netherlands and in 2009 represented about
60% of its total production. In order to fulfill Kyoto Protocol commitments, the use
of natural gas was growing in the Netherlands, while its share of coal-fired electricity
production was progressively decreasing; in fact, coal contribution accounted for 40%
of total electricity generation in 1990 and decreased to 25% in 2009.
The Netherlands is the largest gas producer in the EU (BP 2013) and in 2008 over
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60% of electricity was from gas-fired generation. It is likely that a depreciation of the
US dollar against the euro could have increased the use of domestic natural gas, with
a subsequent reduction of gas imports, thus explaining the negative sign.
Daily electricity prices are characterized by clear seasonal patterns associated with
time intervals, such as the day of the week or the month. Electricity prices can be sea-
sonal because demand is linked to weather conditions; patterns over the week can be
affected by the pattern of social and economic activities. The relevance of periodicity
is acknowledged, for instance, by Wilkinson and Winsen (2002) and Hernáez et al
(2004), who show that different day types have different price patterns.
The ARCH-in-mean coefficient shows that the volatility of electricity prices
affected their level only in Italy in the first period. The conditional variance was sig-
nificantly influenced by the EUR/USD exchange rate returns for Spain (in agreement
with the findings of Muñoz and Dickey (2009) in spite of the different methodological
approach used), by the oil price returns for both Germany and the United Kingdom
and by both exchange rate and oil price returns for Italy and the Netherlands, although
the magnitude of the effect, ie, the spillover, differs across countries.
If we consider the second time frame, ie, the period 2008–11 (part (a) of Table 3
on page 21), the level of electricity prices is not affected by the level of the exchange
rate for all countries except the United Kingdom. The level of the oil price has a
statistically significant effect for Italy. For France and Spain, the t statistics resulting
from the one-period lagged ARCH-M test are significant for both GARCH models,
indicating that there is statistical evidence implying the conditional variance affects
the conditional mean in those countries (alone).
Instead, as far as the conditional variance is concerned, the ARCH .˛/ and
GARCH .ˇ/ parameters are positive and significant in both models. This indicates
the presence of ARCH and GARCH effects in the conditional variance equations. The
highest own-innovation or ARCH spillovers .˛/ are observed for Germany and Spain,
indicating the presence of strong ARCH effects. The lagged volatility or GARCH
spillovers .ˇ/ are also significant for all countries, but larger in magnitude for Italy
and the United Kingdom. In addition, the GARCH parameters for the Spanish elec-
tricity market exceed unity, implying that the model is not stationary for the presence
of a unit root in the conditional variance. Past shocks persist for very long periods
instead of dissipating.
The GARCH model assumes that the conditional variance depends on a linear
autoregressive process of past squared returns and variances. Although this model is
able to capture heteroscedasticity and volatility clustering, excess kurtosis with fat
tails and the leverage effect of conditional distribution cannot be described by the
classical GARCH model. Accordingly, in our study the loglikelihood, AIC and BIC
provide evidence that augmenting the GARCH model with leverage terms enhances
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the model’s performance. In fact, the sum of the NGARCH parameters ˛, ˇ and  is
always lower than unity, indicating model goodness.
The parameter for the asymmetric volatility response ( ) is negative and significant
for all the countries examined, representative of an asymmetric response to positive
innovations in the conditional variance equation. This result, which is generally con-
sistent with the skewness values reported in Table 1 on page 6, shows that electricity
price volatility tends to rise in response to positive price spikes.
5 DISCUSSION
In the time period 2005–7, the effect of exchange rate returns volatility on electricity
price return volatility was significant only for Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, but
became significant for all the examined countries within the time frame 2008–11.
This increased volatility transmission may reflect the greater correlation between a
wide variety of markets in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis contagion. There
was also more volatility to transmit: the coefficient of variation of the daily EUR/USD
exchange rate rose by one-third between the two periods, while that for the GBP/USD
rate doubled.
Exchange rate log returns only had a statistically significant effect on the Italian
electricity price level in the first period. In the second period, we find significant coef-
ficients for France and for the Netherlands. This divergence is surprising, given the
strong convergence that was observed among the electricity markets of the Nether-
lands, Germany and France (see Dijkgraaf and Jansen 2007).
For Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, at least within the period 2005–7, oil price
return volatility significantly affected the volatility of electricity prices. This is not
surprising given the importance of fossil fuels in European electricity production, as
shown in Figure 1 on page 3.
The better performance of the NGARCH model over the GARCH model indicates
that the effect of exchange rates and oil prices on electricity price volatility is asym-
metric. The negative asymmetry parameter can be interpreted as an inverse leverage
effect (Knittel and Roberts 2005; Janczura and Weron 2010), implying that exchange
rate and oil price increases have a clearly negative impact on electricity price volatility,
while exchange rate and oil price decreases do not significantly affect the electricity
price. We recorded a decrease in the asymmetry of this response, which fell by 54%,
in absolute terms, on average over the six countries after the 2008 crisis. This means
that the subprime crisis might have induced a markedly more similar response in
European electricity prices to both positive and negative oil price and exchange rate
shocks.
A volatile environment weakens the effect on price level changes since it reduces
the element of surprise. While there is no literature regarding the asymmetric effects
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of the euro exchange rate against the US dollar, the presence of asymmetric effects
of oil prices on electricity price volatility was previously described by Hadsell et al
(2004) and Higgs and Worthington (2005).
It is interesting to note that, in spite of the different methods used to measure
the electricity price volatility, our study exhibits a similar outcome for the Spanish
electricity price volatility to that previously shown by Muñoz and Dickey (2009),
ie, the volatility of Spanish electricity spot prices was affected by the EUR/USD
exchange rate. In relation to the different approaches, while we used GARCH models
to assess the conditional variance and the conditional mean of electricity price returns,
Muñoz and Dickey (2009) defined the current time volatility as the squared difference
of present and one-period lagged electricity prices, in order to then apply a vector
error correction model.
The few other studies reported in the literature regarding the effect of oil prices and/
or exchange rates on electricity price volatility reach differing conclusions. Moham-
madi (2009) did not find a long-term relationship between oil and US electricity
prices. In contrast, Narayan et al (2008) observed that previous values of oil price
and USD/EUR exchange rates affect the evolution of future values of the exchange
rate, in terms of both levels and volatility.
Future studies including a larger number of countries, including countries (such
as Australia, New Zealand and some countries in Latin America) in which there is a
working electricity spot market to set the price, might help to clarify the role of these
or other countries’ currencies exchange rates against USD and that of the oil price in
the conditional variance and the conditional mean of the electricity price.
6 CONCLUSION
We investigated the effect of daily exchange rate returns and crude oil spot price
returns on the electricity spot price return for a sample of European countries. The EU
countries investigated were selected on the basis of their national currency (EUR/USD
or GBP/USD) and their dependency on fossil fuels for electricity production, with
France, Spain and Germany using more nuclear, hydro and alternative sources than
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy. Furthermore, Spain was also chosen in
order to provide terms of comparison with the results reported in Muñoz and Dickey
(2009).
We show that there is in many cases a transmission of volatility between both the
exchange rate and the oil price returns toward the price return of wholesale electricity
and that, for some countries, the level of the electricity price return is also affected
by changes in the exchange rate and oil price returns. The effects become greater
for all the countries studied in the time frame 2008–11, likely as a consequence of
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the economic crisis that struck the Eurozone after contagion deriving from the US
subprime mortgage crisis.
A volatile wholesale price that will be passed through to electricity consumers
implies significant risks to their bills. It is also unattractive to most low-carbon gen-
erators, whose costs are not linked to fossil fuel prices. Ensuring that payments to
these generators are largely de-linked from the overall level of power prices (as with
Feed-in-Tariffs or the UK government’s proposed Electricity Market Reform) would
reduce risks for generators and consumers alike.
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This paper studies the interactions between electricity and carbon allowance prices in the year-ahead
energy markets of France, Germany, United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, during Phase II of the EU
ETS. VAR and Granger-causality methods are used to analyze causal interfaces, whereas the volatility of
electricity prices is studied with basic and asymmetric AR-GARCH models. Among the main results, the
marginal rate at which carbon prices feed into electricity prices is shown to be ca. 135% in the EEX and
Nord Pool markets, where electricity and carbon prices display bidirectional causality, and 109% in the
UK. Therefore, generators in these markets internalized the cost of freely allotted emission allowances
into their electricity prices considerably more than the proportionate increase in costs justiﬁed by effective
carbon intensity. Moreover, electricity prices in France are found to Granger-cause the carbon price. This
study also shows how European electricity prices are deeply linked to coal prices among other factors, both
in terms of levels and volatility, regardless of the underlying fuel mix, and that coal was marginally more
proﬁtable than gas for electricity generation. EU policies aimed at increasing the carbon price are likely to
be crucial in limiting the externalities involved in the transition to a low-carbon system.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the establishment of the European Union Emission
Trading System (EU ETS), carbon prices represent a major cost
for EU electricity producers. As such, the carbon price should feed
into the marginal cost of electricity and hence, the power price.
Traditional economic theory suggests that the rate at which
additional costs feed into product prices is greater, or less, than
100% when the underlying market is imperfectly competitive. For
instance, Bonacina and Gulli (2007) found that carbon prices are
fully incorporated in power prices when the electricity market is,
conversely, perfectly competitive. However, it is not clear to what
extent carbon costs are passed through to wholesale electricity
prices in practice. Various studies have reported the “pass-
through” rate of the carbon cost into electricity prices in Europe.
Sijm et al. (2006), for example, conclude that pass-through rates
generally varied from 40% to 100% during Phase I. Others, such as
Bunn and Fezzi (2008) found pass-through rates to be as low as
42%. On the other hand, Fell et al. (2013) found that carbon costs
are fully passed through in most countries, perhaps by even more
than 100%.
This paper investigates the extent by which EU electricity
generators internalized the marginal costs of carbon emissions
into their electricity prices during Phase II of the EU ETS. We look
into this question by considering the thermal efﬁciencies of
natural gas- and coal-ﬁred electricity generation as well as their
carbon intensities. We analyze four of the major EU markets,
namely those of Germany, France, United Kingdom and the Nordic
countries. This work also studies the inﬂuence of fuel prices on the
dynamics of electricity forward price levels and volatility.
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It is expected that, in many sectors, businesses will pass on their
extra carbon costs through to consumers, thus earning net proﬁts as
a result of the impact on product prices combined with the extensive
free allocations of emission allowances (Smale et al., 2006).
In fact, a major characteristic of the pilot phase of the EU ETS
was that almost all emission allowances were allocated for free to
the installations covered by the scheme. The over-allocation of free
emission permits during Phase I of the EU ETS, starting from 2005,
was the cause of severe market distortions. During the ﬁrst phase
of the EU ETS (2005–2007), more than 2.2 billion allowances of 1 t
each were allocated each year. At average current market prices for
2005, this represented a social value of approximately EUR 40
billion p.a., ca. 60% of which was allocated to the power sector
(Sijm et al., 2006).
The generous rounds of free allocation, which continued
until the end of Phase II (i.e., until 2012) provided windfall
proﬁts for EU power generators and resulted in the carbon
market crashing in Phase I. In addition, the general economic
outlook in Europe, originating from the 2008 US subprime
crisis, resulted in the carbon market crashing once again in
Phase II. This resulted in an extremely low carbon price and
proved to be detrimental to the incentives for producers to
abandon carbon intensive generation.
Since 2008, an increasing number of studies have focused on
the analysis of the EU ETS. Studies such as Zachmann and Von
Hirschhausen (2008) and Chevallier (2009) focused on the drivers
of electricity and carbon prices, respectively. Keppler and
Mansanet-Bataller (2010) were the ﬁrst to analyze the interplay
between energy prices during Phase I. They also considered the
ﬁrst of ﬁve years of Phase II, in the context of the French Power-
next, albeit that market alone. However, as Phase I is widely
considered a “learning” Phase, given the excessive over-allocation
of free permits, and Phase III was only recently launched (in
January 2013), Phase II (2008–2012) currently remains the only
complete and potentially informative period available to us in the
examination of the interactions between electricity and carbon
prices within European markets.
Since the launch of the EU ETS, the interactions between
electricity and carbon prices have been the source of thorough
debates. It is not clear whether the rate at which carbon prices
feed into the electricity prices of EU markets reﬂects the perfectly
competitive market structure advocated by the EU Commission.
In addition, there is a lack of studies analyzing the causal relation-
ship between carbon and electricity prices during the full length of
Phase II whilst comparing the main electricity markets in Europe.
This paper aims at (i) deﬁning the causal interface between
carbon and electricity prices in four of the major European
electricity markets, (ii) inferring whether price setting in these
markets represents the competitive practice of EU electricity
generators and (iii) providing an analysis of the impact of fuel
prices on European electricity prices and their volatility, during
Phase II of the EU ETS.
The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows: the next
section introduces the main concepts related to this study,
describes the market data used and outlines the main methodol-
ogies of this study. Section 3 reports the main results, whereas
Section 4 discusses them and compares the four European markets
under analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main ﬁndings
and policy implications, thereby concluding the paper.
2. Methods
Section 2.1 provides the relevant background in the form of a
review of the studied electricity markets (Section 2.1.1) and a
description of the relevant theories (Section 2.1.2), whereas an
analysis of the data is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3
introduces the main econometric methods employed in this study,
i.e. VAR-based analysis, Granger-causality and the AR-GARCH
model, used to study the volatility interactions between our
variables and the different electricity prices.
2.1. Backgrounds
This section brieﬂy introduces the markets under study and the
theories related to the causal relationships between carbon and
electricity prices.
2.1.1. European electricity markets
Fig. 1 depicts electricity generation by fuel for each of the
studied markets. Germany mainly uses coal and lignite (46%), and
some natural gas (14%). France, instead, generates electricity
mostly using nuclear power (79%), but employs small quantities
of coal (4%) and natural gas (4%). The United Kingdom, on the
other hand, is largely based on natural gas (40%) and coal-ﬁred
generation (30%) (World Bank, 2013). Finally, the Nord Pool market
is mainly dependent on hydro (53%) and nuclear power (21%) for
baseload electricity generation, as well as some fossil fuels (15%)
designed to serve peaking demand (Entsoe Memo, 2014).
The EU carbon scheme is subdivided into different trading
periods. This paper relates to Phase II of the EU ETS carbon market
(2008–12). Phase II saw a sharp reduction in the number of issued
permits and represented a step towards the abolition of free
allocation in favor of auctioning, which occurred from Phase III
forward. Fig. 2 shows the behavior of the carbon year-ahead price
during Phase II. The Phase II carbon forward price rose over
25 EUR/MT of carbon dioxide during the ﬁrst half of 2008, almost
reaching 30 EUR/MT. Carbon prices then crashed from July 2008,
from a high of 28 EUR/MT to about 8 EUR/MT in February 2009, or
a drop of about 72% in just over 7 months. The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gave two
main reasons for this substantial fall: reduced output in energy
intensive sectors due to the economic recession1 and the fact that
the European markets' perception of future fuel prices was revised
downwards (UNFCCC, 2009), as shown by the behavior of the
natural gas and coal year ahead prices.2
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Fig. 1. The selected countries' electricity generation fuel mix (2011).
Data sources: World Bank (Germany, France and United Kingdom shares) and
ENTSOE-Memo (Nord Pool shares).
1 This implies that a lower extent to abatement is required to meet the cap,
thereby providing a decrease in the carbon price.
2 Figs. C1 and C2 in Appendix C show the behavior of the gas and coal one-year
forward price levels. Please refer to Figs. B1–B4 for the energy forward price levels
behavior in each of the four markets.
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2.1.2. Theoretical background and previous work
The long-run cost abatement, or the carbon cost "pass-
through" effect relates to the percentage of the carbon price which
is passed-through to the electricity price, representing a causal
effect running from the carbon price to the electricity price. A fully
competitive electricity market is expected to deliver a pass-
through rate of 100%, which is the case with internalization of
any costs incurred in a competitive generation process.
Since the start of Phase I, there have been large debates in
relation to the applicability and empirical ﬁndings of the pass-
through theory. This was primarily due to the fact that power
producers were experiencing large abnormal proﬁts due to the
free allocation of emission allowances. In the case of the German
electricity market, econometric simulations by Sijm et al. (2005,
2006) found a pass-through rate on the EEX electricity price of
about 80%. Other markets exhibited a slightly lighter effect, though
still at a minimum of 60%. Empirical support for this measure was
provided in various studies; however most of these considered
Phase I. Bunn and Fezzi (2009) were the ﬁrst to address this issue
by using equilibrium models, thereby ﬁnding evidence of a
positive carbon price pass-through effect for the United Kingdom.
Fell (2010) similarly reported this relationship for the Nordic
countries. On the other hand, by using gas as an explanatory
variable in a VECM for Germany, Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen
(2008) provided evidence of an asymmetric pass-through effect,
implying that rising carbon prices had a larger magnitude of effect
on the electricity price compared to falling prices.
Whereas the pass-through theory relates to the effect of the
carbon price on the electricity price, the inverse situation happens
in the short-run, when carbon abatements cannot be performed,
aside from the important potential of running gas instead of coal-
ﬁred stations, and entails the power producers increasing their
output by using more carbon allowances. Some authors have
reported the causal link directed from the electricity price toward
the carbon price. For example, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller
(2010) show how the electricity price directly and signiﬁcantly
impacts on the carbon price in Phase II (although, only one year of
data was employed). Moreover, Naziﬁ and Milunovich (2010)
isolate the inﬂuence of the Nord Pool electricity price on the
carbon price using a VAR model for Phase I. However, Phase II is
not analyzed in this study. Some of these authors refer to the
causal link running from the electricity price to the carbon price as
proof of the so-called “short-term rent capture theory”. This
theory refers to the scenario in which selling allowances on the
carbon market results in an opportunity cost for electricity gen-
erators with a degree of market power. As the author notes, in
avoiding production in order to sell allowances, these producers
give up their electricity market rent. Thus selling allowances also
entails an opportunity cost which may be passed through to the
carbon price (Convery et al., 2008; Ellerman, 2010). Supporters of
this theory suggest how the allocation of free permits affects
generators' cost curves in different ways. Most importantly, it does
not affect average costs at the level of output compatible with free
allocation. Given the absence of an increase in average costs and
the increased marginal costs of production, this scenario implies
an increase in the levels of proﬁts by electricity producers, at each
level of output, thereby increasing total proﬁts (Keppler and
Cruciani, 2010).3 This is depicted in Fig. 3 which shows how
monopolistic proﬁts increase due to free permit allocation. The
fact that the average cost curve fails to increase by the right
amount, in proportion to the marginal cost rise, implies a larger
amount of proﬁt to be gained by the electricity producer. The
increase in proﬁts is given by the difference between the two areas
(P0, D, AC0, c0)–(P, D, AC, c)40. In this situation, the electricity
output has decreased from Q to Q0 whereas the price level has
increased from P to P0. However, as can be seen from Fig. 3, there is
reason to believe that the change in proﬁts can be small.4 Thus, in
Fig. 2. The behavior of the EU ETS Phase II carbon forward price (2008–12).
Fig. 3. An increase in marginal costs implies higher monopolistic proﬁts deriving
from free permit allocations. Q0 is the output level corresponding to free allocation.
AC is average cost, MC is marginal cost, D is demand and MR is marginal revenue.
3 However, this may only occur if power prices rise with marginal costs.
4 The increase in proﬁts is small if we consider a simple model with the
demand, average costs, marginal costs and marginal revenue curves assumed to
behave according to standard shapes, as those shown in Fig. 3. In addition, there is
no substantial and widely accepted proof, or theoretical reason to believe that
national electricity prices can considerably affect the European price of carbon.
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this paper we will refer to the causal link directed from the
electricity price to the carbon price as a purely statistical relation.
2.2. Data analysis
This section introduces the time series data and analyzes their
stationarity properties. It then describes the main econometric
techniques employed in this study, i.e. Vector autoregression and
Granger-causality. Finally, the GARCH models, used to analyze the
volatility interactions between the energy and electricity prices,
are brieﬂy exposed.
2.2.1. Data choice and description
We consider the forward power market, speciﬁcally the year-
ahead market where, for example, electricity delivered in 2014 is
traded during every weekday of the year 2013. The data runs from
January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012 (i.e., 1304 datapoints),
covering the full length of EU ETS Phase II. All data were obtained
from Bloomberg and transformed in EUR/MWh, except for the
carbon price, which is kept in EUR/MT of CO2, in order to take into
account the carbon intensity of the different generation units (i.e.,
coal and gas, which possess different carbon contents). The choice
of considering year-ahead markets relates to the fact that spot, or
day-ahead, prices are contaminated by demand changes on a daily
basis that long-period forward prices are hardly affected by.
Daily data relative to gas, coal and carbon one-year forward prices
were selected to explain the electricity prices of the four major
European markets, namely those of the European Energy Exchange
(EEX, Germany), Powernext (France), APX UK (United Kingdom) and
Nord Pool (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark; speciﬁcally, we use
the system price). Fig. 4 reports the time courses relative to the one-
year forward prices of electricity for the four considered markets.
The highest electricity prices (EUR) between 2008 and 2012 are
generally those in the United Kingdom (on average, ca. 62 EUR/
MWh), followed by French prices (57 EUR/MWh). Electricity prices
in Germany (55 EUR/MWh) are slightly lower than those in France,
whereas the lowest prices are those prevailing in the Nord Pool
market, at around 44 EUR/MWh. The natural gas forward price
data are from three of the major European natural gas trading
hubs; i.e., Bunde (situated in Bunde/Oude at the Dutch–German
border, EEX), the Title Transfer Facility (TTF, or the Dutch hub) and
the National Balancing Point (NBP, the UK hub). The Dutch forward
price is used in the model for France, whereas the NBP price is
used in that for the United Kingdom.5 In the models for Germany
and Nord Pool the Bunde gas price is employed, given that
Norway, a major gas supplier, exports its natural gas mainly to
Germany. By coal, we refer to the internationally traded commod-
ity classiﬁed as coal CIF AP#2, or the ﬁrst-year Generic CIF ARA
steam coal price,6 delivered to the Dutch ARA region, which
represents a European coal price benchmark.
2.2.2. Descriptive statistics
This section reports the main descriptive statistics of the raw
data relative to the considered variables. The next section exam-
ines the data's stationarity properties, ensuring the applicability of
the data for the econometric analyses introduced in Section 2.3.
Table 1 reports the mean values, standard deviations and ranges of
the variables of interest. The highest forward prices (Nord Pool and
Fig. 4. The behavior of the 4 electricity forward prices during EU ETS Phase II (2008–12), i.e. Germany, France, United Kingdom and Nord Pool.
Table 1
Summary statistics of carbon, electricity, gas, coal and stock index prices.
Price Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Carbon 14.08 5.30 5.72 29.33
UK electricity 62.21 13.83 40.15 108.45
DE electricity 54.91 9.25 42.60 90.70
FR electricity 56.90 10.06 43.85 93.45
NO electricity 44.17 7.81 27.60 69.75
UK gas 20.59 6.20 7.17 36.79
DE gas 24.51 5.71 12.00 42.48
FR gas 24.19 5.74 11.75 42.20
NO gas 24.51 5.71 12.00 42.48
Coal 11.39 2.24 7.60 19.72
FTSE index 6378.08 900.24 3872.26 8523.71
DAX index 6169.17 899.13 3666.41 7849.99
CAC index 3671.07 546.90 2519.29 5495.67
OBX index 427.08 100.35 178.73 587.51
5 Note that some data have been reported in more than one ﬁgure: for
instance, the electricity forward price levels for France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and Nord Pool are reported together in Fig. 4 to show the similarities
between their behaviors. They are also individually reported in Figs. B1–B4, along
with the relative fuel prices and carbon prices in order to exhibit the relationship
between electricity, fuel and carbon prices, in each market.
6 Coal prices are cost, insurance and freight inclusive.
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United Kingdom) also present the highest variances. Table 2
depicts the values of skewness and kurtosis relative to the
distribution of the studied time series. The Jarque-Bera (JB) tests
are also reported. As shown in Table 2, none of the variables has a
normal distribution.7 In particular, the French electricity price
presents positive leptokurtosis. Platykurtic distributions are instead
observed for all other prices. In addition, all stock indices besides the
French CAC, which is skewed rightwards, are skewed to the left,
whereas all energy prices are skewed to the right. All JB tests identify
the statistical signiﬁcance of results at the 5% level (αo1.96).
2.2.3. Stationarity tests
Table A1 shows the mean values, standard deviations and
ranges relative to the ﬁrst differences of electricity, carbon, coal
and natural gas year-ahead prices and stock indexes. The Aug-
mented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–Peron tests (PP) were
used to check the stationarity properties of the data. To check for
the presence of a unit root we test the null hypothesis that the
difference is assumed to be stationary, against the alternative that
the trend is a non-stationary process. Under the null hypothesis,
the autoregressive polynomial of the underlying time series has a
root equal to 1. The results of the stationarity tests on the level and
differenced series are reported in Tables A2 and A3, respectively.
Estimation by Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC, BIC)
suggested the selection of one lag. If the ADF statistics was less
than 2.87, the null hypothesis was rejected. The raw data
appeared to exhibit non-stationary behavior, as the performed
ADF tests were greater than 2.87, whereas stationarity was
achieved after ﬁrst differencing. The results summarized in
Tables A2 and A3 indicate that the ﬁrst differences of the variables
tested are stationary and integrated of ﬁrst-order, thus they are
I(1). Johansen's maximum likelihood procedure can be used to
examine the possible existence of cointegration between the
variables examined. The null hypothesis of no cointegration was
not rejected and the ﬁrst difference or innovations of the variables
can be used to test for Granger-causality.
2.3. Econometric models
2.3.1. VAR-based Granger-causality analysis
A VAR model is used as the benchmark for the Granger-
causality analysis, which will determine the direction of causation
between our variables. The pass-through rates of carbon prices
into electricity prices, depending on the existence of such
relationship, will be established by the respective GARCH condi-
tional mean model parameters and the effective carbon intensity
of the units on margin, as described in Section 3.3. The VAR
modeling approach, introduced by Sims (1980), often provides an
accurate representation of the dynamic behavior of a system of
variables. However, its main drawback entails the economic
interpretability of its parameter estimates. The VAR coefﬁcients
only represent reduced form model parameters because the
instantaneous interactions of the endogenous variables are not
explicitly modeled but are included in the covariance matrix of the
residuals (see Cooley and Le Roy, 1985; Bunn and Fezzi, 2008). The
VAR(p) equation is expressed as
yt ¼ A1Yt1þB0xtþεt ð1Þ
where for each market considered, yt is a K1 vector of endo-
genous variables (in this case the electricity price) and xt is an
M1 vector of exogenous variables (in this case containing coal,
natural gas and carbon prices and the stock index), A is a KKp
matrix of coefﬁcients and B0 is a KM matrix of coefﬁcients, Yt is
the Kp1 vector given by
Yt ¼
yt
⋮
ytpþ1
0
B@
1
CA
and εt is a vector of innovations which can be simultaneously
correlated but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and
uncorrelated with all variables on the right hand side of Eq. (1).
The Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz–Bayesian (BIC) information criteria
were used to determine the most appropriate lag lengths of the
model. The conditional maximum likelihood estimator is used as
an estimator for the coefﬁcient matrix and is consistent and
asymptotically efﬁcient. The latter involves employing the Kro-
necker product as well as the vectorization of the matrix contain-
ing the endogenous variables.
Granger causality (Granger, 1969) describes the dependency
relationships between two time series and is used to reveal the
causal relationships between the variables under study. According
to this test, if two series {Xt} and {Yt} are strictly stationary, {Yt}
Granger-causes {Xt} if past and current values of Y embody further
information regarding the future values of X. In fact, supposing
that FX,t and FY,t denote the relevant information set of past values
of both Xt and Yt, at time t, {Yt} is said to Granger-cause {Xt} if the
following condition is satisﬁed:
ðYtþ1;…;YtþkÞ jðFX;t ; FY ;tÞ  ðYtþ1; …;YtþkÞ j FX;t ð2Þ
where “” denotes distribution equivalence. Supposing that
XlXt ¼ ðXtℓXþ1;…;XtÞ and that YlYt ¼ ðYtℓYþ1;…;YtÞ represents
the lag-vectors, where ℓX ;ℓYZ1, the null-hypothesis states that
realized values of XlXt embed further evidence on Ytþ1, beyond that
present in YlYt (Karagianni et al., 2009).
2.3.2. GARCH models
The previous analysis of skewness and kurtosis (see Table 2)
suggests that the distributions of the ﬁrst differences of the
electricity prices are asymmetric. All outliers – identiﬁed as values
exceeding by ﬁve standard deviations the autoregressive mean –
were removed and replaced by polynomial interpolation, follow-
ing Trück et al. (2007). The electricity price series are adequate for
an investigation using heteroscedastic volatility models given that
their ﬁrst differences are serially autocorrelated and display time-
varying volatility. In addition, inspection of the differenced prices
(see Figs. D1–D4) also shows how the series exhibit the property
of volatility clustering. The possibility of transforming the series
into natural logs was abandoned given that it would have implied
Table 2
Skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque–Bera test results.
Price Skewness Kurtosis Prob (JB)
Carbon 0.261 0.585 o0.0001
UK electricity 1.240 1.235 o0.0001
DE electricity 1.663 2.346 o0.0001
FR electricity 1.936 3.048 o0.0001
NO electricity 0.83 0.26 o0.0001
UK gas 0.369 0.744 o0.0001
DE gas 0.537 0.628 o0.0001
FR gas 0.503 0.505 o0.0001
NO gas 0.537 0.628 o0.0001
Coal 0.822 1.269 0.0004
FTSE index 0.64 0.11 o0.0001
DAX index 0.56 0.39 o0.0001
CAC index 0.79 0.43 o0.0001
OBX index 0.78 0.28 o0.0001
7 See Figs. D1–D4 for an illustration of the time series' behaviors in terms of
ﬁrst differences.
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a reduction of the volatility magnitude observed in the electricity
prices, thereby potentially disguising the explored statistical links
(see Karakatsani and Bunn, 2008). Seasonality is typically an
important issue to be considered when analyzing electricity price
data. However, we did not expect year-ahead seasonality but
checked it through the use of Boolean indicators; however, no
seasonality was detected.
We empirically formulate the following speciﬁcation for the
conditional mean model, applied to explain the ﬁrst differences of
electricity prices, yt, as:
yt ¼ a0þa1yt1þωXtþεt ð3Þ
where Xt is ðiÞh^t . The GARCH process (Bollerslev, 1986) is repre-
sented by
ht ¼ θþ ∑
q
i ¼ 1
αiε2t iþ ∑
p
i ¼ 1
βiht iþγ1yt ð4Þ
where yt is a vector with one-period lagged exogenous variables
(i.e., carbon, gas and coal future prices and stock market index)
that explains the time varying variance process ht.
The model assumes that θ40, αZ0 and βZ0, as well as
(αþβ)o1. The sum of the estimates for α and β is, in many cases,
considerably close to one, thereby violating the condition for
stationarity. The estimated value of β enables for an assessment of
the persistence of shocks; in fact, an absolute value of βo1 ensures
the convenient properties of stationarity and ergodicity for our
model. Finally, the GARCH model assumes that h responds in a
symmetric fashion to the innovations to one-period lagged volatility;
different speciﬁcations of the GARCHmodel are ﬁtted to the data and
the most parsimonious model is selected. In fact, we will use the
simple asymmetric ARCH (SAARCH) model by Engle (1990) for one of
the four countries examined (United Kingdom). The SAARCH model
basically adds the γ term in Eq. 4 that makes the GARCH model
respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks.
2.3.3. A priori evaluation of model parameters
Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly intensive in
coal- and gas-ﬁred electricity production, as indicated by their
generation fuel mix (see Fig. 1). Therefore, their models are
expected to yield the largest coefﬁcients for the relationship
between electricity prices and both the coal and natural gas prices.
France, on the other hand, uses tiny fractions of coal and gas (both
about 4%) in producing electricity, instead largely based on nuclear
power. The same applies to the Nord Pool market, which only uses
about 15% of fossil fuel generation. Thus, we would expect gas and
coal prices to have a relatively small impact on the electricity prices
of Nord Pool and Powernext. However, it should be noted that
countries such as those comprising the Nord Pool market can also
be reliant on coal prices for baseload generation as coal represents
the opportunity cost of current hydrogeneration. However, local
prices may also be set by the electricity imports from neighboring
countries as well as by the opportunity cost of not exporting. The
above hypotheses are also expected to be qualitatively valid in the
conditional variance models, although it is possible for results to be
larger in relative magnitude in terms of volatility.
2.3.4. Calculation of pass-through rates
The cost pass-through rate (PTR) of the carbon price into
electricity prices is calculated as the GARCH conditional mean
coefﬁcient, or the derivative of the electricity price with respect to
the carbon price (ωcarbon), divided by the “theoretical” value of the
carbon cost (TCC)
PTR¼ωcarbon
TCC
ð5Þ
The theoretical carbon cost (TCC), or the effective carbon intensity of
coal and gas-ﬁred generation, is, in turn, given by the sum of the
carbon intensities of gas- (0.35) and coal-ﬁred generation (0.9) times
their average shares in electricity generation at the margin, as
TCC¼ 0:9ζCþ0:35ζG; ð6Þ
where C (G) stands for coal (gas) and ζC and ζG are the coal and
the gas average shares at the margin in the market's total
electricity generation, respectively. In turn, ζcoal and ζgas are
given by the thermal efﬁciency of coal times the GARCH coefﬁ-
cient on the coal price (the marginal change in the electricity
price given a unit change in the coal price; i.e., ωcoal) and the
thermal efﬁciency of natural gas times the GARCH coefﬁcient on
the gas price (the marginal change in the electricity price given a
unit change in the gas price; i.e., ωgas), as
ζC ¼φCωcoal ð7Þ
and
ζG ¼φGωgas: ð8Þ
The efﬁciency of gas, φG, is set as equal for all markets (0.53),
whereas that of coal, φC, is known to vary across countries.8 We
use an efﬁciency factor of 0.36 for United Kingdom and Nord
Pool, while a factor of 0.4 is used to represent the efﬁciency of
coal-ﬁred generation in Germany and France.
As ωcarbon approaches the “theoretical” carbon price value
(PTR), the marginal rate at which the carbon price feeds into the
electricity price approaches 100%, indicating a competitive inter-
nalization of carbon costs. Consequently, values o100% suggest
some degree of market power, whereas values 4100% indicate
that costs are integrated within electricity prices more than
proportionately. The latter may therefore imply that abnormal
proﬁts are earned, on average, in the market.
3. Results
This section reports the main estimation results relative to the
employed time series models. Section 3.1 presents the VAR model
and Granger-causality test results, whereas the GARCH volatility
results are reported in Section 3.2. Finally, Section 3.3 presents the
observable cost pass-through rates.
3.1. VAR analysis and Granger-causality test results
The VAR model estimation by the eigenvalues of the compa-
nion matrix of the system showed that the variables were jointly
ergodic, implying that the effects of shocks die out, thereby
demonstrating the applicability of the models. The Lagrange
multiplier test was not able to reject the null hypothesis of no
serial correlations even with a single lag, thus the optimal lag
length was set at 1. This was further conﬁrmed by the values of AIC
and BIC, as well as the Wald test statistics. Table A4 shows the VAR
results. The signiﬁcant correlations found through the VAR model
do not imply causality, rather they simply indicate that one
variable can cause changes in the other variable or that both
variables can be caused by a different, omitted factor. However,
given the choice of variables included in the model, this should not
be the case. In fact, an indicator of economic activity and all major
fuel costs were incorporated to comply with this analysis. The
Granger-causality test results are reported in Table 3, for each
8 Thermal efﬁciencies are assigned according to efﬁciency of conventional
thermal electricity production of the European Environment Agency (2013).
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market. The probabilities in bold indicate the rejected hypotheses
and thus the inverse statement is considered valid. Tables A5–A8
provide the complete set of results relating to the Granger-
causality tests for Germany, Nord Pool, France and the United
Kingdom.
In Germany, the relationship between carbon and electricity
future prices is bidirectional, although with a stronger effect of
electricity prices on carbon prices than vice-versa, as shown by the
relatively higher probability value for this direction of causation.
In addition, the coal price Granger-causes the electricity future
price, even though Germany uses large amounts of coal in
electricity generation (see Table A5). Finally, the signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between coal and carbon future prices observed in the
VAR model is likely driven by a third, unknown factor.
In the case of the Nord Pool data, all relationships established
throughout the VAR model were successfully reﬂected by the
Granger-causality tests. In particular, there is a bidirectional causal
relationship between Phase II carbon price and the electricity
price. However, the relationship by which the electricity price
drives the carbon price is stronger compared to the inverse
relationship. In addition, the natural gas price affects the carbon
price. Furthermore, there is evidence of a bidirectional causal
relation between coal and gas prices in the Nord Pool market,
whereby coal prices affect gas prices comparatively more than
vice-versa (see Table A6). Finally, the carbon price negatively
affects the coal price, as recorded in all other markets.
In France, a unidirectional relationship between electricity and
carbon future prices is recorded. In addition, the CAC Index and
the Phase II carbon future price display a bidirectional causal
relation, even though this is not supported by a strong coefﬁcient.
The model for France also indicates that the carbon price affects
the coal price. However, coal and gas prices do not display
Granger-causality, meaning that a third factor should be respon-
sible for the signiﬁcant relationship observed in the VAR model
(see Table A7). Finally, a strong bidirectional link is recorded
between coal and stock prices in France.
The electricity future price Granger-causes the carbon future
price in the United Kingdom. In contrast, the coal price does not
Granger-cause the electricity price, neither vice-versa, suggesting
that a third variable can be responsible for the strong cointegra-
tion observed between coal and electricity prices (see Table A8).
This could perhaps be related to some form of expectations about
the markets. Furthermore, the carbon future price negatively
affects the ARA coal future price. In addition, the United Kingdom
gas future price Granger-causes the coal price. Finally, a third
factor must be responsible for affecting both electricity and coal
future prices since the detection of Granger-causality between
these two variables was not possibly veriﬁed.
3.2. GARCH analysis results
The electricity prices represent the endogenous variables in
each of the four models and were regressed against the carbon,
gas and coal prices, and national stock market indices. Since the
time series showed a signiﬁcant volatility clustering property, the
ARCH class of models was used to depict these properties. More
complex volatility models, such as TGARCH, EGARCH or APARCH
did not improve the signiﬁcance of the models and therefore the
most parsimonious model, the AR(1)–GARCH(1,1) model, was
applied in all cases except for the United Kingdom, for which the
SAARCH model was used. Table 4 reports the estimation results for
each of the studied markets.
As shown in Table 4, the future prices of carbon, gas and coal
are all relevant factors in the determination of the levels and
volatilities of electricity future prices in the Nord Pool, Powernext,
EEX and APX UK markets. The conditional mean model results
imply that the ﬁrst differences of carbon, gas and coal determine
the electricity price ﬁrst difference in all markets. The coefﬁcients
estimates of ωcarbon range from 0.38 to 0.67.
The volatility of electricity future prices is also determined by
the carbon, gas and coal future price volatilities, in all markets. The
most important determinant9 of electricity price volatility is the
volatility of coal prices, with coefﬁcients for βcoal ranging from 2.2
(Nord Pool) to 4.1 (France). However, the relation did not reach
statistical signiﬁcance in the United Kingdom. Carbon price vola-
tility is also shown to have a large impact on electricity price
volatility in France, Germany and, especially, in the Nord Pool
market, but slightly less in the United Kingdom. Finally, gas price
volatility was the most considerable in terms of its impact on
electricity price volatility in the United Kingdom , but substantially
less in other markets. Moreover, the volatility of carbon and coal
prices are signiﬁcant predictors of electricity price volatility in all
markets except for the United Kingdom. In addition, natural gas
price volatility predicts electricity volatility in all markets except
Germany. Overall, as expected, the volatility transmission of fuel
prices onto electricity prices was notable and conﬁrms previous
ﬁndings (e.g., Mansanet-Bataller and Soriano, 2009; Castagneto-
Gissey and Green, 2014).
The presence of an asymmetric parameter for the British model
reﬂects the so-called leverage effect (the parameter γ1), which
occurs when past price changes are negatively correlated with
future changes in volatility. The observed negative gamma coefﬁ-
cient indicates that positive price level shocks induce a greater
effect on volatility compared to negative shocks.
Furthermore, relative to the ARCH-M estimation, the condi-
tional mean of electricity prices was not signiﬁcantly affected by
the volatility of the respective electricity prices in any of the four
markets, at any of the three lags employed. The high GARCH
coefﬁcient for all countries, except for the United Kingdom,
suggests the existence of a large degree of volatility persistence,
considered to be a common feature in ﬁnancial series, especially
with electricity prices. The ARCH and GARCH parameters are
positive and signiﬁcant, indicating the presence of ARCH and
GARCH effects in the electricity differenced future prices. Since
α1þβ1o1 (α1þβ1þγ1o1 for the SAARCH model), it can be
Table 3
Granger causality test null hypothesis for the causal relationship between electricity and carbon prices in Germany, Nord Pool, France and United Kingdom. F is the F-statistic
and P is the probability value. At a P-value less than 0.05 we reject the null hypothesis, thus the inverse of the statement is implied with 95% conﬁdence.
HO DE NO FR UK
F Pr. F Pr. F Pr. F Pr.
Electricity prices do not cause carbon prices 0.368 0.215 1.101 0.288 0.344 0.842 0.357 o0.0001
Carbon prices do not cause electricity prices 1.450 0.068 1.064 0.079 41.793 o0.0001 3.837 0.441
9 This is measured by the GARCH conditional variance model coefﬁcient
estimate times one standard deviation of the independent variable. Note that the
estimated coefﬁcient is a result of the employed units.
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argued that there is stability in volatility, although the volatility
persists over time, as shown by the high values of the GARCH
parameter, for each of the examined markets.10
3.3. Carbon cost pass-through rates
The carbon cost pass-through rate into the electricity prices is
calculated based on the conditional mean results, as explained in
Section 2.3.4. The implied gas and coal shares at the margin are
computed assuming that the pass-through rate of gas and coal
prices into electricity prices is equal to one.11 Table 5 shows the
implied gas and coal shares at the margin and the derived carbon
price pass-through rates:
The causal relationship running from the carbon price toward
the electricity price is observable only in the Nord Pool and EEX
markets, where the recorded pass-through rates exceed 134%. In
these cases, however, the impact of electricity prices on carbon
prices was considerably larger than the opposite relationship. The
UK model, on the other hand, yields the conclusion that it is the
carbon price to inﬂuence the electricity price, and not vice-versa,
thereby recording a carbon cost pass-through rate of ca. 109%.
Conversely, the electricity price affects the carbon price in France,
thus the pass-through theory cannot be conﬁrmed. However,
the computed value for this relationship is noticeably lower in
the French market (88%), representing the only case falling
behind the full pass-through rate of 100%. Therefore, in all cases
where the computed pass-through rates are backed by the
appropriate statistical relationship, the obtained results indicate
that average electricity producers in these countries excessively
incorporated their carbon emission costs into wholesale elec-
tricity prices.
Table 5 shows the gas (coal) shares at the margin implied by our
models, which should equal the average ratio recorded over the
studied period between the marginal change in CCGT (coal) output
with respect to the marginal change in total generation, respectively.
We validate the gas and coal price coefﬁcients by considering the
British case, for which hourly generation-by-fuel-type data was
available.12 The average ratios of marginal changes of CCGT and coal
to total output were calculated as 0.41 and 0.44, respectively. These
values are very close to the implied gas and coal shares at the margin,
shown in Tables 5, i.e. 0.37 and 0.49, respectively. Moreover, if the
actual marginal shares are substituted into the “theoretical” gas and
coal shares in Eq. (6), we derive an even higher pass-through rate of
115%, which emphasizes non-competitive practices in the United
Kingdom. Using these values, the pass-through rates of gas and coal
prices into electricity prices were derived as 90% and 112%. Therefore,
these results suggest that British generators integrated the cost of
coal substantially more than the cost of gas.
Similarly, the implied shares of gas and coal for France, Germany
and Norway should reﬂect the effective marginal shares in electricity
generation in these countries. In fact, Germany is mostly reliant on coal,
thereby explaining the relatively higher implied share of coal compared
to gas. On the other hand, France and the Nord Pool countries are
mostly based on nuclear and hydropower and use only very small
amounts of both fossil fuels, which might explain the similar implied
shares of coal and gas, which are noticeably lower than the same
implied shares derived for Germany and the United Kingdom.
Nevertheless, the implied shares of coal are larger compared to
those of gas in all the studied markets, indicating the importance
of coal in electricity generation during Phase II.
4. Discussion
The excessive carbon cost pass-through rates observed in the
EEX, Nord Pool and UK markets suggest that prices in those
Table 4
Parameter estimates from the AR-GARCH (Germany, France and Nord Pool) and SAARCH (United Kingdom) models. Standard errors are given in brackets. Note that the
parameter “Carbon” in the conditional mean model corresponds to ωcarbon in Eq. (5); the same applies to “Gas” and “Coal” in the same model, which correspond to ωgas and
ωcoal, respectively, in Eqs. (7) and (8). SMI stands for stock market index.
UK DE FR NO
Conditional mean model
Carbon 0.621 (0.054) o0.0001 0.668 (0.032) o0.0001 0.378 (0.039) o0.0001 0.521 (0.048) o0.0001
Gas 0.697 (0.034) o0.0001 0.472 (0.035) o0.0001 0.628 (0.042) o0.0001 0.505 (0.051) o0.0001
Coal 1.366 (0.119) o0.0001 1.132 (0.079) o0.0001 0.870 (0.089) o0.0001 0.883 (0.104) o0.0001
SMI 0.0006 (0.0002) 0.007 0.0004 (0.00009) o0.0001 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.289 0.087 (0.018) o0.0001
Constant 0.021 (0.016) 0.178 0.014 (0.009) 0.131 0.014 (0.011) 0.194 0.011 (0.014) 0.437
Conditional variance model
Carbon 0.540 (0.367) 0.141 1.604 (0.360) o0.0001 1.665 (0.421) o0.0001 2.965 (0.479) o0.0001
Gas 1.253 (0.078) o0.0001 0.378 (0.208) 0.070 0.569 (0.134) o0.0001 0.500 (0.157) o0.0001
Coal 0.063 (0.389) 0.871 4.094 (0.281) o0.0001 2.897 (0.332) o0.0001 2.195 (0.526) o0.0001
SMI 0.012 (0.0008) o0.0001 0.0006 (0.002) 0.786 0.008 (0.001) o0.0001 0.004 (0.003) 0.137
Constant 2.329 (0.093) o0.0001 4.764 (0.242) o0.0001 5.995 (0.268) o0.0001 5.036 (0.361) o0.0001
Table 5
Implied gas and coal shares at the margin and carbon price pass-through rates. The
standard errors of the carbon price GARCH conditional mean model coefﬁcients,
representing the change in the electricity price per unit change in the carbon price
are 0.032, 0.039, 0.054 and 0.048 for Germany, France, the United Kingdom and
Norway, respectively. However, these were not used to calculate the pass-through
rates. The PTRs in bold indicate the direction of causation running from carbon
prices toward electricity prices.
Market Implied coal share
at margin
Implied gas share
at margin
Carbon cost pass-
through rate (%)
DE 0.45 0.25 135
FR 0.35 0.33 88
UK 0.49 0.37 109
NO 0.32 0.27 137
10 Please refer to Table A9 for the complete set of GARCH results, including the
ARCH-in-mean and ARCH results, for each of the four markets.
11 For example, the pass-through rate of natural gas prices into electricity
prices is given by the change in electricity price per unit change in gas price (or the
gas price GARCH coefﬁcient in the conditional mean; i.e., ωgas) times the thermal
efﬁciency of gas power plants (53%), divided by the percentage of time gas-ﬁred
plants are at the margin. This enables us to solve for the implied share of gas at the
margin; i.e., 0.53ωgas. The same applies to the derivation of the implied coal share
at the margin, calculated using a thermal efﬁciency of 0.4 for Germany and France
and 0.36 for the United Kingdom and Nord Pool. 12 This data was retrieved from the Elexon Portal.
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countries might be driven by prices in trading partners with more
emissions, or that additional, unknown transmission mechanisms
are occurring contemporaneously to the changes in carbon prices.
However, it is also possible that generators are somehow pushing
through bigger increases in their electricity prices, suggesting anti-
competitive behavior. To a similar extent, Mokinski and Wölﬁng
(2014) recently found an asymmetric pass-through of EUA prices
into wholesale electricity prices in Germany. In addition, they
found that this asymmetry had disappeared in response to a
report on investigations by the competition authority. The present
study similarly ﬁnds asymmetric innovation effects in the United
Kingdom.13 Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that German, Norwegian
and UK generators took advantage of the changes in carbon prices to
increase their electricity prices more than proportionately, and that
electricity market power seems to be particularly evident in France,
although the French market is heavily regulated.
Soon after the institution of the EU ETS, some energy intensive
ﬁrms in Germany called on the local competition authority to
scrutinize the practice of price setting by German generators. Their
main complaint was that internalizing the actual cost of freely
allocated allowances constitutes an abuse of market power and should
be disallowed. On the other hand, the producers argued that the
generation of additional units of electricity required the use of
additional allowances, which could have otherwise been sold, regard-
less of whether they were bought on the market or initially allocated
as a free endowment. In fact, they claimed to be in line with
competitive practice having increased prices by the additional oppor-
tunity costs. The German competition authority thus undertook
investigations in the matter and issued hearing summons to RWE
and E.ON, which accounted for over 60% of German installed capacity.
The progress report was published in 2006 (Bundeskartellamt 2006).
Thus, concerns seem to remain for Germany, the UK and Nord Pool
countries, as the low and continually falling prices during Phase II
cannot possibly justify the excess internalization of additional costs.
This suggests that structural and behavioral remedies would be
sensible. As Borenstein et al. (1997) note, relatively small investments
in transmission capacity may yield surprisingly large payoffs in the
form of increased competition. It is thus crucial for the EU Commission
to introduce new competition policies. Policies aimed at improving
and increasing internal and external transmission, widening the
market, and enhancing market operations between countries can be
seen as appropriate remedies. Furthermore, it can be crucial to deploy
additional resources towards investments in renewable energy, which
could contribute by reducing power prices.
This study has also demonstrated that, during Phase II, the
price of coal represents the primary determinant of electricity
prices both in terms of their levels and volatility. Their effect is
the largest in the electricity markets of Germany and the United
Kingdom, which use the largest amounts of coal in electricity
generation in our sample compared to France and Nord Pool.
Even though in most cases causality was not detected via the
VAR-Granger method, our GARCH results suggest that there is a
strong link between coal and electricity prices across all coun-
tries. Fuel prices can therefore set the price of electricity in
countries where little amounts of coal are used. Indeed, the
future electricity price in a hydro-dependent market such as
Nord Pool will depend on the expectation of future coal prices as
fuel-based generation determines the primary opportunity cost
of producing electricity.
In Phase II, the combination of low coal prices, high gas prices
and an ultra-low carbon price resulted in coal-ﬁred generation
revealing as increasingly proﬁtable in a number of European
countries, where gas-ﬁred power plants operated at a loss. For
example, in 2010, Germany's largest utility spent EUR 400 million
building a gas-ﬁred power station (EON SE's Irsching-5 in Bavaria),
declared just three years later as largely unproﬁtable although it
represented one of the most efﬁcient gas plants in the world.
In fact, it operated less than 25% of the time as falling power prices
made burning natural gas unproﬁtable by record margins. More
generally, European utilities, including the GDF Suez SA and
Centrica Plc gas plants in France were stuck in a similar crisis. In
addition, production from gas plants in France decreased by 24% in
2012. As European weakness held back electricity demand,
cheaper coal and the collapsing cost of carbon permits are
alienating the use of gas-ﬁred plants. Switching to coal-ﬁred
Fig. 5. The marginal proﬁtability of coal- over gas-ﬁred electricity generation in the markets of Germany, France, United Kingdom and Nord Pool, calculated as the clean dark
spread minus the clean spark spread. It is possible to note how for the majority of the period considered, coal was more proﬁtable than gas. One of the reasons for this
entailed the low coal and carbon prices in Europe. In addition, note how the proﬁtability of coal over gas tends to rise increase between 2010 and 2012, in all markets.
13 The asymmetric effect recorded for the United Kingdom implies that positive
innovations have a larger effect compared to negative innovations. However, the
innovations derive not only from carbon prices but also from coal and gas prices.
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generation not only increases emissions but also lowers proﬁts for
gas-ﬁred plants. It should be noted that this reﬂects heavily on the
European economy as these plants generate about a quarter of
European power (Andersen and Patel, 2013).
As can be appreciated from Fig. 5, the marginal proﬁtability of
coal over gas-ﬁred generation14 was generally positive throughout
Phase II. In addition, there seems to be an upwards trend in the
marginal proﬁtability of coal over gas starting slightly after the start
of 2010 and lasting until the end of 2012. One of the reasons why
coal has become so proﬁtable is because it became cheap on world
markets, also as a result of the new shale gas bonanza prevailing in
the US, where gas prices have sharply and unexpectedly dropped.
An additional factor behind the increase in coal-ﬁred generation is
undoubtedly represented by the EU regulations in force at the time,
such as the Large Combustion Plant Directive, which have pushed
generators to maximize their coal use before shutting down. Ger-
man and British emissions also rose. Coal use soared in 2011, and EU
carbon emissions increased after years of consistently falling.
Therefore, reducing the number of emission permits might repre-
sent a viable solution as the price of carbon would likely rise and
possibly provide an increasing use of gas rather than coal. Back-
loading was adopted by the EU Commission and Parliament in 2013,
however representing only a temporary measure.15 A sustainable
solution aimed at correcting the imbalance between permit supply
and demand requires structural changes to the ETS.
This increased use in the utilization of coal could have represented a
substantial drawback in consideration of the strict emission reduction
objectives set by the European Commission in order to comply with the
Kyoto Protocol agreements. However, it should be noted that, in May
2002, the EU ratiﬁed KP1, using in particular Article 4 of the Protocol
which allows parties to fulﬁll the requirements for emission reduction
jointly. Thus, all EU member states in the so-called “bubble”, or the EU-
1516 states, were required to comply with a combined reduction of 8%
by 2012, compared to their 1990 levels. Therefore, the consequences of
increased carbon emissions of individual countries might have perhaps
negatively reﬂected on the requirements in the EU burden sharing
agreement. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily represent a setback
for the EU as a whole as the severe economic situation in Europe
deriving from the US subprime crisis notably decreased production
across EU countries, thereby driving down carbon emissions. In fact, the
EU has over-achieved its ﬁrst Kyoto emissions target and is on track to
meet the 2020 objective (European Commission, 2014). However, if the
proﬁtability of coal was to encourage an even increased use of coal in
the coming years, there could be a chance for the EU not to fully meet
its future emission reduction targets.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This study considered the interactions between electricity and
carbon year-ahead prices during Phase II of the European Union
Emission Trading System (2008–12) and investigated the drivers of
electricity future prices in terms of levels and volatility.
Among the main results, the causal relationship between
carbon and electricity forward prices is bidirectional in the Nord
Pool and EEX markets. In addition, there is evidence that the
French electricity price Granger-causes the carbon price, whereas
the inverse relationship holds in the UK. Based on the results
obtained in this study we conclude that the average electricity
generator in the UK, Germany and the Nordic countries interna-
lized the cost of carbon emissions into their electricity prices
considerably more than proportionately in relation to the increase
in costs deriving from effective carbon intensity, even though
permits were freely allocated. To this extent, safeguarding a
healthy level of international competition among European gen-
erators must be ensured in order not to deviate from the path
toward full integration.
In addition, coal prices are shown to be the most inﬂuential
determinants of electricity prices in Europe during Phase II, both in
terms of levels and volatility, although coal represents an inframar-
ginal production unit. Moreover, this study also showed that coal was
substantially more proﬁtable than natural gas throughout the dura-
tion of Phase II. This fundamental reliance on coal, which mainly
derives from low coal, natural gas and carbon prices, may represent
an obstacle in the accomplishment of EU emission reduction goals,
despite the EU burden sharing agreement. Moreover, policies aimed
at limiting the supply of emission permits should be considered an
appropriate measure to discourage coal use and support natural gas-
ﬁred or carbon-free electricity generation.
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Appendix A
See Tables A1–A9.
Table A1
Summary statistics of the ﬁrst differences of electricity, carbon, coal and gas
forward prices, and stock prices.
First difference Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Carbon price 0.013 0.343 1.72 1.62
UK electricity price 0.010 1.152 13.33 9.44
DE electricity price 0.014 0.71 3.65 4.45
FR electricity price 0.012 0.79 7.40 7.00
NO electricity price 0.012 0.85 10.47 4.20
UK gas 0.002 0.63 2.45 8.03
DE gas 0.0006 0.381 1.72 3.40
FR gas 0.0003 0.382 2.55 2.30
NO gas 0.0006 0.381 1.72 3.40
Coal 0.0007 0.205 1.43 1.38
FTSE index 0.94 92.88 492.98 594.69
DAX index 0.15 95.63 523.98 518.14
CAC index 1.39 63.53 368.77 367.01
OBX index 0.003 0.830 3.50 3.57
14 The marginal proﬁtability of coal over gas-ﬁred generation was calculated as
the clean dark spread minus the clean spark spread. The clean spreads are calculated
as Clean Spark Spread¼Spark Spread(Carbon Price0.411); Clean Dark
Spread¼Dark Spread(Carbon Price0.971). The spark spread, instead, is given by
Wholesale electricity pricePrice of gas/0.53, whereas the dark spread by Wholesale
electricity pricePrice of coal/0.36. An efﬁciency of 0.36 is used for United Kingdom
and Nord Pool and 0.4 for Germany and France. Please see Figs. E1–E4 for the clean
spreads and marginal proﬁtability of coal over gas during Phase II, relative to the
markets of Norway, United Kingdom, France and Germany.
15 Back-loading does not reduce the overall number of allowances to be
auctioned during Phase III, but only the distribution of auctions over the period.
16 The EU member states in the “bubble” were Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
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Table A2
ADF and PP t-statistics for unit root tests on the level series. Values lower than the 5% critical value of 2.87 (boldface-marked) imply acceptance of the null hypothesis that
the series are stationary. Clearly, all level series are non-stationary.
Levels ADF PP
Carbon price 2.63 2.72
UK electricity price 1.74 1.72
DE electricity price 1.28 1.38
FR electricity price 1.32 1.36
NO electricity price 2.05 1.96
UK gas 1.75 1.65
DE gas 1.18 1.38
FR gas 1.18 1.35
NO gas 1.18 1.38
Coal 1.65 1.79
FTSE index 2.47 2.34
DAX index 2.02 1.98
CAC index 3.37 3.30
OBX index 1.36 1.33
Table A3
ADF and PP t-statistics for unit root tests on the series' ﬁrst-differences. Values lower than the 5% critical value of 2.87 (boldface-marked) imply acceptance of the null
hypothesis that the series are stationary. Note that all series become stationary if expressed in ﬁrst differences.
First Differences ADF PP
Carbon price 34.33 34.33
UK electricity price 37.29 37.28
DE electricity price 32.58 32.50
FR electricity price 35.84 35.84
NO electricity price 36.32 36.38
UK gas 35.44 35.51
DE gas 31.77 31.93
FR gas 32.69 32.85
NO gas 31.77 31.93
Coal 33.24 33.23
FTSE index 35.23 37.55
DAX index 35.23 35.24
CAC index 38.05 38.30
OBX index 36.08 36.09
Table A4
VAR parameter estimates. SMI is short for stock market index (i.e., DAX for Germany, CAC for France, FTSE for the United Kingdom and OBX for the Nord Pool countries).
Endogen. variable Exogen. variable UK DE FR NO
Coeff. (S.E.) P Coeff. (S.E.) P Coeff. (S.E.) P Coeff. (S.E.) P
Electricity Electricity 0.107 (0.033) 0.001 0.033 (0.043) 0.438 0.198 (0.036) o0.0001 0.075 (0.034) 0.030
Carbon 0.387 (0.103) o0.0001 0.162 (0.071) 0.024 0.466 (0.072) o0.0001 0.173 (0.080) 0.031
Gas 0.004 (0.055) 0.938 0.0044 (0.066) 0.947 0.335 (0.070) o0.0001 0.093 (0.078) 0.232
Coal 0.475 (0.179) 0.008 0.204 (0.122) 0.094 70.373 (0.125) 0.003 0.077 (0.140) 0.581
SMI 0.00029 (0.00036) 0.419 0.00020 (0.00021) 0.349 0.00069 (0.00035) 0.051 0.022 (0.031) 0.478
Constant 0.005 (0.032) 0.876 0.013 (0.019) 0.487 0.012 (0.021) 0.567 0.013 (0.023) 0.585
LL 10751.190 8944.367 8806.76 3276.776
AIC 16.612 13.834 13.623 5.122
BIC 16.831 14.053 13.842 5.340
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Table A5
Granger-causality test results for the German model (1 lag considered). The numbers in bold denote the P40.05 at αo1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds.
Null hypothesis for Germany F-stat Prob.
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.450 0.068
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.0002 0.010
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 2.196 0.146
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.275 0.643
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.368 0.215
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.131 0.897
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 7.631 0.043
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.714 0.485
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 12.481 0.006
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.269 0.501
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.038 0.950
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.057 0.892
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 24.244 o0.0001
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 1.726 0.019
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 0.192 0.656
The DAX future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 4.099 0.055
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 0.0039 0.076
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 0.196 0.679
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 1.231 0.104
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause DAX future prices 7.273 0.059
Table A6
Granger-causality test results for the Nord Pool model (1 lag considered). The numbers in bold denote the P40.05 at αo1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds.
Null hypothesis for Nord Pool F-stat Prob.
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.064 0.079
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.661 0.267
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.409 0.338
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.120 0.041
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.101 0.288
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.199 0.916
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 8.335 0.006
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.579 0.282
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.424 0.566
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.484 0.019
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.906 0.581
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.824 0.308
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 0.226 0.345
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 0.122 0.270
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 4.758 0.050
The OBX future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 4.289 0.104
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.234 0.741
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.628 0.581
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 0.404 0.769
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause OBX future prices 3.465 0.226
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Table A7
Granger-causality test results for the French model (1 lag considered). The numbers in bold denote the P40.05 at αo1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying
statement cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds.
Null hypothesis for France F-stat Prob.
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 41.793 o0.0001
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 23.408 o0.0001
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 9.072 0.011
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 4.890 0.087
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.344 0.842
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 0.499 0.779
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 12.64 0.002
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 3.943 0.139
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 12.130 o0.0001
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.844 0.358
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 7.307 0.007
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 1.060 0.303
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 6.618 0.037
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 4.699 0.095
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 16.082 o0.0001
The CAC future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 2.229 0.328
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 2.241 0.326
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 1.375 0.503
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 0.127 0.939
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause CAC future prices 4.639 0.098
Table A8
Granger-causality test results for the British model (1 lag considered). The numbers in bold denote the P40.05 at αo1.96, thereby indicating that the underlying statement
cannot be accepted and that the inverse therefore holds.
Null hypothesis for United Kingdom F-stat Prob.
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.357 o0.0001
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 0.066 0.977
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 11.057 0.029
The FTSE index future prices do not Granger-cause electricity future prices 1.998 0.309
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 3.837 0.441
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 2.607 0.747
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 11.031 0.001
The FTSE index future prices do not Granger-cause carbon future prices 1.699 0.429
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 5.989 0.024
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.270 0.256
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 6.393 0.048
The FTSE index future prices do not Granger-cause gas future prices 0.606 0.532
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 16.657 o0.0001
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 0.534 0.436
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 0.692 0.694
The FTSE index prices do not Granger-cause coal future prices 4.353 0.129
The electricity future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 1.363 0.609
The carbon future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 1.231 0.314
The gas future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 1.210 0.618
The coal future prices do not Granger-cause FTSE Index future prices 3.078 0.364
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See Figs. B1–B4.
Table A9
Parameter estimates from the AR-GARCH (Germany, France and Nord Pool) and SAARCH (United Kingdom) models. Standard errors are given in brackets.
UK DE FR NO
ARCH-in-mean
L1 0.008 (0.009) 0.374 0.062 (0.163) 0.705 0.327 (0.260) 0.070 0.045 (0.083) 0.587
L2 0.0025 (0.008) 0.740 0.016 (0.208) 0.939 0.372 (0.389) 0.340 0.044 (0.108) 0.682
L3 0.0032 (0.006) 0.564 0.041 (0.129) 0.748 0.064 (0.237) 0.788 0.015 (0.075) 0.838
AR 0.149 (0.036) o0.0001 0.106 (0.031) 0.001 0.139 (0.031) o0.0001 0.083 (0.031) 0.007
ARCH
ARCH (α1) 0.492 (0.055) o0.0001 0.145 (0.027) o0.0001 0.075 (0.012) o0.0001 0.178 (0.029) o0.0001
GARCH (β1) 0.396 (0.025) o0.0001 0.750 (0.039) o0.0001 0.894 (0.014) o0.0001 0.803 (0.029) o0.0001
SAARCH (γ1) 0.181 (0.032) o0.0001 – – –
α1þβ1 – 0.895 0.969 0.981
α1þβ1þγ1 0.707 – – –
LL 1483.878 509.475 793.419 1079.276
AIC 3001.757 1050.950 1618.839 2190.553
BIC 3089.688 1133.709 1701.598 2273.312
Prob4χ2 o0.0001 o0.0001 o0.0001 o0.0001
Q(20) 107.959 58.782 59.932 123.931
Fig. B2. Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in France (FR).
Fig. B1. Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in Germany (DE).
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Appendix C
See Figs. C1 and C2.
Fig. B3. Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in the United Kingdom.
Fig. B4. Electricity, coal, gas and carbon year-ahead prices in the Nord Pool market (NO).
Fig. C1. The behavior of the NBP, EEX and TTF natural gas forward prices.
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Appendix D
See Figs. D1–D4.
Fig. C2. The behavior of the ARA CIF coal forward price (2008–12).
Fig. D1. Electricity one-year forward price ﬁrst difference (DE, FR, UK, NO).
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Fig. D2. EU ETS Phase II carbon emission allowance one-year forward price difference.
Fig. D3. Gas one-year forward price ﬁrst difference (DE, FR, UK, NO).
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Appendix E
See Figs. E1–E4.
Fig. D4. Stock market indexes ﬁrst differences (DE, FR, UK, NO).
Fig. E1. Behavior of the clean dark and spark spreads, and their difference (i.e., the marginal proﬁtability of coal over gas) in the United Kingdom during 2008–12.
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Fig. E2. Behavior of the clean dark and spark spreads, and their difference (i.e., the marginal proﬁtability of coal over gas) in Germany during 2008–12.
Fig. E3. Behavior of the clean dark and spark spreads, and their difference (i.e., the marginal proﬁtability of coal over gas) in France during 2008–12.
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tivity.We report a considerably large peak lasting fromOctober 2011 to April 2012, where the graph's density over-
basal jump reached a magnitude of 2.4 times, suggesting an improved degree of connectivity of electricity markets
during this period. By applying theMarkov regime-switchingmodel on thenetworkdensityweﬁnd that this change
coincides with the implementation of the European Commission's Third Energy Package. At the local level, the in-
strength values quantifying the dependence of the electricity price variation of an EU country on other countries,
validate the reliability of our technique by verifying historical events such as the occurrence of interconnectors
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monitored. Our model, which is able to create a time-varying network describing the evolving inﬂuences between
the European electricity prices, is able to detect important changes in market integration and can be considered a
suitable and promising approach for this task.
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The Single EuropeanAct, signed in 1986,wasmainly intended to com-
plete the internal European market, created at the start of 1956 with the
Treaties of Rome. The central aims preﬁxed by the EU were those of
increasing the security of supply and harmonizing energy prices in
Europe, with the ambition of creating an Internal Energy Market (IEM)
by 2014. The main obstacles to achieving market integration are not
only structural market distortions, such as the low level of liberalization
of some European electricity markets, including regulated prices, but
also excessive market concentration and a high degree of market power
in generation at lower merit. Market opening and increased cross-ess School, South Kensington
dom. Tel.: +44 207 3816652.
- Bâtiment ICM, 47 Bld de
r speciﬁc requests on Granger-
k (G. Castagneto-Gissey),
@gmail.com (F. De Vico Fallani).border trade fostered by EU legislation should keep energy prices at
lower levels, thereby enforcing competition.
The issue of whether European electricity markets are integrated was
explored by various authors, using diverse methodological approaches
and achieving contrasting results, with some authors accepting the inte-
gration hypothesis, and others rejecting it. Studies in this ﬁeld typically
investigate pairs of electricity prices exhibiting an equilibrium relation-
ship, the latter implying that at least one of them is causing movements
in the other and therefore that one variable is statistically able to provide
useful information to predict the other variable's activity. This concept is
referred to as Granger-causality and is an established time series tech-
nique for the analysis of economic and ﬁnancial processes (Granger,
1969; Granger et al., 1998).
This study applies Granger-causality via and network theory to study
the interactivity (or connectivity) of European electricity prices during the
period 2007–2012. This enables us to detect any abnormal changes oc-
curred during this period, indicating the potential presence of events
which disrupted the normal functioning of markets. The novelty of our
study resides in the use of graph theoretical approach to model the dy-
namic interactions among European wholesale electricity prices. Our
423G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432aim is that of providing inferences regarding the European network's
state and evolution over time.Wemodel the causal interactions between
the electricity spot prices as a connectivity network, where nodes repre-
sent the different countries in our sample and the links in between
them denoting the signiﬁcant inﬂuences between relative pair-wise
price variations.
This study explores the time-varying interactions among a represen-
tative sample of 13 European electricitymarkets bymeasuringGranger-
causality between electricity price dynamics. We intend to address the
question of whether electricity markets in the European area exhibit
any abnormal behavior which can be explained by historical events.
In addition, we validate the technique's reliability by verifying the
commissioning date of European interconnectors, as well as the imple-
mentation of different market coupling initiatives, established during
the studied period, in relation to the generated local connectivity data.
The proposed approach takes advantage of modern network theory, a
mathematical framework capable to characterize connected systemswith
great efﬁcacy (Costa et al, 2007. The complex pattern of propagation be-
tween the different countries' electricity prices gives rise to an intercon-
nected system, a network, which changes over time and informs us on
how the prices of different markets inﬂuence each other. Our purpose is
that of extracting information from this time-varying network in order
to draw conclusions regarding the development of the European electric-
ity market integration process. Our innovation in this sense relates to the
use of a system approach describing the multivariate interactions be-
tween the electricity prices of the countries constituting the European
market, rather than only investigating their simple univariate proﬁles.
Whereas past studies have provided evidence that only some electric-
ity markets are converging (see for example Zachmann, 2008, or Bunn
and Gianfreda, 2010), in the sense that their electricity prices have a
long-run cointegration or equilibrium relationship, we instead use such
information, concerning the short-run causality interactions among
these prices, to determine the dynamic behavior of the entire system.
Our study shows that, until 2011, the connectivity of European elec-
tricity markets remained at a substantially low level, around 2% on our
measure, with a large jump to c.ca 7% occurring during the ﬁnal quarter
of the sameyear. Aside from such relatively large jump, abnormal changes
in connectivitywere essentially similar in number andmagnitude.We can
therefore conclude that the way toward the attainment of a reasonable
rate of electricity market integration in Europe seems to still be very long.
The modern theory of networks, which originated through the dis-
covery of small-world networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and scale
free networks (Barabási and Albert, 1999) at the end of the last millen-
nium, represents the most recent approach to complex systems. The
study of complex networks has attracted a large amount of interest in
the last years and was applied to metabolic systems, social networks
and the brain (Boccaletti et al., 2006). We apply this promising tech-
nique to the electricity price system with focus on the widely debated
issue of European electricity market integration.
The remainder of the manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses the main background information related to this work,
whereas Section 3 outlines the relevant methodologies. Section 4
reports the main results, thereafter discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes this study.
2. Backgrounds
The following section introduces the main background information.
We ﬁrst discuss about the organization and structure of electricity spot
markets in Europe (Section 2.1), to then focus on the previous work
dealing with European electricity market integration (Section 2.2).
2.1. European electricity spot markets
Energy utilities, in particular gas and electricity companies, were
considered to be conventionally regulated monopolies, at least untilthe EU ﬁnalized its verdict of bringing forward the liberalization process
across the various Europeanmarkets. The EU's aimwas primarily that of
correcting energy market distortions and, among other measures, it
decided to implement a competition policy throughout the enforcement
of Directives 1996, 2002 and 2009.
The main difference between traditional ﬁnancial markets and
electricity markets is represented by the inherent limitations in trans-
mission capacity, or supply deliverability, of electricity markets, as
well as the non-storable nature of electricity, which causes the spot
market to really be a one-day forwardmarket. Although electricitymar-
kets are very different from ﬁnancial markets, making it rather difﬁcult
to exercise time and space arbitrage for a series of reasons (including
the fact that electricity markets normally serve national needs),
decisions and price strategies are ever more taken simultaneously
over several European electricitymarkets, based on shared sets of acces-
sible information and regulations. The diversity between commodity
markets and electricity markets can also be traced back to the fact that
additional security components exist in the case of electricity markets
given that electricity is delivered at the exact instant of time in which
the consumer requires it. Effectively, it is the demand inelastic nature
of electricity prices, which is caused by the instantaneous nature
of the product, which causes the difference between electricity and
ﬁnancial markets (Hjalmarson, 2013).
Most electricity spot price formation processes in the European area
rely on themechanism of marginal pricing. This reﬂects themerit order
of wholesale electricity supply under which, the most expensive power
plants operate during periods of high demand and prices, whereas the
least expensive (and usually the least carbon intensive) are activated
when demand is relatively low. This emphasizes the importance of the
fuel mix present in electricity generation within each market as well
as the underlying role of competition. In addition, a fully competitive
and integrated network of electricity markets should provide rapid
price adjustments throughout.
It is possible that, although the European electricity system is a
young and imperfectly connected one, and considering the presence
of physically separated pairs of markets, signaling may still quickly
spread throughout European energy markets, perhaps suggesting that
an efﬁcient competition structure might prevail.
2.2. Previous work
Within the past few years, different authors have addressed their ef-
forts in trying to ascertain whether electricity markets in the European
area are establishing concrete steps toward the completion of an internal
market and thus whether price coupling and harmonization are being
practically achieved. Since 2004 until today, a series of contrasting studies
have emerged with some showing a certain degree of price convergence
between couples of electricity prices, and some others rejecting it. In fact,
none of these has ever studied the dynamic relationships of a substantial
collection of electricity prices in order to understand whether there have
been global changes in market integration. For example, based on a
principal component analysis, Zachmann (2008) rejects the overall mar-
ket integration hypothesis except for some pairs of countries. Studies
such as that by Robinson (2007), who uses B-convergence and co-
integration tests, on the other hand, suggest that convergence did in
fact occur for most countries. The truth would probably depend on the
proximity of the markets under study, which increases the probabilities
of market coupling or interconnector commissioning, as well as the peri-
od of time under scrutiny. However, this is not fully proven, as shown by
the contrasting conclusions which have so far been reached in this con-
text. Indeed,more recently, Bunn andGianfreda (2010) demonstrated in-
creased market integration for Germany, France, Spain, The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. Integrationwas found not to increasewith geo-
graphical proximity but rather with interconnector capacity. Moreover,
Kalantzis and Milonas (2010) found that not only interconnection but
also geographical distance play a central role in price dispersion.
Table 1
Mean and standard deviation of wholesale day-ahead electricity prices in the time frame
2007–2012. The normality distribution test (JB), including skewness and kurtosis values,
are also reported.
Mean Std. Dev. Prob.
(Skewness)
Prob.
(Kurtosis)
JB test
Belgium 56.090 26.450 1.865 14.016 b0.0001
Denmark 50.064 20.360 4.686 84.000 b0.0001
Finland 31.855 16.244 16.325 563.686 b0.0001
France 57.485 46.211 36.837 2204.547 b0.0001
Germany 54.115 25.095 1.678 9.835 b0.0001
Italy 75.639 29.088 0.832 1.490 b0.0001
The Netherlands 55.452 24.451 1.548 5.364 b0.0001
Norway 28.581 10.031 0.670 3.977 b0.0001
Portugal 50.619 17.146 0.160 0.441 b0.0001
Spain 47.799 16.142 0.082 0.757 0.003
Sweden 31.663 15.854 17.287 620.242 b0.0001
Switzerland 60.233 25.243 1.470 7.362 b0.0001
United Kingdom 48.230 25.242 3.563 24.205 b0.0001
424 G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432Furthermore, using a correlation and co-integration analysis, Boisseleau
(2004) did not ﬁnd convergence among wholesale electricity day-
ahead prices. In contrast, Armstrong and Galli (2005) observed conver-
gence among wholesale price differentials in the markets of France,
Germany, The Netherlands and Spain, from 2002 to 2004. Very recently,
by using a fractional co-integration analysis, Houllier and de Menezes
(2013) showed that long memory for price shocks and co-integration
exist only for a few markets, such as Germany, The Netherlands and
France.
The creation of a single, competitive electricity market in Europe
should, principally in the absence of transmission constraints, deter-
mine the convergence of electricity prices in the direction of a single
price for all national markets. In such scenario, we would expect the
global integration of European electricity markets to be generally
improving throughout the years.
3. Methodologies
This section explains the methodology of our work, as we aim at
understanding how European electricity markets are integrating over
time. We ﬁrst construct the time-varying connectivity networks by
computing the Granger-causality between the variations of electricity
prices in different EU countries, over a moving time window with
ﬁxed length. Then, we quantify the topology of the time-varying net-
works by measuring the weighted degrees, or strengths (local network
indices) and the connection density (a global network index).
3.1. Data analysis
We use hourly time series data relative to a sample of 13 European
wholesale electricity day-ahead prices, covering the period 02/07/2007
to 29/06/2012. The markets considered are: Belpex (Belgium), APX UK
(United Kingdom), APX Endex (The Netherlands), Nord Pool Spot
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Powernext (France), European En-
ergy Exchange (EEX) (Germany, Switzerland), Gestore dei Mercati
Energetici (GME) (Italy), OMI-Polo Portugués (OMIP) (Portugal) and
Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad (OMEL)
(Spain). The electricity prices (Thomson Reuters) were obtained with a
time sampling of one hour. This applies to all markets aside from the
British one (APX UK), for which trading observations are recorded at
every half-hour of each day. The total amount of available data points
for each market is therefore 31,320 (62,640 in the case of British prices,
for which we take hourly averages to make them compatible with the
other series). We only use data relative to weekdays given that it re-
ﬂects electricity markets during normal functioning hours in which all
agents (e.g., ﬁrms) are actively operating, as well as because the usage
and diversity of weekend data might induce an adverse effect on the
overall treatment and assessment of the data. Furthermore, the maxi-
mum time difference between the studied countries is two hours;
thus, all prices have been aligned to take this into account. The 13 hourly
electricity day-ahead prices (in EUR/MWh) can be described as depicted
in Table 1.
The highest electricity price is the Italian one (c.ca 76 EUR/MWh),
possibly due to the large amounts of imports as well as the carbon in-
tensity pertinent to the electricity generation process in Italy (even
though prices in EU ETS Phases I and II were very low), whereas the
lowest price is registered in Norway (c.ca 29 EUR/MWh), perhaps
due to their efﬁciency stemming from an almost exclusive use of
hydropower to produce electricity. France, Sweden and Finland display
price valueswhich are highly skewed to the right and accompanied by a
large excess kurtosis, i.e., a leptokurtic price distribution. Finally, the UK
is the country which exhibits an electricity price which is closest to the
mean price of wholesale electricity in our European sample (i.e., EUR
49/MWh). Based on the characteristics of the technique we employ,
all electricity prices are used in raw form, i.e., they are not normalized,in order to capture more information from the movements in every
price series at each point in time.
3.2. Creating a European electricity spot price connectivity network
This section brieﬂy introduces the implementation of the method to
construct the connectivity network containing the statistical dependen-
cies between the variations of different EU electricity prices. The indi-
vidual autoregressive (AR) representation of each electricity price
series is given by:
x tð Þ ¼
Xp
k¼1
a1kx t−kð Þ þ ϵ1 tð Þ; var ϵ1 tð Þð Þ ¼ Σ1 ð1Þ
y tð Þ ¼
Xp
k¼1
d1ky t−kð Þ þ η1 tð Þ; var η1 tð Þ
  ¼ Γ1 ð2Þ
where a1k and d1k are the autoregressive coefﬁcients, ϵ1(t) and η1(t) are
noise terms and k=1,…, p. The joint description of the bivariate series
[x(t), y(t)]T can be given by the pth-order AR:
x tð Þ ¼
Xp
k¼1
a2kx t−kð Þ þ
Xp
k¼1
b2ky t−kð Þ þ ϵ2 tð Þ ð3Þ
y tð Þ ¼
Xp
k¼1
c2kx t−kð Þ þ
Xp
k¼1
d2ky t−kð Þ þ η2 tð Þ ð4Þ
where the noise terms are uncorrelated over time and their covariance
matrix is expressed as:
Σ ¼ Σ2 ϒ2
ϒ2 Γ2
 
ð5Þ
whereΣ2= var(ϵ2(t)), Γ2= var(η2(t)) andϒ2= cov(ϵ2(t), η2(t)). If x(t)
and y(t) are independent, then b2k and c2k are zero.
We can notice that the value of Σ1 measures the accuracy of the
autoregressive prediction of x(t), based on its own past values, whereas
the value of Σ2 represents the accuracy of prediction of the present
values of x(t) based on the past values of both x(t) and y(t). A measure
of Granger-causality is deﬁned as (Lin et al., 2009):
GCy→x ¼ wyx ¼ log
Σ1
Σ2
 
: ð6Þ
We apply a multivariate autoregressive (MVAR) approach to create
the Granger-causality networks (Geweke, 1982) between the electricity
14 3
5 2
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0 0.72 0.35 0
0 0 0
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0 0.230 0.67 0
0 0 0.91 0 0
0.72
0.91
0.35
0.67
0.09
0.540.23
Fig. 1. Example of in-strength and out-strength computation in a simple n-node network (in this example, n=5). The network's adjacencymatrix is shown on the right while the graph is
given in the left panel.
425G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432spot price time series of the 13 European markets.2 Given the set Y(t) =
[y1(t),…, y13(t)]T of the 13 simultaneously observed stationary time se-
ries, the MVAR model of order p is deﬁned:
Y tð Þ ¼
Xp
m¼1
AmY t−mð Þ þ E tð Þ ð7Þ
where each matrix Am (of dimension 13 × 13) is formed by elements aij
describing the linear interaction of yj(t− m) on yi(t), p represents the
number of lags of each explanatory variable, and E(t) is the vector of
error terms. The MVAR model of country y's electricity price treats each
of the remaining 12 electricity prices as well as their lags, as explanatory
variables. We estimated each MVAR model using the Burg algorithm
(Burg, 1967, 1975).
Stage III of our analysis represents our innovation: the creation of
a Granger-causal connectivity3 network system. In our case, which
relates to MVAR estimation, the necessary data for ﬁtting a multivar-
iate AR model of order p must be larger than M2p, where M is the
number of time series (Schlögl and Supp, 2006). For this reason,
the Granger-causality was computed with an MVAR model of order
p = 4 (set by the Akaike criterion, discussed in Appendix A) over
temporal windows of 720 points, which corresponds to a time scale
of 30 days.
In order to have a time-varying estimation of the network we re-
ferred to a sliding window with a shift of 4 points, i.e., we estimated a
network every 4 h, resulting in a total of 7651 total shifts, or estimated
networks. In other words, we are creating a matrix 13 × 13 for each of
the 7651 time shifts from the original 31,320 hourly price data points
available for each market.
Each 13 × 13matrix of causality valueswas converted into aweight-
ed adjacency matrix A by applying a threshold Wth such that the
Granger-causality values were signiﬁcantly stronger (p b 0.05, with
false discovery rate, corrected for multiple comparisons) than the null
hypothesis of no causal relationship. The weight of the link between
nodes i and j is set such that Aij=wij ifwij≥Wth, andwij=0 otherwise
(diagonal elements were set to wii = 0). This operation resulted in the
generation of sparse weighted networks.2 For more details of the methodological procedures, please refer to Appendix A.
3 All calculations are run onMATLAB 12.0. For information about the standard Granger-
causal connectivity computational technique, please refer to Seth (2010). See also Seth
(2008, 2011) for amore theoretical approach to causal networks. AppendixH includes fur-
ther information on the employed simulation code.3.2.1. Network theoretical indices
In mathematics and computer science, graph theory is the study of
mathematical structures used to model pair-wise relations between
objects from a certain collection. A graph is an abstract representation
of a network. It consists of a set of N nodes, (the EU countries), and a set
of L edges or links (the intensity of Granger-causality between the elec-
tricity prices). The adjacency matrix A contains the information
concerning the relative graphs' connectivity structure (see Fig. 1). When
aweighted anddirected edge exists fromnode i to node j, the correspond-
ing entry of the adjacency matrix is Aij ≠ 0; otherwise Aij = 0.
3.2.1.1. Node strength. The simplest attribute of a node is its weighted de-
gree, or strength, which is the sum of the weights of the total number of
links established with other vertices. This quantity is subdivided into the
in-strength, din, and out-strength, dout, when directed relationships are
being considered. The formulation of the in-strength index, din, can be in-
troduced as:
din ið Þ ¼
X
j∈VAi; j: ð8Þ
Eq. (8) represents the total strength of the links coming into the ver-
tex i. V is the set of available nodes (electricity prices) and Aij indicates
the presence of directed edge from node j to node i, with a weight
given by the relative node's pair-wise linear Granger-causality in the
time domain (see Eq. (6)). Interactions that do not reach statistical sig-
niﬁcance are set to zero. The value of a given in-strengthwill depend on
the intensity of linear pair-wise Granger-causality between two nodes,
which can be a number between 0 and 1; therefore, we can expect to
see values between 0 and 12 in the extreme case in which the variation
of a price of an EU country is fully Granger-caused (i.e., GC= 1) the var-
iation of the price of another EU country. It shall be noted that connec-
tivity strength values can be zero or positive numbers.
Conversely, for the out-strength:
dout ið Þ ¼
X
j∈VAj;i: ð9Þ
Eq. (9) represents the total strength of the links going out from the
vertex i. It shall be noted that Aj,i≠ Ai,j because of the asymmetry in
Granger-causal relations.
In-strengths and out-strengths have clear functional interpretations.
A high in-strength value indicates that a unit is inﬂuenced by a large
number of other units, while a high out-strength value speciﬁes the
existence of a large number of potential functional targets (Boccaletti
426 G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432et al., 2006). The ﬁgure (Fig. 1) depicts an illustrative example of in- and
out-strength computations.
A simple example of how to calculate in-strengths (and out-
strengths) is provided in the ﬁgure. For simplicity, we depict a 5-node
network. Note that the network graph (for a given time shift) is given
on the left whereas the relative adjacency matrix is shown on the
right. Therefore, thenetwork graph is one composed of 5 nodeswhereas
the adjacency matrix is a 5 × 5 matrix, with each entry representing
the magnitude of pair-wise linear Granger-causality between the
nodes. Therefore, the main diagonal of this matrix is effectively
disregarded and set at zero. If we take node 3 as the node of interest,
it is possible to see that the only nodes, which are affecting node 3
(as indicated by arrows directing toward node 3) are nodes 1 and
5. Therefore, column 3 shows non-zero entries at the corresponding
positions for rows 1 and 5. The sum of these column entries is the
node's in-strength. On the contrary, the network graph shows that
node 3 is signiﬁcantly affecting (with outgoing links) only nodes 2
and 4. Therefore, row 3 shows positive values at the corresponding
positions for columns 2 and 4. Similarly, the sum of entries in this
row (i.e., 0.54 and 0.09) represents the out-strength for price 3 at
the given time shift.
3.2.1.2. Network global connection density. In order to capture the
global level of connectivity of a system throughout a certain period
of time, we refer to the network system's global connection density, D,
deﬁned as:
D ¼ 1
N N−1ð Þ
X
i; j∈V
Ai; j ð10Þ
where V is the set of available nodes. Global density is a measure
of the overall quantity of causal interactivity, which is sustained by
a network over a given period of time. In our case it represents the
connectivity, or causal activity, supported by the network of elec-
tricity prices throughout the period of time under study. In fact, a
large degree of causal density indicates that the system is stronglyFig. 2. Behavior of the 13 European price in-strength values between 2007 and 2012. Darker col
y-axis represents one of the 13 markets.coordinated in terms of individual market activities or pricing
processes.
4. Results
The following section reports themain results. Firstly, the electricity
price in-strength estimations are presented. The reliability of our tech-
nique is then veriﬁed by providing evidence that the computed local
connectivity data successfully reﬂects the occurrence of historical
events. Finally, the results relative to global connectivity are reported.
4.1. Node strength estimations
Following our estimations, the electricity price which displayed the
largest number of in-strengths, i.e., the one which is mostly Granger-
caused by other electricity prices in the sample, is the Dutch electricity
price. In fact, the Netherlands was a net importer of electricity since
the 1980s and for almost the entire period under analysis (until
2010), thus, its electricity price might have been determined by a num-
ber of other markets. During the studied period (i.e., 2007–12), large-
scale maintenance projects were ongoing in its neighboring countries
(CBS Statistics Netherlands, 2010) and this could have perhaps been
the reason for a large mean value of incoming Granger-causality, one
of about 24%. On the other hand, the market which was less affected
(with a mean in-strength value of 14%), as shown by the lower number
of incoming causalities, was the Norwegian one. This is comprehensible
since Norway tends to export extensively given its low marginal cost
production through hydropower.
In addition, if we consider the degrees of Granger-causality between
the Nordic countries' electricity prices, the result is not surprising. For ex-
ample, during the ﬁrst window (i.e., 02-Jul-2007 01:00→ 11-Aug-2007
00:00), Norway signiﬁcantly affected the electricity prices in Finland,
Sweden and Denmark. On the contrary, the electricity prices in Finland,
Sweden andDenmark did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence theNorwegian price.
The behavior of the 13 market's electricity price in-strength values
over the studied period are given in the ﬁgure below (Fig. 2).ors indicate larger in-strength values, as shown on the right-hand side bar. Each unit on the
Table 2
Price in-strength mean values before (µt − 1) and after (µt + 1) the known coupling dates
for each occurred market coupling event which took place between 2007 and 2012.
H = 1 implies acceptance of the null that µt + 1 is signiﬁcantly different from µt − 1.
Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative: November 2010
Coupled markets µ2 ≠ µ1 ? µ2 µ1 µ2 N µ1 ? Δ µ
427G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432The above ﬁgure depicts the behavior of the connectivity in-strength4
relative to each of the thirteen European markets over the period
2007–2012. It is possible to note a substantial increase in node in-
strength values during 2011Q4 for many EU countries. This implies the
tendency of European prices to depend on the price variations in other
countries, towards the end of the studied period.H p-Value
FR 1 P b 0.0001 0.2590 0.1871 ✓ +38.50%
BL 1 P b 0.0001 0.2455 0.2120 ✓ +15.80%
NL 1 P b 0.0001 0.2675 0.2118 ✓ +26.30%
DE 1 P b 0.0001 0.2538 0.1530 ✓ +65.88%
Interim tight volume coupling: November 2010
DE 1 P b 0.0001 0.2538 0.1530 ✓ +65.88%
DM 1 P b 0.0001 0.3221 0.1284 ✓ +150.86%
NorNed cable: February 2011
NO 1 P b 0.0001 0.1940 0.1111 ✓ +74.62%
NL 1 P b 0.0001 0.2675 0.2345 ✓ +14.07%
APX–Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool: February 2011
BL 1 P b 0.0001 0.2510 0.2154 ✓ +16.53%
NL 1 P b 0.0001 0.2675 0.2345 ✓ +14.07%
NO 1 P b 0.0001 0.1940 0.1111 ✓ +74.62%
SW 1 P b 0.0001 0.3051 0.1265 ✓ +141.19%
FI 1 P b 0.0001 0.2015 0.1292 ✓ +55.96%
DM 1 P b 0.0001 0.3177 0.1784 ✓ +78.08%
BritNed: March 2011
UK 1 P b 0.0001 0.1809 0.1138 ✓ +58.96%
NL 1 P b 0.0001 0.2695 0.2408 ✓ +11.92%
Table 3
Change in correlation between the indicated markets' electricity spot price in-strengths
before and after the Central Western Europe initiative coupling of France, Belgium, The
Netherlands and Germany (November 2010). P b 0.0001 in all cases.4.1.1. Applying the model to verify historical occurrences
In this section we verify the reliability of our model. This is examined
by checking whether the electricity price mean in-strengths (or the sum
of a country's degree of incoming Granger-causality in one window) and
pairwise correlation with other coupled markets in-strengths had effec-
tively increased since the introduction of transmission interconnectors.5
Thiswould indicate that our technique is able to detect the presence of in-
creasing market integration. We perform: (i) simple t-tests to investigate
whether the mean in-strength relative to the coupled markets' electricity
prices had increased after the commissioning/coupling date compared to
the period preceding that date and (ii) correlation tests to check if the re-
lationship between the coupled markets' price in-strengths had become
stronger in the period succeeding the commissioning/coupling date
compared to the previous period. If a country's transmission system has
physically connected with another transmission system then the average
of incoming causalities should be larger after the occurrence of electricity
interconnector commissioning between two countries. Similarly, the cor-
relation between the in-strength series after the coupling date should
increase.
Market coupling events that occurred between 2007 and 2012 are:
the Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative (November 2010;
coupling of France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany), Interim
Tight Volume Coupling (November 2010; involving Germany and
Denmark), the NorNed cable (February 2011; connecting and coupling
The Netherlands and Norway), APX–Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool
(February 2011; coupling the markets of Belgium, The Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and the BritNed cable
(March 2011; connecting and coupling the United Kingdom and The
Netherlands) (EU Commission, Energy Observatory, 2007–12). Table 2,
reported below, depicts the t-test results and changes in mean values,
for each coupled market's price in-strengths, in the periods before and
after the commissioning/coupling date.6
The table reported (Table 2) shows that the mean value of coupled
markets' electricity price in-strengths generally increases after the
date of interconnector commissioning or market coupling. The average
increase is one of over a half, i.e., 0.56%, across all considered markets.
This was also the case for the correlation tests, which provided evidence
that Pearson pairwise correlation between the coupled markets' price
in-strengths increased considerably in the period after coupling/
commissioning took place. This can be appreciated from the following
tables (Tables 3–7), which indicate the change in the degree of in-
strength correlation after the coupling date, for each case that occurred
during the studied time period.7
Furthermore, we detected similarities between countries whose elec-
tricity markets have beenmore closely linked in the past. The behavior of
the price in-strength values during the month of February 2011 are
shown for Belgium and The Netherlands in Fig. 3 (left panel) and for the
four Nord Pool countries (right panel).8 For greater visual clarity, we4 Please refer to Appendix C for the respective out-strength representation.
5 Please refer to Appendix D for a more extensive explanation of the employed t-tests
and correlation tests.
6 The date used to indicate a certain period in time corresponds to the second of the two
dates indicated in a given network time shift. For example, it is possible to refer to the shift
“04-Nov-2011 09:00:00 to 16-Dec-2011 08:00:00” as “16-Dec-2011 08:00:00” in order to
denote a speciﬁc point in time.
7 We were able to consider all cases of market coupling and interconnector commis-
sioning that occurred between 2007 and 2012, with the exception of the coupling of
Italy and Slovakia in 2011 due to unavailability of Slovakian data.
8 Please refer to Table 6 for the coupling of APX–Endex, Belpex and Nord Pool.depict a shorter period of time as opposed to the full-length of the data.
The behavior of the price in-strength values during themonth of February
2011 are shown for both sets of markets.
Fig. 3 shows that electricity price in-strength behavior was very sim-
ilar among Nord Pool countries, showing differences compared to
Belgium and the Netherlands, which were similar among themselves.
The latter may be linked to the fact that the Nord Pool countries are
more integrated among each other, with the same observations apply-
ing to the markets of Belgium and the Netherlands. This suggests that
proximity, as well as past integration, are relevant elements in the de-
termination of current electricitymarket integration.Moreover, the cor-
relation among Nord Pool countries' price in-strengths indicates that
their relationship can be considered very similar among them but is
very different from the behavior assumed by Belgian and Dutch price
in-strength values. The latter is in agreement with Kalantzis and
Milonas (2010) who found that geographical proximity plays a signiﬁ-
cant role in price integration. In contrast, studies such as Bunn and
Gianfreda (2010), found that proximity does not play an important
part. Nevertheless, further research should be devoted to answer this
question.Central Western Europe (CWE) Initiative: November 2010
Corr. before Corr. after Change in
correlation
03-Mar-2009 08:00→
01-Nov-2010 04:00
01-Nov-2010 04:00→
30-Jun-2012 00:00
FR, BL 0.739 0.838 +13.40%
FR, NL 0.420 0.645 +53.60%
FR, DE 0.341 0.491 +44.23%
BL, NL 0.749 0.727 −0.03%
BL, DE 0.533 0.581 +9.01%
NL, DE 0.755 0.865 +14.57%
Table 4
Change in correlation between the indicated markets' electricity spot price in-strengths
before and after the Interim Tight Volume Coupling of Denmark and Germany (November
2010). P b 0.0001 in all cases.
Interim Tight Volume Coupling: November 2010
Corr. before Corr. after Change in
correlation
03-Mar-2009 08:00→
01-Nov-2010 04:00
01-Nov-2010 04:00→
30-Jun-2012 00:00
DM, DE 0.146 0.373 +155.16%
Table 5
Change in correlation between the indicated markets' electricity spot price in-strengths
before and after the introduction of the NorNed cable coupling The Netherlands and
Norway (February 2011). P b 0.0001 in all cases.
NorNed cable: February 2011
Corr. before Corr. after Change in
correlation
02-Sep-2009→
01-Feb-2011
01-Feb-2011→
30-Jun-2012
NO, NL 0.217 0.307 +41.94%
Table 7
Change in correlation between the indicated markets' electricity spot price in-strengths
before and after the introduction of the BritNed cable coupling The Netherlands and the
United Kingdom (March 2011).
BritNed cable: March 2011
Corr. before Corr. after Change in
correlation
28-Oct-2009→
01-Mar-2011
01-Mar-2011→
30-Jun-2012
GB, NL 0.235 0.295 +25.82%
428 G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432Finally, our hypothesis relating to an increased correlation between
the coupled markets' electricity price in-strengths is shown to be
accepted in all cases. The same applies to the observation of larger
price mean in-strengths after the commissioning/coupling date, which
is also shown to be true in all cases. Such result is not biased by the
individual price in-strength peaks (see Fig. B1 in the Appendix) that
some countries display toward the end of the period under study. In
fact, most of the countries which actually coupled their transmission
lines with other markets did not exhibit a peak during the ﬁnal part of
the studied time period, which might have otherwise provided an up-
ward bias for the mean in-strength value in the second time interval.
4.2. Global connectivity of EU electricity prices
Global density, as deﬁned in 3.2.1.2, ﬂoated around a relatively low
mean level of 2% throughout the entire time frame, with a standard
deviation of 0.0086. The maximal value of global connectivity is shown
as the largest peak in the ﬁgure (Fig. 4), which displays the behavior of
the system's global connection density during the period 2007–2012.Table 6
Change in correlation between the indicated markets' electricity spot price in-strengths
before and after the APX Endex–Belpex–Nord Pool coupling of Belgium, The
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark (February 2011). P b 0.0001 in all
cases.
APX–Endex, Belpex, Nord Pool: February 2011
Corr. before Corr. after Change in
correlation
02-Sep-2009→
01-Feb-2011
01-Feb-2011→
30-Jun-2012
BL, NL 0.653 0.754 +15.42%
BL, NO 0.386 0.497 +28.65%
BL, SW −0.082 0.579 +808.08%
BL, FI −0.200 0.5462 +373.10%
BL, DM 0.313 0.536 +70.93%
NL, NO 0.217 0.307 +41.94%
NL, SW −0.033 0.386 +1269.70%
NL, FI −0.170 0.407 +339.60%
NL, DM 0.180 0.315 +75.42%
NO, SW 0.458 0.824 +79.83%
NO, FI 0.108 0.793 +636.62%
NO, DM 0.726 0.829 +14.19%
SW, FI 0.668 0.849 +27.14%
SW, DM 0.313 0.782 +149.71%
FI, DM 0.225 0.788 +249.38%By exploiting the Granger-causal interactions between EU electricity
prices, ourmodel yields a time-varying indicator of European price con-
nectivity, the system's global density, which exhibits a clearly stochastic
behavior. In our work, we calculated the distribution of the global
connection density series for the entire time length and extracted
the relative z-score values in order to understand in what instants
of time global connectivity was 3 standard deviations above the mean
(Z N 1.96, p b 0.05). Thus, all values above (below) the upper (lower)
conﬁdence bound imply ‘abnormal’ values and thus point to an unusu-
ally large (low) connectivity. As discussed at later stages, this coincides
with the implementation of important regulations dealing with
European electricity market integration. Periods of lower-than-normal
connectivity occurred as frequently as greater-than-normal connectivi-
ty, indicating that the process of electricity market integration is not
particularly pronounced. Results relative to global connectivity denote
a very large spike occurring in December 2011 and reaching a magni-
tude of c.ca 7% in December 2011. This implies that an average 7% of
causality increases was recorded at the very most. Furthermore, an ini-
tial interconnectivity peak, one of around 4%, can be observedwithin by
the ﬁrst 592 shifts of our model (i.e., November-December 2007). The
succeeding two peaks reached values of about 3%. Generally, European
electricity market connectivity remained at a mean level of c.ca 2%.
The largest peak in global density was recorded during the period be-
tween 29-Nov-2011 04:00 and 17-Apr-2012 08:00, with an over-basal
increment of 2.4 times.9
We applied the Markov chain regime-switching model to the global
connection density series in order to detect the precise point in which
the largest peak starts. The observed jump in global connectivity was
considered as a change to another regime. The switching mechanism
is typically assumed to be governed by a random variable that follows
aMarkov chain with different possible states. The date of global density
jumping from regime 1 to regime 2 was 24 October 2011, returning to
regime 1 on 9 April 2012. The two regimes are shown in Fig. 4.10 On
19 October 2011, the Commission implemented the Guidelines for
trans-European energy infrastructure, which ensures that strategic
energy networks and storage facilities will be completed by 2020. To
this end, the EC has identiﬁed a dozen priority corridors and areas
covering electricity, gas, oil and carbon dioxide transport networks.
Therefore, it is likely that the technique picked up the large change
in EU regulations with only a four-day delay. This date also reﬂects the
implementation of further rules on network system operation and
balancing, discussed in Section 5.1.1.
A possible cause of the 2011Q4 peak might have perhaps entailed
the impact of a potentially major occurrence of extreme temperatures
throughout Europe. Such increase was in fact observed across different
market price in-strengths (see Appendix Fig. B1). However, by analyz-
ing the density time series relative to the heating degree days (and
cooling degree days) of different major European cities,11 we found9 Please refer to Appendix E for a representation of the values of all recorded global con-
nection density peaks and their date of occurrence.
10 Please refer to Appendix F for more information on the applied regime-switching
model.
11 These are: Rome and Athens (controlling for the Southern European area), Oslo and
Stockholm (Northern Europe), Lisbon and Madrid (Western Europe), Paris and Berlin
(Central Europe), Warsaw and Prague (Eastern Europe).
Fig. 3. Left panel: Representation of Belgian and Dutch price in-strengths during themonth after their coupling date, i.e., February 2011. Their behaviors are closely related and different in
comparison to the Nord Pool countries' electricity price in-strengths, shown on the right: Right panel: Representation of Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Danish price in-strength values
during the month after their coupling, i.e., February 2011.
429G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432their low correlation not able to explain the dramatic jump in global con-
nection density, thereby excluding the possibility of a cold (or heat)wave.
We additionally used a simple ARIMA (1,0,0)model to checkwhether
European electricity price global system connectivity represents a
random walk process.12 The estimation results show that a random
walk process could have produced the generating process underlying
the data and therefore an AR(1) model is a suitable representation of
EU electricity price connection density. In fact, the AR(1) parameter coef-
ﬁcient estimate displays a highly signiﬁcant value of 0.99. Therefore, the
expected value of current changes in connectivity is given by white
noise, thus the best estimate of connectivity at time t is represented by
its value at t− 1.
4.3. Network representations
The system of electricity price interactions, summarized throughout
the global connection density series by computing the degree of Grang-
er-causality between electricity price variations, gives rise to a network
which varies over time. An example of a network estimated at a given
point in time is shown in Fig. 5. The following image shows the network
graph and relative adjacency matrix at two points in time. The upper
panel shows the network during its largest global connection density
peak window (i.e., December 2011), whereas the lower panel shows
the graph and relative adjacency matrix during an average connectivity
value (i.e., April 2010, as an example).
It is possible to appreciate that the larger intensity of Granger-causal
interactions occurred during December 2011 compared to April 2010.
This is shown by the fewer and weaker arrows in the respective net-
works, corresponding to lower values in the relative adjacency matrix.
5. Discussion
The regime-switching model applied to the computed global
connection density series provided evidence that the large peak in EU
electricity price connectivity coincided with the implementation
of the Third Energy Package, issued by the European Commission in
September 2007.
The goodness of the model employed in this study was veriﬁed by
means of t-tests and correlation tests. The t-tests served to understand
whether electricity price mean in-strengths generally increased after
the market coupling (or interconnector commissioning) date. We
showed that this holds in all cases and that the mean in-strength
increased, on average, by more than a half during the period after the12 Please refer to Appendix G for the autoregressive model results.dates of interconnector commissioning or market coupling institution.
Similarly, the correlation between electricity price in-strengths in-
creased in all cases, on average by a factor of 1.89. In addition, the elec-
tricity priceswhich exhibited the highest in-strength values – indicating
that these countries' electricity prices are subject to a great deal of
inﬂuence from other countries' electricity prices – were those of the
Netherlands; on the other hand, the countries exhibiting the lowest
in-strength values were the Norwegian electricity prices, implying
that prices in Norway are the least subject to changes in other prices.
The large in-strength values for the Netherlands can be explained by
the fact that large-scale maintenance projects were ongoing in The
Netherland's neighboring countries (CBS Statistics Netherlands, 2010)
during the studied period (i.e., 2007–12). This was possibly a reason
for the recorded large mean value of incoming Granger-causality in the
Dutch case. On the other hand, the low potential for Norwegian prices
to be affected by others is comprehensible considering that Norway
tends to export extensively given its relatively low prices deriving from
an almost exclusive use of hydropower for electricity generation.
In relation to the out-strength results5, the electricity prices with
highest out-strength values were recorded in Great Britain, indicating
that British prices showed a high potential of inﬂuencing other prices;
conversely, those with the lowest out-strength values were displayed
by Denmark and Belgium, implying that Danish and Belgian spot prices
correspond to the electricity priceswith the lowest ability of inﬂuencing
other prices. These results can instead be explained by the fact that
larger countries are able to inﬂuence other electricity prices in a certain
area relatively more compared to smaller countries.
5.1. Global connectivity and the third energy package
So what precisely has changed during 2011Q4 that might have in-
duced such a relatively large rise in EU electricity spot price causal inter-
activity? During this period, the introduction of major network codes
relating to capacity allocation and congestion management occurred.
The treatment of congestion is a crucial aspect in electricity pricing
and changes in congestion management causes alterations to the for-
mation process of electricity prices, in turn possibly providing the obser-
vation of an increased causation among them. Balancing also represents
a key mechanism which might also impact on prices and was perhaps
one of the mainly revised procedures. In fact, two main sets of policies
were put into action precisely during the period in which the largest
peak occurred (i.e., in 2011Q4). These mainly regarded system opera-
tion and balancing, as discussed in the next section.
During the ﬁnal quarter of 2011, the eurozone, as well as other
European countries, experienced worsening economic conditions. The
latter was the reason for contracting gross value added in the main
Fig. 4.Behavior of global connectivity of the 13European spot prices in the sample throughout the period2007–2012. The dottedhorizontal lines represent theupper and lower conﬁdence
bounds (Z N 1.96). Time is on the x-axis, whereas the value of global connection density (expressed in unit) is shown on the y-axis. The two regimes are: [1] 11-Aug-2007 to 24-Oct-2011
and [2] 24-Oct-2011 to 9-Apr-2012 (0.0265). The third regime, i.e. 9-Apr-2012 to 30-Jun-2012 (0.0404) is not signiﬁcantly different from regime [1]. The peak in global connectivity oc-
curred on 24-Oct-2011, whereas the Commission's network guidelines were introduced on 19-Oct-2011.
430 G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432energy intensive sectors (e.g., construction, manufacturing andmining)
and led to a decreasing industrial electricity demand in Europe
(European Commission, Quarterly Reports on European electricityFig. 5. The graph and adjacencymatrices relative to high and average global density relative to t
2010 01:00:00→ 13-Apr-2010 00:00:00 (lower image). Left panels: Geographic representation
tain intensity of Granger-causality between the variations of electricity prices, as reported in the
ing to the networks in the left panel. Each entry of the matrix indicates the intensity of Grange
color-scale reported on the right.Markets, 2011Q4). Thus, it can also be possible that the large increase
in connectivity might have been induced by the sharp fall in demand
everywhere in Europe.he shift 04-Nov-2011 09:00:00 to 16-Dec-2011 08:00:00 (upper image) and shift 02-Mar-
of Granger-causality networks. The thickness of the associated arrow corresponds to a cer-
upper left hand-side corner of the network. Right panels: Adjacencymatrices correspond-
r-causality between the price variations of two EU countries (out of 13), according to the
431G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432Also, besides a very short cold spell in mid-November, the tempera-
tures were generally evenmilder in most parts of Europe for the resting
duration of the quarter. This is also shown by the reduced heating from
households that occurred throughout this quarter. Furthermore, the de-
creased level of industrial demand at a European-wide level brought
about one of the lowest consumptions of electricity in Europe in the
last decade.
European electricitymarket connectivity remained at a substantially
lowmean level of 2.32%. In addition, the ratio of themagnitudes relative
to positive and negative abnormal behaviors suggests the lack of a
strong and consistent process characterizing European electricity mar-
ket integration. This might be the result of the presently insufﬁcient
interconnection among national grids (Bollino et al., 2013; Trillas,
2010). As Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) note, the European energy market
liberalization process is increasingly focused on electricity market inte-
gration and cross-border mechanisms. They suggest how this signals
that the liberalization of national markets for electricity is now closer
to the single European energy market long-term objective. However,
the latter requires an increased number of physical interconnections
and improved technical arrangements. It is crucial for European system
operators to deploy their efforts in providing a full integration of
electricity markets at different levels – among which are those relating
to market concentration, investments, security of supply and aspects
of market design and regulation – which are critical for the dynamic
performance of the single European market.
We believe that full integration under various regimes is a necessary
condition for increasing European market connectivity at an acceptable
rate and that improved legislative integration under different aspects,
amongwhich those relating tomarket design, can be a key factor for im-
provements in connectivity between markets. Therefore, increasing in-
terconnection among national grids should be seen as a primary need.
The achievement of a sufﬁcient level of physical electricity interconnec-
tion among countries principally implies the convergence of electricity
prices in the direction of a single European price. Very importantly,
this also reduces the impact of congestion and market power on elec-
tricity prices.
5.1.1. Introduction of network code and system balancing rules
The guidelines on System Operation, or the Capacity Allocation
and Congestion Management Network Code was approved in 2009
and was effectively implemented in the period between 2011Q2 and
2011Q4 (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, 2011), or
in coincidence with the recorded large connectivity peak. The Commis-
sion notes that, as a minimum, each common grid model is to cover an
area suitable for the capacity allocation method utilized, at least the
synchronous area. Furthermore, the common grid model is by then
required to include a detailed description of the transmission net-
work including the location of generation units and demand. During
this period, the Commission also required improved transparency
between TSOs. Such network code requires European TSOs to update
the common grid model and the common base case more often, as
required for a given allocation procedure, with all data relevant for
the respective calculations, such as the expected network topology,
generation and demand forecast. In fact, from this period on, TSOs
are required to make this data available to all European TSOs, ready
for immediate use.
The newly applied network code foresees that TSOs implement
capacity allocation in the day-ahead market based on implicit auctions
via the novel single price coupling algorithm which simultaneously de-
termines volumes and prices in all relevant zones. This is done through
the usual marginal pricing principle. Also, the implementation takes
into account the role of the power exchanges and requires harmoniza-
tion of day-ahead bidding deadlines. Moreover, in the case where insuf-
ﬁcient transmission capacity exists for the enabling of all requested
trades, calculated zonal prices should differ. Moreover, this code en-
forcement implies that there can only be one price calculated for eachbidding area and hour. This new algorithm also allows for block bids.
The code also deﬁnes the price of transmission capacity between zones
when congestion occurs. Such deﬁnition implies that, in the event of
congestion, the price of transmission capacity is given by the difference
between the corresponding day-ahead zonal electricity prices.
Furthermore, a second substantial change to regulations that oc-
curred in the period corresponding to our largest observed connectivity
peak is represented by the Framework Guidelines on balancing. An
integrated electricity balancing market is the last component of the
IEM. However, integration of the different national balancing markets
is a challenging task due to the dramatic differences present in existing
national balancing market arrangements. However, the balancing
framework guidelines are, in fact, intended to balance such differences
by fostering cross-border competition and an improved balancing
efﬁciency, while protecting the security of supply. The code establishes
common rules for electricity balancing across Europeanmember states,
namely: the establishment of common principals for procurement and
an EU-wide methodology for the activation of Frequency Containment
Reserves, Frequency Restoration Reserves and Replacement Reserves, as
well as the activation of Balancing Energy from Frequency Restoration
Reserves and Settlement (ENTSO-E Draft Network Code on Electricity
Balancing, 2013). These new guidelines are in linewith the Commission's
Regulation No. 714/2009 of Directive 2009/72/EC.
Therefore, it might be possible that such speciﬁc and wide-scale
changes – in relation to capacity allocation, congestion management
and balancing as well as the introduction of the single price coupling
algorithm, which directly and notably inﬂuence the electricity price in
each market, as well as the relation between electricity prices across
markets – might have caused the large interconnectivity peak in our
system of European electricity price networks.
5.2. Model shortfalls and future work
From a network perspective, the study of higher order graph indices
(e.g., network's efﬁciency, entropy, etc.) could provide deeper insights
into the structure and dynamics of the European energy system. The
model could also be augmented by the use of fuel prices in the expres-
sions for individual electricity prices, thereby providing a more ad-hoc
representation of each system and thus the entire network. In addition,
from an empirical side, a larger number of electricity markets (a total
of 13 were considered in this study) could be taken account of, possibly
together with an even more prolonged sample time frame (about
6 years in this work). From a theoretical viewpoint, researchers in ﬁ-
nancial and energy economics could beneﬁt from extending this tech-
nique in various ways, from the application of exogenous (or perhaps
endogenous) weights in order to better represent the role of countries
in the system, to the formulation of a system comprising more compli-
cated econometric models, including various further applications.
We ﬁrmly hope that this paper can foster and advance the research
presently focusing on electricitymarket integration aswell as that relat-
ing to other energy systems.
6. Conclusions
This study applies graph theory to model the interactions between
European electricity spot prices during the period 2007–12. European-
wide electricity price connectivity is measured by the system's global
connection density, or the total quantity of causal interactivity sustained
by the network system. The novelty of this work resides in the com-
bined use of Granger-causality and network theory to disentangle the
relationships among electricity prices over time.
The goodness of the technique is veriﬁed on the basis of the estimated
local connectivitymeasures (i.e., the electricity price in-strengths) in rela-
tion to historical market occurrences. In all cases, the electricity price
mean in-strength relating to coupledmarkets is shown to increase, on av-
erage, by more than a half, a factor of 0.56, during the period succeeding
432 G. Castagneto-Gissey et al. / Energy Economics 44 (2014) 422–432the known interconnector commissioning (or market rules implementa-
tion) dates compared to the period prior to those dates. Similarly, in all
cases, the correlation between the coupled markets' price in-strengths
is shown to increase by a factor of 1.89 after the coupling date.
On the other hand, the analysis of global connectivity resulted in the
detection of a substantially large abnormal spike in global connection
density, one of c.ca 7%, occurring in the ﬁnal quarter of 2011, which
possibly reﬂects the implementation of crucial market integration and
balancing rules affecting the pricing and coordination processes of
European electricity markets. In fact, the Third Energy Package (2007)
came into force during the period between 2011Q2 and 2011Q4 and
coincides with the largest peak in global connection density.
Aside from such a relatively large jump, abnormal positive and
negative changes in connectivity were essentially similar in number
and magnitude. We can therefore conclude that the way toward the
attainment of a reasonable rate of electricity market integration in
Europe seems to still be very long.
On the path to full market integration, market networks should
be periodically monitored. Our model, which is able to create a
time-varying network describing the evolving inﬂuences between the
behaviors of the different European electricity prices, is able to detect
important changes in market integration and can be considered a
suitable and promising approach for this task.
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